

The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate

Ifriqiya and Its Andalusis, 1200-1400



Ramzi Rouighi

The Making of a
Mediterranean Emirate

THE MIDDLE AGES SERIES

Ruth Mazo Karras, Series Editor
Edward Peters, Founding Editor

A complete list of books in the series
is available from the publisher.

The Making of a MEDITERRANEAN EMIRATE

Ifrīqiyā and Its Andalusis

1200–1400

RAMZI ROUIGHI

PENN

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS

PHILADELPHIA

Copyright © 2011 University of Pennsylvania Press

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher.

Published by
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112
www.upenn.edu/pennpress

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rouighi, Ramzi.

The making of a Mediterranean emirate : Ifriqiya and its politics / Ramzi Rouighi.

p. cm. — (The Middle Ages series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8122-4310-9 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Africa, North—History—647–1517. 2. Africa, North—Historiography. 3. Hafsides. I. Title.

DT199.R68 2011

961'.022—dc22

2010027768

C O N T E N T S

Introduction: Orientations	1
PART I. THE LIMITS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION	
Chapter 1. The Politics of the Emirate	25
Chapter 2. Taxation and Land Tenure	55
Chapter 3. Between Land and Sea	76
PART II. EMIRISM AND THE MAKING OF A REGION	
Chapter 4. The Age of the Emir	97
Chapter 5. Learning and the Emirate	123
Chapter 6. Emirism and the Writing of History	148
Conclusion: Departures	173
List of Abbreviations	
Notes	179
Bibliography	181
Index	221
	235

This page intentionally left blank

INTRODUCTION

Orientations

Any book about medieval North Africa, and this one is no exception, confronts at least two sets of related problems from the outset. First, the prevailing modes of scholarly interpretation incorporate multiple layers of conceptual difficulties. Second, so do the historical sources. In both cases, the issues are often connected but not always in the same way, with the same effect, or for the same reasons. All historians who confront the relationship between their own notions and those of the sources they seek to elucidate share these two problems. However, when it comes to the study of medieval North Africa, modern history has engendered such entanglements that it has become very difficult to explain all the intricacies and complexities involved. Even specialists, who have studied the matter closely, may find that with all the critiques and the counter-critiques it has become difficult to trust one's bearings. My starting point in this book is that it is simply not possible to discuss medieval North Africa without also discussing its representations in both medieval and modern writings, and throughout this book, I will shuttle back and forth between them. Where, however, does one begin?

A convenient entry point into medieval North African history and its problems is the notion of region, which draws together empirical and conceptual questions. The notion of region combines both because it is at once a context, a container for meaning, and a means by which contextualization becomes possible. Consequently, a study of the making of a region involves paying attention simultaneously to social relations and ideas about them.

Consider, for instance, the notion of North Africa itself. Ostensibly, it is a neutral spatial category, a geographic entity, the area situated between the Sahara desert, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Yet it is also a specifically modern category, remade in the process of imposing French

colonial domination. The French never colonized Egypt and so naturally their North Africa, which became everyone's North Africa, mostly refers to what is today Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.¹ This North Africa is definitely not the same as the north of the continent of Africa.

The idea that North Africa represented a region did not correspond to actual political or economic circumstances. Politically, French North Africa included areas that were technically part of France (departments), others that were territories, and yet others that were French protectorates. There were distinct laws and regulations that differentiated between them. But this colonial North Africa was not an economically integrated region. The French oversaw the uneven development of a number of economic zones, and then brought them together, most visibly through infrastructural investments, into an economy centered on Paris. All the roads of colonial North Africa led to Paris—or to the colonial capitals that maintained settlers as agents of colonial economic integration. Colonial administration and supervision combined with economic extraction to produce not an integrated North African region but a system of colonial domination in northwest Africa. If anything, North Africa's status as a region in most people's minds demonstrates that an idea need not correspond to material or sociohistorical conditions in order to prevail. Thus, the question is how it continues to be possible for so many to think of North Africa as a region in spite of the obvious technical difficulties entailed in doing so.

In the past, North Africa was a region because it was one of the pillars of colonial discourse. The active and institutionalized degradation of the sociopolitical and economic standing of the natives (*autochtones*) under French colonial rule came to constitute the empirical basis for a discussion of their characteristics, some of which pertained to the geographical or natural setting.² North Africa was crucial to the amalgamation and conflation that sustained colonial confabulations about the race, culture, civilization, traditions, and religion of the natives.³ These, rather than the activities of the colonizers, were used to explain the wretchedness of the North Africans.⁴

One of the consequences of the reification of North Africa was its universal appearance in scholarship as an acceptable category that supported scholarly generalizations. The situation continues today. One need only look for the prevalence of references to "Roman" or "ancient" North Africa which, more than the anachronistic proclivities of some historians, demonstrate the adaptation and accommodation of colonial knowledge to post- or neocolonial conditions.⁵ What is at stake here is not the historians' use of a colonial category,

but rather the fact that in following this convention they risk designing their research in ways that incorporate ideas they might not necessarily agree with.

The refitting of the terms of colonial knowledge, which has been ongoing since the 1960s, has toned down what scholars now consider derogatory statements about the natives. The way to convey respect for the natives has been to replace North Africa with a native category, the Maghrib, though doing so merely maintains the pretense of the colonial body of knowledge.⁶ As it happens, the Maghrib too is an ideological construct produced and reproduced in the process of supporting the domination of a number of pre-modern elites.⁷ In other words, like modern North Africa, the medieval term Maghrib was a construct that served amalgamation and conflation, not elucidation and clarification. However, unlike North Africa, it has been in use for centuries, incorporated into a number of discourses, not always for the same reasons or with the same consequences. Consequently, using the Maghrib, or one of its subregions, as a container within which to fit history does more than support colonial discourse. It gives credence to the dominant discourses of the successive medieval dynasties that utilized the category to prop up their rule. Neither option is particularly attractive.

This book proposes an alternative perspective focusing on Ifrīqiyyā. It examines how intellectuals associated with the Ḥafṣid dynasty (1229–1574) represented the dynasty's rule over specific groups and areas as its rule “in” or “of” Ifrīqiyyā. It analyzes the ways their writings have served as the empirical basis upon which modern historians have transformed Ifrīqiyyā into the easternmost region of the Maghrib. The book argues that the perspective of these texts gains significance in relation to political struggles that led to the elimination of the political autonomy of urban emirates in Ifrīqiyyā and the imposition of rule from Tunis at the end of the fourteenth century. Intellectuals of the era described the ruler (emir) of Tunis as ruling over all of Ifrīqiyyā because he had eliminated what they saw as political fragmentation—not because he actually controlled the entire “territory” of Ifrīqiyyā or all those who inhabited it. In order to establish this, the book will bring into focus the evolution of the city of Bijāya, the main city under Ḥafṣid rule, beside Tunis. It will show that Bijāya was not always under the rule of Tunis or the Ḥafṣids, that it was not dependent on its integration into an Ifrīqiyyā-wide economy, and that the range of activities of its elite demonstrate the Tunis-centric bias of the sources.

Arguing that contemporary writers partook of an ideology that became increasingly dominant after the end of the fourteenth century requires a careful examination of the evidence. It involves using the descriptions of

sociohistorical processes found in the texts to demonstrate that claims about the extent of the emir's influence were politically motivated embellishments. The conceptual tools with which scholars have understood such processes make the articulation of this argument a complex task. While the notion of region figures prominently because of the specific claims of Hafṣid intellectuals, it is not the only issue this study tackles. Scholarly ideas about regions and regionalization are part of a broader discourse sustained by a nexus of related conceptions and approaches. A discussion of some of these will shed light on the scope of the challenge ahead.

How Ifrīqiyā Was Made

Maghrib specialists have not analyzed the evolution of the category *Ifrīqiyā* over time in relation to sociohistorical and intellectual changes. Instead, they have tried to define it, or ascertain the most reliable description of it, by cataloguing references in Arabic texts written over seven or eight centuries, from al-Andalus to Baghdad. This approach collapses chronology and ignores the conditions within which various authors produced those references. Unsurprisingly, it has also yielded conflicting bits of information. This is what the historian Mohamed Talbi discovered: “The details given by the various Arabo-Muslim geographers and historians do not always agree,” he wrote. Apparently, these authors did not precisely understand “the exact frontiers of *Ifrīkiya*.” Talbi’s challenge was therefore to explain their confusion.

It may be said that the geographical *Ifrīkiya* consisted essentially of the ancient (Numidia) Proconsularis and Byzacena, which formed the nucleus of it, to which were later added Tripolitania, the Numidia of the Aurès, and even a part of Sitifian Numidia. Upon this geographical concept was superimposed an administrative concept. Because of this, *Ifrīkiya* tended to be confused, in the writings of the chroniclers, with the territory that, in the Middle Ages, was ruled in turn from Qayrawān, from Mahdiyya or from Tunis—a territory which expanded or contracted according to the vicissitudes of history.⁸

In order to eliminate this confusion, Talbi proposed that late antique Roman categories be used instead of medieval ones.⁹ This unsatisfactory position rests

on the unexplained and not obvious distinction between a late antique “geographic” conception and a medieval “administrative” one, the former assumed to be more accurate than the latter. In addition to fostering anachronism, this interpretation implies that geographical notions develop independently of politics, an idea that deserves, if not demonstration, at least explanation.

Moreover, if in the medieval period Ifrīqiyyā was a territory that expanded and contracted, then medieval authors were not necessarily confused when they disagreed about its frontiers. For instance, the “divergence” over whether the city of Bijāya belonged to western Ifrīqiyyā or was the capital of the central Maghrib was not necessarily due to confusion. The city only became important in the second half of the eleventh century when it became the capital of the Hammādids (1015–1152). As such, it became the capital of the central Maghrib, a region associated with that dynasty. This explains why the great geographer al-Idrīsī (d. 1166) considered Bijāya to belong to the central Maghrib.¹⁰ Later, when the Ḥafṣids claimed Bijāya, it was reasonable for the Mamlūk official and author Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī (d. 1349) to believe it belonged to Ifrīqiyyā.¹¹ But when the Bijāyan judge al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1304) wrote of “our central Maghrib” including Bijāya in it, he was expressing thoughts supportive of the autonomy of the Ḥafṣid emirate of Bijāya from Tunis and its standing as the capital of the central Maghrib.¹² Deciding where the borders of Ifrīqiyyā were had political implications and learned contemporaries seem to have understood that.

Recently, Dominique Valérian has suggested that, “in spite of the vagueness of the sources, [historians] must preserve the political and administrative sense that [Ifrīqiyyā] had in the early years of the Islamic Maghrib and that it retained in many later texts,” namely, that “Bijāya actually belonged to Ifrīqiyyā, which experienced a real political unity in the Ḥafṣid period.”¹³ Valérian did not explain why he believed that historians should preserve earlier notions or why the fact that later authors reproduced earlier notions made those notions more valid. Nevertheless, he gave weight to political considerations in deciding the frontiers of Ifrīqiyyā. Although he also noted the importance of narrative practices in producing what he described as a blurry and vague conception of Ifrīqiyyā, he argued that the political unification imposed by the Ḥafṣids warranted that Bijāya should be included in it. The problem is that Ifrīqiyyā was not always politically unified and was certainly not always under the control of the Ḥafṣids. Why the Ḥafṣid period should become the standard rather than the Hammādīd period is also not self-evident.

In spite of these difficulties, Valérian’s original insight connecting region and politics is critical because it enables the notion of “Ifrīqiyyā” to become



Map 1. The medieval Maghrib.

the object of historical analysis rather than to be taken for granted. Instead of using a particular historical period or political circumstance as a measuring rod against which to compare others, it is preferable to imagine that Ifrīqiyyā underwent a number of articulations each of which corresponded to specific socio-historical and intellectual conditions.¹⁴ Clearly, intellectuals associated with the Ḥafṣids were not alone in producing notions of what Ifrīqiyyā meant. However, by focusing on them, this book seeks to account for an important source of the inconsistencies behind both the historical and historiographic records.

State, Territory, and Region


Historians who have studied Ḥafṣid politics have assessed the power of the Ḥafṣid state by analyzing its control over its territory, the region of Ifrīqiyyā. In this transposition of modern notions of state and territory, the natural expression of Ḥafṣid domination is assumed to be the homogeneous territory that fell between primarily political borders. For specialists such as Talbi, the Ḥafṣids ruled that territory from Tunis, their capital. This dynastic or state-centric perspective has the benefit of agreeing with the perspective of the sources. But it rests on one fundamental assumption, and that is the equivalence of the modern concept of “state” and the medieval Arabic term *dawla*.

The medieval word *dawla* is commonly translated it in English as “state” or “dynasty.” But *dawla* is attested in the earliest Arabic chronicles, and thus centuries before a notion of “the state” became established in European

languages.¹⁵ Its meanings accrued and evolved in relation to widely different sociohistorical conditions and conceptions, and by the time Hafṣid chroniclers used the term, they were attributing to it meanings not all found in modern notions of the state.¹⁶

Certainly, Hafṣid authors applied the term *dawla* to the ruling family or dynasty. For example, in his *Kitāb al-‘ibar* (*Book of Examples*), Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) entitled the section on the Hafṣids “the *dawla* of the descendants of Abū Ḥafṣ” (*dawlat Banī Abī Ḥafṣ*).¹⁷ This usage suggests that the *dawla* was something the Hafṣids possessed or embodied collectively. In another example, the *dawla* was depicted as “Hafṣid,” as in “the Hafṣid *dawla*” (*al-dawla al-hafṣiya*). In this sense, “Hafṣid” was a quality the *dawla* possessed.¹⁸ This conception of *dawla* is, however, not the one most commonly found in the sources. Most frequently, *dawla* was applied to an individual ruler. This *dawla* began with the reception of the oath of allegiance and ended when the ruler died—or when he abdicated or was deposed. It is such a conception that the historian Ibn Qunfudh (d. 1407) applied when he wrote that the “*dawla* [of the Hafṣid al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77)] lasted twenty-nine and a half years.”¹⁹ In this sense, *dawla* was a regnal period (*mudda*), not a kinship group or dynasty.²⁰

While the “collective” *dawla* could continue to exist, in rare cases, without a Hafṣid emir, the more “personal” *dawla* could become extinct (*inqaradat*) while he was nominally in charge—although the end of the regnal period (*dawla*) had to await his actual death. This was the case of the *dawla* of Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar (r. 1284–95). “[His *dawla*] became extinct with the disappearance of its pillars (*arkān*).²¹ The first who died among its pillars was Abū Zayd ‘Īsa al-Fāzāzī—his family had means, leadership, and knowledge (*ilm*).”²² The conception of the *dawla* assumed here by the pro-Hafṣid historian Ibn Qunfudh differs from the aforementioned ones and refers neither to a dynasty nor to a regnal period. This *dawla* was imagined as a structure with weight-bearing walls or pillars. Significantly, this perspective envisaged a broader notion that included elite individuals outside the Hafṣid dynasty. Ibn Qunfudh also used the term *dawla* to describe an entity similar to the family. As the head of *his dawla*, the ruler was portrayed as keeping it in order, as a father would.²³ This familial (dynastic) *dawla* was run like a business. When the ruler managed his *dawla* properly, peace extended beyond his narrow circle, benefiting the people (*al-nās*). Conversely, when the *dawla* was not in order (*murattaba*), everyone suffered. Interestingly, in spite of the multiplicity of meanings they lent a *dawla*, Hafṣid intellectuals never personified the concept. Their *dawla* did not raise taxes, build roads, or purchase goods. Moreover, it did not engage



Map 2. The tripartite division of the Maghrib.

in relations with abstract entities such as tribes and cities. In this sense, it was not like the reified modern state.

Scholars have disagreed about whether the sources associate dynastic rule with a territory. Historian Mohamed Kably argued that the absence of personal names (*nisab*, sing. *nisba*) tied to a specific territory rather than a kinship group or a town suggests that the notion is simply an anachronistic imposition.²⁴ In contrast, Dominique Valérien thought that the existence of terms pertaining to fiscal and administrative units “around” cities implied that such an association truly existed—in spite of the absence of an Arabic term that would have expressed that exact relation.²⁵ Whether political authority and territory were associated can be debated, but the sources clearly do not make the connection through their use of the notion of *dawla*.

In his *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord*, Charles-André Julien took the equivalence between *dawla* and state for granted. His map of North Africa in the thirteenth century illustrates the transformation of the rule of three dynasties into that of three states, each within a territory. Julien translated the tripartite political division of the Maghrib between the Hafṣids, ‘Abd al-Wādids (1236–1555), and Marīnids (1217–1465) into Hafṣid rule in Ifrīqiyyā, ‘Abd al-Wādīd rule in the central Maghrib, and Marīnid rule in the western Maghrib. As the title of his book states, this view establishes the modern nation-states of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco in the pre-modern past—the modern national territory of Tunisia being the successor of Ifrīqiyyā.²⁶ Unfounded and tenuous as it certainly is, this vision has enabled the wholesale nationalization of history.

The inattentive use of the modern notion of the state to interpret pre-

modern texts has led historians such as Robert Brunschvig to conceive political history in terms of the changing power of the Hafṣid state. When he discussed the period that saw a number of Hafṣid emirs rule independently from the ruler of Tunis, Brunschvig naturally thought of it as a period of “fragmentation” and “disintegration.”²⁷ He was not troubled by the fact that his point of view matched that of ideologues who favored a particularly Tunis-centric configuration of dynastic domination. Rather than account for them, Brunschvig dismissed the ideas of those who preferred autonomy as illegitimate, and presented the perspective of those who supported a strong ruler of Tunis as neutral and natural. Effectively, his state-centric approach depoliticized politics by cherrypicking types of change, and limited his analysis to the fluctuation between strength and weakness in the same Hafṣid state.²⁸ This is a fundamental point that brings state-centric colonial scholarship and nation-state-based nationalist historiography in line with the staunchly pro-Tunis Hafṣid authors writing at the end of the fourteenth and in the fifteenth century.

In part, these difficulties arise because historians do not always, or fully, take stock of the changing composition of the ruling group, or do so but then take sides with one of the parties. That is why it is preferable to think of an oscillation of Hafṣid domination from a “regional” mode centered on Tunis to a “local” configuration with a multiplicity of autonomous Hafṣid capitals such as Bijāya. A change in perspective away from strength and weakness of a state is in keeping with this book’s lack of predilection for either of the two modes of domination. This approach also identifies the victory of the regional mode at the end of the fourteenth century as a political phenomenon that requires elucidation.

Characterizing a specific political configuration as regional explains why this book does not develop a theory of regionalization and then test whether it applied to Ifrīqiyyā by mustering evidence. Its primary goal is not to use empirical evidence to demonstrate the nonexistence of a region—however one may define it;²⁹ rather, it is to explain what is involved in conceiving of medieval regions in the first place.³⁰

Tribes, Bedouins, and Pastureland

Like the state, the notion of tribe is mostly a source of confusion. On the one hand, a tribe can refer to a small group of nomads with a few goats and maybe a dog. On the other, the term is used to describe a great number of groups who may share elaborate ideas of collective genealogy. In a few cases, tribes founded

urban dynasties and even empires.³¹ The notion has thus no analytical power and lumps together groups with widely different livelihoods, organization, and senses of collective identity. In addition to being an impediment to reasoned explanation of sociohistorical and cultural differences, the term carries with it a heavy ideological baggage, from biblical to colonial tribes.

Although the term appears in the sources (*qabila*, pl. *qabā'il*), it is generally used without special care for analytical precision. Like modern references to biblical tribes, it expresses ideological preconceptions that are not always negative. The term *qabila* did not imply an associated territory, although when medieval authors used it to refer to pastoralists, they assumed that the latter moved across a geographic space and that some of these tribes claimed that space as theirs. Medieval authors did not systematically identify each tribe as a tribe, but simply noted the common names of various groups. Modern historians routinely append the moniker “tribe” to these names presumably to help identify them to nonspecialists. When they do so, they make it seem as though they are distinguishing between tribes and states on solid analytical grounds. They are not.

The written record includes only those tribes whose actions made them noteworthy. In general, these groups had political relations with the Hafṣids. In contrast, there is very little information about groups that lived outside the dynastic spotlight. For instance, from the narrative of a raid by Abū Fāris ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (r. 1394–1434) into the Awrās Mountains southeast of Bijāya, it is clear that many groups lived there outside of Hafṣid rule.³² Even in the case of politically prominent tribes, authors did not mention the borders of their territory, but only that they lived near a city, a river, or a mountain range. This makes situating tribes in Ifrīqiyyā in more than very general terms a very difficult proposition.

The Hafṣids did not always control the main highways, and bands of roving bandits made land travel a hazardous proposition for much of the fourteenth century and well into the fifteenth.³³ In some areas, villages banded together to defend themselves and to share the losses they caused.³⁴ The sources often refer to these outlaws as Bedouins or *a‘nāb*, another vague term that does not allow us to identify them with any degree of precision.³⁵ While it is common today to use Bedouin to refer to nomadic groups, the term was applied less specifically to all those who did not live in cities. For city-dwellers, settled agriculturalists who lived in villages and nomadic pastoralists were Bedouins. The term was almost an adjective that described non-urban groups, and jurists

used it mostly in a derogatory sense. The predominantly urban character of the sources—and their utilization of categories that fit the prejudices of modern colonial and postcolonial historians—make the task of historicizing the perspective of urbanites a necessity.

The City and Its Autonomy

From the 1280s to the 1370s, the rulers of Tunis had a hard time quashing the independence of the Ḥafṣid emirates of Bijāya, Qasanṭīna (Constantine), and Tarāblus (Tripoli). Their inability to do so was, according to supporters of the regional configuration of Ḥafṣid domination such as Ibn Khaldūn, the result of weakness.³⁶ Scholars have approached autonomous cities in Ifrīqiyyā from a number of perspectives. In the 1940s, Brunschvig saw them as the result of the weakness of the state and petty infighting between cousins. While this would not distinguish him from Ibn Khaldūn, he insisted that their autonomy be distinguished from the popular, communal, and republican character of western European city-states. He reasoned that “in Islam,” legal prescriptions and institutional limitations made a commune inconceivable and thus impossible. Not everyone agreed. Other historians analyzed examples that challenged this view based on prescriptive texts, and sought to develop an alternative approach to the Islamic city.³⁷

In a seminal article that took the comparison with European city-states a step further, Michael Brett focused on the involvement of the Tripolitan elite in bringing about Tripoli’s autonomy from Tunis.³⁸ He argued that seeing Tripoli as a Mediterranean city-state was preferable to understanding it as an Islamic city, and made better sense of its autonomy. Although he did not develop this idea further, his essay pointed to the possibility of developing comparisons with southern Europe that went beyond stating what Islam prevented and what Muslims lacked. Arguing from a different standpoint, Muḥammad Ḥasan thought that, even if urban institutional arrangements in Ifrīqiyyā were different from those of European city-states, they performed similar functions.³⁹ He also discussed the involvement of the non-elite mass (*al-‘āmma*) in politics, but did not argue that there were urban republics in Ifrīqiyyā.⁴⁰ More recently, Valérian abstained from making claims about the participation of the “population” in politics, given the character of the sources. Although he was sure that Bijāya was never an “urban republic,” he was not as

confident about the existence of political structures that would have allowed Bijāyans to express themselves collectively.⁴¹ While it is not certain whether these structures existed or not, comparisons with European republics and Islamic cities have not helped decide the question. Instead, they have tended to serve as a distraction and perpetuate the discourse of absences and lacks.

Though it pays special attention to Bijāya, this book is not an urban history. It does not try to account for the functioning of the city, its infrastructure, or its history. Instead, it uses the politics of city-centered autonomy—specifically, the autonomy of Bijāya—as a way to illuminate the ideology behind the making of Ifrīqiyyā. Since this ideology was not specific to Bijāya or its elite, it incorporates the perspectives of elites in other cities and assesses their participation in support of the regional emirate. The focus on Bijāya sheds light on the socioeconomic and political conditions that enabled urban elites to challenge the dominance of Tunis and points to the process that ultimately led to the political and ideological defeat of the local configuration. In this vein, an event such as the irruption of the “populace” in politics gains full significance in relation to an argument about the realignment of urban elites around the ruler of Tunis. Emphasizing the importance of this event, especially given the paucity of available information, is meant to draw attention to the tendency of the sources to downplay the political role of non-elite groups and, therefore, to the depoliticizing character of the extant chronicles.

An important goal of this work, especially as it tries to explain why scholars have imagined the Maghrib and Ifrīqiyyā as “regions,” is to bring an awareness of the limited number of historical studies, many of which are now dated, that have served as the basis of scholarly generalizations. Even when these studies do not share the *a priori* assumption that the Maghrib constitutes a unit with some degree of ethnic, institutional, and intellectual homogeneity, others have used them to support discussions that did so. The question of the homogeneity of the Maghrib and the similarity of developments within it remains open and in need of serious study. This, rather than any resistance to generalization or comparison *per se*, explains my reticence to making too many claims about neighboring dynasties, even when their ideologies appear to be similar.

Recognizing the confluence of problems raised in medieval and modern texts, this book develops an approach that takes on the challenge of writing medieval political history using historiographic narrative sources, which are our most important source of information. It does so by foregrounding the

past and its representations both in the medieval period and in the present all at the same time.

Framing the Masses

Information about non-elite groups, the urban populace among them, is rare because the writers from whom we get our information about politics tended to equate politics with intra-elite struggles. Historicizing the perspective of the sources, and thus showing their partiality, begins with the realization that their analysis of their societies was often inaccurate, limited, and misleading, although not necessarily self-consciously so. Those who authored the texts we use as evidence did not believe that subordinate groups could contribute anything to history and so mentioned them only when their actions shed light on those of the elite. Central to the deployment of this elite perspective were the twin notions of *khāṣṣa* and *‘āmma*.

The entourage and highest-ranking members of a ruler's court were known as his *khāṣṣa*. The literal meaning of *khāṣṣ* is private and particular. Its negative double is *‘ām* which means general and common. The *khāṣṣa* constituted the core of the ruling elite and played an active role in politics, performing crucial functions such as determining heirs-apparent and taking the oath of allegiance. They were pillars of the *dawla*. Members of the *khāṣṣa* of Ḥafṣid emirs were not necessarily the same as his chief officials—although that was generally the case. They belonged to a group that was privy to the ruler's secrets such as the location of his treasure, the terms of negotiations and agreements with enemies and allies, and his military plans. The composition of the *khāṣṣa* of a particular emir was subject to change. It depended on solidarity between members and the loyalty they demonstrated their leader. It is important to note in this regard that although most of those who were part of a ruler's *khāṣṣa* were members of the upper classes of society, not everyone who belonged to the social elite was automatically a member of the *khāṣṣa*.

Whereas the term *khāṣṣa* described a specific group of individuals with ties to the ruler and each other, *‘āmma* (also *kāffa*) was a generic term that lumped together a number of very distinct groups, from notable scholars and wealthy merchants, to craftsmen and petty officials. Members of the *‘āmma* were subjects of the ruler who were not part of his *khāṣṣa*, and thus not part of the *dawla*. In fact, the term does not correspond to any actual sociopolitical

group and has very little descriptive or analytical value. It simply distinguished those who were part of the ruler's circle from everyone else. Revolts against the ruler that were not led by recognized political factions of elites were automatically attributed to the *'āmma* as a whole, even if it was clearly a mere portion of the *'āmma* that was involved. Interestingly, Bedouin "tribes" belonged neither with the *'āmma* nor the *khāṣṣa*, even when they were allied or tributary. They stood as separate and distinct entities. The urban emir may have secured the allegiance of individual Bedouin leaders, but the latter did not become members of the *khāṣṣa*, and their fellow tribesmen were not part of the *'āmma*.

The political imaginary suggested by the concepts of *khāṣṣa* and *'āmma* poses the question of the bias of the sources in a way that goes beyond the political activities of individual authors. Tying political conceptions to the politics of regionalization allows us to delineate the contours of political discourse in Ifrīqiyā and thus move beyond the issue of the objectivity, reliability, and representativeness of individual sources and statements.

The Learned and the Evidence

The category "intellectual" is a modern one and using it to describe educated men and women in medieval Ifrīqiyā can be anachronistic.⁴² One of the problems associated with using the concept is that historians might project onto the past the modern idea that intellectual activity is socially differentiated or autonomous. Yet, the idea that it is easy to situate intellectual activity, and thus intellectuals, in modern societies is itself problematic. Clearly, identifying some individuals as intellectuals and excluding others is itself a political act that, some might say, serves to legitimize the prevailing social order.

In medieval Ifrīqiyā, the notions of knowledge or science (*'ilm*) and of the learned man who practiced it *'ālim* (pl. *ulamā'*) had similar effects. They delineated the form and content of acceptable thought and served to legitimize a social order, especially by establishing a hierarchy of knowledge. The ulama's writings not only constitute most of the historical archive, they present the historian with a particular ordering of it.

Moreover, medieval ulama did not always agree on who could be considered an *'ālim* or the criteria that identified one as such. When the Chief Judge of Tunis, Ibn 'Arafa (d. 1401), heard that the historian Ibn Khaldūn held a position as judge in Cairo, he scoffed. For him, Ibn Khaldūn was not a *'ālim* because his knowledge of Mālikī jurisprudence was too poor to qualify him


as one. The modern historian's decision to identify some individuals as ulama risks taking sides and reproducing the judgments of medieval authors. One must somehow find a way to acknowledge Ibn Khaldūn's involvement at the Ḥafṣid court, his authorship of an important historical narrative, and the opposition he inspired in some of Ifrīqiyyā's most prominent learned men.

As if this were not enough, the activities of the ulama, and the established forms of knowledge that they maintained, systematically marginalized the ideas of many in their societies—so many, in fact, that historians have a hard time recovering the contingency of the social hierarchy that they represented in ways that made them seem part of the natural order. For the ulama, an individual whose ideas rallied hundreds and opposed the power of elites by organizing armed resistance was not a thinking individual. Their habit of denigrating this type of person may seem perfectly justified in retrospect since often they were barely literate. But for modern historians, the actions of these *illiterati* are quite relevant. Without them, the particular institutional arrangements that prevailed in Ifrīqiyyā may appear as having descended from the heavens.

We have a choice: we can use the nomenclature of the medieval ulama and thus reproduce their biases, or we can use modern terms such as “intellectual.” Though the latter path equally risks bias, I have chosen it. In this book, I use the term intellectual to apply universally to all those who articulated political ideas, and not merely to those designated as ulama in the sources. Doing so has the benefit of recalling the *political* partiality of the historical evidence and its bias against certain social groups. In the absence of neutral terms, medieval or modern, it might have been helpful to use a completely different concept or to invent one to serve my purposes. My sense is that doing so would not be necessarily more fruitful. Instead, “misusing” the notion of intellectual in the particular sense I propose maintains an awareness of the conceptual work involved when historians take into account medieval and modern ideologies simultaneously.

The Mediterranean

The Mediterranean encapsulates a set of connected historical problems related to the categories that frame research and the character of the archive. Following Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell's distinction between “history *in* the Mediterranean” and “history *of* the Mediterranean,” this study of Ifrīqiyyā



Map 3. The western Mediterranean.

is primarily a study of history in the Mediterranean.⁴³ Its argument about the multiplicity of economic arrangements and the integration of some, but not all of them, agrees with Horden and Purcell's view of the prevalence of microregions in the Mediterranean.

Whether their work is a history *in* or *of* the Mediterranean, however, Mediterraneanists have tended to reinforce the idea that North Africa was a single region by framing their research in terms of relations between a European city, kingdom, or region, and all of North Africa or the Maghrib.⁴⁴ This routine act of lumping and generalizing has weakened the degree of specificity and nuance that some Mediterraneanists want to enshrine. By challenging the habit of assuming that Ifrīqiyyā, and by extension North Africa or the Maghrib, should be understood as regions, this book hopes to contribute to the development of new habits based on the ongoing rethinking of historical knowledge about the Mediterranean.

Another common scholarly shorthand that requires some attention is the “Islamic Mediterranean” which, as far as one is able to tell, stands for the “lands of Islam” that have a Mediterranean coast.⁴⁵ Although it is rarely meant as a serious analytical category, this epithet lends credence to the practice of understanding history through the prism of religion. Merely stating that some

societies were Islamic does little to illuminate why understanding them as such improves our interpretation of their histories. Unfortunately, this practice is as common as it is problematic. It is thus necessary to resist the sirens that call for a greater inclusion of the “Islamic Mediterranean” into the Mediterranean field—at least under this rubric.

Al-Andalus and the Role of Andalusis in Ifrīqiyyā

In the first half of the thirteenth century, the rulers of al-Andalus lost control of a great number of cities to Aragon and Castile. The defeat of the Almohad armies, which controlled most of al-Andalus, at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (*mawqi‘at al-‘uqāb*) in 1212 accelerated the process of reorganizing politics in both al-Andalus and the Maghrib. In the following decades, the Andalusis lost a number of major cities: Cordoba in 1236, Valencia in 1238, and Játiva in 1248, followed soon after by Seville. In 1268 Murcia fell. Andalusis left their towns and cities in droves. Andalusi exiles sought refuge and livelihood in nearby cities still under Muslim control or else crossed the sea and settled in the larger cities of the Maghrib, Tunis and Bijāya prominent among them.

The Ḥafṣids (1229–1574) saw in the plight of al-Andalus a political opportunity. They encouraged elite Andalusis to join their court and appointed them to prominent official positions. New to Ifrīqiyyā, these Andalusis had no attachments to any other group but the Ḥafṣid dynasty on whom they relied for their livelihood. As they became an important component of the elite, Andalusis participated fully in politics, playing an active role in bringing about the independence of Bijāya and other local Ḥafṣid emirates. However, by the end of the fourteenth century, prominent Andalusis grumbled that their local emirs lacked power and became ardent supporters of the regional emirate.

When they first joined the Ḥafṣid court in the thirteenth century, elite Andalusis brought with them a particular form of political expertise and cultural refinement.⁴⁶ They also used their forced exile to elicit the sympathy of the Ḥafṣids and others. The great number of learned Andalusis sponsored by the Ḥafṣids overwhelmed, by their very presence, the intellectual scene. As it happens, their writings have also shaped modern historical interpretations of the period. The expertise and sophistication of Andalusis and their victimization at the hands of Christians were ideas full of political significance, and were neither arbitrary nor neutral. The notion of al-Andalus’s greatness has had an exceptionally long half-life in historiography, and modern scholars

have tended to interpret the sources as accurate representations of the civilizing mission that elite Andalusis took up in Ifrīqiyyā. These preconceptions relayed familiar sentiments about Europe's relations with Africa. As one historian put it,

As the long-standing struggle between Islam and Christian Spain drew to a close, the successful intensification of Christian militance gave increasing impetus to the emigration of Spanish Muslims. It did, in fact, mark the beginning of what was to prove a veritable diaspora, of which Africa experienced appreciable effects.⁴⁷

A focus on the politics of regionalization better situates the articulation of ideas such as the greatness of al-Andalus by relating them to particular political agendas. It eschews the difficulties inherent in deploying modern racial ideology and the burden of civilizing Africa without having to dwell on their problematic character. That said, the migration of elite Andalusis from Iberia to Ifrīqiyyā is not itself the primary focus of this book. Instead of analyzing the causes or workings of this trans-Mediterranean migration, the book seeks to assess its effects on elite politics and the articulation of Emirist ideology.

Ibn Khaldūn

Historical chronicles (*tawārīkh*) are an important source of information in establishing a chronology of political events and identifying the individuals and groups involved. Most of the information we have about thirteenth- and fourteenth-century politics in Ifrīqiyyā comes from dynastic histories by four authors: Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn Qunfudh, al-Zarkashī (fl. 1482), and Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457).⁴⁸ These men's backgrounds, experiences, and trajectories were dissimilar in many ways, but their chronicles share a basic dynastic vision of politics, one that shaped the stories they saw fit to tell, retell, or omit. Since all were involved, directly or not, in the very processes their chronicles describe, it is important to situate their political views in relation to the politics of regionalization.

Ibn Khaldūn's *Book of Examples* (*Kitāb al-‘ibar*) is not as concise as the other three and includes information not found in any of them. It is our sole source on a number of critical events such as the rule of the non-elite in Bijāya

in the 1360s.⁴⁹ This makes it a very important source for the types of arguments this book makes about regionalization. Moreover, this author's theoretical reflections about politics in the introductory volume (*muqaddima*) of that work make it special in yet another respect. He argued that a new science of civilization (*'ilm al-'umrān*) was necessary to make sense of history. This theoretical move and the way he implemented it have gained him fame as father of sociology and the Muslim Machiavelli.⁵⁰

But Ibn Khaldūn's concerns were firmly grounded in the politics of his time.⁵¹ His ideas were steeped in the intellectual traditions that formed the basis of political strategy in Ifrīqiyyā, and need to be analyzed in relation to the emergence of Emirism. However, since he was far more consistent than other authors in his attempt to make sense of politics, his views require even greater attention. This is not to say that the other authors were less political or intellectually deficient. Rather, they described politics as they saw them but did not try to formulate a theory about the rise and fall of dynasties.

Ibn Khaldūn was an enormously original thinker. Many have asked to what extent his originality was specific to him, to his historical context, or to Islamic civilization.⁵² This line of questioning explains, at least in part, Ibn Khaldūn's immense popularity beyond the relatively small field of Maghrib studies and the fourteenth century. The availability of translations of his works in a number of languages has meant that scholars with little or no familiarity with either the Maghrib or the fourteenth century can use him to support all sorts of arguments. In a similar vein, interpretations of Ibn Khaldūn's work exhibit an oddly consistent confidence in the very few, and often dated, historical studies that support their understanding of the context in which the author lived.

In this book, Ibn Khaldūn's ideas are used to identify and characterize a specific political ideology—Emirism. This does not mean that they are reduced to his family's association with the Ḥafṣids or even his own friendship with a Ḥafṣid emir. Rather, the book argues that they fit within an ideology that supported a particular version of Ḥafṣid dynastic rule. Doing so does not preclude historians from finding other ways of employing them. For instance, Maya Shatzmiller made a compelling case for thinking of Ibn Khaldūn in relation to Marīnid historiography. Describing him as a Ḥafṣid ideologue here does not contradict that argument. But it does open up new interpretative possibilities, including a rethinking of differences between dynasties in the Maghrib and al-Andalus.⁵³ In any case, the use made of his text is self-consciously partial:

to the extent that the arguments are about Ibn Khaldūn and his work, they situate both in relation to a specific politics.

Organization

This book's organization supports its dual goal of ascertaining the extent of regional political and economic integration in Ifrīqiyyā and linking it to the victory of the regional emirate at the end of the fourteenth century. Together, these two aspects account for the making of a Mediterranean emirate.

The book begins with a political narrative that focuses on the emergence of two political visions of Ifrīqiyyā in the fourteenth century: one “local,” which emphasized the autonomy of the emir and thus supported an independent emirate, the other “regional,” which supported the unification of Ifrīqiyyā under the ruler of Tunis. The first chapter shows that the immigration of elite Andalusis precipitated the reorganization of Ḥafṣid domination and led to the emergence of independent emirates in cities such as Bijāya. By the end of the fourteenth century, the regional configuration became a possibility, then a reality under the rule of Abū Fāris.

The following two chapters evaluate the notion that Ifrīqiyyā was an economic region. Chapter 2 analyzes the transformation of land tenure and agricultural production beginning with the Almohads and continuing with the Ḥafṣids. Utilizing collections of legal opinions, chronicles, and travelogues, the chapter examines the fiscal system put in place by these two dynasties and the extent to which it fostered the homogenization of practices and conditions in Ifrīqiyyā. Chapter 3 examines the organization and evolution of manufacturing, commerce, and piracy in Bijāya. It builds on studies such as those of Dominique Valérian and María Dolores López Pérez, which draw upon European commercial sources, and uses them to test whether Ifrīqiyyā can be meaningfully understood as a region. The chapter identifies the main commodities traded in the city's markets, and evaluates the importance of piracy in order to assess the degree of economic integration.

The next three chapters analyze the making of Ifrīqiyyā by intellectuals. They pay special attention to judges and chroniclers whose writings form the bulk of the evidence supporting the arguments of this book. Chapter 4 argues that the defeat of autonomous emirates was supported by a specific political ideology I call “Emirism.” Examining how this ideology became dominant after the accession of Abū Fāris to the throne in 1394, the chapter discusses its

impact on the ways contemporary historians came to conceive of the entire fourteenth century. The writings of intellectuals at the Ḥafṣid court will be the particular focus of this chapter. Chapter 5 argues that the Ḥafṣid dynasty was able to exert a remarkable degree of control over what intellectuals said and wrote. Through an analysis of institutions of learning, it explains the cultural effects of the politics of regionalization and, most importantly, the influence of Andalusi intellectuals on consolidating Ḥafṣid power. Paying special attention to judges and Sufis, the chapter utilizes biographical dictionaries and other literary sources to establish the dynasty's involvement in favoring particular intellectual expressions. Since biographical dictionaries focus primarily on the urban elite, their utilization for this purpose can be particularly useful. Chapter 6 analyzes the work of Ḥafṣid historians who framed the political history of Ifrīqiyyā in terms of Emirist ideology. These three chapters use the career and oeuvre of Ibn Khaldūn to illustrate the relationship between the politics of regionalization, official ideology, and historical writing. The book concludes with a discussion of the impact of this fourteenth-century ideology on our understanding of the medieval Maghrib, and explores the possibility that the entire medieval period has been seen through the prism of the fourteenth century.

This page intentionally left blank

P A R T I

The Limits of Regional Integration

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER I

The Politics of the Emirate

When the Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Zakariyā Yahyā (r. 1229–49) died, his son Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Muṣṭanṣir (r. 1249–77) became ruler of Ifrīqiyyā. Acceding to the throne in Tunis, al-Muṣṭanṣir took control of a large kingdom that stretched from Ṭarāblus (Tripoli) in the east to Bijāya in the west. During his long reign, Bedouins, powerful Almohad sheikhs, and urban elites continuously challenged his authority. In 1270, the integrity of his kingdom miraculously survived a Crusade against Tunis led by Louis IX.¹ Saved by Louis’ death, al-Muṣṭanṣir still had to pay a great sum of money to end the siege of his capital. Old, politically weakened, and seriously impoverished, he battled ceaselessly to maintain his power. After his death, the unity of the Ḥafṣid kingdom crumbled. A number of Ḥafṣid emirs based in large cities such as Bijāya, Qasanṭīna (Constantine), and Ṭarāblus declared independence from Tunis. Supported by urban elites and powerful Bedouin armies, these emirs fought each other to maintain or expand their holdings in Ifrīqiyyā. For almost a century, they challenged the preeminence of the ruler of Tunis until Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad II (r. 1370–94) led a political realignment that put an end to independent Ḥafṣid emirates. The process of reunification reached its culmination under his son Abū Fāris ‘Abd al-‘Azīz.

Some modern scholars, the historian Robert Brunschwig foremost among them, understood the period of the multiplication of emirates in Ifrīqiyyā as one of the weakness of the Ḥafṣid state.² He and others described the endemic warfare between Ḥafṣid emirs and celebrated those rare occasions when a maverick Ḥafṣid was able to impose his will on all the others. In so doing, they replicated the perspective of contemporaries such as Ibn Khaldūn, who saw the rule of autonomous emirs as the result of the weakness of the Ḥafṣid dynasty, its fragmentation, poor health, and old age. Ibn Khaldūn wrote:

It should be known that the first (perceptible) consequence of a dynasty's senility is that it splits. . . . The same was the case with the Almohad dynasty. When the shadow it cast began to shrink, the Ḥafṣids revolted in Ifrīqiyā. They made themselves independent there and founded their own realm for their descendants in that region. Their power flourished and reached its limit, but then, one of their descendants, the emir Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā, the son of Sultan Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm, the fourth Ḥafṣid caliph, seceded in the western provinces and founded a new realm in Bijāya and Qasanṭīna and environs.³

By framing the political history in relation to an ebb and flow of the power of a centralizing state, historians set up a particular outcome, the centralization of power in Tunis, as an ideal political situation and, by the same token, independent emirates as anomalies. While this approach is helpful in organizing the complicated and often contradictory historical record, it is irremediably attached to the dynastic perspective of the sources.⁴ As an alternative, I argue that the period between 1200 and 1400 is better understood in relation to two distinct but related processes. The first was characterized by the oscillation between two modes of Ḥafṣid political domination: the “regional” mode, in which the Ḥafṣid ruler of Tunis controlled all the major cities of Ifrīqiyā, appointed their governors, and received taxes from them; and the “local” mode, in which independent Ḥafṣid emirs withheld the taxes they collected for Tunis, and raised strong enough armies to maintain themselves in power. The second process, which will be the focus of Chapter 4, was the gradual emergence of Emirism, an ideology that became dominant under the “regional” rule of Abū Fāris.

Conceiving of the political history in terms of an oscillation between regional and local domination generates a periodization with four important moments: (1) the foundation and consolidation of the dynasty; (2) the independence of Bijāya (and other cities); (3) the popular rebellion and non-dynastic rule of a group whom the sources refer to as the *ghawḡā'*, or mob; and (4) the reunification of Ifrīqiyā under Abū Fāris. These moments, which form the basis for the four sections of this chapter, are not arbitrary. They mark major political realignments within the elite in support of a particular agenda and, in the case of the popular rebellion, the failure of the elites to reach a compromise with each other. In other words, each configuration of Ḥafṣid domination came about because of the victory of specific coalitions over others, not because of the fluctuation of the power of an impersonal state.⁵ Rather than

presenting a state-centric view, this perspective, and by extension the organization of this chapter, imagines politics as the process by which a particular group comes to rule, a process that the references to the “Hafṣid state” tend to leave unexamined, or worse, to take for granted.

Like the state, the notion of a “tribe” presents the historian with a series of challenges. First, it generally acts to mask rather than illuminate politics, mainly by casting very different circumstances under the same, generally unfavorable, label. For even if the sources describe tribes (*qabā'il*) as static and unchanging, they were not always the same, but represented different political groups, orientations, and agendas. Second, the tribes that appear in the sources are merely those that gained significance in relation to dynastic politics. They were not necessarily the only tribes around. Their activities both for and against the Hafṣids explain their depiction in the sources. Third, and as for the Bedouins’ self-representation, there are hints that they produced written narratives about the past. But these were mostly tales about the feats of hero ancestors and pious teachers.⁶ The few extant lines of poetry and hagiographic narratives clearly demonstrate the involvement of tribes in political struggles but do not offer details sufficient for an analysis of political history. Last, and while they present us with facts of a different order, dynastic sources are no less problematic. For instance, they tend to represent relations between tribes and the Hafṣids within the framework of pledges of allegiance and tribute, which creates a sense of their neutralization and pacification. But the pledges of tribal leaders were not everlasting. They did not prevent them from forming alliances with others, including enemies of the dynasty, and even from openly rebelling against it. While it is important to account for these aspects of the perspective of our sources, it is most prudent not to fall prey to a romantic view of Bedouins and imagine, as some continue to do, the existence of egalitarian and democratic tribes.⁷

Our ability, then, to determine whether the Hafṣid dynasty truly ruled over all of Ifrīqiyyā, and so whether Ifrīqiyyā was politically unified under their rule, is determined by the perspective of the sources. The sources do make it clear that during the period of local emirates, no Hafṣid emir ruled over a unified Ifrīqiyyā or exerted effective control over areas beyond the city or cities he controlled. At least during that time, Ifrīqiyyā was not a homogeneous political region, and there can be little doubt about that. But this lack of political unification did not prevent historians in the fifteenth century such as Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457) from thinking of the Hafṣids as the “kings of Ifrīqiyyā,” and not only of some areas of Ifrīqiyyā or only part of the time.⁸

In addition to the Hafṣid dynasty and powerful Bedouin groups, a third

group in the political configuration of Ifrīqiyyā were the Almohad sheikhs (*shuyūkh*).⁹ These generals led the Almohad military occupation of Ifrīqiyyā and enforced the expropriation of lands, the imposition of heavy taxation, and the transfer of wealth from the eastern Maghrib to their capital in Marrakech (Marrākush). The sheikhs belonged to the coalition that first conquered the western Maghrib and were then dispatched to the east to lead the Almohad military. The Almohads (1130–1269) built fortified neighborhoods or Kasbahs (*qasabāt*, sing. *qaṣaba*) inside the cities they ruled, and these became the centers of their military-fiscal-judicial domination. The Ḥafṣids had originally been Almohad sheikhs, and they now had to contend with their former peers who decided to remain in Ifrīqiyyā. Bringing these sheikhs under control was a long and arduous political process that the Ḥafṣids commenced at the beginning of their rule. To counter the power of the Almohads, the Ḥafṣids encouraged the immigration of elite Andalusis to Ifrīqiyyā, at first with the backing of an Andalusi militia. Conflicts between the Andalusis, who were favored by the Ḥafṣids, the Almohads, and members of the urban elite became a common feature of politics. These conflicts often involved alliances with Bedouins. Lastly, as is evident from the Crusade led against Tunis by Louis IX, Mediterranean powers had an impact on regional politics—if only because they forced the Ḥafṣid rulers to mobilize their resources and organize defenses. Generally, however, they played a secondary role, because they were not able to shape the terms of political change or bring about outcomes that could put them in a position of leadership in Ifrīqiyyā. Though their military raids and their occupation of coastal areas in Ifrīqiyyā, in some cases for extended periods, appear further to demonstrate Ifrīqiyyā's lack of territorial integrity, by themselves these actions did not constitute a threat to the Ḥafṣid order. Their impact on the development of Emirism, the political ideology that became dominant at the end of the fourteenth century and shaped the region's subsequent history and historiography, was at best indirect and secondary.

The Foundation and Consolidation of the Dynasty: The First Regional Emirate (1220–77)

The Last Years of Almohad Rule in Ifrīqiyyā

Almohad rule in the Maghrib and al-Andalus stretched over the largest area to come under the rule of a single political entity since Roman times. In the first years of the thirteenth century, the Almohads experienced difficulties holding

it together.¹⁰ In the provinces, rebellions multiplied, as did conspiracies and bloody purges at the court in Marrakech. Worse, the local military commanders on whose shoulders the integrity of Almohad domination rested were no longer satisfied with the great wealth they derived from their posts. The central government tried to stay a step ahead of its generals' discontent by accelerating their rotations, but that policy further undermined the stability of the regime.

Ifriqiyyā was even less stable: the anti-Almohad ruler of Majorca, a member of the Almoravid Banū Ghāniya clan, controlled a large portion of the central Maghrib (*al-Maghrib al-awsat*) with the support of a number of powerful Bedouins. The Banū Ghāniya would emerge as a persistent threat to the Almohads and, ultimately, as an opportunity for those seeking autonomy from them: the Ḥafṣids declared independence from the Almohads in the process of eliminating the Banū Ghāniya from Ifriqiyyā.

The way this came about was as follows. At the turn of the thirteenth century, a Bedouin chief rebelled against the Almohads and declared independence in his native city of al-Mahdiya (Mahdia). He took on the caliphal title of al-Mutawakkil 'alā Allāh and led his troops on a raid against the city of Tunis. Emboldened by the success he had there, he attacked the Majorcan emir Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya. Ibn Ghāniya's reaction was swift and decisive.

First, Ibn Ghāniya invaded al-Mahdiya and forced the rebel caliph to capitulate and recognize his rule. Then, taking advantage of this victory, he led his troops on to other cities. Bāja fell when Ibn Ghāniya defeated an Almohad army sent there from Bijāya. He then took Biskra, Tabassa (Tebessa), and al-Qayrawān (Kairouan). Without putting up a fight, Būna (Annaba) sent its capitulation in 1203 and a besieged Tunis surrendered, agreeing to a very heavy tribute. Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya became the ruler of Ifriqiyyā. Though his rule was short-lived, it was significant for the transformation of the Ḥafṣids into an independent dynasty.¹¹

The Almohad reaction to Ibn Ghāniya's opportunistic attack was immediate. The Almohad caliph al-Nāṣir (r. 1199–1213), who had just ousted the Banū Ghāniya dynasty from the Balearic Islands, led an army against Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya in Ifriqiyyā. The Almohad navy easily took back Tunis, forcing Yaḥyā to retreat to the south. There, in 1205, Yaḥyā met defeat at the hand of the Almohad sheikh 'Abd al-Wāhid b. Abī Ḥafṣ al-Hintātī—a relative of the man who would go on to found the Ḥafṣid dynasty. After the Almohads had forced the surrender of Yaḥyā's cousin in al-Mahdiya, the Almohad caliph al-Nāṣir entered Tunis victorious. Though Yaḥyā was still alive, the rebellion had been effectively quelled.

Up to that point, Almohad rulers had appointed only close relatives to the governorship of Tunis and Bijāya, the two largest Ifriqiyan cities. They now

broke from that custom: before heading back to Marrakech, al-Nāṣir decided to appoint ‘Abd al-Wāhid as governor over much of Ifrīqiyyā, presumably a reward for defeating Ibn Ghāniya. As a Hintātī, ‘Abd al-Wāhid belonged to an important Almohad clan, but he was not a member of the Mu’imnid ruling family. When al-Nāṣir left Tunis in 1207, this sheikh took control of the area from Tunis to Tripoli. Though still not all of Ifrīqiyyā, it was enough to help him build his stature as a political leader.

The Almohad Origins of the Ḥafṣids

‘Abd al-Wāhid’s father, Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar b. Yahyā al-Hintāti, had been an early supporter of the founding father and *mahdi* of the Almohads, Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130).¹² He had been a member of Ibn Tūmart’s Council of Ten (the highest executive body in the Almohad hierarchy), and one of the most important participants in the negotiations that led to the proclamation of the first Almohad caliph, ‘Abd al-Mu’min, after Ibn Tūmart’s death.¹³ Abū Ḥafṣ had gone on to become one of the most important military leaders of the Almohad conquests. He was especially active in al-Andalus, where he participated in the conquest of Almería from Castile. His political role was even more important, and hinted at the independence he would assume later on: he advised the caliph and opposed him on occasion in the name of the ideals of the *mahdi*.¹⁴ His loyalty to the Almohad cause was, however, never in doubt. On two occasions, ‘Abd al-Mu’min left him in charge of Marrakech, an act that demonstrated the caliph’s trust in Abū Ḥafṣ and Abū Ḥafṣ’s full membership in the ruling elite. Later, all this helped make ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s successor al-Nāṣir trust Abū Ḥafṣ’s descendants—and to help Abū Ḥafṣ’s son ‘Abd al-Wāhid become the governor of Ifrīqiyyā, thereby helping to create an independent Ḥafṣid dynasty. Indeed, ‘Abd al-Wāhid was not the only descendant of Abū Ḥafṣ whom the Almohad caliphs held in great esteem. The Almohads singled the family out for favor by maintaining marriage ties with them and offering many of them trusted and sensitive positions.

Throughout the early period of Almohad rule, ‘Abd al-Wāhid and his descendants continued to earn the trust of the caliphs and gradually secured their claims on a hereditary governorship of Ifrīqiyyā. The rebel commander Yahyā b. Ghāniya obliged in the creation of Ḥafṣid tales of heroism by continuing to rebel: no sooner had al-Nāṣir and his army returned to Marrakech, leaving ‘Abd al-Wāhid in charge of Ifrīqiyyā, than Yahyā b. Ghāniya reemerged in southern Ifrīqiyyā and threatened Almohad rule yet again. The new governor marched against him and defeated his army near Tabassा in 1208. Ibn Ghāniya

fled in the direction of the central Maghrib and, with help from allied Bedouins, went on to defeat Almohad troops near Tāhart (Tiaret). It was not until 1209–10 that ‘Abd al-Wāhid dealt a serious blow to Ibn Ghāniya and his supporters among the Riyāḥ, ‘Awf, Dabbāb, Dawāwida, and Zanāta and imposed peace. Defeated and on the run, Ibn Ghāniya once again escaped alive.

When al-Nāṣir died in 1213, ‘Abd al-Wāhid briefly withheld his support for the designated caliph Abū Ya‘qūb, an act in which he probably drew on his father’s moral standing. ‘Abd al-Wāhid ultimately recognized the caliph’s appointment. He also enjoyed support among the Almohad sheikhs in Ifrīqiyyā: when he died in 1221, the sheikhs recognized his son Abū Zayd ‘Abd al-Rahmān as his successor to the governorate of Ifrīqiyyā. But the Almohad ruler al-Mustansir (r. 1213–24) did not agree with their choice, and instead appointed Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismā‘il b. Abī Ḥafṣ to serve as interim governor until the governor of Seville, and ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s grandson, Abū al-‘Ulā, could take over in Ifrīqiyyā.

The political defeat of the Ḥafṣid clan in Ifrīqiyyā was brief, and they owed their next victory, once again, to Ibn Ghāniya, who used the confusion to rebel yet again. New to the area, Abū al-‘Ulā was unable to rout Ibn Ghāniya immediately. Instead, ‘Abd al-Wāhid’s son, Abū Zayd, defeated Yahyā in 1223 and headed for Tunis as a victor. This could not but have solidified the family’s claims to leadership in the region. The new caliph, al-Ādil (r. 1224–27), recognized Abū Zayd for his impressive military victory and appointed him governor of Ifrīqiyyā. But his authoritarian and unpopular governorship ended in 1226, after just two years, when the caliph appointed his brother, the sheikh Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Wāhid b. Abī Ḥafṣ, to replace him. One Ḥafṣid had been deemed lacking, and another was now appointed in his stead—so thoroughly had the Almohads come to rely on the house of Abū Ḥafṣ.

The new Ḥafṣid governor of Tunis, Abū Muḥammad, had little to no control over Bijāya and western Ifrīqiyyā. But that was the least of his concerns. As soon as he took over, he had to fend off yet another Ibn Ghāniya-led rebellion in southern Ifrīqiyyā, as well as the rebellion of the Walḥāsā in the region of Būna. The chaos afforded yet another opportunity for a Ḥafṣid governor to stake his claim to the region—to become, as it were, a son of Ifrīqiyyā.

Ifrīqiyyā Becomes Ḥafṣid

The lord (*mawlā*) Abū Zakariyā claimed independence (*istabadda*) in Ifrīqiyyā, since it was his country (*balad*) and the country of his father and brother.¹⁵

With yet a third son of ‘Abd al-Wāḥid, Abū Zakariyā, the Ḥafṣid dynasty made Ifrīqiyyā its home. In 1227, Abū Zakariyā became governor of Tunis, having previously served as the commander of Gābis. The Almohad caliph would have sent the diploma of governorship to Abū Muḥammad, who had served in the post under the previous caliph, except that Abū Muḥammad, following the path of moral indignation first carved by his grandfather Abū Ḥafṣ, refused to recognize the caliph’s appointment. Abū Zakariyā received the appointment instead. In 1228, one of his first acts was to prove his loyalty to the regime over his family: with the help of Almohad troops, he exiled his brother Abū Muḥammad. He then entered Tunis and became the ruler of the Almohad province of Ifrīqiyyā—the third descendant of Abū Ḥafṣ to assume the post.

Abū Zakariyā’s loyalty to regime was neither blind nor uncritical. Despite his support for the caliph over his own brother’s objections, he still retained some distance from events in the capital, and could be provoked to rebellion when the Hintātā were threatened. Indeed, al-Ma’mūn (r. 1227–32) tested Abū Zakariyā’s loyalty in the course of a wider conflict in the Maghrib. Al-Ma’mūn’s rule over the Maghrib was hardly secure. While he was trying to reassert Almohad control in al-Andalus, he received news that his cousin Yaḥyā b. al-Nāṣir had rebelled in the Maghrib. He immediately headed south to engage in battle with his cousin, and in the course of the conflict, publicly repudiated the *mahdī*’s doctrine. He also killed a great number of Almohad sheikhs, some of whom were Hintātā.¹⁶ The response was immediate: the Ḥafṣids were, after all, Hintātā and could not simply accept the slaughter of kin. Abū Zakariyā disavowed al-Ma’mūn and, in his stead, recognized Yaḥyā b. al-Nāṣir as the legitimate Almohad caliph. But whether out of principle or political motives, Abū Zakariyā could not sustain fealty to a mere pretender. In 1229, he eliminated Yaḥyā’s name from the Friday sermon (*khuṭba*), and made the imams deliver it instead in the name of the *mahdī* and the four “rightly guided” caliphs (*rāshidūn*). Abū Zakariyā then formalized his independence from Marrakech by taking up the title of emir (*amīr*), the only title he ever bore. Seven years later, he added his own name to the weekly sermon, thus publicly proclaiming himself an independent ruler (1236–37).¹⁷

For later Ḥafṣid historians such as Ibn al-Shammā‘, Abū Zakariyā claimed Ifrīqiyyā because it was already his country. This is typical of the chronicles’ tendency toward historical foreshortening. In reality, the first Ḥafṣid ruler was an Almohad and articulated the legitimacy of his rule in Almohad terms. Abū Zakariyā fashioned himself as the inheritor of the charisma and spiritual

leadership of Ibn Tūmart, and of the military skills and piety of ‘Abd al-Mu’min. His supporters also made use of the fact that his grandfather, Abū Ḥafṣ, had been an early follower of the *mahdī* and a great Almohad general. While he was viewed as rooted in the region, his political legitimacy still drew on roots in the far west.

As for the Almohad sheikhs of Ifrīqiyyā, with the political situation in the west spiraling out of Almohad control, they had two choices: go back to Marrakech in loyalty to the caliph or stay in Ifrīqiyyā. Many stayed. Once they were no longer there on a temporary assignment, they had to reassess their situation and commit themselves to being in Ifrīqiyyā. Abū Zakariyā permitted their role to shift: they now gained renewed influence at the court, precisely at a time when Tunis was flourishing as a capital; Abū Zakariyā sponsored the building of a prayer hall (*muṣallā*) outside the city’s walls and organized spacious markets around the Great Mosque of Tunis.

Abū Zakariyā’s sense of continuity with the Almohads was palpable both inside and outside the court. Following Almohad custom, he redesigned Tunis’s Kasbah, the fortified tower and walled quarters where the ruling family and high government officials lived. In Ramadan 1233, he inaugurated a new minaret for the Kasbah’s mosque, which had been and remained known as the Almohad Mosque. In the treaties with northern Mediterraneans, his subjects are described as “Almohads.”¹⁸ Even his methods of cultivating loyalty and punishing offenders were Almohad, including favoring the Ku‘üb and Mirdās at the expense of the Dawāwida who had supported Ibn Ghāniya. Unsurprisingly, the Dawāwida resisted the new order, and just as unsurprisingly, Abū Zakariyā sent an army against them, defeated them, and made them relocate from Tunis to the Zāb and the area south of Qasanṭīna. In 1238, he marched against the defiant Hawwāra, defeated them, and forced the survivors into servile labor, just as the Almohads had done.

Having consolidated his power in Ifrīqiyyā and nipped in the bud a conspiracy of Almohad sheikhs, Abū Zakariyā now focused on expanding his realm. But here he had a momentous decision to make. Would his emulation of the Almohads extend to actually taking over their realm? Would he assume their mission of protecting the Muslims of al-Andalus? Abū Zakariyā chose a course of restraint, but sovereigns in the Maghrib nonetheless looked to him as an Almohad successor. In 1242, he invaded Tilimsān (Tlemcen), but decided not to march against the Almohads in the western Maghrib. Yet the kings of Iberia who led “the Christian reconquest” feared Abū Zakariyā’s growing power: in 1231, James I of Aragon raced to Majorca, which had been under

his control since 1229, because of rumors of a Ḥafṣid expedition against the island. Likewise, the emirs of al-Andalus looked to Abū Zakariyā for protection, just as they had looked to the Almohads: in 1238, the emir of Valencia, Zayyān b. Mardanīsh, hoping to defeat James's siege of the city, appealed to Abū Zakariyā, whom he recognized as overlord. Abū Zakariyā sent a small flotilla, but it was unable to help. In October 1238, Valencia capitulated. Though his aid was inadequate and ultimately futile, the sources are unanimous in emphasizing Abū Zakariyā's intention of coming to the rescue of Muslims.¹⁹

When Abū Zakariyā died in 1249, he left a great reputation behind him. Some of the chronicles depict him with mere boiler plate praise of the sovereign, as having listened to the complaints of the poor and having been loved by the masses. But others detected the thin line he walked between Almohad succession and outright independence. They described him as surrounding himself with a Council of Almohads that supported Ḥafṣid claims to authentic Almohad lineage. They also praised his wise reliance on freed Christian captives (*'ulūj*) and Andalusi immigrants, who, together with Christian mercenaries, helped the Ḥafṣids to keep in check the power of the Almohad sheikhs.²⁰ Almohad though he might have acted, he was also willing to carve an independent course of rule.

Fending Off Urban Elites, Bedouins, and Crusaders

Abū Zakariyā's son and heir, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad, benefited from the support of his father's confidants, a fact not to be taken for granted given that the bonds of patronage at court were rarely passed on by legacy. The chroniclers note that when Abū 'Abd Allāh arrived in Tunis, he immediately enjoyed the double allegiance of the Almohad sheikhs and the common people ('āmma).²¹ But things were not so simple. In 1250, he survived a coup attempt fomented by Almohad leaders who resented the rising power of the freed slaves and the Andalusis. In 1253, his own brother, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm, continuing the family tradition of internecine quarrels, escaped Tunis, where he had been closely watched, and took refuge among the Dawāwida. Their sheikhs pledged allegiance to him, recognized him as emir, and helped him form an army to unseat his brother. When they were defeated, Abū Ishāq fled to al-Andalus, where he found refuge at the court of Muḥammad b. Yūsuf of Granada.

In 1253, a mere four years after assuming rule, Abū 'Abd Allāh took on the caliphal title Commander of the Faithful (*amīr al-mu'minīn*) and assumed the caliphal-sounding regnal name al-Mustanṣir. This move must be seen in the context of his attempts to quell the Almohad sheikhs, now in the form

of the Banū Nu‘mān. A powerful Almohad family, the Banū Nu‘mān had supported al-Mustanṣir’s father, and he came to see their influence as governors of Qasanṭīna as a serious threat to his rule. He eliminated three of the most prominent members of their clan from the political scene by killing them.

Threats to al-Mustanṣir’s rule came not only from the Almohad sheikhs but from the urban elites, and further members of his own family. Taking advantage of the political instability in eastern Ifrīqiyyā, urban elites in the western town of Milyāna made bids to break away from Tunis. In 1261, al-Mustanṣir’s brother Abū Ḥafṣ took Milyāna and placed it in the hands of the Awlād Mandil before heading back to Tunis. East of Milyāna, the Mediterranean port city of Jazā’ir Banī Mazghanna (Algiers) also proclaimed independence from Tunis and prompted a similar reaction. In both cases, the Ḥafṣids asserted their military domination at great cost.

In addition to urban elites who jockeyed for influence, the Ḥafṣids faced a constellation of armed Bedouin groups, each with its own agenda and strategies. A few years before the events of Milyāna, al-Mustanṣir had seen firsthand how challenging Bedouins could be. When the coalition led by the self-proclaimed messiah Abū Ḥimāra threatened to overtake the whole southern Zāb, al-Mustanṣir led an army from Tunis, had Abū Ḥimāra killed, and arrested the leaders of the Mirdās and Dabbāb who had offered him logistical support. But even then, he could not rest on his laurels, facing the ever-troublesome Dawāwida in the region south of Qasanṭīna, aided by members of his own family. With al-Mustanṣir’s cousin Abū al-Qāsim on their side, the Dawāwida sought to sponsor their own Ḥafṣid ruler. But when the time came to fight, Abū al-Qāsim cowered, fleeing to al-Andalus and leaving the Dawāwida and their sheikh Shibl b. Mūsa to face the Tunisan army alone. The battle went in favor of al-Mustanṣir, who forced the enemy to retreat to the south of al-Masīla. Unsatisfied, al-Mustanṣir was back on the offensive two years later, in 1268, with the help of the Ku‘ub, Dabbāb, and Sadwīkish. The Banū ‘Asākir branch of the Dawāwida accepted defeat and pledged allegiance to him, but the Banū Mas‘ūd refused to capitulate and fled to the south of Biskra, well into the Sahara, where their livelihood would be endangered. After some discussion, they reversed their decision and asked to negotiate terms with al-Mustanṣir, who responded by arresting their leaders and decapitating them, and then leading a surprise attack against their remaining supporters.

Seriously challenged inland and still having trouble imposing his will in the region, al-Mustanṣir now faced yet another enemy: Louis IX. In 1270, after the failure of his Crusade in the Levant, Louis led a Crusade against Tunis.

After four months, the tight naval siege he maintained forced al-Mustanṣir to ask for help from nearby cities and Bedouins. Whether the move would have weakened his rule or allowed him to build alliances we will never know: just when al-Mustanṣir's capital seemed about to fall to the crusaders, a mysterious illness killed Louis and forced the crusaders back home with the body of their leader, and future saint. The peace treaty al-Mustanṣir signed to convince the crusader army to leave came at a heavy price: two hundred and ten thousand ounces of gold, and a number of commercial concessions and guarantees.²²

Half a century was not enough to secure Ḥafṣid rule over all of Ifrīqiyyā. As soon as al-Mustanṣir died in 1277, wars of succession ensued. The political crisis made it clear that the ruler of Tunis had had a very fragile hold on power. Louis's Crusade showed that al-Mustanṣir could not defend his kingdom without the help of Bedouins. The succession wars showed that all the major political players sought to confer legitimacy on their actions by attaching themselves to a Ḥafṣid emir. This illustrates the extent to which the Ḥafṣids had succeeded in becoming the dynasty of Ifrīqiyyā.

The Ḥafṣids of Ifrīqiyyā

The Ḥafṣids were at first just Almohad governors, but over time, they claimed an increasing degree of autonomy. Making Ifrīqiyyā Ḥafṣid, or bringing it under unified Ḥafṣid rule, was a gradual, imperfect, and often violent process. It also involved making the Ḥafṣids, the powerful Hintātī clan from the western Maghrib, into Ifrīqiyyans. This process did not begin as a well-formed or formulated plan. The first Ḥafṣid governor could hardly imagine that his descendants would make Ifrīqiyyā their homeland. In fact, once the Ḥafṣids declared independence from Marrakech, they did not denounce their roots in the Almohad order. On the contrary, they claimed continuity with the Almohads and behaved like them, too, as if the Almohad capital had moved from Marrakech to Tunis. Nonetheless, the Ḥafṣids seceded, made Tunis their capital, and began appointing the governors of Bijāya. Rulers of Tunis had never done this before.

The making of the first Tunis-based regional emirate began with the imposition of Ḥafṣid domination over the body of Almohad sheikhs. To defeat those sheikhs, the Ḥafṣids utilized a variety of strategies, the most significant of which was to establish alliances with urban elites and Bedouins. They also encouraged elite Andalusis to immigrate to the cities they controlled—Tunis and Bijāya foremost among them. They appointed Christian converts to key positions in the bureaucracy and bolstered the number of non-Almohad

soldiers by utilizing Andalusi and Christian militias from nearby kingdoms such as Aragon.²³ As they saw them, these paid soldiers constituted an army more loyal than any they could muster at home to fend off Bedouins, Almohad sheikhs, and other members of the Ḥafṣid clan. All this is remarkable when considered against the uncertain beginning the Ḥafṣids had in Ifrīqiyyā and their attachment to the Almohads. It is therefore far from surprising that a few groups continued to resist their “regional” domination.

Bijāya as an Autonomous Ḥafṣid Capital (1277–1346)

The resolution of Ḥafṣid crisis of rule came in the form of Bijāya’s secession from Tunis. The secession at first followed a familiar pattern: wealthy merchants sought out the Ḥafṣid emir Abū Zakariyā Yahyā (r. 1285–1301) and supported his accession to the throne in their city. But unlike the previous abortive secessions, this one split the Ḥafṣid dynasty into two self-recognized branches, each claiming control over a different part of the kingdom that had once been ruled by Abū Zakariyā (1229–49) and al-Mustanṣir (1249–77). While Bijāya was not the only autonomous city, focusing on its independence gives a concrete example of the shift from the regional Ḥafṣid emirate to a number of local ones.

The Limits of Regional Rule

When Abū Zakariyā Yahyā II al-Wāthiq succeeded al-Mustanṣir to the throne in Tunis, he was young and, according to the Ḥafṣid historian Ibn Qunfudh, his *ḥājib* (vizier) treated him “as an adult guardian [treats] a child.”²⁴ A native of Murcia, this *ḥājib*, Ibn al-Habbabar, had risen in the ranks under al-Mustanṣir, becoming chief of the customs house in Tunis before being appointed to the highest office. He married into the Hintātī clan and wielded a great deal of power, eliminating potential competitors and appointing his own men, many of whom were Andalusis, to sensitive positions. He also appointed his own brother as governor of Bijāya.

The Bijāyan notables did not appreciate the newcomer’s haughty attitude and cavalier treatment of them, and not long after his arrival, conspired to rid themselves of him, of al-Wāthiq, and of their supporters. To do so, they sent for al-Wāthiq’s uncle, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhim in Tilimsān. Abū Ishāq had fled to Granada during al-Mustanṣir’s rule (1249–77), and upon hearing of al-Mustanṣir’s death, he had reentered the Maghrib to await his moment at

the ‘Abd al-Wādid court in Tilimsān. The moment arrived when a delegation of Bijāyans arrived and offered him their city. He accepted readily and was proclaimed emir in Bijāya in April 1279.

Ibn al-Habbabar responded to this move by sending an army to Bijāya under the command of Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar—another uncle of al-Wāthiq’s—who promptly defected and joined Abū Ishāq on Bijāya’s side. This major defeat left Tunis with no real army and forced al-Wāthiq to abdicate in favor of Abū Ishāq in August 1279.²⁵ Abū Ishāq then arrested Ibn al-Habbabar, confiscated his property, and had him killed. The young al-Wāthiq was arrested for plotting with the leader (*qā’id*) of the Christian militia and was executed in 1280, together with his three sons. Prominent individuals associated with al-Mustanṣir and Ibn al-Habbabar received the same treatment.

As a ruler of Tunis and Bijāya, Abū Ishāq showed a clear policy of favoritism toward Andalusis. Abū al-Qāsim Aḥmad b. al-Shaykh was put at the head of the palace while Abū Bakr b. Ḥasan b. Khaldūn, the grandfather of the famous historian, headed the treasury. The Ḥafṣid ruler then appointed his son Abū Fāris governor of the province of Bijāya and agreed to the appointment of Muḥammad b. Khaldūn, the son of his treasurer, to the highest office, that of *ḥājib*, in Bijāya. In turn, the new governor of Bijāya, Abū Fāris, designated the Almohad Ibn al-Wazīr governor of Qasanṭīna, and two sons of the powerful Banū Muznī from Biskra as governors of the southern regions of al-Zāb and al-Jarīd. By appointing them as governors, the Ḥafṣids extended their influence over the Banū Muznī dynasty, which ruled in that oasis town. The move gave the Ḥafṣids more consistent access to Saharan caravans and consolidated the Banū Muznī in their capital, even if they had to recognize the Ḥafṣids as overlords.²⁶

Abū Ishāq attempted to stretch his influence even further over the region by maintaining good relations with his western neighbors, the ‘Abd al-Wādids (1236–1555). The founder of that dynasty, Yaghmurāsan (r. 1236–83), renewed his allegiance to Abū Ishāq and, in 1282, sent his heir to Tunis with gifts to ask for the hand of a daughter of Abū Ishāq for one of his sons. The union of the two dynasties was thus sealed. Soon after that, the new couple became the parents of two future ‘Abd al-Wādid sultans. But the relative peace between the eastern and western Maghribī dynasties did not afford the government of Tunis the relief it sought. Crop failure in 1280 and the reluctance of the Bedouins to pay taxes led Abū Ishāq to send his two sons, Abū Zakariyā and Abū Muḥammad, at the head of important military units to collect the taxes in fall 1282.²⁷ Doing so was no easy task. The powerful Dabbāb had rallied behind a

man who claimed to be al-Faḍl, the son of the former Ḥafṣid ruler al-Wāthiq (r. 1277–79), and sought to unseat Abū Ishāq.

Kings and Kingmakers

This man was Aḥmad b. Marzūq b. Abī ‘Umāra. His family was from al-Masila (M’sila) and had emigrated to Bijāya, where he had grown up. He worked as a tailor in Bijāya, then traveled to the western Maghrib, where he claimed to possess supernatural powers and to be the awaited *mahdī*. In order to demonstrate his good faith and messianic status, he promised to produce miracles that would convince the skeptics. On the appointed day, the miracles he promised failed to materialize and he had to escape the region. He traveled back to Ifrīqiyyā and stayed with Bedouins in the region of Tripoli, where a former servant of the Ḥafṣid al-Wāthiq claimed he recognized Ibn Abī ‘Umāra as al-Faḍl.

The two managed to convince the chief of the Dabbāb of this, put together an army, and openly rebelled against Tunis. The powerful Ku‘üb promptly joined the rebels and, with their support, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra was declared caliph in the regions south of Tunis. In December 1282, Qābis (Gabēs) fell to the rebels, and in fear, a Ḥafṣid army led by a son of Abū Ishāq disbanded before battle. Leaders from al-Qayrawān, Safāqis (Sfax), and their surrounding areas joined the new caliph against the ruler of Tunis. In January 1283, more Tunisian soldiers, led by the Almohad sheikh Mūsā b. Yāsīn, sent to fight the rebels deserted and joined the other side.

Isolated and defeated, the Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Ishāq fled Tunis in the dead of winter with a few of his supporters. Repeatedly robbed and harassed en route, he finally reached Bijāya where his son Abū Fāris was governor. But he would not find the support he sought even there. Sensing an opportunity in his father's arrival, Abū Fāris obtained his father's abdication and was declared caliph in Bijāya in March 1283. Ifrīqiyyā now had two caliphs: Abū Fāris in Bijāya and Ibn Abī ‘Umāra in Tunis.

A war between the two Ḥafṣid caliphs was inevitable. It took place in June 1283 in the plains of Marmājanna and lasted an entire day. Abū Fāris was killed, his three brothers and his nephew captured. Ibn Abī ‘Umāra ordered their heads severed. The only Ḥafṣid who survived the battle was Abū Fāris's uncle Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar, who fled the scene in the company of a small group of loyalists.²⁸

The news of the defeat created great commotion in the now defeated Bijāya. The two Ḥafṣid emirs in town, the old Abū Ishāq and Abū Zakariyā,

fled in the direction of Tilimsān. Abū Iṣḥāq did not get very far before being captured in the land of the Banū Ghubrīn by the partisans of a Bijāyan who led a pro-Ibn Abī ‘Umāra party. They imprisoned him until an emissary of Ibn Abī ‘Umāra arrived from Tunis, then killed him and sent his head to Tunis, where it was paraded. Abū Zakariyā was far luckier, arriving in Tilimsān, where he received a warm welcome from the ‘Abd al-Wādīd ruler who had married his sister not long before.

Meanwhile in Tunis, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra attempted a purge of the old Ḥafṣid guard. He appointed the Almohad sheikhs Müsā b. Yasīn and Abū al-Qasim b. al-Shaykh to the two highest positions and had the chief of the treasury, Abū Bakr b. Khaldūn, arrested, confiscated his possessions, tortured him, and had him strangled to death. In a bid for support from the urban elite, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra canceled an unpopular tax and behaved outwardly like a pious man, visiting the shrines of saints and ordering the building of a mosque at the place wine was sold.

But Ibn Abī ‘Umāra’s purge went too far. On the advice of the Almohad ‘Abd al-Ḥaq b. Tafrākīn al-Tinmāllī, he jailed many Bedouin chiefs, thus angering the very groups who had brought him to power. His attitude toward the region’s notables was no better: he killed many of them, including his highest officials, on the tiniest of suspicions. Having alienated the Bedouin chiefs, the urban notables, and the Almohads, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra found himself without much support. His demise was even more precipitous than his rise.

And soon enough, in 1284, the chief of the Ku‘üb went to meet Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar, the sole survivor of the battle of Marmājanna, swore an oath of loyalty to him and led a rebellion to bring down Ibn Abī ‘Umāra. The two armies met south of Tunis; Ibn Abī ‘Umāra’s soldiers disbanded while he escaped and went into hiding somewhere in Tunis. In July 1284, Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar received the oath in Tunis, taking the caliphal title borne by his brother, al-Mustanṣir bi-Allāh. One week later, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra was found hidden at the house of an Andalusi shopkeeper; he confessed his fraud in the presence of witnesses and was decapitated.

These events were apparently memorable to later historians, who narrated them in lavish detail. But for us, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra’s usurpation of the Ḥafṣid name demonstrates two important aspects of the political situation after the death of (the first) al-Mustanṣir: the importance of access to an army; and the importance of membership in the Ḥafṣid dynasty. Without fulfilling those two requirements, it was impossible to survive as the ruler of Tunis. In their struggles against each other, all the urban-based elites—Tunisans, Andalusis,

and Almohads—had found themselves incapable of overpowering the others without external military help, whether African or European. The gradual demilitarization of the Almohad sheikhs and the elimination of the Andalusi militia only strengthened the hand of Bedouins.

The Emir of Bijāya and His Backers

The end of the first regional emirate came at the hand of Bijāya's wealthy merchants. In 1284–85, a delegation of Bijāyans, headed by the prominent Andalusi Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, went on a mission to Tilimsān to convince the Ḥafṣid emir Abū Zakariyā b. Abī Ishāq to be their ruler.

[Ibn Sayyid al-Nās] went to Tilimsān to urge Abū Zakariyā to claim his lordship [over Bijāya]. [After convincing Abū Zakariyā], he borrowed money from Bijāya's merchants and spent it to acquire the instruments and symbols of kingship (*ubbahat al-mulk*) on his behalf. He also gathered clients and followers [in his name].²⁹

The merchants' money had bought Bijāya its own independent emir and, although the sources do not tell us this, probably secured them a good return on their investment in the form of official support for trade.³⁰ Their involvement in politics helped put an official stamp on the commercial orientation of the city.

As the main organizer and leader of this operation, Ibn Sayyid al-Nās reaped great benefits. As soon as Abū Zakariyā Yāḥyā (r. 1285–1301) took over the reins of power, he appointed Ibn Sayyid al-Nās to the position of *ḥājib*, the highest in his administration. Commenting on Ibn Sayyid al-Nās's performance in the position he too had held, Ibn Khaldūn ranked it higher than that of the legendary *ḥājib* of al-Mustansir (r. 1249–77). But in an aside characteristic of his style, Ibn Khaldūn also explained that Ibn Sayyid al-Nās's task may have been facilitated by the absence of influential Almohad sheikhs in Bijāya who could have challenged him.³¹ This remark may merely indicate Ibn Khaldūn's jealousy toward the man whose shoes he later filled. Nonetheless, it suggests that the Almohads did not represent a significant political group in the city. In Bijāya, the Almohads had lost the influence they had held in the half-century since the Ḥafṣids had taken over the city. The Ḥafṣid strategy of undermining their power by appointing Andalusis had worked better and faster in Bijāya than in Tunis.³² The influence of Andalusis in Bijāya was such that when the Andalusi Ibn Sayyid al-Nās died, his secretary, another Andalusi, replaced him.³³

But the power of a few individuals can hardly be taken to mean that in the 1280s, Andalusis formed a unified party. Even a perfunctory survey of the sources demonstrates that Andalusis were fully engaged in politics against other Andalusis, and that there was hardly such a thing as Andalusi solidarity. If anything, powerful Andalusi individuals led opposing factions against Andalusis and non-Andalusis alike, with the purpose of gaining influence over the Ḥafṣid rulers or ingratiating themselves with them. But this did not prevent members of the old families of Bijāya from attributing the loss of influence they felt to the Andalusis, from feeling that Andalusis discussed political matters in threatening ways, and that they often acted in consort. Prominent Bijāyans of the “old” families such as the judge Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī (1246–1304) were not among the leaders of the independence movement, even if they supported it. Certainly, it would have been difficult for the Andalusis to achieve Bijāya’s autonomy without their participation and support. But together, the two groups formed a powerful enough coalition that it succeeded in bringing about a local emirate, and in maintaining it for decades to come.

Behind the Local Emirate

The coming together of powerful Andalusis and “old” Bijāyans enabled the formation of an independent Ḥafṣid emirate in Bijāya. The event was noted in Tunis, where the ruler immediately formed an alliance with the ‘Abd al-Wādids of Tilimsān to defeat Abū Zakariyā Yahyā and end his rule over the city.³⁴ But the alliance’s attacks on the city failed. Worse for Tunis, Bijāya’s successful resistance led many cities in the region, such as Qasanṭīna, to defect and join the new emirate.

As they joined Bijāya, these urban elites showed that they did not favor a regional configuration in principle—only if they were the ones behind it. Such regional politics would have to wait until the late fourteenth century. Once Abū Zakariyā Yahyā died, his son Abū al-Baqā’ (r. 1301–9) briefly unified Ifrīqiyyā from Bijāya, but his feat was quickly undone in a rebellion led by his own brother, Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr, the emir of Qasanṭīna (1310/11).³⁵ Abū Bakr defeated Abū al-Baqā’ and his supporters among the Ṣanhāja and took over Bijāya in 1312, but he stayed there only long enough to appoint the Andalusi Ibn Ghāmr ḥājib and then leave the city to him. At this point, Bijāya was nominally ruled from Qasanṭīna rather than Tunis, but it was functionally as independent as it had been before—a Ḥafṣid emirate under Ibn Ghāmr’s rule.³⁶

Here again, the strength of the Bedouins came into play. The ascendancy of Andalusis like Ibn Ghāmr displeased powerful Bedouins near Bijāya since

their power rested on the Ḥafṣid emirs' military dependence on them. As Ibn Khaldūn put it:

Ya‘qūb b. Khulūf was known as Abū ‘Abd al-Rahmān, the leader of Ṣanhāja. Ṣanhāja [soldiers constituted] the army of the sultan and were settled near Bijāya. [Ibn Khulūf] had an important position in the government and [obtained] wealth from wars and [from] defending [the city] against its enemies. Both the emir Abū Zakariyā and his son [Abū al-Baqā’] used to leave him in charge of Bijāya when they traveled. . . . So Ibn Khulūf demanded that the sultan [Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr] dismiss Ibn Ghāmr.³⁷

Ibn Khulūf and other Bedouin chiefs were crucial to the maintenance of local Ḥafṣid emirates such as that of Bijāya. Deriving strength from their military contribution, they made political demands that the Ḥafṣid emirs had to consider. Although Abū Bakr did not accede to Ibn Khulūf's demands, Bedouins were clearly not alien to the urban scene and its politics. Unlike those over which the Ḥafṣids had little or no control and, who often raided villages and towns under Ḥafṣid rule, these Bedouins formulated political demands within the boundaries of Ḥafṣid power. They were allies and their support was politically crucial.

Until his death in 1319, Ibn Ghāmr was the effective ruler of Bijāya, even if he governed in the name of Ḥafṣid legitimacy. But challenges to his influence did not abate, and many came from Bedouins. Ibn Talīlān, the chief of the Kutāma, and Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. Thābit, chief of the Banū Thābit, both led battles against him. Ibn Ghāmr was successful in eliminating his opponents, only to see them run to the ‘Abd al-Wādīd ruler of Tilimsān urging him to invade Ifrīqiyyā. The ‘Abd al-Wādīds' two campaigns in 1313 and 1315 against Ifrīqiyyā penetrated deep, through the lands of the Banū Thābit south of Bijāya and around Qasanṭīna, and even reached Būna. They were incapable, however, of taking any of the important cities and had to retreat to Tilimsān.³⁸

A year before Ibn Ghāmr's death, in 1318, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr became ruler in Tunis and began imposing the unification of Ifrīqiyyā. When Ibn Ghāmr died in 1319, Abū Bakr appointed the younger of his own sons, Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā, as governor of Bijāya, and chose a certain Ibn al-Qālūn as his *ḥājib*.³⁹ Soon after, this *ḥājib* was replaced by another, also named Ibn Sayyid al-Nās.⁴⁰ So successful was this Ibn Sayyid al-Nās in ingratiating himself with the Ḥafṣid ruler of Tunis that he was then called on to assume the same post

in the capital. Treating the office of *hājib* like his property, before he left for Tunis Ibn Sayyid al-Nās appointed his successor in Bijāya. Although there were others like them, Ibn Ghāmr and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās exemplified the powerful *hājibs* who were the effective rulers of Ifrīqiya's local emirates.⁴¹ The emergence of such individuals, many of whom were Andalusi, was the other side of the multiplication of independent capitals in Ifrīqiya.

The Emergence of a Regional Elite

There was something deeply unstable about the independent emirate of Bijāya. The high-level officials were mercenaries who were unattached to city or country. They did not have ties to an ancestral home nearby and were not related to the powerful Bedouins that supported the local emirate—although on occasion *hājibs* formed politically motivated marriage alliances with Bedouins. The alliances they built were not long-lasting and, ultimately, their influence was never routinized. The death of a *hājib* or his elimination from the political scene was the chance for new contests and the formation of new coalitions that often rejuvenated old enmities and created new ones. No party or faction had overwhelming political advantage, and this led to a high turnover of officials. High turnover, in turn, not only produced discontinuity in the management of the government's affairs, it fostered a whole class of functionaries who worked a few years in Bijāya, then in Qasānṭīna, then in Tilimsān or Granada. Instead of having the sons of Bijāya run the independent government of their city, the *hājibs* relied on politically less threatening outsiders. The result was the emergence of a group of administrators, jurists, and tax collectors who could find employment in any city, but who believed Tunis to be the real capital. Even when they belonged to the old families of Bijāya, like the Ghibrīnīs, they attempted to appoint their sons and grandsons to judgeships and other official positions in Tunis.

Conflicts between Ḥafṣid emirs, *hājibs*, members of the urban elite, and Bedouins undermined the autonomy of the Ḥafṣid emirate of Bijāya. The perceived weakness of the ruler of the city undoubtedly encouraged the expansionist aspirations of the 'Abd al-Wādids, Marīnids, and Catalans who saw in his weakness a political opportunity. But they, too, were unable to do more than pick favorites among the major local players. The possibilities were becoming narrower with every conspiracy that ended in blood, every costly and wasteful siege, and every battle that saw loss of life and treasure. No Ḥafṣid emir in Ifrīqiya seemed to be able to rally a strong enough coalition to

eliminate all the others and bring back a regional emirate. The situation was ripe for a political earthquake, and since it did not come from within, it had to come from outside.

Elite Rule Challenged (1346–64)

Commoners and the Rule of the Elite

In 1346, the aging Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46) learned that his son Abū Zakariyā, who was the emir of Bijāya, had died. He decided to send his other son Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar to replace him. When Abū Ḥafṣ arrived in the city, he quickly realized he was not welcome there. Popular opposition to his appointment was fierce and led to the appointment of the people’s favorite instead. Ibn Khaldūn describes the situation as follows:

The scoundrels (*awghād*) of the court forced Abū Ḥafṣ to use violence.⁴² The people (*al-nās*) feared the consequences and consulted one another. Then there were days of great fear in which a great number of [people among the] populace (*kāffa*) [tried to] force their [will] on the incoming emir. They marched around the Kasbah bearing arms calling for the rule of their [deceased] emir’s son. Then they scaled the [Kasbah’s] walls and assailed [Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar’s] house, and captured him. They then proceeded to take him out [of the Kasbah] after they had pillaged all his possessions and took him to the home of the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, their [deceased] emir’s son and their lord, who was ready to break from them and join the caliph [Abū Bakr], his grandfather.

His uncle permitted [Abū ‘Abd Allāh to accept their offer] and they pledged allegiance to him in his house. The following day, they took him to his palace in the Kasbah and made him their ruler. He appointed his client Fāriḥ as his *ḥājib*. . . .⁴³ The sultan became aware of the affairs of Bijāya and he sent them Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān, a most pious sheikh from the Almohads, to placate them. He sent with him a letter investing his grandson Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, son of the emir Abū Zakariyā, [with the office] following their desires. [After that] they were relieved and enjoyed the rule of the son of their [deceased] lord.⁴⁴

Before these events, the participation of commoners (*kāffa*) in the politics of Bijāya had never been so significant that they could decide which Ḥafṣid emir would rule. While Ibn Khaldūn's description makes it seem that the populace made the emir, his reference to a protégé of the Banū Sayyid al-Nās suggests the involvement of the elite behind the scenes. It is also possible, however, that Fāriḥ, who had benefited from Andalusi support in the past, was acting independently of Ibn Sayyid al-Nās and that he was behind the armed commoners. In any case, the "commoners" in question were not completely alien to local politics. If the involvement of non-elites in politics did not produce a complete redrawing of the political map this time, they soon after had a chance to make their presence felt in even more significant ways.

Marīnid Conquests and the Role of the Populace

In 1337, the Marīnid ruler Abū al-Ḥasan (r. 1331–48) took over the 'Abd al-Wādīd capital Tilimsān and became the most powerful monarch in the Maghrib. For the first time since the Almohads (1130–1269), a single dynasty was in the position of being able to bring the entire Maghrib under its rule. Growing Marīnid power threatened the autonomy of Bijāya and other cities in Ifrīqiyyā, including Tunis.

Between 1337 and 1346, Abū al-Ḥasan's influence on Ifrīqiyyā expanded greatly.⁴⁵ For the Ḥafṣid rulers of Bijāya, a consolidation of power on the western frontier did not bode well. Using a strategy that had worked before, the caliph of Tunis, Abū Bakr (d. 1346) sought to placate the Marīnids and hoped that a deal with Aragon would secure naval support in case of an attack.⁴⁶ In 1342, Abū Bakr officially named his son Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad as heir, and saw it fit to include Abū al-Ḥasan as underwriter of his edict.⁴⁷ Taking an oath guaranteeing the caliphal succession furthered the Marīnid ruler's involvement in Ḥafṣid affairs.

At the death of Abū Bakr, his son Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar received the pledge of allegiance thanks to the political maneuverings of Ibn Tafrākīn, the leader of the Almohad sheikhs in Tunis.⁴⁸ Hearing of the death of his father, the official heir to the throne, Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad, ran back to the capital to claim his right, but Abū Ḥafṣ would not let that happen and had the heir and another two of his brothers killed. The Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan used this usurpation as a reason to get directly involved in the affairs of Ifrīqiyyā.⁴⁹ He enticed Ibn Tafrākīn to switch camps and join a host of anti-Abū Ḥafṣ groups in support of the Marīnids. In 1347, the Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan led an army to conquer Ifrīqiyyā, leaving his son Abū 'Inān Fāris in charge of his own capital. On his

way, he obtained the peaceful submission of the powerful Dawāwida and of governors as far east as Tarāblus.

Abū al-Ḥasan took Bijāya from the Ḥafṣid emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh without a fight.⁵⁰ The Marīnid ruler sent him and his brother, the emir of Qasanṭīna, from Ifrīqiyyā to the western cities of Wujda and Naḍrūma, where they “ruled” as his clients. Abū al-Ḥasan then pushed toward Tunis and entered it without much resistance in September of 1347. The Marīnid sultan made a spectacular entry into the city on his horse, flanked on his right-hand side by the leader of the Zughba of the central Maghrib and the Almohad sheikh Ibn Tafrākīn, and on his left by two Ḥafṣid emirs whom he had freed from the jails of Qasanṭīna. He took possession of the palace of Tunis and then left for a campaign in the south to secure the region.

Next, Abū al-Ḥasan ordered an end to a practice that had allowed Bedouins to collect taxes in exchange for their military service, and offered to pay them instead for services rendered. For him, the Bedouins’ regular access to tax revenue gave them too much autonomy. Not wishing to lose this source of income, the Bedouins attempted to overthrow the Marīnids and restore a Ḥafṣid emir in Tunis. A coalition of Bedouin and Ḥafṣid emirs rallied behind the grandson of a former Ḥafṣid pretender by the name of Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām. In 1348, the two armies met and Abū al-Ḥasan’s army, which included many Ifrīqiyans, disbanded. He barely escaped with his life: loyalty to the Ḥafṣids gained renewed significance in Ifrīqiyyā.

The news of the defeat encouraged those who had rebelled against Abū al-Ḥasan. Meanwhile, his own son, Abū ‘Inān, declared himself sultan of Tilimsān and moved on the western territories.⁵¹ As soon as Abū ‘Inān let them, the two Ḥafṣid emirs his father had exiled promptly returned to Ifrīqiyyā. Once again, the Bijāyans made Abū ‘Abd Allāh their emir. Other members of the Ḥafṣid house rallied against the Marīnids and took back most of Ifrīqiyyā. Abū al-Ḥasan was left with nothing but the area immediately surrounding Tunis. After a series of losing battles against Ḥafṣid supporters and Ifrīqiyān Bedouins, Abū al-Ḥasan fled by sea. On his way back to the western Maghrib, he attempted to stop in Bijāya, but was refused entry. He found refuge in the west among the Hintātā of the High Atlas and died a year or so later, unable to unseat his son Abū ‘Inān.

After Abū al-Ḥasan was defeated, the three Ḥafṣid emirs of Bijāya, Qasanṭīna, and Tunis had to reclaim their dominions. The Marīnid interlude had emboldened some Bedouins and each Ḥafṣid emir needed to reassert his dominance over his domain. So frail was the grip these emirs had on power

that when Abū ‘Abd Allāh, Bijāya’s emir, ventured out of the city to lead a campaign against Qasanṭīna, he immediately lost control of the western port city of Tadlis. The Marīnid episode meant that only with difficulty could the emir of Bijāya impose his rule over areas he had once controlled securely. Perhaps discouraged by the political situation in which he found himself, Abū ‘Abd Allāh sought the protection of the Marīnid ruler at Tilimsān, Abū ‘Inān, who offered to take care of him only if he renounced his rights over Bijāya. He accepted. In 1352, Bijāya came under Marīnid control. Abū ‘Inān appointed his relative ‘Umar b. ‘Alī al-Waṭṭāṣī as governor—but left Abū ‘Abd Allāh’s *ḥājib*, Fāriḥ, in charge of the city.⁵²

Fāriḥ traveled to Qasanṭīna looking for support against the Marīnids. In his absence, the new pro-Marīnid governor arrived to take over Bijāya, and Ḥafṣid supporters, backed by the Ṣanhāja, openly rebelled against him. They killed a number of judges and pro-Marīnid notables, and sent for Fāriḥ, urging him to return. Unfortunately for him, the rebels soon after changed their minds and joined the Marīnid camp. When he arrived in Bijāya, they killed him, and sent his head to the Marīnid ruler. They then invited the Marīnid governor of Tadlis to become governor of Bijāya. After the Ṣanhāja left town in direction of Tunis, Marīnid officials arrested Fāriḥ’s supporters, including Hilāl, a client of the Banū Sayyid al-Nās, and the judge Muḥammad b. ‘Umaṛ. They also arrested “the leaders of the mob elements (*‘urafa’ al-ghawghā’*) from among the people of the city” and sent them to a prison in the western Maghrib.⁵³ While it is not clear who the *ghawghā’* were, they clearly had ties to judges and influential Andalusī families; and unlike the Ṣanhāja, the *ghawghā’* were “people of the city,” and could not just leave town after their defeat.⁵⁴ It is difficult, however, to identify the *ghawghā’* or their political motivations with any more precision than this.⁵⁵ Ibn Khaldūn would use the same word to describe the group that took over power in Bijāya later that year. It was not, however, surprising to find powerful groups such as the Ṣanhāja, pro-Ḥafṣid notables, and Andalusis involved in this anti-Marīnid rebellion. They each had reasons to oppose the Marīnids or to support their favorite Ḥafṣid. The end result was the same: the Marīnids controlled much of Ifrīqiyā, but the frail coalition that supported them did not hold together for long. Rather than a return of the Ḥafṣids, however, this time they faced an enemy against whom they were unprepared.

Popular Non-Dynastic Rule in Bijāya (1359/60–64)

The Marīnid Abū ‘Inān had appointed the governor of Tadlis, Yaḥyā b. Maymūn, to be governor of Bijāya. But his administration of the city ran

counter to the interests of its notables and they sought to eliminate him. For help in doing so, they contacted the Tunisian *hājib* Ibn Tafrakīn and tried to rally the Ḥafṣids again. The emir of Tunis, Abū Ishāq heeded their call, readied an army, and marched on Bijāya. “When they neared the city,” Ibn Khaldūn tells us, “the *ghawghā’* revolted against the governor Yahyā b. Maymūn and arrested him and those with him. [The *ghawghā’*] put them in a ship and sent them to Ibn Tafrakīn who put them in jail, where they were treated well, until he felt sorry for them and sent them back to the [western] Maghrib. And so, the [Ḥafṣid] sultan Abū Ishāq entered Bijāya in 761[1359–60]. . . . He appointed his son [Abū ‘Abd Allāh, emir of Bijāya] and the Almohad sheikh Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. Muḥammad from Akmāzīr as his *hājib*.⁵⁶ The Ḥafṣids were back in power in Bijāya, or so it seems, because according to Ibn Khaldūn, who is our only source of information on the subject, “the leader of the men of the *ghawghā’* was ‘Alī b. Ṣalih, who was among the [inhabitants] of low quality in Bijāya and their most contemptible. Around him had gathered the evil [ones] and the criminals.⁵⁷ And with the power he had over them he was able to overpower the *dawla*.⁵⁸ In other words, ‘Alī b. Ṣalih, the thug, was the effective ruler of Bijāya, not Abū Ishāq or his son.⁵⁹

When Abū ‘Abd Allāh, the former emir of Bijāya, was “freed” by Abū ‘Inān, he headed to his former capital in the company of Awlād Sibā’ sheikhs, who jockeyed for position in the new situation. According to Ibn Khaldūn, he attempted to unseat “his uncle” for four years, without much success.⁶⁰ During the fifth year, he persuaded the much more powerful Dawāwida and the Sadwīkish to help him, and so he entered the city in 1364. He was helped by sedition among the rebels.

When the *ghawghā’* were certain that the emir [Abū ‘Abd Allāh] was going to break their hold [on the city], and they became tired of the rule of ‘Alī b. Ṣalih, their leader (*‘arif*), they revolted against him and reneged on their oath to him.⁶¹ They left his cause and firmly joined the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh. . . . Then they brought to him his uncle Abū Ishāq, and [Abū ‘Abd Allāh] was benevolent with him. [Abū Ishāq] left [Bijāya] for his capital [Tunis]. Abū ‘Abd Allāh took control of Bijāya, the seat of his emirate, in 765 [1364] from ‘Alī b. Ṣalih and those with him among the leaders of the mob (*‘urafā’ al-ghawghā’*) who were [responsible] for the rebellion (*fitna*). He took all their possessions and then accomplished God’s decree by killing them.⁶²

The leader of the *ghawghā'* in Bijāya did not claim to rule on behalf of an emir, Ḥafṣid or Marīnid—even if the Ḥafṣid Abū Ishāq was in Bijāya. ‘Alī b. Ṣalīḥ does not seem to have pledged allegiance to Abū Ishāq. At the same time, he did not receive the oath of allegiance from either the city’s notables or the ‘āmma, but only from the ‘urafā’ who supported him. He was *primus inter pares* of an alliance of men who did not belong to notable families and who took over the reins of power.

The Effects of Elite Jockeying for Power

When in the early 1280s, the tailor Ibn Abī ‘Umāra came to power, he had been backed by powerful Bedouins and urban elites. His usurpation of the Ḥafṣid name would have been impossible without their support. But the *ghawghā'* seized a political opportunity afforded by the post-Marīnid invasions and the high level of contentiousness between elite factions. While it is easy to make too much of this episode, it illustrates well the decomposition of the political bloc behind the local emirate. The Marīnid invasions demonstrated that in the largest cities of Ifrīqiyyā, elite rule was not the only possibility. The local option could easily lead to the autonomy of cities without the need for the dynasty or its elite supporters. The question was whether anyone else would pursue this option or elite groups would form an alliance strong enough to eliminate it as a possibility. Over the next four decades, the elites would succeed in banding together over Ifrīqiyyā.

The Coming of the Regional Emirate (1364–1400s)

Taking Bijāya Back

After four years of rule by the *ghawghā'* in Bijāya, Ḥafṣid rule was restored in 1364. The emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh took over the city and employed the son of an influential Tunisan Andalusi family as his *hājib*. A few months later, he replaced him with his infinitely more famous brother, the historian ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Khaldūn.⁶³ Ibn Khaldūn remembered receiving a very warm welcome when he arrived in Bijāya from Granada, where he had served the Naṣrid Muḥammad V (r. 1354–59; 1362–91).⁶⁴ But the celebrations did not last long. The political situation in Bijāya was grave and Ibn Khaldūn quickly realized that the odds were not in Abū ‘Abd Allāh’s favor. For his emir to survive politically, he had to gain the support of the Bijāyan notables and defeat the ruler of Qasanṭīna, Abū al-‘Abbās. He did neither. The Bijāyans called on Abū

al-‘Abbās to rid them of Abū ‘Abd Allāh and his administration.⁶⁵ Recognizing his party had no chance of defeating Abū al-‘Abbās, Ibn Khaldūn begged for his life and safety. Abū al-‘Abbās allowed Ibn Khaldūn safe passage but then killed Abū ‘Abd Allāh and took over Bijāya in 1365/6.

Abū al-‘Abbās appointed the son of Abū ‘Abd Allāh as emir over Bijāya and then “advised [the new emir] to turn to Muḥammad b. Abī Mahdī, the leader of the city (*za‘im al-balad*), the commander of the navy, and foremost among the wily and manly (*ahl al-shaṭāra wa-al-rujūla*) among the city’s men and its archers.” Ultimately, “Ibn Abī Mahdī [was] regent and spoliator of [the emir’s] rule (*mustabiddan ‘alayhi*).”⁶⁶

Once more, Ibn Khaldūn describes a set of novel political relations but does not elaborate. The commander of the navy, backed by armed young men, was the effective ruler of Bijāya. The restoration of Ḥafṣid rule in Bijāya brought about a weak emir maintained in place by armed men. Shedding some light on the identity of these young men, Ibn Khaldūn comments:

The people of Bijāya started [committing acts of piracy] thirty years prior [to the Franco-Genoese expedition against al-Mahdiya in 1390]. They gathered a faction from among the pirates (*ghuzāt al-bahr*), built a navy, and chose the best men for it. These would arrive at the European coasts and islands by surprise and kidnap however many [people] they could and take away however many ships they found, and return with booty, slaves and hostages. [This was so] until the western coastal towns of the [province of] Bijāya were filled with their hostages, who made the country’s roads overflow with the noise of their chains and shackles when they went about doing their business and seeking their release. . . . This was painful to the European nations . . . and they [sought] revenge on the Muslims.⁶⁷

In Ibn Khaldūn’s treatment of the *ghawghā’* and the pirates, one notices a clear preference for the latter. The pirates were tied to the Ḥafṣid dynasty since their leader had an official position as commander of the navy. It is reasonable to believe that he wielded a great deal of power *because* of the importance of his function to the Ḥafṣids, both as the leader of the navy and as provider of revenue. Furthermore, the pirates’ activities were inscribed in the logic of Crusade/counter-Crusade. That alone conferred upon them an ideological veneer not available to the *ghawghā’*. In the eyes of Ibn Khaldūn, the power that the

leader of the navy had over the Ḥafṣid ruler was similar to the preeminence of the various *ḥājibs* and thus clearly distinct from the actions of the *ghawḡā*. Pirates were the armed hand of dynastic restoration.

Toward a New Regional Emirate

In 1369, the old ruler of Tunis, Abū Ishāq, died. The emir of Qasanṭīna and Bijāya, Abū al-‘Abbās, quickly moved on the capital and took it over in 1370. For the first time in several decades, he brought the Ḥafṣid dynasty under a sole ruler. For the following twenty years, he worked tirelessly to consolidate his power and pacify the region. He fought countless battles against rebellious Bedouins, persuaded many others to accept him as ruler, and did the same with urban elites. During his reign, Bijāya lost some of its political significance because both Marīnids and ‘Abd al-Wādids were too weak to help support any independent city. As he rebuilt the sociopolitical foundations of a new Ḥafṣid dominion, Abū al-‘Abbās privileged Qasanṭīna and Būna at the expense of Bijāya.

Abū al-‘Abbās ruled for more than two decades (1370–94), the first such stretch in a few generations. Many, including Ibn Khaldūn, who dedicated his famous *Kitāb al-‘ibar* to him, admired his reign. Ibn Khaldūn credits Abū al-‘Abbās for reclaiming power from the hands of the *ḥājibs*, and beginning the process of concentrating power in the hands of the ruler. Ḥafṣid historians depict Abū al-‘Abbās as the ruler of all Ifrīqiyyā, even though he delegated a great deal of power to emirs such as his son Abū Fāris of Qasanṭīna. But even correcting for later Ḥafṣid bias in favor of regional unity, Abū al-‘Abbās had begun the process of pulling Ifrīqiyyā together.

When Abū al-‘Abbās died in 1394, Abū Fāris was recognized as the new emir. He left Qasanṭīna for Tunis and was proclaimed ruler without the sort of opposition the Ḥafṣids had until now made customary. Whereas Abū al-‘Abbās had established peace, Abū Fāris naturalized it. He expanded his domain in the south and in the west, bringing Tilimsān under his authority. Importantly, under his rule Tunis became the undisputed capital of Ifrīqiyyā, and greatest city of the Maghrib, rivaled only by Fās (Fez), the Marīnid capital. His forty-year reign was that of a regional emir. The historians agreed: according to Ibn al-Shammā‘, Abū Fāris “attained the maximum control over Ifrīqiyyā (*balagha min mulki Ifriqiyyā al-ghayatu al-quṣwā*) by subduing the Bedouins (*a’rāb*).”⁶⁸

After Abū Fāris’s death, his grandson Abū ‘Abd Allāh ruled for a little more than a year. ‘Uthmān (r. 1436–88) succeeded him. ‘Uthmān had to face a certain Abū al-Ḥasan, who had declared himself ruler of Ifrīqiyyā from Bijāya

and attempted to take over Tunis. However, by 1440, his attempt was crushed, and ‘Uthmān ruled a unified Ḥafṣid dynasty for decades. Under him, the Ḥafṣids brought into the fold the urban notables who had previously been so difficult to persuade. Far from the cities and the areas that they controlled, the picture was less clearly in their favor. However, no single group could now challenge the Ḥafṣids. While the Bedouins enjoyed a great deal of autonomy vis-à-vis the dynasty—not all of them paid taxes or contributed soldiers—with Abū Fāris, the Ḥafṣids were once more able to bring all of Ifrīqiyyā under their rule. Tunis was once more the capital of Ifrīqiyyā.

In the view of Ḥafṣid authors, Abū Fāris proved to be the greatest ruler the dynasty had produced in more than a century. He subjected local emirates, Bedouin confederacies, and independent cities that had blossomed for nearly a century outside Tunis’s control. If this description of Abū Fāris likens him to a messianic figure, it is only because in the eyes of those who lived through the period of war and instability, he was one. He finally realized the political fantasies of the preceding generations. Ḥafṣid commentators saw him as the true heir to the legacy of his two ancestors, Abū Zakariyā (d. 1249) and al-Mustanṣir (d. 1277), whom they so idealized. For them, the accession of Abū Fāris was a second coming of the regional emirate and a rebirth of the dynasty.⁶⁹

The Ḥafṣid intellectuals in the fifteenth century who celebrated Abū Fāris by comparing him to Abū Zakariyā and al-Mustanṣir accomplished an important ideological slight of hand. They recast the history of Ifrīqiyyā in the intervening period in terms of the heroic task of returning Ifrīqiyyā to the hands of the Ḥafṣid dynasty. This idea anchors their dynastic conception of historiography and casts the fourteenth century as a period of chaos and war between cousins.

How Ḥafṣid Was Ifrīqiyyā?

In the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Ḥafṣid emirs led a number of political coalitions. Sometimes, the support they garnered allowed them to control Tunis and all the large cities of Ifrīqiyyā. At other times, they effectively controlled just a few cities. But many of these emirs were mere puppets in the hands of powerful Andalusi or Almohad *ḥājibs*. Consequently, the idea that Ifrīqiyyā was a region ruled by the Ḥafṣid dynasty does not correspond to the political realities of the time. Even when, in its regional configuration,

Ḥafṣid domination brought together cities from Tripoli to Bijāya, there were always areas that were beyond its reach—and not only mountainous ones. The local Ḥafṣid emirs' ability to impose their domination was severely limited by their fear of venturing too far from their cities lest someone take them in their absence.

Adding up the areas effectively ruled by local Ḥafṣid emirs would, then, still leave a great deal of Ifrīqiyā outside the dynasty's purview. Local emirs controlled areas near the cities. When the political realignments at the end of the fourteenth century eliminated local emirs, they did not radically alter this basic aspect of Ḥafṣid rule. Even under the regional emirate of Abū Fāris, the Ḥafṣids did not control all the "territory" of Ifrīqiyā, as modern historians have claimed following the medieval chronicles. Rather, they held the cities and projected their influence from there.

Not that this "influence" was an abstraction. It was tied to the ability to accumulate wealth and raise armies. Political and financial considerations were inextricably linked. The pledges of allegiance the dynasty received from urban elites, "small" dynasties, and Bedouins engaged all these groups either militarily, financially, or both. For this reason, no analysis of politics can be complete without an examination of the system of land tenure, agricultural production, and taxation through which the Ḥafṣids exercised their power in Ifrīqiyā. To discern the contours of the dynasty's influence, one must understand the extent to which it was able, through its political leadership, to engender regional integration on an economic level.

C H A P T E R 2

Taxation and Land Tenure

The Ḥafṣid dynasty was not able to keep all of Ifrīqiyā under its political control in the fourteenth century. However, there is nothing preventing the local configuration of Ḥafṣid rule from fostering the development of a regional economy. Political unity and economic integration needed not go hand in hand. But the activities of the ruling elite and its allies did nothing to encourage, promote, or support the types of specialization in production and circulation that would have made Ifrīqiyā an economic unit. Instead, the range of their intervention outside cities narrowed over time and became mostly extractive and predatory and, in effect, undermined the cause of economic integration.

Agriculture and animal husbandry were the two most important economic sectors in Ifrīqiyā, dwarfing both commerce and manufacturing.¹ Most people in Ifrīqiyā worked the land or tended animals, and often did both. By itself, however, the preponderance of these two activities did not amount to regional specialization or integration: the organization of agricultural production did not follow a single mode. Throughout the fourteenth century, a number of economic arrangements prevailed, maintaining markedly different types of land tenure, labor contracts, and legal and fiscal regimes. When the Ḥafṣid dynasty levied taxes, rents, and even ransoms, it brought these economic zones together, but there were limits on the degree of integration this produced. The treasury took the economic surplus and redistributed it to generate, maintain, and reproduce political, rather than economic, ties.

This had been the situation for a long time. The Almohads (1130–1269) had tried to bring together the pieces of this economic mosaic by force and implement a coercive fiscal system. But their political situation empowered semi-independent allies and enemies, especially Bedouins, and local Ḥafṣid

emirs ruled independently of, and often in conflict with, one another. Ultimately, the Ḥafṣids (1229–1574) undid important components of the Almohad system or, to put it more accurately, remade them in the process of imposing their rule in its local or regional form. The involvement of the urban Ḥafṣid dynasty and its supporters in agriculture became increasingly limited to the perimeters of cities such as Bijāya. Concurrently, the remaking of politico-economic relations in the country, through mechanisms and institutions not fully controlled by the urban elite, led to the formation of novel social relations. These processes further consolidated the disengagement of the urban dynasty from the affairs of the country and strengthened economic zones that were often only partly tied to other zones, sometimes fully autonomous, and only rarely tied to an Ifrīqiyyā-wide economy.

Besides commerce, which will be the subject of the following chapter, taxation and forceful expropriation of surplus were the most consistent mechanisms of economic integration. The Ḥafṣids utilized military and legal force to secure sources of revenue. Like the Almohads, the Ḥafṣids and those who benefited from the land grants they distributed, urbanites and Bedouins, tried to retain control over these lands by legal means. All contemporaries, regardless of their political orientation or social standing, recognized this. This basic fact of politics weakened the ownership and control of land and made the role of the judiciary particularly prominent.²

The Ḥafṣids utilized at least three legal regimes, or ways of legitimizing their fiscal actions. First, they claimed taxes that were regulated by Islamic law and due from all Muslims, such as the *ūsh̄r* (tithe). In Ifrīqiyyā and the entire Maghrib, al-Andalus included, the Mālikī school of jurisprudence was predominant. The Ḥafṣids mobilized Mālikī law especially in areas where urban influence was greatest. Then, there were a number of other levies for which Muslim jurists had a hard time finding a rationale in their authoritative books and that Mālikī jurists considered extra-legal or illegal. These formed part of an individual ruler's laws and tended to vary from one ruler to the next even if rulers drew on prevailing custom, old and new. Third, the dynasty received contributions from Bedouin sheikhs or village leaders who collected excises based on the customs of their locality. These contributions or tributes were not technically taxes. However, to collect them, the sheikhs used similar means and arguments to those used to collect taxes. When the Ḥafṣids brought under their domination Bedouins who possessed a body of organized customary laws (*qānūn*), they levied taxes or tributes based on rates of taxation the Bedouins

had established. But for the most part, this last type of law predominated in areas not under Hafṣid rule (*ard al-qānūn*).

The reach and efficiency of the Hafṣid fiscal system varied with political and military circumstances. The more visible changes drew the attention of contemporaries and made their way into chronicles. Contemporary sources were less well aware of the impact of the incremental transformation of the tax structure itself, a “subterranean” and slower change that undermined the ability of the dynasty to collect legal taxes. Since agricultural taxes were assessed based on the status of land, a modification of the type of land tenure could have serious fiscal implications. Although the character of the sources makes it difficult to appreciate the short-term effects of strategies to evade the dynastic fiscal system, they gain significance in the longer term, shedding light on a process of fiscal resistance that can only be sketched imprecisely from the inconsistent and often contradictory references found in collections of legal opinions.³

Together with land tenure and taxation, contractual relations between laborers and farmers, landowners and tenants, or owners and shepherds determined the rate of profit. They also shed light on the homogenization of labor relations and may have been an important site of regional integration. The types of labor contracts were, however, tied to local customs and the ways the Almohads and the Hafṣids dealt with land—especially when it came to land grants (*iqtā'āt*, sing. *iqtā'*). In terms of prevailing relations between parties involved in agricultural production, Ifrīqiyyā did not exhibit a homogeneous or homogenizing set of contractual relations.

To make my arguments about the lack of regional integration, I will utilize two types of sources: collections of legal opinions and literary sources. Both include very useful information about the period but also have their limitations. The legal opinions provide us with the basis for a typology of agricultural relations and allow us to determine which practices were accepted. But the opinions included in these compilations are not representative of all the legal cases that emerged at any given moment or place.⁴ In addition, jurists had the tendency to frown upon legal innovation and tended to privilege precedent, which further skewed the sample. On the other hand, information found in literary sources, such as the historical narratives and travelogues used here, tend to be anecdotal and inconsistent. However, they are informative about the activities of the ruling dynasty and, for instance, allow us to show that the Almohads used land expropriations and land grants as ways of

securing their rule. They also demonstrate the continued existence of a multiplicity of economic arrangements well into the fifteenth century.

The coexistence of various types of land tenure, taxes, and labor contracts can make for a knotty discussion of their combined, but not always synchronic, evolution over time. The fragmentary and inconsistent character of the evidence magnifies the problem by making it difficult to draw a map of either the distribution of land or labor contracts. This is not necessarily a setback, however, because the focus here is not on geographic location, but on the impact of the Ḥafṣid fiscal system in fostering regional integration. Even without drawing a precise map, it is possible to differentiate between areas in the “countryside” based on the predominant economic arrangements.

Around the cities of Ifrīqiyā, there were three concentric circles of countryside. The first was a “green belt” of farms and gardens (*basātīn*), which, in the case of Bijāya, extended for twelve miles.⁵ Using water from rivers and wells, farmers planted a variety of vegetables and legumes.⁶ Some of these gardens were in fact large parks designed for the rest and entertainment of Ḥafṣid emirs.⁷ In their midst, there often stood functioning towers (*abrāj*, sing. *burj*) from which lookouts watched for intruders. Not far from these gardens, it was common to find palm, olive, and fig trees. These fruit groves (*ghābāt*, sing. *ghāba*) were located at the outskirts of cities. Lands in this first belt, near the cities, tended to be privately owned. Their owners hired laborers to work them or rented them out to individuals who lived on or near the land.

In the second belt, there were larger estates in which dry farming prevailed. To work the land, tenants or sharecroppers lived in small clusters of about ten to twenty houses or in small villages. In addition to vegetables and legumes, they planted cereals such as oats, barley, and wheat and usually kept sheep, cows, and goats. In spite of their distance from urban centers, which could be quite significant, these estates are best thought of in association with the cities, because they were mostly owned by urbanites, the ruling family foremost among them.

Beyond the first and second belts were “Bedouin” lands (*bādiya*). Less fertile and usually less well watered, these were generally farther from the Mediterranean coast toward the Sahara. Pastoralist nomads who lived in tents traveled across these lands in search of pastures. They were not alone, however, as a number of small villages survived on a mix of dry farming and animal husbandry. Given the regularity of droughts and the poor quality of their land, they often suffered famines and other hardships. The lot of these Bedouins was very similar to that of people who lived off the land in the mountains

southeast of Bijāya and Qasanṭīna, for example. They were poor, and supplemented their diet by raising cattle, hunting wild animals, and harvesting nuts and other products of the forests.

The development of these three rings around the cities was a gradual process that began to be noticed as early as the end of the eleventh century. By the fourteenth century, the commonly held view about the origins of this arrangement was that the Fatimid ruler of Egypt, al-Mustansir (1036–94), had punished his former vassal in Ifrīqiyyā by encouraging Banū Hilāl Bedouins to migrate to the west. The historian Ibn Khaldūn most famously articulated the idea that Ifrīqiyyā experienced a decline because of these Bedouins, likening the Banū Hilāl to destructive swarms of locusts.⁸ Modern historians have debated the invasion of the Banū Hilāl and strongly disagreed about its impact. The substance of the debate centers on the interpretation of the literary sources that describe these events.⁹ Although archeological evidence would help better date these transformations and explain the emergence of fortified villages and cities, medieval archeology remains too underdeveloped to offer help. Ultimately, it is not clear whether the Bedouin invasions caused the decline of agriculture or the other way around. In any case, by the thirteenth century the association of agricultural production with defensive structures such as watchtowers, walls, or networks of fortifications was well established. Bedouins and bands of bandits operated in the countryside and caused a great deal of insecurity, limiting commercial activity and fostering self-sufficiency. They limited the scope of the Ḥafṣid dynasty to those areas it managed to control. Even there, however, tax evasion became a serious problem.

The Limits of Fiscal Integration

When he conquered the eastern territories of Ifrīqiyyā in the 1150s, the Almohad caliph ‘Abd al-Mu’min (r. 1130–63) took possession of the lands of those who resisted by force of arms.¹⁰ The Almohads then sought to confer upon their appropriation of land an Islamic legal cover through fiscal categories that allowed them to extract the maximum possible amount of cash and produce, notably under the rubric of *kharāj*, a tax that was fully established and had legal precedent, and which recalled the early years of the Muslim conquests of the seventh century.¹¹ On some of these *kharāj* lands, the Almohads demanded half of the product of the land, an extraordinary rate by the standards of the time.¹²

Most of the land that came into the hands of the Almohads had been held, at least nominally, by preceding dynasties: the Almoravids of Marrakech (1062–1147), the Ḥammādids of Bijāya (1015–1152), and the Zīrids of al-Qayrawān (972–1148).¹³ These lands did not all have the same status. Some had been given as grants (*iqtā’āt*) to Bedouins and were assessed on that basis, others were held as the private domains of the rulers, and yet others were uncultivated.¹⁴ While officially the Ḥammādids and Zīrids granted lands to Bedouins, the political realities were such that they had little choice but to do so. The power of Bedouins practically forced these dynasties and the urban elites that supported them to retreat to the areas immediately surrounding cities. By taking over the capitals of these kingdoms, the Almohads challenged the existing status quo in Ifrīqiyyā. They kept an active military force there and expanded the area effectively controlled from the cities. Consequently, Bedouins rebelled against the Almohads and gave military support to the permanent rebellion of the Banū Ghāniya. To build up support in Ifrīqiyyā, the Almohads developed a more conciliatory attitude toward the urban elites, refraining from expropriating land from the “old” families of Bijāya, unless they had opposed them militarily. This left urban elites with considerable amounts of land in nearby areas.

In 1159, the Almohad caliph ‘Abd al-Mu’mīn attempted to impose a coherent tax policy in the new kingdom by initiating a land reform meant to maximize revenue. To achieve his goal efficiently, he ordered an extensive land survey (*taksīr*).¹⁵ But the Almohads did not collect only what can technically be considered taxes. When it was advantageous to them to do so, they continued a number of existing dues, long-term rents, ad hoc tolls, fines, and other levies. The net result was a veritable fiscal arsenal that they deployed strategically. While I call this a fiscal system, it should be clear that it encompassed a multiplicity of methods and strategies used by a fiscal administration led by a chief financial administrator (*sāhib al-ashghāl*).¹⁶ A division of labor and specialization among various offices paralleled the multiplicity of regimes. The fiscal administration was composed of a number of officials whose functions were to assess, monitor, collect, and transfer the surplus to the central treasury.¹⁷ The dynasty’s lands (*makhzin*) were managed by a special administrative unit called the *diwān al-mustakhlīṣ*, *dār al-mukhtaṣ*, or *diwān al-diyā‘*.¹⁸ The sheikhs then proceeded to administer a large-scale redistribution of monies to pay the troops and subaltern officials, and to maintain the support of strategic allies. After the Hafṣids took over, they undermined the power of the Almohad sheikhs by gradually taking away their financial responsibilities

and handing them to prominent Andalusis such as the Banū Khaldūn and the Banū Sayyid al-Nās.

The Almohads managed some of the property that had belonged to the preceding dynasties under the rubric of *jazā'*, which a Tunisian jurist defined rather vaguely as “buying land on the condition of paying an agreed-upon rate according to an agreed-upon schedule.”¹⁹ For the Ḥafṣid judge Ibn ‘Arafa (d. 1401), *jazā'* recognized the “buyer” as the eventual outright private owner, but the schedule of payments extended well beyond his lifetime, making him effectively a renter or sharecropper, depending on the stipulations. Moreover, because *jazā'* land had the de facto status of private property (*milk*), it is also known to have been included in dowries and transformed into inalienable pious endowments. Almohad soldiers found the *jazā'* particularly enticing because it afforded them the possibility of becoming landowners, and many took possession of lands that they had brought back into cultivation (*mawāt*) under this rubric.²⁰ Obviously, the Almohads were only happy to increase their revenues by expanding cultivated land. But over time, the dynasty would lose control over these lands.

The officials of the Almohad treasury rented out some of the lands under their supervision to individuals who, in addition to paying the *‘ushr* (tithe), also paid a smaller amount known as *ḥukr*.²¹ These tenants had restricted use of the land: the dynasty did not allow them to plant new trees, an action that could be grounds for outright appropriation of the land after long-term occupation. But the level of oversight needed to protect these lands was not always available. Eventually, some tenants were able to purchase or take possession of them in a slow and gradual process that extended well into the fifteenth century.

The same picture of gradual loss of fiscal revenues emerges from a survey of illegal taxes. Originally, the Almohads used the imposition of such taxes by their predecessors as a rallying cry against them. In a letter addressed to Almohad supporters (*talaba*) in al-Andalus, ‘Abd al-Mu’min wrote that “the [illegal] *magħārim*, the *mukūs* and other unacceptable levies were the greatest of crimes (*ażam al-kabā’ir jurman*).”²² But in the thirteenth century, the Ḥafṣid emirs made the *mukūs* and *magħārim* standard in a variety of forms and amounts and imposed them on whomever they could. They normally collected them on a regular basis from local authorities, but sent a troop (*maballa*) in case of late payments or urgent financial need. During tax raids, the Ḥafṣid *maballa* often harassed the population and damaged their homes and fields in search of hidden underground caches (*maṭāmīr*, sing. *maṭmūr*). The fiscal arsenal included a number of other taxes, such as the *tadyīf* (or *diyāfa*) and *inzāl*, the

fee that a military force imposed on its “hosts” or that rulers imposed on their “guests.”²³ Tax collectors demanded these very unpopular fees from villages during their visits. Canceling these illegal taxes was also a political tool used to rally supporters. During their long rebellion against the Almohads, the Banū Ghāniya canceled taxes in the areas they controlled; so did the Ḥafṣid usurper Ibn Abī ‘Umāra in 1282–83.²⁴ The Ḥafṣids finally eliminated them in the mid-fourteenth century, a move that illustrates the erosion of their power over non-urban areas.²⁵

Taxation, a Limited Means of Regionalization

To summarize thus far: As a mechanism of regional integration, taxation was only as effective as politics allowed. Almohad military power had expanded the reach of the ruling dynasty beyond the fortified cities and villages and into areas controlled by Bedouins. Their fiscal aggressiveness had the potential to foster economic integration. But it also challenged the economic interests of Bedouins, who rebelled against the Almohads and seriously weakened their domination over the eastern Maghrib. As Almohad sheikhs, the Ḥafṣids adapted the fiscal policies of their predecessors to the new political situation. Eventually, the oscillation of Ḥafṣid domination between the regional and local modes undermined the dynasty’s ability to impose an Ifrīqiyyā-wide fiscal system. On the political defensive for much of the fourteenth century, the dynasty lost a great deal of its revenues to Bedouins and urban elites who mobilized legal means to change the status of property in the first two rings around the cities. The Ḥafṣids found a solution to their revenue problems in predation and extortion, and thanks to tax raids in the countryside and Mediterranean piracy, were able to maintain themselves in power. With these developments, the cities of Ifrīqiyyā became the main political and economic bases of dynastic power.

Land Grants

Taxation was not the only mechanism capable of fostering regional economic integration. Land grants (*iqtā’at*), too, had the potential to make Ifrīqiyyā into an economically integrated region, depending on their location, who benefited from them, and the markets for which they produced. The Almohads, and after them the Ḥafṣids, granted lands they controlled, legally or not, by writing up formal acts of concession. According to the Ḥafṣid judge Ibn ‘Arafa (d. 1401), the concession concerned only the products of the land and not its ownership

(*inqitā'uba innamā huwa inqitā' intifā' lā milk*).²⁶ In the fourteenth century, it was common to have multiple claimants who obtained grants from different, often competing, rulers. Al-Burzulī insisted that the act of concession (*zahīr*) had to be renewed with each successive ruler, thus articulating the view that rulers who may have obtained lands through illegal expropriation from their rightful owners still had the privilege to decide who could possess them legally.

Those who received land grants from the ruler, including the ulama, rented them out to cultivators who lived on the land.²⁷ Although technically they did not own the land, grantees could pass it down to their children. This aspect of land tenure was a source of conflicts between relatives who used the practice of grant renewal to exclude other heirs. This was the case when the beneficiary of an *iqtā'* died leaving heirs who claimed to have received a new concession excluding everyone else. Ibn 'Arafa reminded the claimants that the privilege of deciding was ultimately the ruler's: "the later concession abrogates the first" (*al-iqtā' al-thāni nāsikh li al-awwal*).²⁸

The Almohads and the Ḥafṣids both used land grants to compensate their armies. After the Almohad conquests in the Maghrib, the regime distributed land grants to the sheikhs, who quickly became a rentier class. With the coming of the Ḥafṣids (1229–1574), many sheikhs stayed in Ifrīqiyyā. They lived in the cities and were usually far from *iqtā'* lands located in the cereal-producing areas such as the Ḥudna (Hodna), the high plains nearly sixty miles to the south of Bijāya. Living off rent from these lands, the Almohad sheikhs resembled other elite groups, the pre-Almohad urban elites and Andalusis foremost among them.²⁹ Those directly tied to the Ḥafṣid rulers, family members, and high-level officials received grants over large estates.³⁰ Known as *hanāshir* (sing. *hinshir*) or *diyā'* (sing. *day'a*), these estates tended to be located at the edge of administrative units '*amālāt*' (sing. '*amāla*') or '*awtān*' (sing. *waṭan*). They were often granted in *iqtā'āt*.³¹ These estates constituted the outer ring around greater urban centers such as Bijāya, Qasanṭīna, Būna, and Tunis.

The Almohads used land grants to provide for Bedouins from the western Maghrib who served in their armies and then settled in Ifrīqiyyā.³² They compensated them by granting them uncultivated lands (*mawāt*), mostly in the second ring around cities.³³ Bringing new land into cultivation and granting it to allied groups brought financial and military returns because it encouraged taxable economic activity and put in place a defensive barrier around urban centers.³⁴ Often accompanied by the forced relocation of enemy Bedouins, this strategy expanded the area within which the Almohads could foster security and commerce. With time, recipients of *mawāt* tried to change the status

of these lands and limit the dynasty's oversight of them.³⁵ Although by themselves such actions did not necessarily undermine economic integration, they point to a serious challenge the dynasty faced.

A slightly different process characterized the settlement of Ghuzz mercenaries who migrated to Ifrīqiyyā from the Mashriq.³⁶ The Almohads granted land to Ghuzz commanders, paying the soldiers a monthly salary because they were “foreigners, with nothing for them to fall back on in these lands but this payment, whereas the Almohads [i.e., the sheikhs] received *iqtā’āt* and the revenue that issued from them.”³⁷ Like non-Almohad western Bedouin settlers, after the Ghuzz lost their primarily military functions, they did not come to constitute a recognized sociopolitical group in Ifrīqiyyā. They simply disappeared into historical anonymity making it impossible to assess their activities in relation to economic integration.

Historical anonymity was not the problem of the powerful Ifrīqiyan Bedouins who challenged the authority of the dynasty outside of the cities. The Almohads had a generally antagonistic relation with them and never granted them any land. The first two Ḥafṣid rulers did not change that. But in the series of political realignments that led to the emergence of the local emirates, Ḥafṣid emirs began using land grants as a way of paying off Bedouins for services rendered. According to the Ḥafṣid historians Ibn Qunfudh (d. 1407) and al-Zarkashī (fl. 1482), Abū Ishaq Ibrāhīm (r. 1279–83) was “the first to grant land in the western regions [of Ifrīqiyyā] to the Bedouins by *zahīr*.³⁸ Ibn Khaldūn dated the introduction of grants to Bedouins slightly later, to the reign of Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar. For Ibn Khaldūn, the support of Bedouins put Abū Ḥafṣ on the throne in Tunis, and, in exchange, the new ruler decided to depart from common practice by granting them land.

In the year 683/1284–85, [the *sultān* Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar] granted lands (*iqtā’*) and the revenues from [illegal] taxes (*maghārim*) to the Arabs as a sign of gratitude for their military support. They had never had lands granted to them [before that]. In fact, previous [Almohad and Ḥafṣid] caliphs had always avoided doing so, never allowing the door for such an eventuality to be opened in their hearts.³⁹

When they granted lands to the Dawāwida of the Banū Riyāḥ, the Ḥafṣids knew that the latter already had effective control over the land.⁴⁰ The grant was a gesture that allowed official ties to continue between them.⁴¹ The Banū Riyāḥ remained a force to contend with throughout the fourteenth century.

In 1394, the judge Abū al-‘Abbās al-Marīd sent a question to the Ḥafṣid judge Ibn ‘Arafa (d. 1401) about the “war against Daylam, Sa‘īd, Riyāḥ, Suwayd, and Banū ‘Āmir, the emirs of the Bedouins of the central Maghrib.” His use of the title emir to describe the leaders indicates that they were powerful in his eyes. Ibn ‘Arafa prefaced his answer with a telling assessment of the situation.

In our Maghrib, among the Arabs [Bedouins] there are nearly 10,000 men or more between mounted and foot soldiers. They mostly raid, rob poor victims on the road, massacre with much bloodshed, pillage without justice, and kidnap the daughters and wives of Muslims by force. These are the customs of their ancestors and descendants. The authority of the ruler or his representative does not reach them, and worse, besides their own military capacity, he is too weak to fight them. In fact, the ruler appeases them with gifts and awards them positions in areas under his control.⁴²

The Ḥafṣids left lands far from cities to “Bedouins.”⁴³ The question is, then, whether Bedouin activities fostered Ifrīqiyyā-wide economic integration. There is no evidence that they did. In fact, conflicts among Bedouins, such as those over control of pastures, suggest that if they participated in regional integration, they did so indirectly, unknowingly, or because of the activities of merchants or some other group.

The Effects and Limits of Land Grants

Land grants were primarily a political instrument in the hands of the ruling dynasty. While the Almohads and the first two regional Ḥafṣid rulers had granted land to military commanders, courtiers, and members of the urban elite, local Ḥafṣid emirs used grants to pay off Bedouins who contributed soldiers, and to secure peaceful relations with others who were potential adversaries. In neither case did land grants foster economic integration. Rather, local Ḥafṣid emirs used *iqṭā’at* to protect their autonomy and thus prevent unification of Ifrīqiyyā under a single ruler.

Pious Endowments

The conversion of private property into pious endowments (sing. *ḥabs/ḥubs/ḥubus*, pl. *aḥbāṣ/ḥābūs*; also sing. *waqf*, pl. *awqāf*) undermined the dynasty’s

finances.⁴⁴ These endowments typically involved the use of revenues from the exploitation of a piece of land to finance a charitable institution (a mosque, a school, or, more modestly, a fountain) and its upkeep and administration—usually by the descendants of a named beneficiary. Since, as a rule, privately founded pious endowments were tax exempt, their expansion diminished the ability of the dynasty to raise revenues.⁴⁵

Pious endowments were established when a privately owned property was transformed into an endowment whose beneficiary was an individual or an institution.⁴⁶ A general endowment (*habs ‘āmm*) was used for public institutions. An official known as *sāhib al-habs al-kabīr*, who decided the wages given to those who maintained the institution, managed such endowments.⁴⁷ A private endowment (*habs khāṣṣ*) referred to endowments to individuals, typically the offspring of the founder. This type of endowment usually barred outsiders from taking over possession of familial property, as was the case of someone who established an endowment because he feared the misdeeds of his neighbors.⁴⁸ Alternatively, establishing an endowment prevented the parceling of land among heirs. In one such case, an endowment was set up by a ruler on behalf of a learned man (*‘ālim*) “whose children wanted to gain exclusive ownership and exclude his grandchildren from benefiting.”⁴⁹ Much like treasury bills today, establishing a *habs* (*tahbīs*) was not a particularly profitable investment. However, it guaranteed an unequalled degree of security.⁵⁰ Islamic law was adamant about maintaining the integrity of these endowments. Restrictions on modifying them even slightly were unambiguous.⁵¹ This did not prevent “enterprising” individuals from trying.⁵²

But *tahbīs* alone did not confer social power. Those who saw in pious endowments a defensive strategy against the predation of the powerful ultimately remained socially subordinate and on the defensive unless they became wealthy by engaging in other economic activities. Contemporaries such as the historian Ibn Khaldūn noted this basic comparative disadvantage of the rentier class. “[Income from] estates and farms do not yield their owner a sufficient income for his needs. [The income from them]) will not pay for the customs of luxury and the things that go with it. As a rule, it serves only to help provide for the necessities of life.”⁵³

The principal beneficiaries of the endowments were not legally considered landowners. Their ability to transform rent into salaries and other benefits made them comparable to the rentier class.⁵⁴ An important difference was, of course, that the beneficiaries of *ahbās* did not determine the rent. The enforcement of contracts related to the exploitation of land associated with these

endowments was critical to the functioning of the system. A Ḥafṣid judge appointed a *nāzir* to fulfill this function. This official usually received a proportion of the land's product.⁵⁵

The fact that endowments were inalienable did not always protect them from other types of changing circumstances such as crop failures, which could be detrimental to the proper working of the endowment. The lack of funds made an endowment difficult to maintain in its original or intended form. The need to act pragmatically and respond to economic realities did little to quell the suspicions that the managers of the endowment, typically descendants of the founder, were eager to modify the endowment for their personal benefit. The death or disappearance of beneficiaries in cases in which the founder did not identify an alternative recipient could also be a problem. The death of a manager often meant that no one knew exactly which piece of land was associated with which building or institution in town. Although clearly a boon to the agriculturalists who worked the land, such a situation was detrimental to the upkeep of urban real estate and the revenues of the descendants of the founder. Another threat to pious endowments came from the actions of Bedouins and outlaws (*mustaqbiqīn al-dhimma*) who routinely ransacked crops and seriously disrupted the functioning of endowments.⁵⁶ Naturally, they were an immediate concern for the landed urban families for whom pious endowments were an economic lifeline.

The endowment administrator relied on “common practice” and often asked for the opinion of local landowners and cultivators in making his assessment. Absentee beneficiaries, executors, and endowment administrators, often the same individual, watched carefully over the *nāzir* to make sure that he did not use his function as a means to defraud them.⁵⁷ The situation put a great deal of power in the hands of those who lived nearer the land to the detriment of absentee beneficiaries. With the passing of time, and taking into account deaths, political strife, and fraudulent expropriation, the conditions were clearly not in favor of the urban rentier class.

In spite of all these risks, however, propertied Ifrīqiyyans utilized pious endowments as a means to protect their possessions from an even more serious threat: the dynasty and its powerful allies.⁵⁸ By supporting the institution, the Almohad and Ḥafṣid dynasties helped strengthen it and weaken themselves, making pious endowments a pragmatic option for individuals seeking shelter from the covetousness of the powerful.⁵⁹ Since legal scholars were among those who utilized this institution to their advantage, it is natural that they were among its most vociferous supporters. Indeed, they convinced the powerful

that a violation of pious endowments was tantamount to committing an unforgivable sin, thus creating a near taboo around it. Like the violations of any other taboo, attacks on pious endowments occurred in the dark, to avoid notice. Legal cases against violators show that at least some were caught trying. Tax assessors, tax collectors, and other officials who used their association with the dynasty to acquire land also used pious endowments as a strategy to safeguard their ill-gotten property and, more importantly, to pass it down to their descendants. This was also the strategy followed by common criminals such as brigands, whose illegal activities were even more visible. Of course, jurists declared these endowments null and void.⁶⁰ But their judgments were contingent on being enforceable.

Pious Endowments and the Limits of Urban Influence

Pious endowments did not cause regional economic integration. They allowed the urban elite to secure a nontaxable source of income and helped protect their social standing from the predations of strongmen. In so doing, pious endowments became an important source of economic stability for a group that played an active role in politics. Since consistent documentation on pious endowments outside urban areas is not available, it is not clear how, if at all, they figured in the evolution of the areas not under Hafṣid control.

Agricultural Contracts

Had there been a peculiarly Ifrīqiyan mode of compensating laborers, it would suggest to us a certain degree of homogenization of economic practices and support an argument about economic integration. But it is very difficult to demonstrate the existence of such a mode or to distinguish economic practices in Ifrīqiyā from those of the neighboring central Maghrib, for instance. It is possible that the preponderance of some arrangements and the marginalization of others emerged at the end of a process of economic integration. But the anecdotal literary evidence and the inconsistent information found in collections of legal opinions do not facilitate an analysis of the ways these arrangements changed over time or their relative importance in specific locations.

As an alternative, we can analyze the types of agricultural contracts formed between those who controlled the land and those who worked it and sketch a rough outline of the power relations between them. While doing so does not conclusively demonstrate regional integration, it does shed light on the social

relations that prevailed in agriculture, and the contribution of jurists to the development of acceptable practices.

The expansion of *iqtā'āt* and pious endowments greatly limited the spread of private property—so much so that in the later fourteenth century, the chief judge in Tunis, al-Burzuli (d. 1438), declared that “the lands of the settlements (*qurā*, sing. *qarya*) of Ifriqiyyā are predominantly not private property (*milk*).”⁶¹ This meant that the majority of cultivators did not own the land they worked.⁶² The disparity between the cultivators, who owned very little, and the dynasty and the landed elite, who had large estates, was staggering.⁶³ Unsurprisingly, agricultural contracts between landowners and cultivators reflected this basic inequality.

The most common contracts were partnerships between landowner and cultivator, such as sharecropping (*muzāra'a*) arrangements, defined as “a lease of agricultural land with profit sharing.”⁶⁴ The cultivator (*āmil*) had the use of the land for a set period and used the seeds that he, or the landowner, provided and tended the crop until the harvest. At that point, the cultivator took a percentage of the harvest, as Ibn ‘Arafa explained in defining the *muzāra'a* as “a partnership for [the sharing of] the harvest.”⁶⁵ Depending on the share of the *āmil*, these partnerships were known as *muzāra'a 'alā al-nisf* or *munāṣafa* (“halving”), *muzāra'a 'alā al-thuluth* (“thirding”), or *muzāra'a 'alā al-rub'* (“fourthing”), and so forth.

In *munāṣafa* or “halving” contracts, one partner provided seed and labor and the other provided tools, animals, and land.⁶⁶ These more “egalitarian” contracts, generally between people of similar social standing, encompassed seasonal labor needs such as harvesting. When the cultivator rented land from the Almohad or Hafṣid dynasty, his labor, seeds, and draft animals constituted possible forms of investment. In *khimāsa* or “fifthing,” by far the most common form of *muzāra'a*, the cultivator (*khammās*) contributed his labor and, depending on “common practices” that remain difficult to map out, a fifth of the seeds.⁶⁷ Absentee landowners who owned larger cereal-producing lands tended to appoint a representative or *wakil* to ensure that they obtained the quantities of crops they were due, rather than cash.⁶⁸

Although these contractual relations had existed for a long time prior to the fourteenth century, there were still disagreements about what they entailed. An important legal debate took place between jurists from al-Qayrawān and Tunis, the two most important centers of jurisprudence. The status of the *khammās* was the most controversial question, especially whether he was a partner (*sharīk*) or merely a hired laborer (*ajir*).⁶⁹ The other key question was

the issue of the *khammās*'s duties. While his main duty was tilling the land and preparing it for cultivation, he often did the planting, harvesting, and transporting.⁷⁰ Responding to the excesses of landowners, al-Burzulī (d. 1438) inveighed against the abuses of the contract of *khimāsa* in the regions of Tunis and Bijāya, where some forced the *khammās* to give up his portion of the hay, to take care of the landowner's animals, fetch wood and water, and other additional tasks.⁷¹ Customary practices benefited not only the landowner, however. The *khammās* often received compensation beyond the fifth he was owed contractually, including food and clothing from his landowner-partner-employer.⁷² These supplements made him no less vulnerable to slight changes in the land's productivity. When faced with unexpected expenses, the *khammās* could ask for advances on the following year's crop in the form of loans. Again, this customary practice went against the prevailing opinion of Mālikī jurists, who held the *khimāsa* contract void if it involved a loan. But such arrangements were common, tying the *khammās* to the land through debt.⁷³ This explains why the complexity of actual arrangements made it difficult for legal thinkers to sort out the legal rubric under which such contracts fell.

Under the *mughārasa* contract, the landowner hired someone to plant trees on his land and gave him a share of the product either when the trees bore fruit or after an agreed-upon period.⁷⁴ The two were co-owners of the land and the trees. This contract was particularly well adapted to trees that took a long time to bear fruit, such as dates and olives.⁷⁵ In the fourteenth century, this form of partnership was less common, given the importance of large cereal-producing estates, irrigation problems, and the expansion of animal husbandry. The fact that private property was generally on the retreat militated against the planting of new groves and thus limited the use for such contracts.⁷⁶

During the harvest season, landowners hired seasonal laborers and paid them a daily wage. Pastoralists who recurrently moved north at the end of spring provided a dependable source of labor.⁷⁷ Seasonal work such as this was one of many occasions for the complex set of relations between agriculturists and pastoral nomads. In times of persistent drought in the high plateaus south of Bijāya, pastoralists were forced to move north in search of pastures and necessarily encroached upon the production of cereals by allowing their herds to graze in the largely unprotected fields of budding wheat and barley. At the same time, the economic value of their herds must not be underestimated. Sheep production was an additional type of activity that catered to urban-based merchants at a time when the commerce of wool and hides was central to Bijāya's relations with its Mediterranean neighbors.⁷⁸

With the spread of animal husbandry, herding became a common phenomenon that was also codified and normalized. The contracts that characterized this activity were similar to those obtaining in agricultural production. They varied from mutual aid and rotation of shepherding to partnerships between owners and shepherds.⁷⁹ Invariably, herds included animals from a number of partners. Although legal texts focus on contracts between individuals, herding was an activity associated with particular groups, such as the Awlād Mirdās south of the Mediterranean city of Būna.⁸⁰ The Sadwikish, who were settled south of Bijāya, and the Walhāṣa, settled north of Qasanṭīna, were both tribute-paying (*makhzin*) tribes specializing in the herding of cows and horses.⁸¹ The Ḥafṣids collected taxes from these settled Bedouins, and they in turn sold valuable wool and hides to the cities.

A Diversity of Labor Relations

The ability of landowners to coerce labor depended on the supply of labor and deeply held notions of fairness. Anecdotal information about famines, plagues, and population movements is not sufficient to allow a study of the evolution of the price of labor and its geographic distribution. But one does observe the increasing importance of powerful families in smaller towns and villages whom the dynasty recognized as legitimate witnesses and experts (*ahl al-filāḥa*, *ahl al-ma’rifa*) on local practices. Such recognition gave them a great deal of power in defining these very practices.⁸² Whether the Ḥafṣids supported village elders and Bedouin chiefs or opposed them, they recognized the importance of local customs (*a’rāf* or *‘adāt/awā’id*) and thus of the coexistence of heterogeneous labor practices in Ifrīqiyyā.⁸³

Politics in the Countryside: The *Ribāṭ* and the *Zāwiya*

The inability of the Ḥafṣids to impose their peace beyond a narrow perimeter near urban centers gave free rein to bands of roving bandits and armed Bedouins. In the fourteenth century, inland insecurity seriously limited mobility within Ifrīqiyyā. Under these conditions, travel and commerce became unsafe and often simply impossible. Maritime travel thus became the privileged mode of transportation for merchants (*li-ta’adhdhbūr ṭarīq al-barr*) and scholars, even if it was in the hands of Christians and was not completely safe either.⁸⁴ There is plenty of evidence for the lack of security in the country. However, the idea of “insecurity” tends to project the fears and concerns of urbanites, not

of those who lived in the country. Facing armed groups that terrorized them and extorted from them, including the Hafṣid militia (*mahalla*), Bedouins sought ways to fend for themselves.⁸⁵ As they did so, they transformed existing institutions—most importantly, the *ribāṭ*.

The *ribāṭ* was a fortified watchtower under the command of a military commander (*qā'id*). As an institution, the *ribāṭ* had a long history in the Maghrib going back to the ninth century.⁸⁶ Ibn Khaldūn tells of the building of 10,000 such forts in the time of Abū Ibrāhīm Aḥmad (856–63).⁸⁷ After the Almohad invasion of Ifrīqiyyā in the twelfth century and the restructuring of the countryside that the Almohads spearheaded, many of these forts, associated by then with Almoravid power structures, were abandoned or transformed. A series of questions asked of the thirteenth-century jurist al-Burjīnī in al-Mahdiya gives a concrete example of this process:

[Al-Burjīnī] was asked about the fort Ḥisn Baqlā [it is unclear where this was], which was built in the fourth century AH [10th century AD] to house pious men (*al-sāliḥin*), of whom there remains only one [in the fort] today. . . . People built houses around it and so it served them as a fortified storehouse and as a refuge when they feared the Bedouins (*a'rāb*) and the enemies of religion. Without this fort they would not have inhabited the area, so great was their fear. Is it legal for them to do so, so that it will be inhabited in the spirit for which it was first established as a pious endowment? Or should it remain empty, given that if it did, it is feared that it might become dilapidated and collapse, and that if we [i.e., the person asking for the opinion of the jurist] prevent them from doing so it may cause the Bedouins to ravage them? Outside the fort, there are endowed lands (*arāḍi muḥabbasa*), water wells, and a few palm trees, but we do not know anymore whether they were endowed for the benefit of the fort or for the poor in it. So would it be legal to take care of the fort using the revenues from these endowments?⁸⁸

In the thirteenth century, many of these *ribāṭs* came to house the shrines of pious people usually associated with Sufi ideas. They were set up as pious endowments and gathered and dispensed food, provided shelter, and performed other charitable actions. The association of the *ribāṭ* with armed resistance to Christian threats did not disappear in our period. Writing in the late thirteenth century, the native Bijāyan judge al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1304) described a few such

forts near his hometown. For instance, he wrote that the tomb of Abū al-Hasan al-Nafzī (d. 1244), an immigrant from Shāṭiba (Játiva), was near the “*rābiṭa* of al-Mutamannī [located] outside Bijāya,”⁸⁹ and that the *rābiṭa* of Ibn Yabkī was located north of the city on *waqf* (pious endowment) land.⁹⁰ The association of the *ribāṭ* with a military function emerges clearly in a comment made by Ibn al-Hājj al-Numayrī (fl. 14th century), who described the tower (*burj*) of one of Bijāya’s most splendid palaces, the Lu’lu’a palace, as serving the function of a lighthouse and as a *ribāṭ al-jihād*, a defensive military structure.⁹¹

In addition to Almohad attacks on an institution associated with the Almoravids, Ḥasan suggests that the Black Death was responsible for a serious depopulation of the *ribāṭs*. The impact of the plague is very difficult to discern, in spite of the many references to the deaths of learned ulama and their families.⁹² It is especially difficult to identify areas or activities that were hit particularly hard. While the causes of a diminution in the number of functioning forts in our period remain unclear, the process led to the consolidation and expansion of the role played by those that survived. This change was accompanied by a shift in linguistic usage—if not in function—from *ribāṭ* to *zāwiya* (plur. *zawāyā*), the latter becoming the preferred term. Meanings associated with “*ribāṭ*” and its occupants, the “*murābiṭūn*,” came to be associated with the “*zawāyā*” and the “*shuyūkh al-zawāyā* and the *fugara’* who lived in them.”⁹³ In many cases, but certainly not always, the *ribāṭ* simply became a Sufi *zāwiya*.

Economically, pious endowments or land grants (*iqtā’āt*) to the settled agriculturalist “Bedouins” supported the *zāwiya*. While the evidence does not allow us to say much about the types of labor contracts and arrangements associated with the *zāwiya*, there is no reason to believe that they differed greatly from those I have discussed above. This suggests that the Sufi organizations that developed around the shrines were far from egalitarian. Importantly, the *zāwiya* was the basis for the type of social hierarchy and solidarity that prevailed in the countryside, and for a “culture” that did not come directly under the control of the urban elite. In this particular sense, and when it operated in non-urban areas, the *zāwiya* was a “Bedouin” institution. Urban legal opinions, both positive and negative, bear powerful testimony to the emerging power of the *zāwiya*, and support the view of a broad, if slow and gradual, remaking of power relations in the countryside (*bādiya*).

In the fourteenth century, bandits raided cities and villages and accumulated booty. The wealth the famous ones accumulated allowed them to purchase land and settle with an air of respectability.⁹⁴ The leaders of the *zawāyā*

often welcomed these bandits, giving them “shelter, food, and care.”⁹⁵ Unsurprisingly, the chief judge in Tunis, Ibn ‘Arafa, declared doing so illegal. In general, however, legal opinion on the activities of the *ribāṭ* shifted with changing historical circumstances. Prior to the Almohad conquest, the reigning legal opinion was that the primary duty of those who lived in the forts, the *murābiṭūn*, was military, and their participation in commercial activity was contrary to legal precepts.⁹⁶ In the twelfth century, some of these *ribāṭs* had an obvious agricultural function, but when al-Māzārī (d. 1140–1) was asked to comment on their status, his opinion was that commerce was still not legally acceptable.⁹⁷ By the fourteenth century, this restriction seemed to loosen. When asked his opinion about the legal status of buying camels from known robbers, the Bijāyan jurist al-Waghīlī (d. 1384) cautioned against it and allowed it only when it was necessary. He then added that it was preferable to buy from *murābiṭūn* who “were known to be careful not to engage in illicit activities or those whose activities were predominantly licit.”⁹⁸ However, even by the end of the fourteenth century, the *zāwiya* was not a market and did not develop as an institution specializing in the circulation of agricultural products. It embodied the remaking of political relations in the countryside around a new leadership whose dual economic and ideological domination was largely independent of the Hafṣid dynasty and the urban elite.

The Zawāyā and the Limits of Regionalization

Land grants and pious endowments allowed the sheikhs of *zawāyā* to become influential political leaders in the countryside. They led their followers (*fugara*) economically, politically, and ideologically, and constituted a nobility that evolved independently of the interests of the urban elites while maintaining relations with them. The influence of the non-urban *zawāyā* grew with the Hafṣids’ gradual loss of power over the administration of the countryside. In that sense, they filled a vacuum in the administration and social organization of economic activities outside the cities. But the *zawāyā* nonetheless limited their activities to the countryside, and thus did not contribute to the political or economic unification of Ifrīqiyyā.

From Agriculture to Commerce

Nothing in the organization of land tenure and agriculture suggests economic integration at a regional level. The organization of agricultural production did

not foster a reliance on Ifrīqiyyā-wide economic processes. On the contrary, it showed the gradual weakening of the hold that the Ḥafṣids and their allies had over land and agricultural production. Taxation was the most consistent mechanism of integration, but it, too, lost of its effectiveness in the fourteenth century.

Agriculture was organized into a number of differing economic arrangements that did not come under the immediate control of the Ḥafṣids and their supporters. Was this multiplicity the result of specialization, competitive advantage, or some other factor? One way to answer this question is to examine a parallel sphere of economic redistribution: the circulation of commodities. Focusing on the activities of the merchants and pirates of Bijāya, the next chapter assesses the extent to which they participated in fostering regional integration.

C H A P T E R 3

Between Land and Sea

A Mercantile Capital

In the tenth century, Bijāya made its first appearance in written sources as one of a number of small ports on the Mediterranean coast when the merchant, traveler, and geographer Ibn Ḥawqal (fl. 970) mentioned the city in passing.¹ A century later, however, it was a large and important port. Al-Bakrī (d. 1094), an Andalusi writer who based his “Book of Kingdoms and Routes” on the reports of merchants and travelers, described Bijāya as a safe haven populated in part by Andalusis.² He added that Bijāya was the primary port that serviced Qal‘at Banī Ḥammād, the Ḥammādid capital.³

Bijāya’s growth continued. At the close of the eleventh century, the Ḥammādis (1015–1152) and their cousins the Zīrids (972–1148), who ruled in the east from al-Qayrawān, lost control of vast inland areas. Defeated by Hilālī and Sulaymid armies, they retreated into a few fortified urban areas to the north of the high plateaus. In 1091, the Ḥammādis left al-Qal‘a, their capital in the south, and began to rule over much of the central Maghrib from Bijāya, turning the city into a political and economic capital which continued to expand. By the mid-twelfth century, it had become, in the words of the geographer al-Idrīsī (d. 1166), “the [principal] city of the central Maghrib and the capital (*‘ayn*) of the land of the Ḥammādis.”⁴ From Bijāya, the Ḥammādis ruled over cities as far west as Tāhart (Tiaret) and as far east as Būna.

Although it stands out for its rapid demographic expansion between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, Bijāya’s most remarkable characteristic is in fact its mercantile orientation.⁵ The Ḥammādis chose Bijāya as their capital

to use Mediterranean commerce to compensate for their loss of control over land and inland trade routes. The expansion of the city was fueled in part by the integration of Mediterranean commerce at a time when it was growing rapidly. The new elite that settled in the city after 1067 saw Mediterranean commerce as a way to save the dynasty. Ruling over a “new” city, the elite built it up with this maritime orientation in mind.

When the Almohads took over the city in 1152, they did not change how merchants ran their businesses, limiting their own involvement in commercial affairs to the appointment of officials who oversaw markets and administered a system of duties, tolls, and taxes.⁶ Bijāya was a source of revenue and a strategic port from which the Almohads sought to establish themselves in the eastern Maghrib. They appointed a governor in Bijāya and another in Tunis, thus transforming the separation of Ḥammādīd and Zīrid territories into two separate administrative divisions. However, the fact that they sent a great deal of the wealth produced in the eastern Maghrib west to Marrakech was no small detail. The Almohad conquest adversely affected the interests of the city’s elite, who lost control over agricultural surplus, commercial routes, and tax revenues. While it is difficult to prove that Bijāya’s “old” elite actively supported anti-Almohad groups in the central Maghrib, it is reasonable to imagine that they did, especially since the Almohads were never truly able to impose a lasting peace, and had to keep a strong military presence or risk losing their position—which is exactly what happened in 1184 when the Almohad governor of Bijāya left for Marrakech after the death of the caliph. Soon after his departure, the Banū Ghāniya ruler of Majorca was able to take over the city “with no struggle.”⁷ More than thirty years after the Almohad conquest, the Almohads remained a heavily armed parasitic group that extracted taxes and sent them west. Politically subordinate to the Almohad sheikhs (*shuyūkh*) to whom they paid taxes, Bijāya’s merchants expanded their businesses unhampered.

Commercial Orientation

The Ḥafṣids (1229–1574) departed from Almohad laissez-faire and aggressively expanded dynastic oversight over markets and merchants. The chief official in charge of finance (*sāhib al-ashghāl*) was one of the primary agents of Ḥafṣid involvement in the markets. His task was to maximize the revenues of the treasury, and involved the appointment and supervision of officials working to achieve that goal. The Ḥafṣids’ aggressive taxation was recognized and even

celebrated.⁸ The historian Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457) mentioned that the great achievements of the first Hafṣid ruler Abū Zakariyā (r. 1229–49) included the formation of a formidable corps of tax collectors (*jubāt al-amwāl*).⁹ Through the office of the judge (*qāḍī*), the Ḥafṣids exerted a great deal of control over markets and merchants. The judge oversaw the application of market regulations regarding prices, weights and measures, and the integrity of currency. In effect, as a representative of the ruler, the judge took on what had traditionally been the purview of the market supervisor (*muḥtasib*).¹⁰ Under the Ḥafṣids, the *muḥtasib* was a government official who specialized in the prevention of artificial shortages, a widely reported and decried practice. He also intervened in conflicts between merchants and between merchants and the populace. In addition, the Ḥafṣids began to appoint officials to positions previously selected by merchants. For instance, shopkeepers who practiced the same trade used to elect an *amīn* (pl. *umānā’*), whose role was to inspect the quality of the merchandise in order to avoid unfair competitive advantage and fraud.¹¹ Ḥafṣid judges appointed an *amīn* for each market, and a supervisor (*amīn al-umānā’*) who arbitrated conflicts between merchants operating in different trades or markets. Under the *amīn*, there were many ‘*urafā’* (sing. ‘*arif*) who inspected the markets on a daily basis and secured Ḥafṣid presence in the markets.¹² Importantly, and in spite of chronic political instability, tax enforcement was rather consistent in the cities. While tax collectors may have found it sometimes difficult to identify the rightful recipient, the new ruler made sure taxes were collected.

Commerce was a sanctioned activity and learned and pious men practiced it without fear of transgressing religious precepts. When it came to taxation, scholar-merchants willingly accepted taxes prescribed by law. Beyond those, they saw a great number of illegal taxes, and many felt morally conflicted about having to participate in this unjustifiable innovation (*bid’ā*). The illegality of Ḥafṣid taxes on merchants troubled Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh al-Sharīf (fl. 13th century), a “pious and learned descendant of the Prophet,” who was also a tailor (*khayyāṭ*) and had a shop at the wool market (*sūq al-ṣawwāfiṇ*). His fellow merchants offered to pay in his stead, but he refused and insisted on “contributing with them and abiding by the practices [of the ‘people of the market’].”¹³ Tax officials could not pay too much attention to such moral considerations. They were satisfied to perform valuable functions that fostered peace and stability. Political considerations made the excesses of the rulers appear as a necessary evil; one that even members of the Prophet’s

family accepted. Bringing jurists under the Ḥafṣid fold helped allay many of these concerns.¹⁴

Commercial Infrastructure

In the geographical work he wrote for Roger II, the Norman ruler of Sicily, al-Idrīsī described Bijāya as a city connected to all the main cities of the Maghrib through a vast network of roads. On the route that led south to the Ḥammādīd capital, al-Idrīsī reported the existence of a string of villages on the rich banks of the Wād al-Kabīr. Many of these villages, one- or two-day trips from Bijāya, held weekly markets.¹⁵ Al-Idrīsī identified a number of thriving marketplaces through which the products of the land found their way to Bijāya. This is neither surprising nor exceptional. Roads to smaller markets that drained surplus agricultural production also connected neighboring cities such as Qasanṭīna and Būna. Geographical works and travelogues only rarely say anything about the quality of commercial exchanges, the kinds of commodities exchanged, or the evolution of trade over time. Still, and in spite of the vagueness of the information, authors of travelogues continued to portray Bijāya as a large city-market. That much is clear in the comments of the fourteenth-century Mamlūk official Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umari (1301–49):

At the foot of the hill, the old city is connected to a navigable canal that leads into it from the Mediterranean Sea. In [the old city] there are two water springs: one is significant and the people of the city drink from it. [Bijāya] has a perennial river about two miles away. The river is decorated all along both banks by gardens and vistas extending over twelve miles. [The gardens are interrupted] only by pathways until the river reaches the Mediterranean. . . . [Bijāya] is second only to [Tunis] in rank and condition [in consideration of] all the transactions [that take place there], what can be found [in its markets] and the circumstances [of its people]. Bijāya has excellent defenses and has great wealth because ships enter it from the sea.¹⁶

The maritime orientation of Bijāya is clear in this passage. While Ibn Faḍl Allāh noted the intensive agriculture practiced in gardens near the city, he attributed the city's wealth to its Mediterranean connections. There is much

evidence to support his assessment. Like Tunis, Bijāya had an inland canal that allowed ships to load more easily. It also had a prosperous shipbuilding industry.¹⁷ In addition, right outside the city's walls were a number of *fanādīq* (sing. *funduq*), caravanserais or staging-points where European merchants conducted business. Found all along the southern Mediterranean coast, these structures included warehouses, taverns, chapels, and housing for merchants.¹⁸ They were crucial to the conduct of business across the Mediterranean.¹⁹

Merchants from Marseille, Pisa, Genoa, and Catalonia all had separate *funduqs* in Bijāya.²⁰ According to the treaties these powers signed with the Ḥafṣids, customs officials would check the merchandise upon its arrival and collect duties, at which point European merchants were free to trade with whomever they wished, anywhere in the city.²¹ They were under no obligation to buy anything from the Bijāyans or sell anything to them. Commercial documents show that many engaged in commercial exchanges with other Europeans. Unfortunately, the same documents are generally quiet about trade between Europeans and locals, although such transactions must have taken place on a regular basis. Customs officials often served as intermediaries between local and European merchants, and it is likely that transactions would also have taken place in the city's many markets without their help. *Funduqs* were part of the commercial infrastructure supporting and framing Mediterranean trade. They were important enough in our period that the Ḥafṣids were fully engaged in supporting them, even if only better to control them.

From the *funduqs*, commodities found their way to Bijāya's many markets. There were two types of markets in Bijāya: those specialized in a single commodity, such as the wool market (*sūq al-ṣūf* or *sūq al-ṣawwāfiṇ*) or the fabric market (*sūq al-bazzāzīn*), and those whose names do not suggest specialization.²² The specialized markets were not peculiar to Ifrīqiyyā. At a minimum, an urban market consisted of a few contiguous shops (*ḥawānīt*, sing. *ḥānūt*) along a street (*zuqāq* or *darb*); a few such streets together formed the larger markets.

Bijāya's markets, its port, and the network of roads that connected it to the major cities of Africa made it typical of African cities on the Mediterranean coast. As al-Idrīsi's description and travelogues such as that of the famous Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 1368 or 1369) show a system of roads connected cities across regions and even continents. It is unlikely that the traffic on the roads leading to Bijāya from cities in Ifrīqiyyā was greater than that from the west, and there is no evidence to suggest this. Its commercial infrastructure of *funduqs* and markets does not suggest an Ifrīqiyan orientation, let alone regional integration.

Instead, they demonstrate that the city was well equipped to partake in Mediterranean commerce and that the urban organization of mercantile activity was similar to that of other cities in Ifrīqiyyā, and those of the central and western Maghrib.

Commodities

For clues about regional integration, it is useful to discuss the commodities that passed through the city's markets: they can shed light on the ties that Bijāya's merchants developed with producers and help determine whether Ifrīqiyyā as a region specialized in the production or consumption of particular commodities.

In the markets of Bijāya, products as varied as fruits and vegetables, meats, honey, beeswax, dyes, olive oil, and ceramics filled the stalls. By far the most important commodities were wool, hides, and cereals, which merchants purchased from cattle raisers, agriculturalists, and foreign merchants. Before discussing these commodities' impact on the economic integration of Ifrīqiyyā, I will offer a broad outline of how trade in them evolved in Bijāya.²³

Wool and Leather

Rising European demand for wool and hides fueled the growth of Bijāya's markets. By the mid-thirteenth century, Italian city-states such as Genoa began to develop wool-based textile manufacturing. This had been a staple of northern European economies, but was new to the Italian city-states.²⁴ As they did so, they looked toward Africa for sources of wool that northern Europeans had not already exploited. The Italian documents do not suggest that these merchants privileged Bijāya, Tunis, or any particular African city. All sources of wool seem to have been equally useful, and the differences between them based purely on economic considerations such as quality, price, and availability. Italian merchants bought raw or semiprocessed (washed or carded) wool but rarely raw cloth.²⁵ For the century ca. 1250–1350, wool from Bijāya was sold in Genoa and often found its way to marketplaces in Tuscan cities such as Florence and Lucca.²⁶

The Ḥafṣids, seeking to derive some benefit from this trade, imposed a tax on wool exports. In the fourteenth century, the guide to Venetian merchants known as the *Zibaldone da Canal* described a “tribute” to be paid to the Ḥafṣids.

I would have you know that Collo is not a city, but a village, and the distance from it to Constantine is 1 day's journey by horse, and 2 by pack animal.²⁷ In addition, it is one of the good places in Barbary, the best except for Tunis and Bugia, and it is a place where everyone wants to go. You can buy, sell, and pay 10 percent of what you sell. And if you buy wool, you pay 2½ bezants per cantar for tribute, and for fleeces one pays 2 bezants per cantar, and for hides one pays 4 bezants for tribute to the court.²⁸

It was only a matter of time before northern Mediterranean merchants came to Bijāya to buy wool as well. Although they came for woolens, they brought large quantities of European fabrics and draperies, further bolstering the importance of textiles in Bijāya.²⁹ Starting in the fourteenth century, however, Iberia and the British Isles flooded European markets with good quality wool and led to the decline of imports from Africa. By the mid-fifteenth century, wool from Bijāya had all but disappeared in European markets. The growth and decline of Bijāya's wool exports paralleled the evolution of the entire wool industry in the city.

The gradual decrease of wool exports did not lead to the immediate disappearance of the industry in Ifriqiyā. A whole array of activities from washing and carding to spinning, weaving, and dyeing were involved in the wool trade. In addition, tailors and other artisans transformed wool into various finished products, from burnouses to mattresses, produced for the local market, and sometimes beyond it.³⁰ A statement about the taxes collected from various markets in Tunis at the time of Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434) gives a sense of the magnitude of this industry. The historian al-Zarkashī (fl. 1482) listed the amounts collected from each market in Tunis. From these we know that the fiscal administration collected 3,000 gold dinars yearly from peddlers who sold clothes and various wares (*sūq al-rahādīna*), 10,000 gold dinars from the cattle market (*raḥbat al-māshiyya*), 3,000 gold dinars from the vegetable *funduq*, 250 gold dinars from the perfume market (*sūq al-‘atṭārīn*), 1,500 gold dinars from the salt *funduq*, 1,000 gold dinars from the coal market (*sūq al-bayād*), 100 gold dinars from the used clothing market (*sūq al-qashshāshīn*), 50 gold dinars from the copper market (*sūq al-al-saffārin*), 50 gold dinars from the musicians' market (*sūq al-azzāfīn*), and 6,000 from the soap market (*sūq al-sābūn*).³¹ While no comparable statement exists for Bijāya, there is no reason to believe that the general picture was not the same, since the wool industries in all the

major cities of Ifrīqiyyā show the same general pattern of development. Cities to the west of Ifrīqiyyā also exhibit these same trends.

Much like wool, Bijāyan leather arrived in Genoa, Pisa, or Majorca, and was often re-exported, becoming so well known that the city lent its name to a type of leather known all over the Mediterranean and even as far away as England. Robert Delort found references to the “bogett,” “bogget, bugeye, bougie, budge, and budye, which designate lambs from the kingdom of Bougie.” He notes that the popularity of this designation is not necessarily associated with a rise of production in Bijāya but with the quality and renown of leather from the city. By the fifteenth century, it was being used to describe a *type* of leather from other places as well. This was the case with the “rumney budge,” which was imported from Romania, and the “bogy de Spayne.”³² The city was involved in leather exports long before the fourteenth century and had developed a reputation for its leathers.³³

The majority of Bijāya’s leather exports were lambskins, such as those that appear in a thirteenth-century list of commodities sold at a market in Flanders (*peleterie de aingnias*).³⁴ In addition to those, the city exported cowhides and goatskins, and more rarely, pelts of *volpi barbaresci*, possibly desert foxes (fennecs) and leopards.³⁵ A fatwa issued by al-Burzūlī (d. 1438) contains a discussion of the pelts and furs of various wild felines traded in Ifrīqiyyā (*al-hirr wa-al-asad wa-al-sibā’ wa-al-fuhūd wa-al-numūr wa-al-ghirbān*), not only in Bijāya.³⁶

Another reason for the rise of Bijāya as an entrepôt was that merchants moved merchandise around to respond to price differences, shortages, and political circumstances. In 1255, the famous Manduel merchant house of Marseille sent leather to be sold in Bijāya.³⁷ In spite of such practices, the majority of hides exported from Bijāya originated there. In his survey of the archive of Genoa, Dominique Valérian found only a single reference to tanned hides (*affaitata*) from Bijāya.³⁸ Valérian also noted the sale of “Cordoban” goatskins from Bijāya in Genoa’s markets. “Cordoban” skins were made especially soft and thin after undergoing an elaborate process.

Although exported hides, and wool, tended to be unprocessed or semiprocessed, Bijāya’s craftsmen, for example the shoemakers (*ballaghīn*), depended on a steady supply of tanned leather. Merchants (*jallādīn*) bought hides inland and sold them at Bijāya’s markets, plausibly in the suburban “slaughterhouse neighborhood” (*ḥawmat al-madhbah*),³⁹ located in the suburbs because of the stench and general pollution that emanated from tanning.⁴⁰ Although the processing and tanning of leather sometimes involved purely mechanical means

such as placing cowhides in the streets to be softened by passersby, the use of chemicals such as alum and salt was also common, making the availability of these materials critical to the development of leather-related industries.⁴¹

Wheat

Determining the extent and nature of the wheat trade presents us with a similar set of challenges. The imbalance between the amount and character of the information about commerce in the Maghrib and the Mediterranean remains a major hurdle. While it is possible for historians to say with a great degree of certainty that Bijāya was both an importer and exporter of wheat, it is difficult to say more. Illustrating this point, the *Zibaldone da Canal* includes a separate notice to Venetian merchants about trading wheat in Bijāya. “You ought to know that at Bugia one sells wheat by a measure that is called a *flacha*, and 1 and $\frac{1}{4}$ *flacha* would make 1 *staio* at Venice.”⁴² The author, or authors, believed that a special notice on wheat would be useful, but we cannot infer that most of the wheat in question was purchased or sold in Bijāya. This does not necessarily mean that the wheat sold in Bijāya was Venetian.⁴³ The actual origin of the wheat could have been Genoa, Sicily, eastern Ifrīqiyyā, the western Maghrib, or all these places seriatim, since merchants routinely bought in one port and sold in another to profit from price fluctuations and exchange rates. It is simply difficult to say.

Based on Angevin documents, we know that in 1276, Bijāya or a nearby port imported 8,580 $\frac{1}{2}$ *salme* or 28,681 hectoliters of wheat, an impressive quantity even if not all of it was sold in Bijāya.⁴⁴ Great quantities of wheat continued to be imported to Bijāya throughout the fourteenth century, as shown by the intermittent evidence of a number of sales. Were wheat imports tied to crop failures and wars, or were they the result of ties between Bijāya and a particular zone of production such as Sicily, Sardinia, or the lands under the rule of Aragon? Were the imports used to feed the city and the army, or were they distributed inland? Unfortunately, this is impossible to say.⁴⁵ There is evidence that Bijāya was also an exporter of wheat, even though its exports are often difficult to substantiate because of the European merchants’ tendency to use general geographical categories such as “*Berbería*.” As for the importation of wheat from other areas of Ifrīqiyyā, it is very likely that Bijāyan merchants purchased from the wheat-rich areas near Būna and Qasanṭīna—especially after Bijāya became an autonomous emirate and some of these areas came under its control. But tracking the evolution of trade, the location of privileged sources of wheat, or fluctuations in quantity is not possible given

the dearth of information. This means that we cannot make positive statements about the impact that trade in this very important commodity had on the integration of Bijāya into an Ifrīqiyyā-wide economy.

Commodities Versus Politics

To sum up so far: European documents show that wool and hides were important exports throughout the fourteenth century, and that they declined after that. Unfortunately, they do not inform us about the origin of these commodities beyond the markets of Bijāya. In the absence of documentation about inland commerce, it is difficult to determine where Bijāya's merchants purchased the wool, what relations they developed with producers to secure a steady supply, and whether these ties fostered regional economic integration. The most serious challenge is to determine whether wool and hides came from Ifrīqiyyā or the central and western Maghrib. As far as wheat is concerned, the Ḥafṣids turned the large *hanāshir* they controlled into cereal-producing areas.⁴⁶ If this put more wheat in the hands of the dynasty, it did not eliminate the need for Mediterranean wheat. Natural fluctuations in production, the attacks of Bedouins and bandits, and Ḥafṣid politics combined to make that impossible. What emerges from this analysis of commodities is the importance of politics in determining commercial integration.

Agents of Integration

There were generally three types of merchants. First, there were shopkeepers who rented, leased, or owned shops at the market. Some of them were artisans (*sunnā'*, sing. *sāni'*) who bought leather, fabric, or wood and used their skills and tools to transform them into marketable products. Others were merchants (*tujjār*, sing. *tājir*) who bought fruits, oil, spices, or fish from producers or wholesalers and resold them for a profit. The majority of shopkeepers in a given market were either retail merchants or artisans. Second, there were those merchants who were technically intermediaries and brokers. They purchased goods from wholesalers elsewhere and sold them in Bijāya for a profit. These intermediaries did not necessarily have a shop at the market, though they sometimes used a shop as a warehouse. Finally, there were rich merchants who owned or controlled a number of shops in various markets. They were in a class of their own, often acting as agents of the ruling dynasty or its prominent representatives, and capable of making huge profits.

Merchants were the primary agents of regional commercial integration. They helped move surplus from an area where it was in great supply to another where there was demand for it. Unfortunately, these men and women did not leave accounts of their activities, and it is impossible to say whether they, or their agents, crisscrossed Ifrīqiyā, developing more frequent contacts with merchants and producers from Tarāblus to Bijāya than they did with merchants from other areas. However, even in the absence of accounting records comparable to the secret books of European merchants, it is still possible to infer a great deal about their strategies and schemes based on legal opinions and anecdotal information. The problem with doing so, of course, is that jurists envisaged a much broader context than Ifrīqiyā. Still, a typology of mercantile contracts and strategies sheds light on the activities of this very important group.

Merchants formed partnerships (*sharikāt*, sing. *sharika*) to purchase merchandise.⁴⁷ These partnerships allowed them to combine their resources and buy greater quantities at lower prices.⁴⁸ In addition, merchants used price differences between markets, and moved merchandise around to maximize their profits. To do so, they most often drafted *muqāraḍa* contracts, in which an investor (*sāhib al-māl*) entrusted an agent (*‘amil* or *muqārid*) with a sum of money or merchandise (*māl*) with which the agent traded using his, and less often her, skills and knowledge of markets. The agent then returned the principal to the investor with the agreed-upon share of the profits. When loss, rather than profit, was the result of the operation, the investor lost his investment and the agent his time and effort.⁴⁹ In general, the investor or investors were far richer than the agent, who was closer to an employee than a partner.

Reliable information about market conditions in a great number of locations was critical to business. Andalusi immigrants who maintained a network of informants and partners from Iberia to Egypt had a clear advantage.⁵⁰ Their commercial success in the Mediterranean allowed them to buttress their position in Ifrīqiyā. Other merchants did not have the luxury of an association of merchants across long distances, and as Ibn Khaldūn put it, “Competition between them exhausts, or comes close to exhausting, their financial resources.”⁵¹ They tried to enhance their position in the market by espousing mundane strategies such as imitating their competitors.⁵² They also sought to acquire merchandise that had yet to enter the market (*talaqqi*), as was the case with imported European commodities such as perfumes and various goods

that came into town from the countryside.⁵³ However, for that, they needed contacts in the office of customs, a privilege not available to most.

Rich Merchants and Politics

Wealthier merchants benefited from their association with the powerful. Ibn Khaldūn noted the ability of these merchants to obtain tax breaks and monopolies that gave them rates of return on investments not available to others:

Emirs and other men in power in a country who engage in commerce and agriculture reach a point at which they buy agricultural products and goods from sellers who agree to relinquish them at prices fixed by [emirs and men in power]. . . . [Merchants and farmers] work with [the ruler] for their own profit, to garner quickly as much money as they may wish . . . especially through profits reaped from doing business without having to pay taxes and customs duties. Exemption from taxes and customs duties is more likely than anything else to cause one's capital to grow, and it brings quick profits.⁵⁴

The involvement of Bijāya's wealthy merchants in dynastic politics was, then, clearly to their advantage. In 1285, rich merchants led by the Andalusi Ibn Sayyid al-Nās sponsored the independence of the Ḥafṣid ruler of Bijāya from the ruler of Tunis. Once they did, their political commitments precluded them from engaging in commerce with the emir's political foes, because they believed that commerce ultimately would enrich the Tunisan ruler and his associates.⁵⁵ While this general belief was prevalent, it was not the only rule followed by these merchants—especially when their personal interests were at odds with those of their fellow wealthy Bijāyans. Some of Bijāya's great merchants engaged in the wool trade and favored the expansion of pasturelands. Others invested in cereals and preferred the expansion of the large estates (*hanāshīr*) and the cultivation of cereals. Not only did these economic interests conflict, they brought into play non-urban political groups, such as Bedouins, who had their own agendas.

The growth of fodder production and other ways to improve the productivity of the land may plausibly have come as reactions to these contradictory demands.⁵⁶ But the resolution of these contradictory economic interests worked itself out chiefly politically, not economically. Battles and

their outcomes decided which commodities, markets, and mercantile groups prevailed.⁵⁷ Conversely, the problem of the mobilization of financial resources for political purposes was never fully resolved in the fourteenth century. The tax base was never secure or broad enough to guarantee the emirs the wealth they needed to afford strong armies and loyal courtiers. Under these circumstances, sponsorship of a local emir remained an actual possibility, and rich merchants must have seen it as a high-risk, high-yield proposition.

Moreover, many of these rich merchants were Andalusis whose commitment to Bijāya's independence lacked ideological depth. In fact, Andalusis continued to maintain contacts in Tunis and other cities from Granada to Alexandria. They accepted official appointments at various courts, Ḥafṣid or not, and did not find doing so particularly disloyal. Whether in Bijāya, Tunis, or Būna, their commercial activities calqued the politics of the Ḥafṣid emirs they served.

Even when it became the second largest city under Ḥafṣid domination, then, Bijāya retained its commercial orientation, a characteristic identified with the political influence of its merchants. The investments of rich merchants followed the politics of the Ḥafṣid emirs they supported, and from whose friendship they benefited. In the fourteenth century, their activities matched the political fortunes of their rulers. For these merchants, the local configuration of Ḥafṣid domination meant a local configuration of their commercial activities. This was an unstable politico-economic situation that found a resolution in the political victory of the regional emirate.

Extortion and the Regional Emirate

Faced with increasingly onerous wars, the local Ḥafṣid emirs of Bijāya made extortion a central feature of their rule. They forcefully expropriated the wealth of merchants and officials, using torture to find out where they hid the treasures they had amassed. Ibn Khaldūn's theoretical discussion of such occurrences echoed contemporary circumstances:

It should be known that a dynasty may find itself in financial straits . . . on account of its luxury and the number of (its luxurious) habits and on account of . . . the insufficiency of its tax revenue to pay for its needs and expenditures. . . . It sometimes imposes customs duties on the commercial activities of (its)

subjects. . . . Sometimes, it multiplies the kinds of customs duties. . . . Sometimes, it applies torture to its officials and tax collectors and sucks their bones dry. . . . (This happens) when officials and tax collectors are observed to have appropriated a good deal of tax money that their accounts do not show.⁵⁸

The dynasty collected as many taxes as it could, and when the revenues were insufficient, it went after its own officials. “If someone achieves [wealth],” Ibn Khaldūn summarized, “the eyes of emirs and governors are directed to him. As a rule, they take it away, or they urge him to sell it to them [at a price they fixed].”⁵⁹ The dynasty’s parasitical character in the economy was as clear as its coercive methods.

More systematic than the extortion of individual wealth, the organization of tax raids against agriculturalists and pastoralists gave local Ḥafṣid emirs access to salutary funds. A Ḥafṣid militia (*mahalla*) descended on unsuspecting villagers, kidnapped their sons, and demanded payment of a ransom. For those like Ibn Khaldūn, who led such raids, the kidnappings were a means to collect (illegal) taxes: “[In 1364] I personally went out to the Berber tribes in the mountains of Bijāya who had refused to pay the *maghārim* for years, entered their lands, and took hostages to guarantee their compliance until I received the taxes from them.”⁶⁰

Tax raids were the product of the economic disintegration of Ifrīqiyyā. Their purpose was to enable the political autonomy of Ḥafṣid emirs in spite of their lack of control over productive land. Above all else, local emirs sought to maintain their independence and showed interest in unifying Ifrīqiyyā only when the political circumstances allowed them to overpower their rivals.⁶¹ The Marīnid invasions of the 1350s demonstrate that the Ḥafṣids’ control over Ifrīqiyyā was deficient. The restoration of the dynasty in extremis came at the cost of great concessions to the powerful Bedouins, who chased the Marīnids out of Ifrīqiyyā. To survive, the Ḥafṣids of Bijāya expanded their involvement in Mediterranean piracy, which allowed them to accumulate wealth at a rate far greater than either agriculture or commerce.⁶²

Pirates for a Local Emirate

The earliest extant sources describing the activities of pirates in Bijāya date to the eleventh century.⁶³ In 1076, Pope Gregory VII (d. 1085) sent the Ḥammādīd founder of the city, al-Nāṣir b. ‘Alannās (r. 1062–88/89), a letter in which he mentioned “Christian captives” held in Bijāya.⁶⁴ In 1114, Africans captured

monks from Monte Cassino during their trip from Sardinia to Sicily, eliciting the intervention of King Roger II of Sicily (d. 1154).⁶⁵ When the Almohads took over Bijāya in 1152, they did not try to eliminate piracy. On the contrary, pirates thrived under their rule. In the biographical note on Abū al-Ṭāhir ‘Umāra (d. after 1189), al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1304) made a remarkable observation in this regard:

Bijāya was a country of pirates (*balad ghuzāt*). From it, pirates launched raids against the islands and coasts of the Rūm and brought back a multitude of captives. Upon their return to Bijāya, the people gathered to buy the captives in the slaughterhouse neighborhood (*ḥawmat al-madhbah*) outside the city's walls (*rabad*). There they divided the booty among themselves. *This continues to be the case today.*⁶⁶

As al-Ghubrīnī narrates it, when the Banū Ghāniya took over Bijāya in 1184, the Bijāyans saw the Banū Ghāniya's ships coming and thought they were Bijāyan ships filled with captives. By the time they realized the ships carried an army, it was too late to organize any resistance, so they pledged allegiance to them.⁶⁷ Whether one accepts al-Ghubrīnī's interpretation of the events of 1184 or not, his statement demonstrates that a late-thirteenth-century Bijāyan could believe such a misunderstanding to be possible and thus the prevalence and normalcy of piracy in Bijāya under the rule of its first independent emir, Abū Zakariyā Yāḥyā (r. 1285–1301).

Although they are relatively rare for this period, references to pirates from Bijāya in European archives confirm this. In 1263, Pere Ferrer of Barcelona was attacked by Bijāyans and was authorized by James I of Aragon (1208–76) to recover his losses from subjects of the Ḥafṣid ruler. The same year, another Barcelonian by the name of Berenguer Tripón was attacked by Bijāyan pirates and received a similar license from the king.⁶⁸ In 1264, the Ḥafṣid al-Mustansīr (r. 1249–77) and the Republic of Pisa signed a peace and commerce treaty for a twenty-year period that included specific stipulations about piracy.⁶⁹ The two parties formally agreed not to support the activity of corsairs and to punish those who engaged in piracy by taking away their property to pay for restitutions. They also agreed not to purchase merchandise and captives forcibly taken from Pisans or Ifrīqiyans. Although the treaty was signed by al-Mustansir, who ruled over a unified Ifrīqiyā, it explicitly refers to the safety of Pisans in “all the land of *Affrichia* and all that of *Buggea*, and all other countries under the rule

of the said emir.”⁷⁰ Interestingly, the Pisans found it worth specifying that the treaty applied not only in Ifrīqiyyā but Bijāya as well, though this in itself does not argue against regional integration.

Partly due to the better preservation of documents in European archives, there are many more references to Bijāya and its pirates in the fourteenth century. These generally pertain to seizures of property and the ransoming of captives. On rare occasions, one finds mention of captives who were able to elude their captors, such as the woman who escaped from Bijāya with her child and arrived in Majorca in 1303.⁷¹ More often, captives had to pay ransoms, even when rulers negotiated their freedom. Letters preserved in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, such as the one exchanged between the Ḥafṣid Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr and James II of Aragon in 1314, attest to the continued activities of Bijāyan pirates.⁷² A document dated the same year discussed articles for a potential truce (*treua*) and included specific stipulations about captives (*embargats o destenguts* or *catius*).⁷³ Over the following two years, James wrote a number of letters to Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr discussing captives.⁷⁴

Rulers also handed out licenses to individuals for the recovery of losses due to Bijāyan pirates. In 1319, King Sancho of Majorca (r. 1311–24) authorized Francesc de Claper to claim reparations after pirates from Bijāya attacked him.⁷⁵ The existence of treaties between rulers made restitutions more probable, but in order to claim anything, plaintiffs needed first to identify the origin of the pirates. But pirates, especially when captured, did not necessarily volunteer that kind of information, making the work of lawyers difficult. Thus in 1324, the Naṣrid emir of Granada ‘Abd Allāh Ismā‘il b. Faraj (r. 1314–25) wrote a letter to James II in which he explained that the Ibn al-Jundī who was suspected of kidnapping and selling captives in Bijāya was not from Granada or even al-Andalus.⁷⁶

The presence of pirates in Bijāya is documented after the eleventh century, but their involvement in politics, let alone their association with the ruling elite, is clearly apparent only after the second half of the fourteenth century. Pirates came to play a more prominent role in politics precisely when the local emirate was becoming impossible to sustain. The expansion of piracy had originally been a boon to local emirs in need of revenues; it now became an important precondition of Bijāya’s participation in the Tunis-based emirate.

Piracy and Regional Integration

In the 1370s, reports of actual cases of piracy multiplied dramatically, as did rumors about the presence of Bijāyan pirate ships near European coasts.⁷⁷ This

remarkable increase coincided with the end of the city's bid for independence from Tunis, when the Ḥafṣid Abū al-‘Abbās (r. 1370–94) unified Ifrīqiyyā and reconfigured Tunis as the only capital. While this seeming escalation may just be an effect of the larger number of extant documents, an observation made by the historian Ibn Khaldūn suggests that something did actually change. Commenting on the Franco-Genoese expedition against al-Mahdiya in 1390, Ibn Khaldūn noted:

When the Christian Franks came to be ruled by many kingdoms, the desire to raid their lands grew among many Muslims on the coasts of Ifrīqiyyā. The people of Bijāya had started to do so thirty years prior [to 1390], gathering those who were eager to fight among the pirates (*ghuzāt al-baḥr*), building up the navy, and choosing for it the best men. They then sailed to the coasts of the Franks and their islands, [attacked them] by surprise and kidnapped as many people as they could. They also fought the unbelievers' ships, often taking them away from them, and returned with booty, slaves, and captives. They were so successful that western Ifrīqiyyā near Bijāya overflowed with captives who filled the country's roads with the noise of their chains and shackles when they went about doing their daily tasks. . . . This was painful to the European nations . . . and they [sought] revenge on the Muslims.⁷⁸

While piracy was not new to Bijāya, Ibn Khaldūn attests to a serious intensification beginning in the 1360s.⁷⁹ Importantly, this entailed the deliberate involvement on the part of the ruling elite, whom he calls “the people of Bijāya,” in this activity. Personifying this expansion is Muhammad b. Abī Mahdī, a close advisor to the Ḥafṣid ruler of Bijāya Abū ‘Abd Allāh before becoming regent to his successor. Ibn Abī Mahdī was also at the helm of the city’s navy (*qā’id al-ustūl*), a title that does not divulge his real influence; Ibn Khaldūn also characterized him as the leader of the city (*za‘im al-balad*).⁸⁰ Indeed, Ibn Abī Mahdī was the effective ruler of Bijāya (*mustabiddan ‘alā [al-amīr]*) between 1370/71 and 1402/3, and as Bijāya’s strongman, in less than a decade he made Bijāya a known center of piracy. A legal case in Majorca suggests that he may have personally benefited from it. In 1381, the Genoese Onofrio di Piccamiglio was accused of going into business with the vizier of Bijāya with the express purpose of arming pirate galleys and seeking to benefit from the sale or rescue of Christian captives.⁸¹ These allegations may have been

false, but the accusers believed they were at least plausible and could convince a court.

Bijāya's pirates did not keep records of their extortions—or if they did, they are not extant. There is no doubt, however, that as an activity, the ransoming of captives was very profitable.⁸² Religious orders such as the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians specialized in ransoming, among others, “the very great number of Christians who are captive in the city of Bougie by the Saracens.”⁸³ But were the sums involved great enough to shift investment incentives away from the countryside and reallocate them to Mediterranean piracy—thus undermining regional integration in Ifrīqiyyā? An analysis of political developments suggests that they were. Indeed, the Ḥafṣids and their allies seem to have had a predominant presence in piracy. Moreover, ransoming benefited particular sectors of Bijāya's elite at the expense of others, and these changes affected the political realignments that led to the victory of the regional emirate—even if orders of magnitude are difficult to decide.⁸⁴

The emergence of extortion as an economic option espoused by the elite of Bijāya, then, compensated for the loss of revenues caused by long-term processes such as the challenge to their control over land, and short-term events, natural, political, or economic. The incorporation of this new Bijāya into the regional configuration of Ḥafṣid domination maintained its close association with extortion and its loose control over the countryside (*bādiya*).

From Politico-Economic Integration to Ideology

Ifrīqiyyā was, in short, not an economically integrated region. The organization of economic activity shows the persistence of multiple economic arrangements, which were brought together decreasingly well through Ḥafṣid taxation and extortion. The Ḥafṣids' inability to enforce their peace over vast areas greatly limited commercial activity. Paradoxically, organized extortion emerged as an alternative to the traditional circulation of surplus through fiscal and mercantile channels. Ultimately, to the degree that there was a certain degree of economic integration, it was primarily the result of politics and implemented through official mechanisms such as taxation.

To the extent that Bijāya was the center of its own economic region, that region was not part of an Ifrīqiyyā-wide economy. But without Bijāya, the idea that Ifrīqiyyā was a single integrated economic region is unsustainable. This does not mean, however, that the Ḥafṣids and their allies did not bring the

areas around cities together. But in the absence of such political action, there were no independent economic mechanisms in place to foster the economic integration of Ifrīqiyyā.

The notion that Ifrīqiyyā was a region because it was the homeland or domain of the Ḥafṣid dynasty overestimates the political and economic power of the dynasty and downplays the autonomy of various other groups. But imperfect and partial as it was, the political and economic integration led by the Ḥafṣids became the basis for the making of the notion that Ifrīqiyyā was a Ḥafṣid region. An obvious embellishment of Ḥafṣid power, the idea was not a groundless fabrication—and Ḥafṣid ideologues were successful in incorporating it into the historical record.

PART II

Emirism and the Making of a Region

This page intentionally left blank

C H A P T E R 4

The Age of the Emir

More than anything else, the political history of Ifrīqiyā demonstrates the fragility of Ḥafṣid domination, the continuing need of forming alliances with various groups outside the cities, and the dynasty's limited success in persuading non-urban elites of the necessity of its rule. Any discussion of the political ideology imbedded in elite sources must begin by acknowledging these basic truths about politics. Doing so allows us to focus on why the sources framed their narratives in ways that emphasize the centrality of the Ḥafṣid dynasty, even as they described less favorable political realities. Before going further, however, it seems useful to review the developments that brought about the victory of the regional mode of domination at the end of the fourteenth century.¹

When they severed their ties with the Almohads in 1228, the Ḥafṣids spearheaded a reordering of politics in Ifrīqiyā. They sought to forge political ties that were distinct from those that had sustained Almohad rule for more than seven decades. Most importantly, if they were to impose their domination over Ifrīqiyā, they had to do it without support from the western Maghrib. Moreover, as erstwhile Almohad sheikhs (*shuyūkh*) themselves, the Ḥafṣids had to distinguish themselves from other Almohads who had remained in Ifrīqiyā. Checking the influence of these sheikhs and bringing them into their fold was, naturally, one of their goals. Mobilizing elite Andalusi immigrants and “old” families in the cities and gaining the allegiance and support of Bedouin groups were also key political objectives.

Half a century after the establishment of the Ḥafṣid dynasty in Ifrīqiyā, the routinization of their rule proceeded apace, even if Tunis was no longer the sole capital. The multiplication of centers of power in Ifrīqiyā, often described as the result of the weakness of the dynasty, had the effect of more

fully anchoring the Ḥafṣids in the region. While these “local” Ḥafṣid emirs who sometimes ruled over no more than a small town may not have been very powerful, their activities were the ground on which grew the desire for an all-powerful ruler who would bring an end to disunity and political fragmentation. This providential leader was to be *the* emir.

In their quest for autonomy and unification of Ifrīqiyā, “local” Ḥafṣid emirs enlisted the support of the elite and maintained a remarkable pace of warfare.² Eventually, their struggles reached a limit no one could ignore. A non-Ḥafṣid non-elite group was able to take Bijāya, the second largest city in Ifrīqiyā, from the hands of the Ḥafṣids and their allies.³ This “mob” (*ghawghā’*), as it was described by pro-Ḥafṣid intellectuals, ruled the city for more than four years, a period that proved too short to secure a broader sociopolitical base and prevent the reconstitution of the elite around the Ḥafṣids. The elite defeated the “mob” in Bijāya and set about redrawing political alliances in Ifrīqiyā, partly to prevent the possibility of another such occurrence. Ultimately, the remaking of political relations, fueled by the Ḥafṣid emirs’ desire to achieve both autonomy and unification, led to the centralization of political rule in the hands of a powerful emir who ruled over all of Ifrīqiyā. The emergence of this regional emirate began under Abū al-‘Abbās (r. 1370–94) and truly culminated with Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434). Its emergence did not eliminate opposition to the Ḥafṣids or their need to form alliances with other groups. However, it did support a particular formulation of the dynasty’s presence in Ifrīqiyā. Chapter 1 analyzed the political struggles that led to the imposition of regional rule under Abū Fāris. This one will analyze the constitution of an ideology, Emirism, that supported the rule of an all-powerful emir.

Royal Authority

The victory of Abū Fāris saw the assertion of royal authority (*mulk*) and signaled the end of the autonomist designs of Ḥafṣid emirs and those who had backed them. This development took place rather slowly and only gradually. Its precedents reached back over a whole century and, even when it came about, it still took a few more decades to make the powerful ruler of Tunis into *the* emir. However, by the mid-fifteenth century, Emirism was dominant. Ḥafṣid ideologues celebrated the authority of the Ḥafṣid ruler, molding Abū Fāris into a hero and casting the fourteenth century as a dark age of dynastic weakness. Although many in the fourteenth century had shared the ideas of

these later authors, for the most part they had seen the rule of a powerful emir as an ideal, a possibility, or a lost opportunity.

Emirism developed in relation to the political autonomy of local emirs in the fourteenth century. Its development foreshadowed the rejection of the state of weakness and fragmentation in Ifrīqiyyā and the end of the limitations put on the authority of the Ḥafṣid ruler. It was a specific ideology that grew in the context of particular political conditions, and expressed ideas related to them. A focus on the period of local emirs helps us account for some of its most significant constituent parts and characteristics.

From Caliph to Emir

It is difficult to point to a particular allusion, phrase, or poem written in the fourteenth century as evidence of an inflection point marking a discursive shift in favor of Emirism. Imagining the ideological change in question in those terms would in fact be counterproductive. Instead, tying the prevalence of Emirist ideas in the fifteenth century to the outcome of actual and, thus contingent, political struggles better accounts for the heterogeneity of the historical record and the contradictory sentiments expressed in it. For instance, the shift in the representation of the Ḥafṣid ruler so as to de-emphasize his status as a religious leader (caliph) in favor of his depiction as worldly leader (emir) is difficult to appreciate fully if the sources are not related back to actual politics. Besides, the emirs who won in the field of battle did not always espouse the most cogent claim to legitimacy.

As a rule, Ḥafṣid intellectuals always aggrandized the ruler and wanted him to bear titles befitting a great leader. In the early thirteenth century, these titles included that of caliph, which had been used by Almohad rulers. Since the Ḥafṣids claimed to be continuing Almohad rule, they could logically claim to be caliphs. This was certainly the opinion of poets at the court of the first Ḥafṣid ruler, Abū Zakariyā Yahyā (r. 1229–49), who urged him to take on a caliphal title (*fa anta bihā aḥaqqu al-‘alamīna*).⁴ However, whether it is because there was another Almohad caliph ruling in the western Maghrib or, as the Ḥafṣid historians suggest, because of his humility, the only title Abū Zakariyā ever bore was that of emir.⁵ His son Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad did not share his father's hesitation. In 1253, shortly after he acceded to the Ḥafṣid throne, he took the title of Commander of the Faithful (*amīr al-mu’minīn*) and the caliphal name of al-Mustansir (r. 1249–77). This was wonderful news to court poets such as ‘Uthmān b. ‘Arabiya (d. 1260 or 1261), who had called for it immediately after the death of Abū Zakariyā. He wrote:

If the moon of the emirate has set,
the sun of the caliphate has risen.⁶

When the emir of Tunis took on the title of caliph, it was as a way of asserting his ascendancy vis-à-vis all other Ḥafṣid emirs who might have had ideas about seceding. This was the case with powerful regional emirs such as Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46) and Abū al-‘Abbās Alḥmad (r. 1370–94). While it is not easy to infer that the rulers shared the sentiments expressed by court poets, these two emirs composed poems in which they boasted of their military prowess, courage, and honor. Abū Bakr described himself as a lion in a forest, daring and courageous, overpowering (*aghlibu*) both deer and anyone who claimed any authority in the land (*tamallaka fibā*).⁷ In his eyes, he alone had ultimate authority, and others could claim parts of Ifrīqiyā only through his mediation.⁸ A few decades later, Abū al-‘Abbās showed a similar outlook in a poem memorializing his conquest of Tūzar (Tozeur). The victory was particularly significant because the city had remained beyond the control of the Ḥafṣids for a long time. As he introduced himself, Abū al-‘Abbās noted that he had inherited the caliphate from his ancestors (*ḥuznā al-khilāfata irthan*) and that for him, kingship was congenital (*al-mulk muttalidun fīnā*). He also took pride in his defense of religious law and his modesty, and then went on to boast of his martial spirit and courage. He concluded the poem by mentioning that his descendants would inherit the caliphate from him.⁹ While these Ḥafṣids claimed the title of caliph, royal authority (*mulk*) was foremost on their minds.

Increasingly, the distinction that mattered was that between those Ḥafṣid emirs who ruled (*wālī, hākim, qā’im bi al-amr, sāḥib al-kalima*) and those who did not. Those who did were remembered, their deeds recorded, and their example recalled. Those who did not were remembered as the descendants of famed emirs. This is visible in the lists of the achievements of great emirs, such as the one compiled for the first Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Zakariyā Yahyā by the historian Ibn Qunfudh.

[Abū Zakariyā Yahyā, r. 1229–49] fathered four sons: Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Mustanṣir [r. 1249–77], who ruled after him, Abū Ishāq al-Mujāhid [r. 1279–83], who ruled after al-Wāthiq b. al-Mustanṣir [1277–79], Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr, who did not rule, and Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar [r. 1284–95]. They all ruled, save Abū Bakr.¹⁰

In a way, those who did not rule were like their sisters who, when they appeared in the chronicles, were exemplary figures who always displayed the greatness of the dynasty.¹¹ What they lacked, obviously, was real decision-making power and authority, which Ḥafṣid historians expressed by using stock phrases such as “he was the true ruler” and “he had ultimate say.”¹² Some emirs did not lack the ambition or will to become rulers, but were simply defeated militarily. In this sense, to be a “real” emir, effective rule and military victory were necessary and sufficient; courage and other personal qualities were not.¹³ This illuminates, at least in part, the countless references to notions such as providence and God’s will in historical chronicles.

Ibn Khaldūn commented on the decision of the Marīnids and ‘Abd al-Wādids (Zanāta) to take up the title of caliph in a way that illustrates the prioritization of royal authority.

When governmental (authority) (*al-amr*) in the Maghrib lapsed and the Zanāta took power, their first rulers continued the ways of desert life and simplicity and followed the Lamtūna (Almoravids) in using the title of Commander of the Muslims, out of deference to the high rank of the caliphate. They rendered obeisance first to the caliphate of the Banū ‘Abd al-Mu’min, and afterwards to that of the Ḥafṣids. The later (Zanāta) rulers aspired to the title of Commander of the Faithful, and are using it at this time to comply fully with royal aspirations.¹⁴

The transformation of the title into an instrument that served royalist aims indicates an ideological shift. Under the Almohads (Mu’minids), the title of caliph was not subject to the choice of the ruler. As they changed that custom, the Ḥafṣids opened ideological possibilities not available to the Almohads and did so in the process of imposing their rule in Ifrīqiyyā.

Titles with pan-Islamic resonance such as *amīr al-mu’minīn* (Commander of the Faithful) and *amīr al-muslimīn* (Commander of the Muslims) did not guarantee the Ḥafṣids recognition beyond Ifrīqiyyā. Al-Mustansīr and Abū Fāris, who received pledges of allegiance from far away places stand out in this regard—even if, and this is worth repeating, these pledges did not determine the outcome of battles in Ifrīqiyyā.¹⁵ The Ḥafṣids also used titles such as *sultān*, *amīr*, and *mawlā*, which pointed to the political and military leadership of the ruler.¹⁶ Noticeably, the autonomous rulers of Bijāya did not claim the caliphal

title, which suggests that, at least in this respect, they accepted the primacy of Tunis. However, because they did not call themselves caliphs, local emirs made royal authority a defining characteristic of the ruler.

Authority Circumscribed

On a hill overlooking the bay and the surrounding gardens that spread across the Wād al-Kabīr river, the Kasbah (*al-qasaba*) of Bijāya stood as a fortified neighborhood within the city's walls. Gated and protected, the Kasbah was the home of the emir, his family and servants, and the important officials of his court and their families. The city itself was also walled and protected. A fortified core of the city, the Kasbah became the local emirate made object.

In the Kasbah, the emir and his entourage kept a mosque where they held official ceremonies and private prayers.¹⁷ Soldiers in uniform were posted at the gates, just as the ruler customarily kept near him a contingent of guards attached to his person.¹⁸ For the Bijāyans, the Kasbah was the home of the ruler, and so naturally, most of them never entered it. Foreign dignitaries and ambassadors, scholars, poets, and famous travelers went into the Kasbah to meet with the ruler or his close advisors.¹⁹ None of them, however, were to enter the Kasbah mounted, a known act of *lèse majesté*.²⁰

The Kasbah was the seat of power, the seat of the treasury (*makhzin*) and, as far as one can tell, the location of the ruler's own treasure. Into it came the taxes from which the ruler paid his armies, the gifts received from allies and subalterns, and the severed heads of enemies. The Almohads gave this aspect of their power added significance by building Kasbahs in all the larger cities they controlled.²¹ The Kasbahs were part of a network of military garrisons the Almohad sheikhs used to maintain control over Ifrīqiyyā.²²

The idea that the ruler was to be separated from the wider populace was commonplace. The Ḥafṣids practiced the seclusion of the ruler, and as Ibn Khaldūn described it, there were clear political implications in terms of actual power:

The royal authority of the (Ḥafṣid) ruler was very far-flung, and a great number of dependents lived in his house. Therefore, he needed a steward to be in charge of his house. . . . [The steward] was in control of the stores (in the treasuries) and had the duty of telling the tax collectors to provide for (the quantities and amounts of money) needed. He was called doorkeeper (*ḥājib*). . . . The ruler stayed in seclusion, and the doorkeeper (*ḥājib*) became the

liaison officer between the people and all the officials. . . . At this time, it also became his duty to give advice and counsel. Thus, his office became the highest in rank and included all government functions.²³

The title *hājib* derives from the verb to veil or hide. And indeed, for the first part of the fourteenth century, the Ḥafṣid emir was *maḥjūb*, or concealed, and his authority was channeled through, or mediated by, his powerful retainer.²⁴ The emir showed his face only to the most important personalities, and otherwise spoke to those who sought him through the *hājib* or through a screen. In the mosque, he prayed in a special room, the *maqṣūra*, or behind a screen.²⁵

In the city, in the Kasbah, the emir's appearance was highly ritualized and limited to great religious celebrations and to the pledge of allegiance by commoners (*al-`āmma*). The emir rarely prayed in the Great Mosque since the Kasbah had its own mosque. Between the Kasbah of Bijāya and the emir's gardens west of town, there were high walls that allowed him to pass by unnoticed. Much labor was expended trying to guarantee that the emir made only rare appearances, and to make the occasions on which he appeared extraordinary and spectacular.²⁶ Illustrating the importance attached to being visually unavailable, Ibn Qunfudh recounts that the emir Abū al-Abbās was the only grandson to see the Ḥafṣid Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr, who was particularly invisible.²⁷ One day, as if sensing his nearing end, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr "went out to the markets and showed his face." He died soon after that.²⁸

In a section under the heading "Commercial activity on the part of the ruler is harmful to his subjects and ruinous to the tax revenue," Ibn Khaldūn argued that the emir should not involve himself in trade. He was aware of the involvement of Ḥafṣid rulers in economic affairs, and used the threat to the dynasty as a way to put forth indirect advice to the ruler:

Sometimes, the ruler himself may engage in commerce and agriculture, from desire to increase (his) revenues. . . . He thinks that this will improve (his) revenues and increase (his) profits. However, this is a great error. It causes harm to the subjects in many ways. . . . Were the ruler to compare the revenue from taxes with the small profits (he reaps from trading himself), he would find the latter negligible in comparison with the former. . . . Furthermore, (the trading of the ruler) may cause the destruction of civilization

and, through the destruction and decrease of (civilization), the disintegration of the dynasty.²⁹

While these ideas can be found elsewhere, Ibn Khaldūn extends the ideas of seclusion and separation to encompass the economic sphere. As the *hājib* of a late “local” emir, he was also describing the conditions that prevailed in most of the fourteenth century.³⁰ With the coming of Ḥafṣid emirs like Abū al-‘Abbās (r. 1370–94) the situation changed.

For some time after (the reign of) the twelfth ruler of the Ḥafṣids [Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr, r. 1318–46], the government was controlled by others, and the ruler kept in seclusion. Afterwards, his grandson Abū al-‘Abbās regained control of his affairs. He removed the vestiges of seclusion and (outside) control by abolishing the office of doorkeeper (*hājib*), which had been the stepping-stone toward (control of the government). He handled all his affairs himself without asking anyone else for help. This is the situation at the present time.³¹

Abū al-‘Abbās led the effort to bring Ifrīqiyyā under unified Ḥafṣid rule. In the eyes of contemporaries, the process involved doing away with the power that *hājibs* had had over emirs. Doing so also meant the undoing of the alliance of urban elites that supported the local configuration and replacing it with a new pact that recognized the prominence of the ruler of Tunis. Freeing the emir from the constraints that limited his authority was thus not an abstraction. It was tied to and shaped by the politics of regionalization.

The City

If being a member of the Ḥafṣid dynasty did not automatically grant authority to an emir, not having a city to rule over was a sure disqualification. The city was the center of politics, economics, and intellectual life. So essential was it for an emir to rule over a city that the idea that a “real” emir was based in a city was simply taken for granted.

For an emir, the “city” did not refer only to the houses and markets inside the defensive walls or those immediately outside them. Ruling a city meant securing a perimeter of agricultural land surrounding the densely populated

center and, most importantly, collecting taxes from it. This, too, was taken for granted. In Bijāya, this perimeter encompassed the irrigated rich land and gardens (*basātīn*) along the river, which stretched for twelve miles.³² The “city” was conceived as a fiscal and administrative unit that included the urban center and its taxed surroundings (*‘amāla*). The sources also consider the city in relation to “its land” or “lands” (*balad*) and as an urbanized core with ties to other smaller settlements (*mawāṭin*). From the point of view of an emir, to rule a city was to secure it militarily and to appoint officials to collect taxes from those who fell within his supervision.³³

As protectors, sponsors, and patrons of economic and intellectual activity, dynasties were commonly seen as being crucial to the growth, development, and even survival of cities. But framing the relation between dynasties and cities in terms of the impact of the first on the second downplays the extent to which, ideologically, the city was necessary for any emir aspiring to royal authority (*mulk*). Both the analysis of political struggles and the designation of cities such as Tunis and Bijāya as seats of royal authority (*qā’idat al-mulk*) demonstrate that control of a city was of vital importance.³⁴ The idea that the category “emir” implied control over a city, even if only as a goal, was shared by all the dynasties of the Maghrib. When the Marinid Abū al-Hasan invaded Ifrīqiyyā in 1347 and received the capitulation of the emirs of Bijāya and Qasanṭīna, he removed them from Ifrīqiyyā and sent them to a region he controlled more firmly. Ibn Khaldūn tells us that Abū al-Hasan granted the cities of Wujda (Oujda) and Naḍrūma (Nedroma) to these two emirs.³⁵ Even defeated “real” emirs were to have a city—although, in this case, the cities were not really theirs to keep.

Big-City Emirs

The Ḥafṣids controlled the major cities of Ifrīqiyyā by appointing a governor (*wāli*) who took up residence at the Kasbah. To show his allegiance to his ruler, he had his name proclaimed at the Friday prayer (*khuṭba*) and struck on any currency he issued. Ḥafṣid emirs who were also governors secured the area under their purview militarily, preventing invasions and repressing rebellions, and supervised the collection of taxes. Combining force and persuasion, they made sure that those who had pledged allegiance to the ruler upon his accession to the throne remained loyal to him.³⁶

But the Ḥafṣids did not control all urban settlements in Ifrīqiyyā. They primarily ruled the cities and larger towns and extended their influence outward from them. The Ḥafṣids guaranteed this influence, rather than actual political

control, through military raids and fragile agreements and alliances that included land concessions (*iqtā'āt*) to largely autonomous Bedouins.

The size of cities, and thus of the areas surrounding them, distinguished dynasties from one another in the eyes of urban intellectuals. Dynasties that ruled over “small towns” and “villages” (*qurā*) were considered subordinate. In fact, the rule of these small kingdoms (*al-mulk al-aṣḡar*) depended on the weakness of the great dynasty (*al-mulk al-aẓam*) that ruled from a large city.³⁷ The hierarchy assumed here implies that the importance of a dynasty is a factor of the size of the city or cities it controls. Actually, big-city intellectuals such as Ibn Khaldūn believed this to be an incontrovertible fact that could easily be explained.

Activities required for luxury customs and conditions exist only in cities of a highly developed culture. . . . (Public) baths fall into this category. They exist only in densely settled cities of a highly developed civilization. . . . Public baths do not exist in medium-sized towns (*al-mudun al-mutawassīta*). It is true that some rulers (*mulūk*) and chiefs (*rū'asā*) desire (to have baths in their medium-sized cities). They construct them and put them into operation. However, since there is no demand for them from the mass of the people, they are soon neglected and fall into ruins.³⁸

Ibn Khaldūn can draw on observable fact about economic activity (*mā'ash*) to establish a means of differentiation between dynasties.³⁹ For him, the more powerful the dynasty, the larger the cities it controls, and the greater its civilization. Conversely, the “cities that are the seats of royal authority fall into ruin when the ruling dynasty falls into ruin and crumbles.”⁴⁰ His learned contemporaries implied or assumed more simply that cities were differentiated by natural characteristics such as rivers and mountains, specialization in a particular commodity, and intellectual life.⁴¹ The hierarchy they assumed was between cities that attracted intellectuals of quality and smaller settlements that did not.

Hafṣid emirs needed to rule cities to count as “real” emirs. For most of the fourteenth century, they ruled over the largest cities of Ifrīqiyyā: Tunis, Bijāya, Qasanṭīna, Tarāblus, Būna, and al-Qayrawān. This made them, in the eyes of Hafṣid intellectuals, the rulers of Ifrīqiyyā. The areas that escaped their control were deemed marginal and beyond Ifrīqiyyā's true borders. The dynasties that ruled them were unimportant and illegitimate. When Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434)

became the ruler, he exerted more influence over them than his predecessors had, but he did not completely eliminate them. His greatness as a ruler entailed the conquest of large cities beyond Ifrīqiyyā and the expansion of Ḥafṣid rule over new urban elites. The importance of his reign resides in urban elites' acquiescence to it and the elimination of the threat of local rule.

Big-City Urban Elites and Emirism

The emergence of Emirism as a dominant ideology in the early fifteenth century was the result of the coming together of those very groups of urban elites, Andalusis and others, which had once supported the local emirate. In a fundamental sense, Emirism was the expression of these urban elites' capitulation following the political dead-ends created by their rivalry. The subdued echoes of their former virulence do form an important part of Emirist ideology.

In his history of the Ḥafṣid dynasty, Ibn Qunfudh expressed his pride in his city of Qasanṭīna, which was also the birthplace of his hero, the Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Fāris. He did so by relating a number of anecdotes about his city, its ties to the Ḥafṣid dynasty, and the great deeds of Abū Fāris and his Ḥafṣid forefathers. He also inserted references to those among his own ancestors who occupied prestigious positions. In an aside typical of his narrative style, Ibn Qunfudh explained why members of the old families of Qasanṭīna, like himself, had reason to be proud.

The emir Abū Zakariyā Yahyā [r. 1285–1301] used to spend the year between Qasanṭīna and Bijāya.⁴² He preferred the people of Qasanṭīna above all and he did not give special treatment to others until he sought their understanding. Some of the 'udūl of our city tell a story about the emir Abū Zakariyā, God have mercy on him, who fell ill once in Qasanṭīna.⁴³ After he recovered, the people of Bijāya (*ahl Bijāya*) came [to pay him a visit]. A group of people from our city (*balad*) went to the Kasbah and the two parties (*tā'ifatān*) met at the Kasbah Mosque. All were waiting for an audience with the emir. The *ḥājib* came out to them—I believe it was Abū al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm b. Abī Yahyā—and went to sit with the people of our city. Among them was my grandfather's father, 'Alī b. Qunfudh, who at the time was the preacher of the Friday sermon (*khaṭīb*) at the Kasbah Mosque. [The *ḥājib*] told them: "Our ruler (*mawlāna*) tells you: 'You know the esteem we have for you. These learned men (*fuqahā'*) from Bijāya are our guests and yours too.'

Allow them to have some precedence with us before you, if you please.’” They replied: “We will.” At that time, the judge of Bijāya was the jurist (*faqih*) and traditionist (*muḥḥaddith*) Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad al-Ghubrīnī, and the judge of Qasanṭīna was the jurist Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Dīm [or Daym]. They entered the room of the ruler (*malik*) in this order: the last of the Bijāyans then the first of the Qasanṭīnans. The Bijāyans greeted the ruler with respect and in an orderly fashion, but the Qasanṭīnans jostled for position, their judge among them, trying to position themselves nearest the ruler. When the two judges met, al-Ghubrīnī asked Ibn al-Dīm: “You saw the good manners of the people of my city who were with me, and you receive no respect from the people of your city.” The judge Ibn al-Dīm replied: “The reason is that your learned men are new to your city (*muḥdathūn bi-baladikum*), whereas [the people of Qasanṭīna] are from prominent families, and each individual believes that his family is superior (*arfa'*) to the others because of its roots in their city and its longstanding prosperity.” [Hearing that], the judge al-Ghubrīnī became silent, as if he regretted his words.⁴⁴

For Ibn Qunfudh, Bijāya was a “new” city; its notables were new people. Unlike Qasanṭīna, which was an ancient city, Bijāya became a city only in the eleventh century. Its people had moved there from Qal’at Banī Hammād, from smaller towns inland such as al-Masīla, or Mediterranean ports such as al-Jazā’ir and Tadlis. A few, for instance the judge al-Ghubrīnī, had moved to the city from ancestral lands nearby. Besides, the most prominent and influential notables in Bijāya were actually Andalusis. Al-Ghubrīnī understood this perfectly well. He knew that Qasanṭīna was an old city and that its notables had deep roots there.

Al-Ghubrīnī’s silence betrays his support for the idea that the “urban character” of a city’s notables measured its prestige. Newly urbanized “Bedouins,” however learned, could not compete with truly urban families. Exhibiting sophistication, politeness, and refinement was, in this context, evidence of a lack of assurance. There was certainly a difference between having an ancestral home near the city, as did the Banū Ghubrīn, and being an urbanite and owning land in the country as Ibn Qunfudh did.

Ibn Qunfudh was not writing at the time his great-grandfather supported the autonomy of Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā from Tunis. His chronicle celebrates the

regional emirate of Abū Fāris and positions the urban notables of Qasanṭīna favorably in that context. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1440), the descendant of the Bijāyan judge, was to become judge in Tunis soon after. The very families that had supported secession were now vying for precedence in the service of the regional Ḥafṣid emirate. Importantly, the urban notability had reasserted itself, eclipsing the Andalusis, whose political influence had begun to wane in the mid-fourteenth century.

The other group that had played an important political role in the fourteenth century, the Almohad sheikhs, had simply integrated into the urban notability. They, too, were “new” to the cities of Ifrīqiyyā, but even if the memory of their former political significance was the subject of pride, they had all but disappeared as a separate social group. By the end of the fourteenth century, to be an Almohad only meant to be from one of the large cities of Ifrīqiyyā.⁴⁵ This was not the case for Andalusis, who retained their distinctness as Andalusis even when they belonged to this or that city’s elite.

Elite Andalusis migrated to Ifrīqiyyā in the thirteenth century and settled in the largest cities, Bijāya and Tunis foremost among them.⁴⁶ Those who left al-Andalus for the courts of the first two Ḥafṣid rulers were not the first Andalusis to do so.⁴⁷ Those who became part of the Ḥafṣid court under Abū Zakariyā (r. 1229–49) and his son al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77) were, however, special in that they issued from the urban elites of Andalusi cities such as Seville, Murcia, and Játiva. Interestingly, once they migrated to Ifrīqiyyā, they became “Andalusis,” a specific identity that emerged in the process of their integration into the elites of Ifrīqiyyā. This outcome is thoroughly supported by consistent references to “Andalusis” to describe a specific group in Ifrīqiyyā.

The earliest evidence suggesting that Andalusis formed a differentiated group is found in the late thirteenth-century biographical dictionary written by Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1304). Al-Ghubrīnī described the Sevillian Ibn Maḥriz (1173–1258) as “the head of the Andalusi group in Bijāya” (*ra’s al-jamā‘a al-andalusiya bi-bijāya*) and as “the leader of the group (*shaykh al-jamā‘a*) and the most prominent (*kabīr*) among them.”⁴⁸ This characterization alone does not necessarily prove the existence of a structured “community” with formalized representation.⁴⁹ However, it does point to the routine habit of referring to Andalusis as if they formed a social group. In fact, “the Andalusis” later became a common category in thinking about the influence that a number of individuals had in Ifrīqiyyā. Ibn Khaldūn often described these powerful individuals as members of the “group of Andalusi immigrants” or the “Andalusi immigrants” (*al-jāliya al-andalusiya*) and only rarely as “the

people of al-Andalus” (*ahl al-Andalus*), a phrase he reserved for Andalusis in al-Andalus.⁵⁰ Illustrating this process, a number of Andalusis in Ifrīqiyyā came to be known as “al-Andalusi,” a description that would have made little sense in al-Andalus.⁵¹

The category “Andalusi” made a great deal of difference in politics, because it mattered whether someone belonged to that “group” or not. Describing the replacement of the powerful *hājib* of Bijāya Ibn Sayyid al-Nās by another Andalusi, Ibn Khaldūn admitted that he knew little about the latter “other than he was from among those who had immigrated from al-Andalus” (*jāliyat al-Andalus*).⁵² The “Andalusi” Ibn Khaldūn remembered that. He also remembered intra-Andalusi differences that recalled differentiation in al-Andalus. For instance, some belonged to the “immigrants from Shāṭiba (Játiva)” (*min jāliyat shāṭiba*) and others came with the “immigrants from Eastern Andalus” (*ma’ā al-jāliya min sharq al-Andalus*).⁵³

As a form of identity in Ifrīqiyyā, “Andalusi” was an urban identity.⁵⁴ It was urban first of all because elite Andalusis migrated to cities. Second, elite Andalusis such as Ibn Khaldūn belonged to the urban elites of al-Andalus.⁵⁵ For him, being a “Sevillian” was important, and naturally that “identity” came with the memorialization of distinctions from other urbanites in al-Andalus.⁵⁶ Prominent Ḥafṣid officials, who belonged to the “Great Families” (*buyūtāt*) of Andalusi cities, brought with them a very “urban” conception and practice of politics.⁵⁷ Even after they migrated to Ifrīqiyyā, the Andalusis expressed pride in their families’ ties to Andalusi cities. An honorable family was said to have produced prominent men in Seville or Jáen or Murcia. This honor stemmed from their attachment and service to a city-centered dynasty and, derivatively, from the great deeds of that dynasty. Unfailingly and repeatedly, Andalusis in Ifrīqiyyā proclaimed their honor as it was expressed in al-Andalus.

While it is difficult to say that Andalusi city-centered cultural expressions elicited a response from the urban elites of Ifrīqiyyā, it is clear that pride in one’s city became common. In a way, al-Ghubrīnī’s biographical dictionary of the learned men who were born in Bijāya, lived there, or even passed through his city was one man’s attempt to put his native city on the map of prestigious centers of learning.

To achieve his goal, al-Ghubrīnī had to show that Bijāyan scholars rivaled the best in terms of the accumulation of honors and intellectual achievements. One of the most competitive arenas in which scholarly distinction could be attained was the individual’s ability to transmit statements (*ḥadīth*) going back

to the Prophet Muhammad. Specialists (*muḥaddithūn*) prized chains of transmission that included famous ulama, especially if those chains had few links. And so it was probably with great Bijāyan pride that al-Ghubrīnī introduced ‘Alī b. Abī Naṣr Fatḥ b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 1254) as a great man “of Bijāyan origin who was born in the city and died in the city,” and who possessed the most prestigious chain of transmission in the area.⁵⁸ The Bijāyan scholar’s importance is further enhanced in the eyes of al-Ghubrīnī because even “the Andalusis include[d] him in their chains of transmission since their chains of transmission were less prestigious than his.”⁵⁹ This nativist jab at Andalusis shows al-Ghubrīnī’s awareness of the weight of Andalusis and demonstrates the competitive character of the urban elite. In fact, given their political prominence in Ifrīqiyyā, the role of Andalusis in the formulation of Emirism requires further analysis.

Grooming the Ruler

Elite Andalusis played a leading political role in Ifrīqiyyā beginning in the early thirteenth century and culminating with the rule of the local emirs whom they championed. While most did not leave writings that would allow us to assess their impact on the development of Emirism, some, like Ibn Khaldūn, did. Even if not all Andalusis shared his ideas, Ibn Khaldūn articulated a vision of politics that was unmistakably Andalusi.

Andalusi Musings

When he wrote *al-Muqaddima*, Ibn Khaldūn had served as a high-level Hafṣid official on two occasions: once each in Tunis and Bijāya. The position of *hājib* of the emir of Bijāya was the highest he would ever hold. His family was not new to positions of power, however. His great-grandfather, the first Ibn Khaldūn to grow up in Ifrīqiyyā, had held the office of Manager of Financial Affairs (*sāhib al-ashghāl*) in Tunis, an office that the family had held in Ishbilyā (Seville) before their migration. By the end of the fourteenth century, the Banū Khaldūn were known pillars (*arkān, a’yāṣ*) of the Hafṣid *dawla*. They had helped the Hafṣids carry the weight of kingship. On one occasion, at least according to Ibn Khaldūn, an Ibn Khaldūn may have literally carried Abū Hafs ‘Umar (r. 1284–95) on his back.⁶⁰ The Banū Khaldūn were not the only elite Andalusis to play an important political role in Ifrīqiyyā.⁶¹ Their ties to the

Hafṣids do, however, point to a connection between the political culture of al-Andalus and that of Ifrīqiyyā.

The political role of Andalusis was tied to their expertise in the administration of government offices. The Hafṣids sought to undermine the political influence of Almohad sheikhs by replacing them in official positions with Andalusi experts.

In the Hafṣid dynasty of Ifrīqiyyā, the top position was at first in the hands of . . . the “*Shaykh* of the Almohads” . . . Bookkeeping and the ministry (*dīwān* of tax collection) were [entrusted to the] *Sāhib al-Asghāl* (Manager of Financial Affairs). . . . He [too had to] be an Almohad. “The pen” [Head of the Chancery] was a separate office under (the Almohads). It was only entrusted to a person with good knowledge of (official) correspondence who could be trusted with secrets. Since people (of consequence in the dynasty) had no professional knowledge of writing, a particular descent was not a condition of appointment to that office.⁶²

Our author points to “the pen” as an institution that does not require a “particular descent.” What is at stake here is the replacement of a logic of appointments based on kinship with one based on skill. Ibn Khaldūn takes for granted the Hafṣid policy of favoring Andalusis, especially under Abū Zakariyā Yahyā and al-Mustanṣir. His observation is an *ex post facto* rationalization of a process that saw the integration of “highly skilled” Andalusis into the bureaucracy. The presentation of Andalusi skills in this pragmatic and “neutral” fashion supported Hafṣid immigration policy by depicting it as a reasonable substitute for the poor quality of work the Bedouins, in other words the Almohad sheikhs, were able to perform. Of course, once Andalusi bureaucrats held these high-level positions, they instituted a form of favoritism that secured employment to their kin and fellow Andalusis. However, Ibn Khaldūn has a good explanation for this behavior.

The Hafṣids gained control over Ifrīqiyyā at the time when the exodus from al-Andalus (*jāliya*) took place. [Immigrant Andalusi] notables came to (the Hafṣids). . . . (The Hafṣids) liked to have them for this (type of work). They entrusted them with the supervision of (tax) affairs, which was what they had been doing in al-Andalus. They employed them and the Almohads alternately

for this purpose. Later on, the accountants and secretaries took the office over for themselves, and the Almohads lost it.⁶³

Andalusi favoritism was not tribal. It was urbane and followed (Andalusi) royal customs. In fact, the quality of the work it secured promoted good kingship. In other words, to be “Bedouin” or “tribal” was to be “Almohad,” “old regime,” and “country,” whereas to be anti-tribal, urban, and dynastic was to be pro-Hafṣid and, as it happened, Andalusi.⁶⁴

The font of knowledge from which the newcomers drew their wisdom had developed in the context of the fractious politics of al-Andalus. While there was no shortage of rivalry and contentiousness in the Maghrib prior to their immigration, the functions that Andalusis came to hold in the Hafṣid government made their contributions politically significant.⁶⁵ For instance, influential Andalusis were behind the independence of Bijāya from Tunis, the event that brought about the rule of local emirs and the multiplication of political centers in Ifrīqiyyā. In fact, a few decades after their arrival, the Andalusis had advised the Hafṣids in such a way that, for Ibn Khaldūn, Ifrīqiyyā began to look remarkably like al-Andalus.

[The Hafṣids’] power flourished and reached its limit, but then, the emir Abū Zakariyā Yahyā, the son of Abū Ishaq Ibrāhīm, the fourth Hafṣid caliph, seceded in the western provinces and founded a new realm in [Bijāya] and [Qasanṭīna] and environs. He passed it on to his children. (Abū Zakariyā and his children) thus split the dynasty in two. . . . The process of splitting may lead to the formation of more than two or three dynasties that are not controlled by the members of the (original) ruling family. This was the case with the Party Kings in [al-Andalus] and with the non-Arab rulers in the East.⁶⁶

Under the so-called Party Kings (*mulūk al-ṭawā’if*), al-Andalus had seen the prevalence of city-based dynasties that replaced the rule of the Umayyads (756–1031).⁶⁷ Although they thrived at the courts of these dynasties, intellectuals expressed nostalgia for caliphs who ruled over more than a town and its surroundings. They lamented the politics of these petty rulers who behaved as if they were like the powerful caliphs of yore. In *al-Muqaddima*, Ibn Khaldūn twice mentions a famous poem by the Andalusi Ibn Sharaf (d. 1067–68) that captured these sentiments that were similar to those of the elite of Ifrīqiyyā.

What makes me feel humble in al-Andalus
 Is the use there of the names Mu'taṣim and Mu'taṣid⁶⁸
 Royal surnames not in their proper place:
 Like a cat that by blowing itself up imitates the lion.⁶⁹

Andalusis did not just foster yearning for a powerful ruler. These “experts” brought about the very city-based political “fragmentation” that fueled Emirist sentiments. They both created the “crisis” and presented themselves as those who had most experience dealing with it. They also brought with them from al-Andalus expert builders, masons, and craftsmen of all sorts who could readily be employed in projects that glorified the Ḥafṣids. Once they conceived of the “need” for expert Andalusis and began to encourage elite courtiers to migrate to Ifrīqiyyā, the Ḥafṣids soon realized that their needs extended well beyond the sphere of government. Having developed a taste for the culture of the Andalusi urban elite, they made Andalusis into a most desirable commodity.

However, and in spite of their elite status and their political influence, Andalusis were also routinely portrayed as victims that needed help. Later Ḥafṣid historians made this point by referring to the impassioned appeal for help that the famed Andalusi litterateur Ibn al-Abbār (d. 1260) delivered at the court of Abū Zakariyā Yahyā (r. 1229–49).

Come with your cavalry, the cavalry of God, to al-Andalus!
 For the way to her rescue is nearing hopelessness.⁷⁰

The religious cloak of this appeal puts the onus of defense of “Muslim lands” on the Ifrīqiyyans. It is a strategic articulation that reproduces pan-Islamic ideology, associated with Caliphism, but gives it a very narrow use and particular direction. Abū Zakariyā was asked to prove himself a worthy Muslim leader, perhaps worthy of the title of caliph, by defending al-Andalus against the unbelievers. To be good Muslims, the elites of Ifrīqiyyā had to lend a hand to the poor Andalusis being chased out of their homes and forced into exile. Immigrant Andalusis made al-Andalus a very familiar “cause” in Ifrīqiyyā and its rescue (*najdat al-andalus*) a popular literary theme.

More than a military defeat, the situation in al-Andalus threatened a way of life. The beautiful gardens, the palaces, and especially the thriving urban culture were all in danger. This civilization transplanted elsewhere would not

be the same, because there was no place like al-Andalus. However, from the point of view of their hosts, the coming of Andalusis had notable effects on the local culture.

The Maghrib, on the other hand, has received a good deal of urban civilization from [al-Andalus] since the dynasty of the Almohads, and the customs of sedentary culture became established there through the control that the ruling dynasty of the Maghrib exercised over [al-Andalus]. . . . [The Almohad dynasty] possessed a good deal of firmly established urban civilization, most of it due to the inhabitants of [al-Andalus]. Later on, the inhabitants of eastern [al-Andalus] were expelled by the Christians and moved to Ifrīqiyyā. In the cities there, they left traces of sedentary culture, most of it in Tunis.⁷¹

For Ibn Khaldūn, and plausibly many other Andalusis in Ifrīqiyyā, the message was clear: the poor urbanization of Ifrīqiyyā and the predominance of Bedouin civilization seriously hampered its cultural attainment.⁷² The immigration of Andalusis into the seats of Ḥafṣid power enhanced the level of civilization in Ifrīqiyyā.

The rearticulation of pan-Islamic ideology and the making of Ifrīqiyyā into a Bedouin region civilized by urban Andalusis were the two avatars of the integration of elite Andalusis into the Ḥafṣid ruling elite. As Muslims, Ifrīqiyyans had the “duty” to help the Andalusis and it was also in their best “interest” to do so. Simply stated, Andalusis went to Ifrīqiyyā brandishing two signs, one that said “Rescue me!” and gained the sympathy of the locals, and another that said “Let Me Rescue You!” and helped consolidate their hold on positions of power in Ifrīqiyyā.

As far as the Ḥafṣids were concerned, the closer they were to the Andalusis, the more urbane they became, and the further they were from Bedouins—and their own (Almohad) Bedouin origins. Andalusis thus had a stake in deemphasizing the ideology of the “Bedouin” Almohad caliphate in favor of a city-centric Emirism. The anti-Bedouin rhetoric did not simply underplay the socioeconomic and political ties that were crucial to the maintenance of Ḥafṣid rule. It set up the city and the country as ideologically opposite poles that anchored the politics of regionalization. Consequently, it would be difficult to account for the cultural content of that politics without a reference to the integration of elite Andalusis in Ifrīqiyyā. Even if it was their political

defeat that brought about the regional configuration of politics, their cultural (or ideological) contributions were fully incorporated into Emirist ideology.

Ibn Khaldūn and Emirism

Like many of his Andalusi contemporaries, Ibn Khaldūn was acutely aware of the importance of his work. However, the intellectuals around him in the Maghrib do not seem to have been especially impressed by its quality, and hardly noticed it.⁷³ For most, he was simply an Andalusi whose family became influential through its association with the Ḥafṣids.⁷⁴ In other words, he was a politico or someone tied to a *dawla*.

One of the most studied aspects of Ibn Khaldūn's theoretical work is the cycle he envisioned of the successive rises and falls of *duwal* (sing. *dawla*). The cycle begins with Bedouins (*badw*) living in the desert. A particular clan gathers other Bedouins around itself, and through their intense solidarity (*'asabiya*), which may be strengthened by a religious message, they found a *dawla*, either by overpowering a previous *dawla* and taking over its capital or by founding their own capital with the ultimate goal of producing *hadāra*, or civilization.⁷⁵ After a *dawla* is established, it undoes the solidarity that brought it to power by relying on functionaries and soldiers who are not kinsmen. Doing so signals the culmination and beginning of the end of the *dawla* because a new coalition of Bedouins would soon be able to muster a large army that would defeat the weaker solidarity of salaried soldiers. Cursory and simplified as it certainly is, this summary allows us to examine Ibn Khaldūn's framework in relation to the politics of regionalization, Emirism, and the Ḥafṣids' claims to legitimacy.⁷⁶

The Almohad Mu'minid *dawla* emerged out of the military campaigns led by the Bedouin followers of Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130). Among them, 'Abd al-Mu'min became the ruler of Marrakech after unseating the last Almoravid ruler and prevailing over rivals. In other words, an alliance of Bedouin groups rallying around a religious message (*al-tawḥīd*) overran an aging urban and erstwhile Bedouin Almoravid dynasty.⁷⁷ Obviously, the Mu'minids fit the Khadunian cycle perfectly.

As far as the Ḥafṣids are concerned, the circumstances that brought about the foundation of their *dawla* require some explanation. The Ḥafṣids emerged out of the coalition of Bedouins who had originally supported the Mu'minids. For Ibn Khaldūn's scheme to apply, they should have been a powerful Bedouin group that defeated the Mu'minids; but instead they were Almohad governors who merely seceded from the Mu'minids.⁷⁸ How did Ibn Khaldūn explain

the rise of the Ḥafṣids? For him, the original moment of the formation of the Ḥafṣid dynasty was not when they declared autonomy from Marrakech, but a century earlier, when their ancestor Abū Ḥafṣ led his kinsmen in support of Ibn Tūmart. This argument, which was also that of official Ḥafṣid ideologues, hinged on their ancestor's "closeness" to Ibn Tūmart, which had to be at least similar to that of 'Abd al-Mu'min.

Ibn Khaldūn does not discuss this matter in the course of establishing his framework in *al-Muqaddima*. Instead, he discusses it in the "historical" section. When he describes the formation of the original Almohads around Ibn Tūmart, he notes that though Ibn Tūmart (*imām*), 'Abd al-Mu'min (*khalifa*), and Abū Ḥafṣ (*shaykh*) had different titles, they "equally shared in majesty" (*jalāla*).⁷⁹ This original equality of majesty enabled Ibn Khaldūn and other Ḥafṣid ideologues to claim the Almohad label. For Ibn Khaldūn, the equality of majesty demonstrated the "ability" of the Ḥafṣids to establish a *dawla*.⁸⁰ Following his scheme, the three men shared in majesty in a pre-dynastic moment, when both Mu'minid and Ḥafṣid *duwal* were in their embryonic state. The problem was thus to explain how the Ḥafṣids were able to continue the Almohad *dawla* in Ifrīqiyyā. Ibn Khaldūn's solution is rather elegant.

In a dynasty affected by senility as the result of luxury and inactivity, it sometimes happens that the ruler chooses helpers and partisans from groups not related to [him but accustomed] to toughness. He uses (these people) as an army that will be better able to suffer the hardships of wars, hunger, and privation. This could prove a cure for the senility of the dynasty when it comes. . . . The same was the case with the Almohad (Ḥafṣid) dynasty in Ifrīqiyyā. Their rulers often selected their armies from the Zanātah and the [Bedouin] Arabs. They used many of them, and disregarded their own people who had become accustomed to luxury. Thus, the dynasty obtained another, new life, unaffected by senility.⁸¹

Ibn Khaldūn conceived of the Mu'minid and the Ḥafṣid *duwal* as the early and later forms of the same Almohad *dawla*, even if it would seem more consistent with his framework to see them as distinct. He did not believe, for instance, that the Mamlūk rulers of Egypt continued the 'Abbāsid *dawla* even if their supporters claimed they did.⁸² Clearly, Ibn Khaldūn acted as a Ḥafṣid ideologue, presenting Ḥafṣid ideological claims as fact.

The political implications of his framework can also be seen in his

treatment of Bedouins. On the surface, Ibn Khaldūn allows for all Bedouins to form *duwal*.⁸³ However, he was not interested in speculating about what that might entail. Instead, to support his theory, he simply used the example of those that had formed *duwal* in the past. The Bedouins who did not form a *dawla* were simply irrelevant. Significantly, he ridiculed those who contemplated doing so during his lifetime.

Some of these people occasionally aspire to the ways of the great rulers. . . . They adopt the customs of sitting upon a throne. They use an outfit (*āla*), organize cavalcades for traveling about the country, use signet rings, are greeted (ceremoniously), and are addressed as Sire (*mawlā*), which is ridiculous in the eyes of all who can observe the situation for themselves. [Others] have refrained from [such impropriety] and lived simply, because they did not want to make themselves the butt of jokes and ridicule.⁸⁴

Since Ibn Khaldūn imagined the rule of a powerful urban dynast to be best, undermining the legitimacy of would-be “Bedouin” dynasties came naturally to him. The reason the situation arose in the first place was not the actions these Bedouins took to free themselves from the oversight of the Ḥafṣids. Instead, it was the inaction of the Ḥafṣid dynasty, its inability to make these Bedouins submit to its will, that led to the existence of these illegitimate and inconsequential dynasties.

This has happened in our own time, in the later (years) of the Ḥafṣid dynasty in Ifrīqiyyā, to inhabitants of places in the Jarīd, including Tripoli, Gabès, Tozeur (Tūzar), Nafta (Naftah), Gafsa (Qafṣah), Biskra and the Zāb, and adjacent regions. They acquired such aspirations when the shadow of the (ruling) dynasty had been receding from them for some decades.⁸⁵

Interestingly, the cities he mentioned here were small towns. Ibn Khaldūn considers them Bedouin because they were “peripheral,” far away from Tunis, the center of civilization.

Cities in remote parts of the realm (*fi al-qāsiya*), even if they have an abundant civilization, are found to be predominantly Bedouin and remote from sedentary culture in all their ways. This is in

contrast with (the situation in) towns that lie in the middle, the center and seat of the dynasty (*dawla*).⁸⁶

Clearly, no amount of “civilization” could rescue those who lived in smaller towns far from the center of politics-and-civilization.⁸⁷ They were irreducibly Bedouin. The Ḥafṣid attempts to bring these cities under their influence was, at least as Ibn Khaldūn described it, necessarily a civilizing process.

The distance of cities from Tunis situated them geographically and politically. Since throughout the fourteenth century politics kept changing, there was a need for a vocabulary to express a basic uncertainty about the degree to which certain cities belonged. Here again, the contribution of the Andalusis was felt, especially their familiarity with what can be characterized as the “frontier-talk” that developed there. More so than later Ḥafṣid historians, Ibn Khaldūn described Ifrīqiyā by utilizing terms associated with the frontier between Muslims and Christians in Iberia.⁸⁸ This Andalusi feature of his language has the effect of accentuating the centrality of Tunis and making urban centers like Bijāya into defensive frontier towns (*thughūr, aṭrāf, tukhūm*).⁸⁹ Certainly, the endemic raiding of the coasts of Ifrīqiyā by Aragonese and other Christian pirates supported this usage. In any case, Ibn Khaldūn envisioned a Tunis-centric Ifrīqiyā. His descriptions of Bijāya as a western frontier town (*al-thaghr al-gharbī min Ifrīqiyā*) signaled his preference for the regional emirate.⁹⁰

Ifrīqiyā and Emirism

The idea that the Ḥafṣids were the kings of Ifrīqiyā emerged before Emirism became the dominant political ideology. In the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldūn had bemoaned the dynasty’s weakness and explained it away. But when it came to introducing the dynasty in his text, he made sure to mention that the Ḥafṣids were the kings of Ifrīqiyā. He writes a “Narrative about the *dawla* of the Banū Ḥafṣ, the Almohad kings of Ifrīqiyā, the beginning of their power (*amr*), and the vicissitudes of their conditions.”⁹¹

A century later, Ḥafṣid historians repeated that claim, making it a central tenet of Emirist ideology. Unlike Ibn Khaldūn for whom the regional emirate was a wish and a memory, they enjoyed the comfortable support of the *fait accompli*. When he designed his history, the Ḥafṣid historian Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457) took for granted that the Ḥafṣids were the kings of Ifrīqiyā. “I will

offer in this work a sufficient synopsis of the reports about the Ḥafṣid rulers (*al-sādāt al-mawālī*), the Almohad caliphs and kings of Ifrīqiyyā (*mulūk*)—may God count them among the righteous Imāms.”⁹²

The power of the Ḥafṣids extended over the larger urban centers, and from them into the country, but not in a homogeneous, continuous, or consistent manner. Their Ifrīqiyyā encompassed a number of distinct types of power relations between the dynasty and groups as different from one another as small-town dynasties, Bedouin confederacies, and village elders in the mountains. This did not prevent Ḥafṣid authors from repeating that all of Ifrīqiyyā was Ḥafṣid. Rather, their repeated references to Ḥafṣid Ifrīqiyyā supported the dynasty’s ideological claims, relegating competing “Bedouin” dynasties to the periphery of Ifrīqiyyā, even when they were located in its heart. For Ḥafṣid authors, it was thus not a contradiction to describe the actual lack of control in many areas while repeating the dynasty’s claims over Ifrīqiyyā. For instance, in his narrative of the return of the Ḥafṣid Abū Yaḥyā Zakariyā al-Lihyānī (r. 1311–17) from pilgrimage, the historian al-Zarkashī (fl. 1482) explained that “he found that the [Bedouin] Arabs ruled (*ghalabat*) Ifrīqiyyā.”⁹³ This did not prevent Abū Yaḥyā from being the true ruler of Ifrīqiyyā in his eyes.

In a critical sense, the lag between actual political control and rhetoric was unavoidable. Autonomists continued to create areas that escaped the control of the ruler of Tunis. When historians in the fifteenth century described the political situation of the previous century, they tended to imagine Ifrīqiyyā in anachronistic terms as larger and more unified than it really was. The exception to this general rule was when they copied sections from previous histories, such as Ibn Khaldūn’s. Their narratives therefore include descriptions of Ifrīqiyyā that appear to be contradictory. For instance, Ibn al-Shammā‘ described Ifrīqiyyā as extending from Tarāblus (Tripoli) to Tanja (Tangier).⁹⁴ This was not surprising, given the great expansion westward under Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434) and Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān (r. 1435–88). Ifrīqiyyā was simply the projection of Ḥafṣid rule and, unsurprisingly, the author presents this as a fact. This does not prevent him from noting the secession of Ḥafṣid emirs or their lack of control over Ifrīqiyyā in the past. Interestingly, he does not describe Ifrīqiyyā as encompassing the western Maghrib in the chronicle itself, but only in the prefatory statements that recapitulate Ḥafṣid ideological claims.

Ibn Khaldūn, too, includes a definition of Ifrīqiyyā and its limits in the preface to the *Kitāb al-‘ibar*. Understandably, he did not believe the region to extend all the way to the western Maghrib, but limited it to the areas east of Būna, thus east of Bijāya.⁹⁵ When it came to discussing Bijāya, he had no

difficulty seeing it as being at the margins of Ifrīqiyā, an appropriate description given his preference for a Tunis-centric Ḥafṣid emir. When a Ḥafṣid ruler such as Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46) was able to control most of the larger cities of Ifrīqiyā, including Bijāya, Ibn Khaldūn celebrated this as the imposition of the correct situation for the region (*intazamat*). In such cases, by accepting Ḥafṣid rule, the formerly marginal towns (*amṣār* and *thughūr*) whose inclusion in Ifrīqiyā was in doubt reintegrated the region and became part of it.⁹⁶

Moreover, when the Ḥafṣid ruler failed to pay attention to the affairs of kingship (*siyāsat al-mulk*), Ifrīqiyā became restless and troubles arose (*idṭirāb al-ahwāl bi-Ifrīqiyā*).⁹⁷ The Ifrīqiyā in question here is the ideological “blanket” area over which the Ḥafṣids were supposed to rule. To the extent that this Ifrīqiyā referred to a concrete referent, it was not a territory or even a particular expanse of land. Instead, as the connection to upheavals suggests, it was meant to invoke the political acquiescence of a number of Bedouin sheikhs and urban elites.

Ifrīqiyā was not, then, simply a geographic region that was controlled by the Ḥafṣids. It was more a vague “homeland” than a territory, and its contours were always contingent on the politics of regionalization. In other words, in the fourteenth century, Ifrīqiyā changed with the changing form and content of politics. With the emergence of Emirism, it came to stand for the Ḥafṣid regional emirate and its decidedly urban character. As such, it played a crucial role in the articulation of Emirism as the ideology that shifted discourse away from the realities of Ḥafṣid rule over a few cities, the people living in the areas surrounding them, and the fragile allegiance of a few others, toward a more grandiose affirmation.

“Ḥafṣid Ifrīqiyā” was one of the pillars of Emirism. But no one in the fourteenth century contrived a plan to make Emirism the dominant political ideology. Rather, the struggles between specific social groups, framed in terms that had little to do with the establishment of an ideal ruler, led to the victory of the regional configuration of Abū Fāris’s emirate. These struggles, conceived in terms of a rather mundane competition for social dominance, formed the fertile ground on which Emirism grew and expanded. Actually, Emirism preceded the emir and, in a critical sense, brought him into being.

One of the key features of Emirism is its profoundly urban character. Here, the role of those Andalusi immigrants who integrated the elite of Ifrīqiyā came to the fore. With few or no ties to the lands beyond cities, Andalusi courtiers and intellectuals adapted the old idea of the city as a center of civility and civilization to actual political conditions. They shaped the development of

Emirism and gave it a particularly Andalusi accent. Moreover, with Abū Fāris, the marginalization of the Almohad sheikhs in Ifrīqiyyā was consummated and the reliance on Almohadism (*al-tawḥīd*), an ideology associated with the domination of specific tribes, became superfluous. As urban emirs, the Ḥafṣids had relegated Bedouins and their ideologies to a subordinate status—at least according to their own intellectuals. This does not mean, of course, that those Bedouins or their ideas simply disappeared, or became inert. Instead, as the Ḥafṣids brought about a regional emirate, they articulated their legitimacy and executed their domination in terms that were contrary to those espoused by the Bedouins they relentlessly combated.

The articulation of this political ideology (which, among other things, secured the domination of the elite through ideas) was the work of intellectuals. Once Emirism became dominant, intellectuals adapted, simplified, and purged it of the reminders of its historical contingency. They told the coming of the emir as a long-prophesied truth.

Learning and the Emirate

Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī (1246–1304), judge and author of a biographical dictionary of Bijāya’s learned men, distinguished sharply between those who belonged in his great text and those who should be consigned to oblivion and obscurity. In the last decades of the thirteenth century, during the reign of the first independent Ḥafṣid emir of Bijāya, Abū Zakariyā Yahyā (1285–1301), al-Ghubrīnī wrote with contempt about those who used Sufi ideas to gather people around them.

These people are a bunch of ignoramuses (*jumlat aghbiyā*) who have no knowledge (*‘ilm*); their practices (*‘amal*) are improper, they are not [legitimate] Sufis (*taṣṣawwuf*), and they lack discernment (*fahm*). They are among those who lead people into ignorance (*yujahbilūn al-nās*). They [falsely] believe that their ways have [legitimate] foundations.¹

Al-Ghubrīnī did not consider these men’s biographies worthy of inclusion in his book because they lacked good ideas and did not perform good deeds, the clear signs of the true possessors of knowledge. Yet, his remonstrance acknowledges a reality too onerous for him to admit: many among his contemporaries thought these ignoramuses to be sources of *‘ilm*. Although he probably did not think about it in this way, for al-Ghubrīnī to cast these Sufis as frauds, and to repudiate their practices and beliefs, he had to make room for them in his compendium of luminaries.

The categories used by medieval authors to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate ideas are not necessarily useful when it comes to analyzing society and politics. Relying on them would force us to leave out those who

articulated ideas for vast sectors of society but were not ulama and, consequently, were not included in biographical dictionaries, official histories, and other texts written by the ulama. Although their ideas have not been well preserved, there is evidence that “ignoramuses” formulated some of the political ideas that circulated among non-elites. Leaders of factions such as the *ghawqha'* may have lacked a bureaucratic apparatus to organize their activities, yet they clearly relied on the partisanship of supporters whom they rallied by using an array of strategies. Under these conditions, political leaders formed a variety of alliances—between the sheikhs of the Sadwikish and the autonomous Ḥafṣid emirs of Bijāya, for example—that affected their constituencies and that they articulated in terms that appealed to them, from kinship to livelihood.

Indeed, powerful men, including Ḥafṣid emirs such as Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad (r. 1370–94) and his son Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434), were only as strong as the support they garnered, however heroic their actions as individuals may have been in the eyes of their eulogists. They fashioned the support of various political factions from the constant effort to convince potential allies, garner their support, and negotiate the terms of their arrangements. These political mechanisms could contribute to the consolidation of power in the hands of the regional emir, but they required highly specialized labor in order to craft common notions among rivals, such as shared interest, duty, and the honorable course of action. This conceptual and mental effort fell to the intellectuals. Various men and women acted as intellectuals, whether they formulated a dynastic vision for territorial expansion, gathered “mobsters” to take over the reins of power, or arranged for agricultural laborers to acquiesce in surrendering a portion of their product to the descendants of a pious man. Of course, one did not need to articulate political ideas to be an intellectual. However, those who did were, even if elite authors did not recognize them as such.

The “ulama” (*‘ulamā’*, sing. *‘ālim*) are one category of intellectual that has received serious scholarly attention, from their emergence in society to their contribution to the production of Islamic learning, its sociopolitical importance, and its transmission and evolution over time.² Scholars have analyzed the constitution of a body of learning (*‘ilm*) associated with the ulama, scrutinized the development of their schools, and described their roles as teachers and scholars, all of which secured their social and intellectual reproduction. In addition, modern scholars have also analyzed the constitution of organized forms of knowledge, their expansion, and their differentiation from one another.

In fourteenth-century Ifrīqiyyā, the category of “ulama” was reserved for specialists of doctrine and the law (*fiqh*, *hadīth*, *tafsīr*, and *kalām*), and did not apply to those practicing other intellectual disciplines, from the literary arts (*ādāb*) to mathematics and medicine. Recognizing that “ulama” only applied to a small group of intellectuals, historian Nelly Amri proposed the alternative notion of “notable intellectuals” (*al-nukhbā al-muthaqqaṭa*).³ This corresponds to the usage of authors of biographical dictionaries, such as al-Ghubrīnī and Ibn al-Tawwāḥ (d. after 1318), who compiled information on more than those who would technically be considered ulama by their contemporaries. Chief among these were the *awliyā'* (sing. *wali*) who are conventionally referred to by modern scholars as Sufis.⁴ Whether they were ascetics or miracle workers, the *awliyā'* were intellectuals who, insofar as they articulated ideas that involved politics, participated in building the political culture of the regional emirate. Yet it remains clear from the criticism of al-Ghubrīnī that in his eyes only a certain well-defined group of intellectuals was worthy of note, even if these came from both the ulama and what Amri calls *al-nukhbā al-muthaqqaṭa*. We must thus read against al-Ghubrīnī’s judgment and suspect that there was more to intellectual activity in Ifrīqiyyā than we are able to know from his works and those of other authors.

Assuming, then, that intellectuals worthy of note were only one type of intellectual, we can analyze the extent to which the Ḥafṣids succeeded in organizing an *encadrement* of intellectuals, primarily by expanding the reach of judges and supporting a select group of Sufis.⁵ The extent of Ḥafṣid success or failure in supporting an official culture reveals much about the role of intellectuals in the making of Ifrīqiyyā. This matters here because the regional emirate was the culmination of open-ended political struggles between changing political parties with conflicting interests and agendas. It came into being at the end of neither a natural process nor a repeatable experiment, nor through the mixing of ingredients in known proportions or the deliberate application of forces of varying intensities. When one considers the contribution of intellectuals, Emirism seems more like a process that was the outcome of sometimes well-intentioned but not always fruitful efforts, egregious or vain miscalculations, small victories, and huge reversals of fortune. But once Abū Fāris stood at the helm of a regional Ḥafṣid emirate, the process that supported his advent did not simply melt away. It was adapted and simplified, purged of the reminders of its historical contingency, and told as a long-prophesied eternal truth. Intellectuals made it a myth. Ibn Khaldūn understood this full well, and explained it to those of his contemporaries who cared to listen.

[The masses] (*al-jumbūr*) have forgotten the time when the dynasty was first established. They have grown up in settled areas for a long time and lived there for successive generations, and so they know nothing about what took place, with God's help, at the beginning of the dynasty. They notice merely that the coloring of the men of the dynasty is determined, that people have submitted to them, and that group feeling ('*asabiya*) is no longer needed to establish their power. They do not know how it was at the beginning and what difficulties had to be overcome by the founder of (the dynasty).⁶

Once more, Ibn Khaldūn's perspective stands out, this time for the way he points out the naturalization of dynastic rule. But neither he nor any of his contemporaries thought of "mystification" as an autonomous activity involving the work of intellectuals. That is not how they thought. It is not as though they made statements about intellectual matters with an intent to deceive; they simply did not conceive of their society in historicizing terms. Consequently, in order better to situate the ideas that brought the Hafṣid regional emirate to power and kept it intact, it is necessary to analyze the organization of learning in Ifrīqiyyā, the involvement of the dynasty and the elite in it, and the consequences on the formulation and "teaching" of Emirism.

Specialists in the intellectual history of the medieval Maghrib have described the thirteenth century as the century of Sufis and the fourteenth century as the century when Mālikī law emerged triumphant.⁷ Recasting the question in terms of politics and the regional emirate does little to explicate learned texts or to ascertain what their authors believed, let alone why. But it can better situate those texts as sources of information about the making of Ifrīqiyyā as a region. It thus makes sense to focus on the local emirate of Bijāya, its institutions of learning, and the relations that intellectuals there maintained with others throughout Ifrīqiyyā and even beyond.

Schooling the Emirate

Schools, Teachers, and Students

Most teachers who taught the basics—reading, writing, and the Qur'ān—did not write books. They mostly lectured. Sometimes their students' lecture notes were preserved long after their death. The labor of these intellectuals often appears in the anecdotes, allegories, and sayings narrated in contemporary

texts. Through their teaching, teachers took part in the maintenance of a basic referential universe shared among those who received at least some education. In other words, teachers knitted patterns of thought that contributed to the establishment of intellectual commonplaces in Ifrīqiyā.

The primary function of these teachers was to circulate ideas that were distilled into tidbits, but most of those ideas were not of their own making. In fact, most teachers were not fully in control of the material they covered. Other than a few, and often famous, luminaries, most teachers could not engage in a systematic analysis of the assumptions on which disciplinary knowledge was founded. They lacked the training, capacity, and leisure to do so, but by simply relaying certain ideas to the exclusion of others, they performed an invaluable ideological task.

In primary school (*kuttāb*, pl. *katātib*), children received a rudimentary or primary education that consisted mostly of learning to read and write, and of committing at least some of the Qur’ān to memory. At the *kuttāb*, children also listened to lectures about the Prophet, his sayings and deeds, and a host of stories and lore about famous individuals and places. As Ibn Khaldūn reports, in Ifrīqiyā most primary teachers were Andalusi:

The people of Ifrīqiyā usually combine the instruction of children in the Qur’ān with the teaching of traditions. . . . In general, their method of instruction in the Qur’ān is closer to the Andalusi method (than to the western Maghribī or Eastern methods), because [their educational tradition] derives from the Andalusi sheikhs who crossed over when the Christians conquered al-Andalus and asked for hospitality in Tunis. From that time on, they were the teachers of [Ifrīqiyā’s] children.⁸

The majority of teachers cited in the *‘Unwān al-dirāya*, the biographical dictionary of notable intellectuals in Bijāya in the thirteenth century, were either Andalusi or immigrants of Andalusi origin. In addition to the *kuttāb*, elementary education took place in mosques, where students of varying levels of competency studied.

The sons and daughters of the elite also received instruction from private teachers.⁹ From early childhood, the elite of Ifrīqiyā maintained a clear separation between their children and those they were to govern, hiring preceptors of quality to educate their children.¹⁰ The famous Andalusi litterateur Ibn ‘Uṣfūr (d. 1271), who had migrated to Ifrīqiyā from Seville, was one of the

most celebrated of these teachers. He taught the Ḥafṣid emir Yaḥyā in Bijāya, and when he moved to Tunis had among his students the future caliph al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77).¹¹

More advanced students attended lectures at the various mosques in the city. The two largest mosques in Bijāya were the Great Mosque (*al-jāmi‘ al-aḍam*) and the Mosque of the Kasbah (*masjid al-Qaṣaba*).¹² They were both institutions of higher, or more advanced, learning that trained countless officials. The biographies of great teachers who lectured at these mosques show that rulers often asked them to recommend students for official positions, as when the ruler of Bijāya summoned the Andalusi Abū Zakariyā al-Laftanī (fl. thirteenth century), who taught at the city's Great Mosque, and asked him to forward him a promising disciple.¹³ In this way, notable teachers mediated between the administrative needs of the ruling elite and the desires of members of the urbanite elite for stable, and often politically crucial, employment.

The Great Mosque and the Kasbah Mosque were clearly the most important mosques. A teaching position in either of them was very prestigious, but teaching at the Kasbah Mosque was more obviously political because of its proximity to the ruler's residence. Ibn Khaldūn lectured there when he was *hājib*. Members of Bijāya's urban elite such as al-Waghlīsī (fl. 13th century) delivered the Friday sermon there. Holding a teaching chair at the Great Mosque was no less political. As a rule, the position was held by a member of the old Bijāyan elite such as Abū Muḥammad al-Qal‘ī (d. 1271), Ibn Makhlūf (d. 1287), al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1304), and al-Mashaddālī (d. 1331) or by Ḥafṣid-sponsored Andalusis such as al-Laftanī (13th century), the famous Ibn Burṭula (d. 1263), and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās (d. 1261).¹⁴ In addition to the teacher, the Great Mosque's most important figure was the *imām* who led prayer and delivered the Friday sermon. In Bijāya, Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Kinānī (d. 1297), an Andalusi from Játiva, held the position for thirty years.¹⁵ Another Andalusi from Valencia led the five daily prayers there while a judge in Bijāya.¹⁶ As a rule, most of those who taught at the Kasbah Mosque and the Great Mosque held official functions in the government as judges, as scribes, or in some other position.

The mosques played a central role in educating the young and in forming Ḥafṣid officials, but they were not alone. Beginning in the thirteenth century, the *madrasa* (plur. *madāris*), an institution that had developed in the east, began to appear in the Maghrib. Unlike the mosque, the *madrasa* was a differentiated institution specializing in formal education and the teaching of a

particular curriculum. Historians have suggested that the Ḥafṣids may have had something to do with the successful establishment of the earliest such institutions in Ifriqiyā—the earliest being probably the Shammā‘iya founded in Tunis by the Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Zakariyā (r. 1229–49).¹⁷ The official mission of this early school was to produce “Almohad” learning—an assignment full of political implications.

The operation of these institutions distinguished them from mosques in yet another respect. Each *madrasa* had a standing faculty, often just one or two teachers, and dormitories for both teachers and students. Rules regulating their functioning developed promptly. By the end of the fourteenth century, it became common to require of students that they be unmarried and at least twenty years old to qualify for a room. They also had to assist in the teaching of the Qur’ān (*qirā’at al-hizb*) to younger students and attend lectures taught by a lecturer (*mugri*). Each student was given ten years to prove himself intellectually, and was expelled from the *madrasa* if he could not perform at an adequate level.¹⁸ While the dormitories were used to house travelers and even urbanites seeking a place to sleep, only a core of regular students could lodge there.¹⁹

After a period of study, students could ask for an *ijāza*, an authorization (or license), which meant that they were authorized to transmit what they had been taught by a particular teacher.²⁰ In the earlier centuries, this mechanism worked to safeguard the quality of transmission of traditions and texts. Yet by the fourteenth century one could receive an *ijāza* from a prestigious teacher for one’s infant child who had been present to “hear” the work recited. Al-Ma‘afīrī (fl. 13th century) is said to have given *ijāzāt* only to those who demonstrated mastery of the material and “could not be convinced to do so otherwise.”²¹ He was clearly the exception that confirmed the rule. The earlier meritocracy of the *ijāza* system, such as it was, had collapsed. Popular teachers such as Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Shu‘ayb (13th century) could be at the helm of many *madāris* at once and deliver licenses to more students than they could actually teach.²²

For many *madrasa* students, stipends were a way to make a living. Ibn ‘Arafa (d. 1401) was asked about the case of a student who left a *madrasa* before the harvest (*qabla tīb al-thamra*) and then returned after the distribution of stipends to ask for his.²³ The jurist thought that if the student was known to have gone to visit his family in the summer, his stipend should be kept for him. The anecdote suggests that some *madrasa* students were not urbanites, which also hints at the ways ideas circulated from urban centers to rural areas.

The social background of *madrasa* students can be guessed from another case in which Ibn ‘Arafa denied a father’s request for his deceased son’s stipend. The argument the father made was that his son had still been alive when the olives from which the stipend was derived were growing and consequently had a right to the fruit of the harvest.²⁴ Perhaps the father was eager to put his hands on a portion of a harvest he knew to have been exceptional; the stipend was also likely a source of livelihood for the entire family, and the death of the son left them short. In any event, urban education brought intellectual and material benefits as well as dependencies.

The importance of the harvest to the livelihood of students can be seen in a third case, in which a student failed to receive his stipend because of crop failure. Ibn ‘Arafa judged that the student could receive his portion the following year, provided he did not leave to study at another institution.²⁵ It is more than probable that these students belonged to the class of poor landlords or tenant farmers who sent a son to the city to learn to read and write and become an imam or tax collector. Al-Ghubrīnī’s biographical dictionary includes quite a few individuals who did not return to their villages or small towns, but rather remained in Bijāya as lower-level functionaries and were recognized as reliable witnesses (*‘udūl*, sing. *‘adl*) working under the authority of the judge (*qādī*).²⁶

In an example of the sort of influence officials had over these institutions, Ḥafṣid judges argued that those who were getting an education at the *madrasa* could not practice Sufi devotion or live in the neighborhood of the *murīdūn* (those who followed a Sufi teacher).²⁷ Naturally, not all those who attended classes in the *madrasa* found employment in the Ḥafṣid administration; some drew too close to uncontrollable and dangerous Sufis, and others simply failed to receive positions. But the judges’ stipulation shows that these institutions were not apolitical centers of learning, as contemporary authors often depicted them. The *madrasa* fulfilled the important task of producing a major part of the bureaucracy as well as the functionaries that articulated the interests of the Ḥafṣid emirate beyond the cities.

The Ḥafṣid dynasty deployed a variety of mechanisms to ensure its influence over intellectuals. The establishment and administration of *madāris*, the proactive involvement in the execution of pious endowments, and the selective appointment of the learned to critical positions were among the most important. As an employer of the learned of Ifrīqiyyā, the Ḥafṣids effectively managed the *encadrement* of intellectuals and thus of intellectual production. Although some contemporaries doubted the ability of “employment” to foster

loyalty toward the dynasty, the impact of the endowed institutions should not be underestimated.²⁸

Cities, Learning, and Autonomy

The *madrasa* was an urban institution. Unlike mosques, which could be found in smaller towns and villages, no *madrasa* was established outside the larger cities of Ifrīqiyyā.²⁹ To the extent that these institutions produced intellectuals who left urban centers to work, they were part of the outward projection of urban influence. Nevertheless, the impact of this process on the articulation of a “culture of the emirate” beyond the cities cannot be fully ascertained beyond the political fact of the resistance of “Bedouins” to the Ḥafṣid dynasty.

Ifrīqiyyā’s urban elites endowed a number of institutions of learning and exerted influence over their functioning and those they employed; thus, indirectly they played a role in deciding the ideas that were taught in them. The Ḥafṣid princess (*amīra*) al-Ḥurra, who was the sister of the Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46), set up an endowment for the *Madrasat ‘unq al-jamāl* in Tunis. She is said to have sought to appoint the scholar Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 1348) as its director (*nāzir*). When he declined to teach at the *madrasa* as well, she offered the position to another learned man, Ibn Salama, who accepted.³⁰ This anecdote, told by the great Tunisian judge Ibn ‘Arafa (d. 1401), who was a student of both men, illustrates the active involvement of the Ḥafṣids and sheds light on the rather small circles that produced fame and intellectual prominence.

Moreover, the pious endowments established by the ruling family and the urban elites stood out from those of the rest of the population because they were better funded and protected.³¹ Ḥafṣid rulers appointed a functionary to oversee pious endowments that had unclear purposes. In such a case, the endowments’ management came under the purview of the ruler, who appointed a *sāhib al-hubus al-kabīr* to manage the land and real estate that funded them, appointed teachers, and distributed stipends to students. Removing all ambiguity about their involvement through the appointment of this official, the Ḥafṣids further extended their reach and influence on education in Ifrīqiyyā.³²

Furthermore, the educational activities of the Ḥafṣids and their supporters were not uniformly spread throughout Ifrīqiyyā. A survey of institutions of learning shows that Tunis was by far the most important educational center.³³ While second in size and importance, Bijāya lagged far behind Tunis in the number of educational facilities, especially those that specialized in more advanced learning. Nothing suggests that the elites of Bijāya were a priori

less interested in transforming their political influence into cultural capital. But the organization of schooling demonstrates that political autonomy was not accompanied by the creation of intellectuals committed to that specific agenda. Even after Bijāya became autonomous, the city's elites continued to behave as if Tunis were the true cultural capital of Ifrīqiyyā. They did not sponsor an alternative cultural program that was truly independent from the “regional” articulation of Ḥafṣid rule.

In addition to the economic and political processes involved in ending Bijāya's elite's bid for autonomy, the ability of Tunis to maintain overwhelming cultural advantage over Bijāya, and other cities in Ifrīqiyyā, was critical to the ultimate emergence of the regional emirate under Abū Fāris. Many of the famous scholars who resided in Bijāya left the city for Tunis once the opportunity arose. This is attested even in works such as al-Ghubrīni's biographical dictionary that sought to put Bijāya on the cultural map. An expression of the pride of Bijāya's “old families,” al-Ghubrīni's *Unwān* still had to include many intellectuals who merely transited through the city. This shows that the city's status as a cultural center was, to say the least, recent. While the Banū Ghubrīn produced scholars who became famous beyond Bijāya, the city's sons generally failed to gain recognition for their intellectual prowess—at least not in numbers comparable to Tunisans. Even when one accounts for those who made Bijāya their home, the city is best seen as a secondary center that led to Tunis rather than an autonomous center of learning in its own right.

Travel for the Emirate

“Travel in search of knowledge” (*riḥla fi ṭalab al-‘ilm*) was a critical ingredient in the production of intellectual distinction. Ibn Khaldūn noted that “a scholar's education [was] greatly improved by traveling in quest of knowledge and meeting authoritative teachers (of his time).”³⁴ In the thirteenth century as well, this form of travel was an established way to achieve scholarly eminence.³⁵ Established scholars and students crisscrossed the Maghrib and Mashriq in search of prestigious teachers, often combining their travels with a pilgrimage to Mecca.

Further fueling the desire for travel, the ease with which *ijāzāt* were obtained at home increased the prestige of those rarer ones delivered by renowned scholars in faraway lands. From their biographies, it is clear that “intellectually notable” Bijāyans did not travel much. When they did, they tended to go to al-Andalus and the western Maghrib, and far less often, to the Mashriq.³⁶ If not all were able to travel, intellectuals in Bijāya did, however, welcome

travelers from faraway places. Mashriqī travelers such as Abū al-‘Abbās al-Jadalī al-Sharīf (13th century), Taqiy al-Dīn al-Mawṣilī (13th century), and Abū Zakariyā al-Murjānī al-Mawṣilī (13th century) were the objects of great interest in Bijāya.³⁷ Competition for “outsiders” was at a premium. It left countless traces in the archive of the period—especially in the form of praise for a host’s generosity and hospitality.

Since this form of travel allowed for the mobilization of intellectual resources not available locally, it also supported the rearticulation of transregional or “Islamic” learning. The résumés of the ulama offer concrete examples of this process, which connected intellectuals from widely different political and socioeconomic contexts. In a crucial way, the travel of intellectuals tended to act as an agent of the homogenization of intellectual practices and ideas beyond “local” political and economic realities. While this alone does not mean that such travel undermined the autonomy of Bijāya, it does help explain why so few intellectuals of renown articulated anti-regional positions.

The Law of Regionalization

When the Almohads took over Bijāya in 1152, they left most of the city’s “old” elites practically intact.³⁸ The Almohad sheikhs (*shuyūkh*) were recognized as militarily superior, and their domination came in the form of taxation, the Friday sermon (*khuṭba*), and the mint (*sikka*). But the Almohads never had enough intellectuals in Bijāya capable of translating their political domination into cultural terms. The old elites survived socially and economically and carried on producing intellectuals specialized in Mālikī law.³⁹ Abū ‘Alī al-Masīlī (d. 1185), who was a judge in Bijāya under the Almohads, recounted that he “encountered around ninety muftis in Bijāya . . . and if there were ninety muftis, how many *hadith* specialists (*muḥaddithūn*) were there, and how many grammarians and specialists in the literary arts (*ādāb*)?”⁴⁰ While the statement is meant to praise the Almohads for sponsoring and protecting the ulama (*ahl al-ilm*), the figure of ninety Mālikī muftis is impressive. Though they ruled for almost eighty years, the Almohads did not threaten the prominence of Mālikī jurists, who continued to dominate Islamic jurisprudence in Ifrīqiyyā.⁴¹

In fact, the Almohads lacked the means to force upon the Bijāyan elites any form of Almohadism—beyond the acquiescence to the political fact of their domination. Members of Bijāya’s influential families retained a great degree of autonomy even when employed by the Almohads. This was true

in the case of Muḥammad al-Uṣūlī (d. 1215), who was known to have been hard on the Almohad governors (*wulāt*) of Bijāya, opposing them vigorously “when they violated the rights of Muslims.”⁴² Al-Uṣūlī ridiculed the Almohad governor of Bijāya, who mentioned that the Almohad caliph al-Manṣūr (1184–99) had been right to persecute the Mālikī establishment—perhaps as a way of putting pressure on al-Uṣūlī. Reminding him of the politics involved, the Bijāyan pointed out that if the deceased caliph was right, the living caliph, al-Nāṣir (1199–1213) must be wrong to offer reconciliation. Fearing that a statement like that would reach the ruler, the governor retracted his statement and sought to gain the favor of the Bijāyan judge. This anecdote illustrates the Almohads’ need to “compromise” with the Bijāyan nobility.⁴³ Ultimately, the Almohads, despite their coercive power, could not undo the hold of Ifrīqiya’s elite on the law. They could not defend the Mahdist framework in which they articulated their claims to legitimacy from intellectuals in al-Andalus and the Maghrib.

Though the Almohads never developed a legal tradition comparable to any of the Sunni law schools (*madhāhib*, sing. *madhab*), they did maintain a working legal system in which the caliph was always the highest judge.⁴⁴ Below him, a supreme judge (*qāḍī al-quḍāt*) was the effective administrator of the judiciary. Notably, if the Almohad ruler dismissed this higher judge, all those he had appointed were automatically dismissed with him. This did not lend itself to judicial continuity or independence.⁴⁵

The Hafṣids and Their Law

The Ḥafṣid emirs appointed judges to adjudicate quarrels and disagreements between their subjects. Through them, they maintained mechanisms for arbitrating the peace and safeguarding it. Although they were high-level officials, judges were paid relatively little. Ibn Khaldūn argued that because their labor was not generally useful, religious officials did not become wealthy—at least not from performing those functions. In a chapter headed “Persons who are in charge of offices dealing with religious matters, such as judge, mufti, teacher, prayer leader, preacher, muezzin, and the like, are not as a rule very wealthy,” Ibn Khaldūn explained the reasons behind his generalization.

I discussed this with an excellent man. He disagreed with me about it. But some stray leaves from the account books of the government offices in the palace of al-Ma’mūn came into my hands. They offered a good deal of information about income and expenditures

at that time. Among the things I noticed were the salaries of judges, prayer leaders, and muezzins. I called it to the attention of (the person mentioned), and he realized that what I had said was correct. He became a convert to (my opinion), and we were both astonished at God's mysterious ways with regard to His creation.⁴⁶

Perhaps the common people had little use for religious officials, but the ruler had more. For him, they performed valuable ideological functions. The social distinction that accrued from the execution of their tasks came in the form of royal recognition. Ibn Khaldūn was frank about the nexus between the Ḥafṣids and these intellectuals during his period, as well as its limits:

Only the ruler (*sāḥib al-dawla*) is concerned with (religious officials) (*al-qā'imīn bi-umūr al-dīn*) and (religious) institutions, as part of his duty to look after the (public) interests. He assigns (the religious officials) a share of sustenance proportionate to the need that exists for them. . . . Because the things (the religious officials) have to offer are so noble, they feel superior to the people and are proud of themselves. Therefore, they are not obsequious to persons of rank in order to obtain something to improve their sustenance. . . . As a consequence, they do not, as a rule, become very wealthy.⁴⁷

Ibn Khaldūn clearly connects religious office and the ruler. His condescension toward those with religious learning who may try to enrich themselves is typical of men of his standing. The ulama understood that because some of the revenues of the treasury were based on the imposition of illegal taxes, accepting payment from the ruler exposed one to the possibility of sharing in the guilt.⁴⁸ This realization made religious scholars think twice before taking money from the dynasty.

The Bijāyan judge 'Abd Allāh b. Hajjāj b. Yūsuf (d. after 1242) donated the entirety of the compensation he received to the poor and "lived exclusively on the rent he collected from real estate he had inherited from his father."⁴⁹ But not everyone could afford to do the same. Ibn Khaldūn's description of "religious officials" under a single rubric tends to gloss over social differences that preceded their employment. In fact, differences between religious officials were simply taken for granted. Lower officials such as the muezzins and imams of smaller mosques were compared to shepherds, hairdressers, cobblers, and water-carriers.⁵⁰

It would be difficult to imagine the judges of Bijāya or Tunis in such a list. Instead, it is easier to find them as high-level officials representing the rulers in politically sensitive situations. The influential judge Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī, author of the *‘Unwān*, was part of an important embassy sent by the Ḥafṣid emir of Bijāya in 1304. Another Bijāyan judge, Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī Bakr al-Yamānī (d. 1292), led two embassies under al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77).⁵¹ No teacher in the *kuttāb* or muezzin would ever have imagined being called on for similar missions.

Judges tended to come from the “old” urban elite who were landowners. Under the Ḥafṣids, those who were appointed to the judgeship in Bijāya tended to come from nearby cities.⁵² Beyond the urban elite, the Ḥafṣids chose their judges from among the Andalusis such as Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Khazrajī al-Shaṭībī (d. 1292).⁵³ Bijāya’s Andalusi judge Abū al-‘Abbās b. al-Ghammāz (d. 1294) assumed effective control of the city when it was threatened by a rebellion, demonstrating that he worked on behalf of the dynasty.⁵⁴ Unsurprisingly, he was promoted and appointed judge in Tunis.⁵⁵ In any case, by virtue of their social background and their relations to the dynasty, judges were more powerful than their salary alone might suggest—although not as powerful as the *ḥājibs* at the time of the autonomous local emirs.⁵⁶

While schoolteachers were Andalusi, Ḥafṣid rulers routinely appointed Ifriqiyān “natives” as judges. This fact illustrates both the integration and place of the Ifriqiyans within the Ḥafṣid order. The socioeconomic background of these individuals and their specialization in the dispensation of legal decisions accounts for what Brunschwig has described as their conservative disposition.⁵⁷ However, it is more accurate to see them as a constitutive part of a dynamic Ḥafṣid order.⁵⁸ Further illustration of the eminently political character of the judgeship can be found in the case of the Tunisian judge who considered becoming active in politics by opposing the ruler and was immediately forced to resign, in spite of the custom of lifetime appointment.⁵⁹

In any case, one must distinguish between the superior judge and the other officials who worked under him. In addition to assistant judges, who helped with particular aspects of the law, the judge headed a formidable administration of justice.⁶⁰ The Ḥafṣids continued to appoint a judge of the Almohads (*qāḍī al-jamā‘a al-muwahḥidiya*) and used this position to exert power on the Almohad sheikhs.⁶¹ Lower judges (*qāḍī al-kuwar* or *akwār*, and *qāḍī al-nawāḥi*) were appointed to the region immediately surrounding Bijāya. These subaltern judges usually came from the areas they served. Their appointment there was sometimes a first career post. One of al-Ghubrīnī’s family members

held such a position in the thirteenth century.⁶² Both al-Ghubrīnī and al-Burzulī held subaltern judgeships prior to taking up the superior judgeship in Bijāya and Tunis, respectively.

The Ḥafṣids also appointed military judges (*quḍāt al-mahalla*), who followed the armies. These continued to be appointed well into the reign of Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434). Although the prerogatives of these judges are not clearly known, it is obvious that the Ḥafṣid rulers' intention to impose their law, wherever their armies went, was the critical factor in maintaining this function. This is especially patent when entire areas escaped Ḥafṣid control. Beside outlaws, the Ḥafṣids acknowledged the existence of entire legal regimes operating outside their jurisdiction. In these "tribal" areas (*arḍ al-qānūn*), customary legal codes prevailed.⁶³

Surely, the judge was not just another *‘ālim* (pl. *‘ulamā’*). These men had great political influence by virtue of their function and their social background. References to them as great men of the city (*kabir bijāya wa-ṣāḥibū shūrāhā*,⁶⁴ *a‘yān*, *a‘yās*, and *shuyūkh*) abound. If no great economic gain could come from holding these religious functions, they certainly bestowed distinction and built a family's cultural capital. Biographical dictionaries kept the names of thousands of such individuals, and conferred upon them and their families a place on the chessboard of history—however small the role they played.

The Official and the Regional

With the coming of the Andalusis, competition for existing positions became a fact of life. This may in part explain the broadening of the reach of the Ḥafṣid dynasty, which encouraged the Andalusis' migration to Ifrīqiyyā. The number of new Andalusi immigrant intellectuals exceeded the number of new positions created by urban expansion.

Estimates of the number of these immigrants vary greatly due to the fragmentary nature of the evidence. They are usually based on the reported 4,000 Andalusi horsemen that joined the Ḥafṣid armies during the Crusade of Louis IX in 1270. This figure is then multiplied by 10 to 12½ to reach the 40,000 to 50,000 mark. Other numbers include the 8,000 who left Granada between January and October 1492 and then the 40,000 who followed suit after the defeat of the Naṣrid ruler. Totals for the whole period (1250–1500) reach well into the 100,000s.⁶⁵ If we estimate the number of Andalusis in Bijāya to be around at least 8–10 percent of the total population of 40,000–60,000 in Ifrīqiyyā, it would give us about 5,000 Andalusis. If we assume that only 5 percent of them were educated, the number of educated Andalusis would be 250. If only 100

sought to occupy official positions, their number would be high enough to staff most of the available such jobs in Bijāya.

The emigration of famous intellectuals such as Ibn Khaldūn to other regions is another clue that sheds light on the intensity of the competition and the involvement of the dynasty in arbitrating it.⁶⁶ Less spectacular but as telling was the forced exile, or expulsion, of many unauthorized notaries to Egypt.⁶⁷

The impact of these pressures on intellectuals can be seen in the multiplication of abridgments and study aids. In Ibn Khaldūn's eyes, this was a negative development.

Many recent scholars have turned to brief presentations of the methods and contents of the sciences. They want to know (the methods and contents), and they present them systematically in the form of brief programs for each science. (These) brief handbooks express all the problems of a given discipline and the evidence for them in a few brief words that are full of meaning. This (procedure) is detrimental to good style and makes it more difficult to understand them.⁶⁸

The phenomenon illustrates the competition for jobs following the immigration of educated Andalusis. It also speaks of a certain standardization of knowledge that accompanied the involvement of the dynasty in fostering a homogenization of institutional practices in teaching and the notariat.

The tendency toward specialization among intellectuals, even to the point of excess, was another artifact of this period. Describing the Andalusi ‘Umar b. al-Hasan b. Dahiya al-Kalbī (d. 1235), al-Ghubrīnī commented on the man's focus on linguistic artfulness and detail, well beyond the standard considerations of linguistic knowledge. This scholar's intention was, al-Ghubrīnī conjectured, “to find one kind of knowledge and become famous for mastering it above everyone else.”⁶⁹ A direct consequence of this embarrassment of intellectual riches was the level of rhetorical luxury in educational licenses (*ijāzāt*), which became ornate literary pieces.⁷⁰ From a license to teach, the *ijāza* had become a showcase.

Such developments did not take place in isolation. They were paralleled by an increased reliance on “official” documents issued by notaries (*‘udūl*, sing. *‘adl*).⁷¹ One notary set up shop at home, eliciting a complaint from an annoyed neighbor, who felt especially inconvenienced by the comings and goings of the marriage judge's assistants (*a'wān qāḍī al-ankiḥa*).⁷² Interestingly, Bijāya

had experienced expansion, commercialization, and waves of immigrants and outsiders with no attachments to the city, and this affected the notaries, whose offices were known as “*dār al-thiqā*,” the “office of trust.” The expansion and officialization of notarized “trust” suggests the Hafṣid ruler’s efforts to prevent fraud and was seen as a departure from Almohad practices.⁷³

Under these conditions, the judges gained increasing influence over the muftis. Men with religious and legal learning could issue opinions on legal or religious matters (*fatāwā*, sing. *fatwā*).⁷⁴ In our period, however, muftis had begun assisting judges, who used them as legal advisors. Al-Ghubrīnī described al-Manjallātī (d. 1291) as “one of the muftis and advisors of his time,” who received rulers at his home.⁷⁵ Al-Ḥamadānī (early 13th century) was one of the muftis and advisors in Bijāya who were consulted by judges such as al-Uṣūlī on legal matters.⁷⁶ The judge ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf (d. 1242) employed both Abū ‘Alī b. ‘Azzūn al-Sulamī and Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Arisī in that capacity, and had himself acted in that capacity before being appointed a judge.⁷⁷ While some of these muftis issued from the same social categories as the judges they advised, others were primarily merchants, although they may have owned land or urban real estate as well.⁷⁸ This was certainly the case of al-Sulamī. Al-Ghubrīnī writes that he had traveled and studied in the Mashriq and owned a store at the Qayṣāriya market in Bijāya.⁷⁹

Theoretically, muftis issued their opinions without regard to judges and the dynasty. They could even issue opinions that went against the dynasty’s interests if they believed they were correct. But paying muftis to do background research for judges on points of law and precedent expanded the reach of judges, and through them the Hafṣids. The regional character of the circulation of Hafṣid officials, judges included, amplified this general trend.⁸⁰ And single families could produce a number of Hafṣid judges in various cities, such as the families of ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf and al-Ghubrīnī.⁸¹ Naturally, these individuals developed social ties in the cities and towns where they held positions. References to “property” and “affairs” suggest that these families held property throughout Ifrīqiyyā. They did not necessarily develop new ties to the land, however. Notably, Andalusis were rarely appointed judges outside cities, and were thus a perfect fit for an emerging regional emirate that articulated its power around cities.

But political troubles threatened such families; by serving one ruler, they could be seen as acting against others. This had consequences not only for their political positions, but also for their real estate investments. This was true in the case of Ibn Khaldūn’s family, which was established in Tunis and

owned real estate in Būna.⁸² The ruler of Būna arrested the historian's brother and stormed the family's houses. While Ibn Khaldūn became a judge in Cairo after leaving Ifrīqiyyā, it is clear that the political situation inspired him to see political quietism as a virtue, and he wrote that the ulama should focus on contemplation and leave politics to others, because they "are, of all people, least familiar with the ways of politics."⁸³

For many, staying out of politics was a way to maintain their positions. Many of these judges and officials were able to find employment in neighboring (non-Ḥafṣid) governments—especially since the borders between Marīnids, 'Abd al-Wādids, and Ḥafṣids were constantly being redrawn. Their insistence on being seen as individuals detached from the daily concerns of this world does little to divert attention from their full participation in expanding the dynasty's hold on intellectuals.

Sufis

Sufis Before the Ḥafṣids

The ulama distinguished between Sufis based on their ideas and practices, not according to the social group that supported them. The Almoravids (1062–1147), who ruled over the western Maghrib and parts of al-Andalus, saw a threat to their rule in the proponents of the teachings of Abū Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). The social basis of the Almoravids' domination was such that they favored Mālikī interpretations of the law emanating from the urban notability. Followers of al-Ghazālī had challenged the intellectual foundations of legal thinking expounded by Mālikīs and others and pointed to serious limitations of the probity of the claims made by Mālikī jurists.

When the Almohads (1130–1269) rallied against the Almoravids, they attacked those who supported them, notable among whom were prominent Mālikī jurists. Almohad ideologues also produced stories tying their spiritual leader Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130) to al-Ghazālī, opening the door for ways of conceiving of an ideal society that were not necessarily tied to the legal formulations of Mālikī jurists.⁸⁴ Renowned Andalusi thinkers Ibn Tufayl (1105–85) and Ibn Rushd (1126–84), whose work embodied these new possibilities, lived in Marrakech, the Almohad capital. In the second half of the twelfth century, the elites that formed and maintained the Almohad dominion, including Bijāyan notability, espoused this more "philosophical" expression of Sufi piety.⁸⁵ Predictably, the Maghrib produced a great many Sufi masters in this period.⁸⁶

It was also in this period that the *zāwiya* became a visible institution in Ifrīqiyyā.⁸⁷ The name *zāwiya* commonly described one of three things: a building housing a Sufi master or teacher; the mausoleum of a *walī*, a person known for piety and wondrous deeds (*karāmāt*); or a place where those who sought to retire from society could find refuge.⁸⁸ Under Almohad rule, this institution gradually established itself in Ifrīqiyyā, adapting to changing power relations, especially the increasing urban orientation of Hafṣid rule and reconfiguration of power in the country.

Consequently, descriptions of Sufis in the late fourteenth century differ greatly from those of the twelfth and thirteenth. Earlier, the elites had welcomed Sufis, and the likes of al-Ghubrīnī gave them positive reviews. But later views ranged anywhere from enthusiastic support of, to militant antagonism toward, Sufis. The legal collections of al-Burzuli and al-Wansharīsī, for instance, tend to depict Sufis as outside the bounds of the law.

A great many intellectuals sought to differentiate among types of Sufis, proposing various classificatory schemes. Al-Burzuli (d. 1438) distinguished between those who specialized in the *zāhir* (apparent meaning of texts and other phenomena) and those who preferred the *bāṭin* (inner or hidden meaning). He also differentiated between those who followed the *sunna* (tradition), those who followed the *kalām* (theology), and those who philosophized, such as the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (10th century).⁸⁹ Others distinguished between Sufis in terms of their relationship to the law. There were those who appealed to the ignorant through dancing and chanting, pocketing their money in exchange for bringing them nearer God.⁹⁰ Then there was a far more “dangerous” group (*tā’ifa*) that produced opinions legalizing what was forbidden. The followers of the latter were considered non-Muslims (*kuffār*) and prosecuted.⁹¹ The distinction between these groups rested not merely on their ideas, but also on their sociopolitical characteristics, and that was consistent with the politics of the time.

Elite and Non-Elite Sufis

The two most significant formulations of Sufi piety in our period were articulated by Abū Madyan Shu‘ayb al-Andalusī (d. 1197 or 1198) and Abū al-Hasan al-Shādhilī (d. 1258). The usual distinction made between these two men is that Abū Madyan’s was the watered down, Maghribī version of al-Ghazālī (philosophical, elite, and Sunni), whereas al-Shādhilī focused on the poor and emphasized the wondrous.⁹² Abū Madyan is credited with an ability to please the elites while appealing to the masses.⁹³ Scholars have noted that al-Shādhilī

had a tremendous following in Ifrīqiyā. Although al-Ghubrīnī fails to mention that anyone in Bijāya was inspired by al-Shādhilī, it is possible that his silence merely reflected the social status of the followers.⁹⁴

The only expression of Sufism al-Ghubrīnī mentions as prevalent in Bijāya among the ulama was Abū Madyan's version. Characteristic of those he refers to as Sufis is general moderation in behavior, except among older Sufis who chose to retire from social life (*i'tizāl*) by locking themselves up at home, in a mosque, or leaving town and seeking isolation in a small village. It is not surprising that al-Ghubrīnī, a judge, found elite Sufis worthy of inclusion in his biographical dictionary: as Dominique Urvoy has shown, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Sufis of Bijāya were students of the law (*fiqh*).⁹⁵

In Bijāya, the teachings of Abū Madyan were relayed by Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā b. Abī ‘Alī al-Ḥasnawī al-Zawāwī (d. 1214/15), who was born among the Banū ‘Isā fraction of the Zawāwā outside the city. His asceticism and the many *karāmāt* associated with him did not prevent him from teaching at the Great Mosque (*masjid al-aḍzam*).⁹⁶ Al-Ghubrīnī described him as both a student of the more widely accepted legal sciences (*uṣūl, fiqh*) and of *hadīth* and as having his own *zāwiya*.⁹⁷ Perhaps because Abū Madyan died far from Bijāya, and Bijāyans could not have a shrine for him, they made one for al-Zawāwī, who, unlike the Andalusi Abū Madyan, was a native son. In any case, his quickly became one of the most significant shrines in the city.⁹⁸ As a rule, there was a time lag between the death of an individual Sufi master and the production of his *karāmāt* in narrative, “hagiographic” or biographic form (*naqāib*).⁹⁹ However, Abū Madyan was special, because he had become famous while still alive—he died on his way to meet the Almohad Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb al-Manṣūr, who had requested his presence at his court.¹⁰⁰

Sufis maintained an ambivalent relationship with the elites of Bijāya. Some associated with the ruling elite and were thus elite intellectuals, even if they emphasized detachment from this world and the primacy of the afterlife. But they were not appointed to official positions by the Ḥafṣids and could not be identified as official intellectuals on that basis. Some Sufis openly expressed their desire to be detached from official affairs. Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Haqq al-Anṣārī (d. 1285) declined to be judge of Bijāya and then Qasanṭīna, while Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. ‘Ajlān al-Qaysī (1209–81) turned down the judgeship of Tunis.¹⁰¹ The latter also refused to be a witness to the peace treaty with the “Christians” signed after the failed Crusade of Louis IX.¹⁰² Ḥafṣid emirs and their judges sought the company and advice of men such as the Andalusi Abū al-Ḥasan al-Azdī (d. 1292) and Abū Yūsuf al-Manjallātī (d. 1291). In spite of

these visits by the leading members of the ruling elite, these men were described as being secluded and cut off from the people (*wa-kāna mungabidān ‘an al-nās, muqāti’an ‘anhūm*).¹⁰³

Ideas usually associated with these elite Sufis, such as modesty and self-abnegation, found their way into the minds of the rulers and their officials. Abū Zakariyā (r. 1229–49) wrote a letter to his son al-Mustansir (r. 1249–77) in which he advised him to be modest and self-effacing, in addition to assuming other qualities befitting a ruler.¹⁰⁴ While al-Mustansir was not known for his modesty, some Ḥafṣid officials, such as al-Wajhānī (fl. 13th century) and Abū al-Ḥasan b. Asāṭīr (d. 1271), were. The latter took his bread to the baker himself and did all the shopping for his household, not out of thriftiness, al-Ghubrīnī insists, but out of modesty.¹⁰⁵ In a similar case, Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Shu‘ayb (13th century) was offered a judgeship, which he immediately turned down. However, his friends convinced him to accept the position and he became governor (*wālī*) of al-Qayrawān. When he held this official position, Ibn Shu‘ayb refused to collect “illegal” taxes and was immediately discharged of his duties. He then returned to his Sufi ways.¹⁰⁶ This example shows that these intellectuals belonged to the notability from which officials were appointed.

Another illustration of the elite character of these Sufis is their participation in dynastic decisions of the highest order. When the Almohad sheikhs protested the designation of ‘Abd Allāh as official heir to Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar (r. 1284–95), the ruler sought the advice of a famous Sufi.

Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar sent for the Sufi sheikh (*al-shaykh al-‘arif*) Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh al-Murjānī and discussed the matter with him. Then an agreement was struck (*waqa‘a al-ittifāq*) that the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. al-Wāthiq b. al-Mustansir would become heir and he was brought to the sheikh, who blessed him.¹⁰⁷

For Amri, this episode shows that arbitration between factions in the state was one of the possible political roles for Sufis.¹⁰⁸ It also shows the full integration of these men into the elite and their participation in elite politics.¹⁰⁹

With a few exceptions, Ifrīqiya’s elite did not look kindly on Sufis whose supporters belonged to the lower strata of society. The Bijāyan judge Abū Zayd ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Wāghlīsī (d. 1384) condemned the “poor people” of the *zāwiyas* (*fuqarā’ al-zawāyā*) for eating until they were full and dancing and clapping their hands during their gatherings. This behavior, he argued, could confuse “those who do not know” because it was similar to the behavior of

true pious men, who sometimes lost consciousness upon becoming aware of (or hearing) deeper truths. As he saw it, the *fugara'* had introduced an illegal innovation (*bid'a*) into their practices and had thus gone astray (*dalāl*).¹¹⁰ The distinction he makes between the legitimate hallucinations of acceptable Sufis and the behavior of the others is typical of men of his social standing, as is his paternalistic tone.

Al-Ghubrīnī recounts an anecdote involving Abū al-Ḥasan al-Azdi (1204–1292), who once confronted a group of such Sufis.

When [Abū al-Ḥasan al-Faqīr and his friends entered one of the mosques in Bijāya without performing the customary salutation], and when it became obvious that they would not change their ways, efforts began to exile them to the western Maghrib (*al-maghrib al-aqsā*) and to expel them from the country. Arguments on behalf of the rights of these people and their kind were few. In fact, duty requires that they be treated in the worst way.¹¹¹

If the elite Sufi *sulahā'* and *awliyā'* had the veneer of recognition painted over their pious mysticism by the urban notability and its ulama, these *fugara'* certainly did not.¹¹² Though they were not always responsible for what their followers later attributed to them, these pious men and women were marginalized by the ulama, and embraced by the lower sectors of society. The paths taken by these two expressions of piety ended up diverging with the gradual imposition of the regional emirate.

Sufis for a Regional Emirate

The Sufis illustrate the growth of nodes of power that did not come under the total control of the Ḥafṣids in the fourteenth century. This can be explained by the shifting character of politics produced by the high degree of contentiousness within the elite.¹¹³ Such lack of complete control illustrated by the state of quasi-permanent warfare explains the coexistence of alternative “cultural programs” spearheaded by social groups not always under the thumb of the Ḥafṣids or their urban-based allies. The autonomy of the *zāwiya* supported the emergence of cultural expressions that elicited a strong reaction from Ḥafṣid jurists, such as “popular Sufism.”

The multiplicity of cultural expressions catering to the urban lower classes illuminates the work of a number of intellectuals whose education, organizational training, and methods developed at the margins of official urban

institutions.¹¹⁴ The pronouncements of judges cannot be taken as evidence of a separation between city and countryside. Instead, as the background of students in the *madrasas* clearly shows, some who did not pursue the “law school track” to the end joined the “popular” Sufis. Their partial training in the law and Sufi “dancing and chanting” enabled them to act as the intellectuals of the countryside and the lower strata in the cities.

One may wonder about the role these intellectuals played in the suspension of dynastic rule in Bijāya. Did they have a part in preparing the ground for it? What was the relationship between the *ghawghā'* and the Sufis? Did the leaders of the *ghawghā'* attempt to convince the people of Bijāya that their rule was legitimate? It is simply impossible to answer questions like these given the nature of the evidence. It is clear, however, that the victory of Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434) reinforced the power of urban elites and simultaneously recognized the de facto autonomy of large areas. The end of local autonomy in Ifrīqiyyā corresponded to a process of concentration of the means of coercion in the cities in the hands of the regional emirate and its supporters.

The reconstitution of the sociopolitical basis of Ḥafṣid rule meant a remaking of the official agenda. The threat posed by non-elite elements such as the *ghawghā'* of Bijāya was real and had to be defeated. In the process of combating these groups militarily, the Ḥafṣids framed their actions, at least in part, in terms of a struggle against those “Sufis” who challenged official religious interpretations.¹¹⁵ Their pacification of Ifrīqiyyā and the elimination of the threat of the “local” option took a few decades. It did not end with the complete obliteration of those identified as enemies. Instead, the new status quo recognized the political situation by giving a great deal of cultural autonomy to politically subordinate groups—once it became clear that they were not a threat to elite domination.¹¹⁶

Whereas in the thirteenth century Ḥafṣid military campaigns had had an anti-Bedouin bent, fourteenth-century campaigns were fought under slightly different pretenses. This is concordant with the gradual reconstitution of the region under new leadership. The anti-Sufism of the period, also described as the triumph of Mālikism, was part of the process of differentiation between the city and the country. While some scholars have described it as a struggle to impose “orthodoxy,” the heightened antagonism that the Mālikī judges bore toward Sufis proves their unwillingness, as well as their inability, to bring various groups into the fold.¹¹⁷ The condemnations issued by judges supported raids against these groups. This was the case in the late fourteenth century against the followers of Abū Zakariyā al-Ḥāḥī. In 1364, the followers

of the *zāwiya* al-Zakrāwiya were persecuted. Some described them as a *madhab*-*hab* whose “beliefs were alien to those of the *ahl al-sunna*.”¹¹⁸ However, the Ibādī Khārijites, whose beliefs were also “alien to those of the *ahl al-sunna*,” were largely left alone during the same period.¹¹⁹ Explaining the process of selective persecution of these groups in purely intellectual or doctrinal terms (orthodoxy vs. heterodoxies) tends to fall short when facing such “anomalies.” An analysis of the concrete sociopolitical relations prevailing in the various localities that were being “regionalized” by the emerging emirate puts these matters in a more comprehensive historical perspective.

Toward Emirist Historiography

The organization of learning, the expansion of official Ḥafṣid culture, and the emergence of centers of power that did not come under the full control of the dynasty were all factors that favored the regionalization of power in Ifrīqiyyā. While a few intellectuals may have preferred the autonomy of their city, they seem to have consistently considered Tunis to be the true cultural capital of Ifrīqiyyā. They were not alone. The autonomous emirs of Bijāya did not attempt to rival Tunis in the number of mosques, schools, or libraries. They did not make a special effort to sponsor a culture of autonomy among intellectuals. The early Ḥafṣid rulers Abū Zakariyā (r. 1229–49) and al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77) had used some of the revenues they collected throughout Ifrīqiyyā to build up Tunis as a cultural center. By the time Bijāya became autonomous, there was a clear lag between the two cities. The revenues from Bijāya’s smaller region could only consolidate its position as “second only to Tunis.”¹²⁰

The immigration of large numbers of Andalusi intellectuals to Bijāya improved the cultural prospects of the city by increasing the number of intellectuals. Two thirds of the notable thirteenth-century intellectuals whose biographies were catalogued by al-Ghubrīnī were not born in Bijāya, and nearly half of all outsiders were of Andalusi origin.¹²¹ With this many outsiders among the city’s intellectuals, it is not surprising that region-wide sentiments prevailed among them. In addition, their employment by the Ḥafṣids ensured their circulation throughout Ifrīqiyyā, a phenomenon that allowed them to develop ties in many of the towns.

The growing importance of the *zāwiya* and the reorganization of politics in the lands surrounding it operated at a scale that did not threaten the rule of the Ḥafṣids. *Zawāyā* were able to thrive outside the grip of the city-based

dynasty, but did not constitute a political alliance capable of unseating the urban elite—at least not until long after the victory of the regional emirate. While they often cast their teacher or leader as a powerful antagonist who stood up to the Ḥafṣid emirs, their representation of power relations tended to parallel those of the ideologues of Ḥafṣid Emirism. Their portrayal of the heroic, supernatural, or symbolic feats of their masters resembled those of Abū Fāris and other great Ḥafṣid rulers.¹²² Although the accounts of the extraordinary events of the lives of Sufi teachers (*manāqib*) have often been distinguished from historical chronicles, the two genres shared a tendency to lionize historical figures and transform them into mythological ones. The extent to which the work of these intellectuals has shaped the interpretation of the entire period will be the focus of the next chapter.

C H A P T E R 6

Emirism and the Writing of History

Through their patronage of institutions of learning and their appointment of intellectuals to official positions, the Ḥafṣids shaped the institutional context within which intellectual production took place. Schools, the courts, and Sufi *zawāya* (sing. *zāwiya*) were essential sites for the execution of their cultural politics. They used them to gain the favor of some, quiet others, and undermine the standing of those who stood against them.

The ability of an emir to gain the support of prominent intellectuals to his cause was critical to his legitimacy among the elites. Their help allowed him to build up his stature, undermine his opponents' arguments, and buttress dynastic propaganda so that it would last beyond his lifetime. Thus, the activities of the intellectual could be very useful politically, even if not all intellectual work was considered useful or even relevant. The intellectuals could also decide to be detached from politics and espouse the sort of neutrality and quietism that were necessary for the maintenance of the status quo. Whatever the case, they partook in an elite culture that was marked by the Ḥafṣid *enclavement* of prominent intellectuals.

The most important sites for the production of a Ḥafṣid-led elite culture were the courts of Ḥafṣid emirs. It was at these courts that Ḥafṣid rulers showed themselves to be friends of learning and the learned by inviting prominent intellectuals to attend sessions with the ruler (*majālis*, sing. *majlis*).¹ For most intellectuals, these learned gatherings were an occasion to show that they deserved the ruler's invitation, and they spared no effort to display their excellence. In many cases, Ḥafṣid rulers were themselves learned and shared the taste of their guests. The education they received from the best teachers prepared them for such gatherings, and some proved themselves connoisseurs, capable of discussing fine points in matters of law, theology, or logic. These

sessions fostered an esprit de corps among the elite and delineated the bounds of elite discourse. As they participated in the making of this culture, the ruling elite could not, and did not try to, suppress the cultural expressions of all subordinate groups. They did not need to do so to secure their political subjection. As long as they did not threaten the status quo, those who were ruled participated in the production, maintenance, and reproduction of the social hierarchy.

The political context within which intellectual production took place changed over time. While all the Ḥafṣid emirs certainly shared the belief that the ruler should belong to the dynasty, they differed on a number of vital issues such as the existence of autonomous emirates. For that reason, one finds alternative interpretations of political history represented in the sources. Unfortunately, the relative dearth of sources severely limits our ability to study the evolution of those interpretations. The two earliest narratives about politics in Ifrīqiyyā—those of Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) and Ibn Qunfudh (d. 1407)—were written at the tail end of the fourteenth century, at the time when the regional configuration of power had won. Although they are not our only sources of information, they are critical to our understanding of politics because they help us establish a chronology of events, identify the important political figures, and give us a sense of the politics involved in historical interpretation. These two early historical narratives were written at a time when the implications of Abū Fāris's political victory were not fully clear. They were then followed by texts composed in the second half of the fifteenth century, when Emirism had already become the dominant ideology. In other words, our information about fourteenth-century politics comes from texts that were written when the period of autonomous emirates had ended. The extent to which later developments shaped the perspective of historians on the earlier era is thus an issue that needs to be integrated into any analysis of the period.

While the Ḥafṣids managed to shape intellectual production and foster the development of an elite culture, they did not do so by following a consistent or coherent cultural policy. It is more accurate to say that the process of *encadrement* of intellectuals continued in spite of the fierce competition among Ḥafṣid emirs and ultimately gained its fullest expression after the unification of Ifrīqiyyā. It is then, and thus after Emirism became dominant, that the historians from whom we get our information about the preceding period wrote Emirist ideology into the historical record. Though the Ḥafṣids may have fostered the development of an official culture, and in turn shaped historical writing, they did not try to impose a particular official interpretation

on those few who decided to write histories—at least not on them as individuals. They did not send a censor to ensure that the portrayal of the dynasty was favorable or threaten to withhold patronage or sponsorship. In fact, since every historian had ties to the dynastic order, and was actively engaged in sustaining it, doing so would have been pointless.² They were content letting History, with a capital “H,” do most of the work for them. Consequently, for the modern historian, the question is not whether the extant chronicles were sympathetic to the Ḥafṣids; they were, and that is well known. Instead, the challenge is to characterize the perspectives of these Ḥafṣid historians in relation to the political history they narrated.

Hafṣid History and Hafṣid Historians

Ḥafṣid rulers were aware of the importance of historical reports that described their victories and great deeds. Like the Almohads, they took professional skilled writers (*kuttāb*, sing. *kātib*) with them to battlefields and had them write highly ornate textual proofs of their heroism. These *kuttāb* were often poets and litterateurs of renown, whose epistles (*rasā'il*, sing. *risāla*) on mathematical, philosophical, or historical subjects and travel accounts (*raḥalāt*, sing. *riḥla*) were kept at the royal library.³ That was certainly the case of the Almohad *kātib* Abū 'Abd Allāh Ibn Nakhīl (d. ca. 1222) who served Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. Abū Ḥafṣ (d. 1221), the Almohad governor of Ifrīqiyyā before Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā (r. 1229–49). His historical writings were prized by his patron and became the standard reference for later historians and biographers, many of whom were employed at the chancery or had access to the library. Ibn Khaldūn used the narrative of Ibn Nakhīl and others to ascertain dates, names, and other details.⁴

But not all historians used these types of sources to compose their own narratives. Those whose histories focused on long-gone eras or faraway kingdoms relied on the information available in older, usually widely circulated, texts. For eras closer to them, they relied on official documents such as peace treaties and royal proclamations, various works written by contemporaries of the events, and the recollection of elders.

The historians and their sources, written and oral, focused on the activities of the dynasty and its officials, and of other members of the elite. This is how they imagined the scope of historical narration. They did not believe that the lives of servants, agricultural workers, shepherds, or nomads should be

included in histories—unless their actions illuminated those of the powerful. Although this should not be surprising, their narratives systematically ignored the majority of the people, who, in turn, were left without historical narratives of their own.⁵ Significantly, dynastic histories were framed in such a way that they made the history of the elite stand for history of the area they ruled.

Likewise, as far as we can tell from extant sources, the writing of chronicles (*ta'rikh*) was not all too popular and tended to be specific to urban dynasties and elites. In fact, there are no extant chronicles from smaller cities that were ruled by autonomous dynasties. Of course, chronicles were not the only texts that referred to past events. Collections of the biographies of learned and pious men (*tabaqāt*), travelogues, and compilations of narratives associated with Sufis (*manāqib*) all described events that had taken place in the past. However, their purpose (unlike that of histories), was not primarily to establish narratives about the succession of rulers, officials, conspiracies, and rebellions. It was rather to catalogue and celebrate those men and women involved in learning and piety.

With the immigration of elite Andalusis in the thirteenth century, the writing of history became immediately more popular in Ifrīqiyyā and attracted more than the few individuals who ordinarily would have developed an interest in the genre or were employed in that capacity by the ruling dynasty. Hailing from the exalted cities of al-Andalus with urban pride in their hearts, the learned Andalusis lent popularity at the Ḥafṣid court to written narratives about the past.

Notable among these Andalusis were al-Bayāsī (d. 1256), Ibn al-Abbār (d. 1260), ‘Alī b. Sa‘īd (1213–86), and Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad al-Gharnāṭī (d. 1292–93). These were major literary talents and historians with ties to the Ḥafṣid court. Al-Bayāsī wrote a history of the early Islamic period for the Ḥafṣid Abū Zakariyā Yahyā (r. 1229–49).⁶ In his compilation of literary biographies, ‘Alī b. Sa‘īd described him as a “historian” (*mu’arrikh*) who “enjoyed the favor of the king of Ifrīqiyyā and [received] a monthly stipend.”⁷ Ibn Sa‘īd was one to know: he held a high-level position under al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77).⁸

Other Andalusis were not so lucky. Ibn al-Abbār al-Balansī was perhaps the most prominent intellectual to have migrated to Tunis. His presence at the Ḥafṣid court under Abū Zakariyā and al-Mustanṣir was a major boon for the dynasty. His arrival buttressed its efforts to make Tunis a major center of culture. In a way, he was the face and voice of Ḥafṣid-sponsored Andalusi immigration: impressively learned, courtly, and loud. His poem beseeching Abū Zakariyā to come to the rescue of al-Andalus quickly joined the body of

learned references. It was widely cited in subsequent works, as it continues to be today.

Ibn al-Abbār's activities at the Ḥafṣid court gained him enemies, especially among Ifriqiyān courtiers who saw Andalusis like him as a threat. Famously, the historian and director of the chancery (*wa-jumi'at lahu khutṭat al-'alāma wa-khutṭat al-inshā*) al-Ghassānī (d. 1269/70) conspired to usurp Ibn al-Abbār's position. He was ultimately successful after the authorities appeared unannounced at Ibn al-Abbar's and found the following poem deriding al-Mustanṣir and his claims to be caliph:

He became a tyrant in Tunis, the son [of somebody] (*khalaf*),
And they called him caliph (*khalifa*) in error.⁹

Shortly thereafter, Ibn al-Abbār was tortured and executed. Later authors believed that al-Ghassānī had planted the poem, and among them, he became notorious for having done so.¹⁰ Interestingly, historians remembered al-Ghassānī as al-Mustanṣir's personal historian: "He was the one who composed the narratives of the deeds (*siyar*, sing. *sira*) of al-Mustanṣir and wrote for him the histories he desired, and the accounts of his *dawla* that he needed. He alone had that privilege and no one could write about that subject but he."¹¹

These histories written in the thirteenth century became sources of information for later historians, whether they were written in the Almohad fashion by *kuttāb* employed by the ruling dynasty, or by elite Andalusis who sought to demonstrate the greatness of their city of origin, their family, or their Ḥafṣid patrons. But after the death of al-Mustanṣir in 1277, fewer histories emerged from the local Ḥafṣid courts. This dearth lasted until the end of the fourteenth century and the end of autonomous emirs. While the reasons for this are not obvious, it explains why our knowledge of the period of local emirates is based on histories written just as those emirates were being dismantled—and thus the bias against them. In fact, since only fragments of earlier chronicles remain, our knowledge of politics in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries depends on the four extant later chronicles that include them. Consequently, it is useful to analyze these chronicles and show some of the politics behind them.

Ibn Khaldūn: Between al-Andalus and the Emir

With more than a century of scholarship scrutinizing every aspect of his work, 'Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) stands as the most widely studied thinker in the history of the Maghrib. I have already argued that he was an

Emirist ideologue (Chapter 4); here I will focus on explaining those aspects of his perspective that made it particularly Andalusi.¹²

Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-‘ibar* (the Book of Examples) presents itself as a history of the "Arabs, Persians, and Berbers and peoples contemporary with them who formed great kingdoms." Ibn Khaldūn held genealogy to be an adequate, if not always accurate, explanation of contemporary collective identities, including his own. In his understanding, the mythological plane of genealogy preceded history. His book begins with the a priori existence of peoples and accounts for their different histories, or successions of dynasties, in genealogical terms. A simple way of understanding the organization of the work is to see it as beginning with the contemporary dynasties and peoples known to Ibn Khaldūn and then proceeding back until it reaches the mythological time of early genealogy.

The *Kitāb al-‘ibar* stands out from the other three extant Ḥafṣid chronicles because it was not written as a history of the Ḥafṣids. The section on the Ḥafṣids appears in the accounts of the third generation (*ṭabaga*) of Ṣanhāja Berbers.¹³ In keeping with official Ḥafṣid ideology, Ibn Khaldūn considered the Ḥafṣids as the heirs and continuators of the Almohads. As the third generation of Ṣanhāja dynasty-founders, they followed the Zīrids (972–1148) and Ḥammādids (1015–1152), and then the Almoravids (1062–1147).

Ibn Khaldūn's framework, which conceived of the transformation of Bedouins into urban dynasties, allowed him to organize a vast amount of information about the four preceding centuries into a reasonable narrative. In their "historical" phase, the Ṣanhāja were divided into a number of groups including the Maṣmūda who founded the Almohad *dawla* and the Hintāta who founded the Ḥafṣid one. In the same fashion, he approached the past of the Marinids (1217–1465) and 'Abd al-Wādids (1236–1555) considering them as second-generation Zanāta Berbers.

The *Kitāb al-‘ibar* was the most systematic and comprehensive work ever written to frame the entire history of the Maghrib as the history of "Arabs" and "Berbers." This is significant because it made an Andalusi perspective the standard way of understanding the Maghrib and its past. Ibn Khaldūn's understanding of these two categories owed a great deal to their earlier development and use in al-Andalus.¹⁴ The Andalusi origins of his ideas on the subject can be seen most clearly in his treatment of his own identity.

Both in his autobiography (*riḥla*) and in the *Muqaddima*, Ibn Khaldūn introduced himself as being originally Ḥaḍramī, thus asserting for himself a Yemeni descent.¹⁵ "Our ancestry goes back to Ḥaḍramawt, [we belong to the]

Arabs of the Yemen, and descend from Wā'il b. Hujr. He was one of the leaders of the Arabs, was known, and had a following.”¹⁶

While it may seem odd for a third-generation Andalusi in Ifrīqiyyā to claim Yemeni descent, doing so was typical of Andalusis in al-Andalus. Beginning in the eighth century, the Andalusi category “Arab” developed as a fusion of groups of Yemeni and Syrian (*shāmī*) descent and in contrast to “Berbers,” which lumped together various groups from northwest Africa.¹⁷ In the Maghrib, the category “Berber” did not immediately become a common means of self-identification. In general, categories referring to specific groups or peoples such as “Zanāta” and “Nafūsa” were preferred. The transformation of various groups in the Maghrib into subcategories of “Berber” was a long and gradual process. Importantly, it was shaped by the early consolidation of the distinction between Berbers and Arabs as it took shape in al-Andalus.

In his autobiography, Ibn Khaldūn demonstrated his family’s long-standing prominence by referring to a number of favorable statements found in famous books. He mentioned a report stating that his ancestor Wā'il had met the Prophet Muḥammad and that the latter had blessed “[him], his sons, and their sons to the end of days.”¹⁸ He also quoted from the work of the famous Andalusi historians Ibn Ḥayyān al-Qurṭubī (d. 1076) and Ibn Hazm (d. 1064) who had mentioned the Banū Khaldūn as one of the important Arab families in al-Andalus.

Ibn Ḥayyān said: The house of the Banū Khaldūn continues to be renowned down to our day in Ishbilya [Seville]. To this day, its notable [sons] continue [to excel] as high-level political officials (*ri'āsa sultāniya*) and outstanding scholars (*ri'āsa 'ilmīya*).¹⁹

The Arabness of the Banū Khaldūn was no arbitrary or innocent fact. In the eleventh century, Andalusi leaders rallied their supporters in relation to the privileges those of Arab descent had enjoyed under the Umayyads (756–1031). The new Party Kings (*mulūk al-ṭawāif*) of al-Andalus (1031–91) promoted ideologies of difference that matched their parceling of the former Umayyad possessions. As they competed with one another in boasting of the honor of their Arab or Berber ancestors, the Party Kings further reified these categories by eliciting the production of genealogical knowledge to back their claims.²⁰

Much of the lament over the downfall of the “Arab” Umayyads was produced under the rule of militantly Arab Party Kings such as the ‘Abbādids of Seville. The Banū Khaldūn served as viziers of the ‘Abbādids, a role in

which their Arabness gained further significance. In Ibn Khaldūn's interpretation, the Party Kings had used "tribal" sentiments to found dynasties in al-Andalus. This ended with the Almoravid conquest. "Yūsuf b. Tashfīn and the Almoravids prevailed over al-Andalus. [With that] the *dawla* of the Arabs waned and their tribes disappeared."²¹

For Ibn Khaldūn, and for those who in al-Andalus had supported the "Arab" Party Kings, the Almoravids were Berber Bedouins from the Maghrib who invaded al-Andalus and ended the power of Arabs. Interestingly, Ibn Khaldūn, who is scrupulous until this point about mentioning the deeds of notable members of his family, now says nothing about them until the Almohad conquest of al-Andalus in the mid-twelfth century. This suggests that the role his family may have played under Almoravid rule was better left unsaid now that he was serving the Almohads.

The Banū Khaldūn reappeared as members of the elite in Seville with ties to the Almohad governors. Ibn Khaldūn proudly recalls that an ancestor of his, on his mother's side, offered a Galician captive to Abū Zakariyā Yahyā, the future first Ḥafṣid ruler, and that she bore him sons and became known as the mother of the Ḥafṣid caliphs (*umm al-khulafā'*).²² He then launches into an account of his great-grandfather's exile from Seville, which was threatened by Fernando III, the ruler of León and Castile. The narrative establishes the lack of agreement between the four families of Seville (Banū Khaldūn, Banū Sayyid al-Nās, Banū al-Bājī, and Banū al-Jadd) on tactics and their ultimate loss of their city. While the chronology of the events is vague, Ibn Khaldūn notes that his family first migrated across the Mediterranean to Sabta (Ceuta) and became in-laws of the prominent Banū al-'Azafī there. Perhaps following the Ḥafṣid conquest of the city in 1242, al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. Khaldūn relied on his family's ties to Abū Zakariyā in al-Andalus and finally joined them by migrating to Būna in Ifrīqiyā.

When he returned from completing his religious duty in the Mashriq [i.e., his pilgrimage to Mecca], he joined the emir Abū Zakariyā in Būna, who was generous to him. He settled there under the shade of his *dawla* and the plenty of his care. [The emir] provided him with a source of livelihood, and granted him land (*iqtā'*).²³

The Ḥafṣids were Andalusophile Berbers. They were Bedouins who became civilized by their association with Andalusi urbanites. The Arabness of Andalusis such as the Banū Khaldūn allowed them to "educate" the Ḥafṣid

Berbers and remake them in the image of the cultured rulers of the Andalus of yore. Typically of Andalusi discourse on the matter, Ibn Khaldūn approached the question of the language of the Berbers in the Maghrib in terms of their proficiency in Arabic, the mixture of Arabic with other languages (*iǧām*), and the development of dialects in cities. In this context, “Arab” was not a description of the Banū Khaldūn’s origins, but a marker of their standing vis-à-vis the didactic functions they were hired to execute. Andalusis were agents of civilization. The disappearance of Arab tribes from al-Andalus, as Ibn Khaldūn noted, had made Andalusis more purely urban and civilized, and thus qualified them to civilize at the exclusion of all others. This was particularly useful in Ifrīqiyyā, where the newcomers were challenged. Almohad sheikhs were Berbers, the urban elite of Ifrīqiyyā were mostly Berber, and the powerful Arab tribes were Bedouins. The Andalusi immigrants were thus the major “civilized Arabs” in the region, and this entitled them to prestige, patronage, and promotion.

Ibn Khaldūn’s *Kitāb al-‘ibar* can thus be seen as one intellectual expression of the integration of elite Andalusis into the elite of Ifrīqiyyā. From this point of view, there is a social context for the presentation of Andalusi knowledge, and one cannot accept it purely as neutral, objective, and universally applicable, even if it purports to be so. Even more importantly, it shows a tension between Ibn Khaldūn’s attachment to al-Andalus in Ifrīqiyyā and his anticipation of the regional emirate.

Ibn Qunfudh: The Place of Birth

Ibn Khaldūn was a well-born Andalusi whose elite status in Ifrīqiyyā derived from his family’s service to the Ḥafṣids. Thanks to his voluminous history, that elite Andalusi perspective forms a large and influential part of our perspective on the period. It is not the only perspective, however, and the three remaining extant chronicles express differing viewpoints. For instance, the historical narrative written by a contemporary of Ibn Khaldūn who belonged to a prominent family in one of the largest cities of Ifrīqiyyā greatly expands our understanding of intra-elite differences.

Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. Ḥasan b. Qunfudh (ca. 1340–1407) was born in Qasanṭīna to a prominent family of scholars. His father and grandfather were learned scholars who delivered the Friday sermon (*khuṭabā'*, sing. *khaṭīb*), a position he also held at the city’s Kasbah mosque before becoming judge (*qāḍī*) and *muftī*. Beginning with his paternal great-grandfather, the family

had developed ties to the Ḥafṣids and their rule in Qasanṭīna. On his mother's side, Ibn Qunfudh was related to a prominent family of sheikhs of the *zāwiya* of Mallāra, a two-day journey east of Qasanṭīna.²⁴ After receiving the best education available in his hometown, Ibn Qunfudh left Qasanṭīna and traveled to the western Maghrib in search of learning. He spent almost twenty years mostly between Tilimsān and Fās, studying with notable scholars and venerable Sufi teachers from the Maghrib and al-Andalus. Upon his return to Ifrīqiyyā, he stayed in Tunis for a while but finally settled in Qasanṭīna.

Ibn Qunfudh wrote a great number of books. An accomplished polymath, he composed works on the plague, medicine, astronomy, and grammar, among other subjects.²⁵ While clearly outstanding in many respects, he was a typical product of his class. He was the learned son of one of a number of prominent urban families.

Ibn Qunfudh is mostly known as a historian of the Ḥafṣids.²⁶ Unlike Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, his chronicle was not a universal history and did not aspire to establish a new science. As he explained, he wrote *The Fārisiya About the Beginnings of the Ḥafṣid Dawla* to memorialize the “honor of Abū Fāris after he had been elevated to [rule in Tunis,] the great capital.”²⁷ Although the chronicle was not particularly exceptional, its organization supported his agenda by following a dynastic pattern and favoring those Ḥafṣid emirs who had unified Ifrīqiyyā and those who had been born in Qasanṭīna.

Ibn Qunfudh's *Fārisiya* emphasizes the events and actions that glorified Abū Fāris and the Ḥafṣid dynasty and glosses over those that did not serve his goal. Using the guise of a synopsis (*mukhtaṣar*), the author was able to construct a flattering, if partial, narrative. Interestingly, and in spite of his stated preference for brevity, Ibn Qunfudh lavishes the reader with references to events that took place in and around Qasanṭīna. Ultimately, as a text, the *Fārisiya* craftily aggrandizes Abū Fāris, the Ḥafṣids, and the city of Qasanṭīna and its notables.

In spite of the eulogistic character of his chronicle, Ibn Qunfudh was meticulous about details and utilized official documents and literary sources kept in the archives and libraries of Qasanṭīna and Tunis. This feature of his work makes it particularly useful in establishing a chronology of events.²⁸ His information about his city and its surroundings is simply unequaled.²⁹ Further enhancing the standing of the *Fārisiya* is its author's inclusion of hearsay and gossip about members of the elite.³⁰ Although those accounts are often included to demonstrate the Banū Qunfudh's ties to the Ḥafṣids or the

dynasty's special appreciations of Qasanṭīna and its notability, they also show that the author had access to privileged information. This is best illustrated by the episode discussed above involving the Bijāyan judge al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1304).³¹

In his history, Ibn Qunfudh expresses his closeness to Abū Fāris in many ways. He mentions his family's long-standing support of the dynasty and service on its behalf. He notes his participation in conversations at the royal court in Tunis with great men of learning such as the judge Abū al-Qāsim al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1440) and mentions that the ruler had read some of his writings.³² Perhaps believing that this was not enough, Ibn Qunfudh tells his readers, Abū Fāris among them, about an episode that demonstrated a still deeper connection.

In the month of Ramadan of that year [800/1398], a lion lunged at the Commander of the Faithful [Abū Fāris] and almost snatched him while the slaves who had followed him on his hunting trip were terrified. But God saved him by extending his protection and backing. That is why once when he chased a lion in his domain (*rahba*), I told him: “Since God has made you victorious, I am not amazed by this animal as much as I am amazed by him who plays with it in the arena.” He laughed [showing that he had] understood the allusion [to that previous event].³³

Beyond this personal aspect of his history, Ibn Qunfudh consistently voices his political support for the regional emirate. This perspective is firmly anchored in his narrative.

In that year [802/1400] the Commander of the Faithful took his army to *recover* (*istirjā'*) Tūzar from the hands of Ibn Yamlūl. He laid siege to it until he took it forcefully and captured him. Then at the end of [the month of] Sha'bān of that year, he moved to *recover* Qafṣa. He stayed near it for a few days until he took it after the surrender of its people. He entered it by force and captured those inside [who ran its affairs]. Then he returned to the capital.³⁴

For Ibn Qunfudh, bringing autonomous towns under the control of the Hafṣid ruler of Tunis was a “recovery”—a return to normal, and he depicts Abū Fāris as merely reclaiming what others had illegitimately appropriated.

Ibn Qunfudh's narrative about the reign of the “usurper” Ibn Abī ‘Umāra (r. 1283–84) illustrates his approach to politically sensitive material. On the one hand, he describes the political circumstances that led to the victory of the usurper, discussing the alliance between urban elites and Bedouins that brought down the “legitimate” Ḥafṣids. But when it comes to explaining this defeat, he focuses on the fraud committed by Ibn Abī ‘Umāra. In other words, he aptly shifts attention away from those who had offered the usurper support, thus downplaying the faction that opposed the legitimate Ḥafṣids. Interestingly, Ibn Qunfudh did not believe that the fraud had interrupted Ḥafṣid dynastic rule. Instead, he held that during the rule of the fraudulent Ḥafṣid emir, the legitimate Ḥafṣid *dawla* continued to exist, but in a hidden or covert (*bāṭin*) form. After the usurper was defeated, the *dawla* returned (*rāja’at*) to its original form (*aṣlihā*), both covert and overt (*zāhir*).³⁵ The very fact that he felt compelled to concoct such an explanation shows clearly that the problem of dynastic continuity mattered to him.

Ibn Khaldūn had seen the events that followed the accession of a legitimate Ḥafṣid emir to the throne in Tunis as the “splitting” of the *dawla* into two. For him such an occurrence was the result of the senescence of the dynasty. Not so for Ibn Qunfudh. Ibn Qunfudh recognized that these events constituted a serious political problem (*fitna, idṭirāb*), but nonetheless goes on to celebrate the greatness of the autonomous emir of Bijāya Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā (r. 1285–1301), who also ruled over Qasanṭīna.³⁶ While this may seem to implicate the urban elite in supporting the break-up of the dynasty, Ibn Qunfudh insists that outsiders who betrayed the ruler caused the city’s three rebellions.³⁷ Perhaps to show his blamelessness, Ibn Qunfudh also mentions that during the political troubles at the beginning of the reign of Abū Fāris, he had retired from public life, staying at a *zāwiyā*.³⁸

Although Ibn Qunfudh’s work honored Abū Fāris, the regional emir, he did not express preference for a powerful Tunis-based emir. His tribute to the ruler came too early for him to realize the full implications of the process underway. When he finished writing the *Fārisiyā* in 1403, Abū Fāris had not yet fully pacified Ifriqiyyā. He had not yet become the regional emir that later historians would readily recognize. While an elite Andalusi like Ibn Khaldūn envisioned a providential unifier of Ifriqiyyā, Ibn Qunfudh did not. The unification of Ifriqiyyā centered on Tunis did not matter as much to him as did the ruler’s connections to Qasanṭīna. Demonstrating his pre-regional or early-regional perspective, Ibn Qunfudh referred to entire areas in Ifriqiyyā, especially in the Atlas Mountains, where the power of the Ḥafṣids was unknown.

In that year [800/1398], the events of Awrās took place with the arrival of the Commander of the Faithful [Abū Fāris] to a place in the far reaches of the mountain [chain] that no king had ever reached before. The scouts made a mistake on their way from the mountain and were harassed by Berbers around shrubby areas and in narrow river valleys. But the Commander of the Faithful stood fast [against the assailants] until most of them left.³⁹

Unlike the inhabitants of cities and towns that had claimed autonomy from the Ḥafṣids, Ibn Qunfudh did not consider the mountain areas as rightfully belonging to the dynasty. On the contrary, it was because everyone knew that mountains lay outside of the dynasty's reach that Abū Fāris stood out from his predecessors. For Ibn Qunfudh, Ifrīqiyā may have been the homeland of the Ḥafṣids, but it was also that of others. His attachment and loyalty to Abū Fāris and the Ḥafṣids did not come at the expense of his urban pride; his eulogy of the man who would be regional emir did not celebrate “Ḥafṣid Ifrīqiyā.”

Al-Zarkashī: Individual Talent and Profession

Unlike Ibn Khaldun's universal ambitions and regionalist vision, and also unlike Ibn Qunfudh's pre-regional but philo-Emirist perspective, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. Lu’lu’ al-Zarkashī (fl. 1482), writing nearly a century later, represented the quietism and encyclopedism of a compiler lacking in true originality—and in a discernable group membership.⁴⁰ Al-Zarkashī's main work, *The Chronicle of the Almohad and Ḥafṣid Dawlas*, expressed the dominant ideas of its time without restraint, in the ornate literary style that demonstrated its author's skill.

Judging from his grandfather's name, scholars have argued that al-Zarkashī was probably the descendant of a freed slave, possibly of Turkic background. Little is known also about his upbringing in Tunis, although the names of some of his teachers suggest that he received a good education.

The *Chronicle* is not the only extant text written by al-Zarkashī. The abridged version of his explanation of the vocabulary of a panegyric (*madiḥ*) in praise of the Ḥafṣid Abū al-‘Abbās (r. 1370–94) has also survived.⁴¹ Al-Zarkashī's choice of subject matter suggests that he may have wanted to attach himself to the dynasty. This interpretation is supported by his decision to append a short historical narrative about the traits and deeds of Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān (r. 1435–88) and his son Muḥammad al-Mas‘ūd.⁴²

Al-Zarkashī begins his *Chronicle* with a rather brief section on Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130) and the Almohads (Mu'minids) and then moves on to the Ḥafṣids, the focus of his work. He relies on earlier historians such as Ibn Nakhil (d. ca. 1222), Ibn Khaldūn, and Ibn Qunfudh for information, often paraphrasing their work or quoting from them verbatim. His history ends with the events of 1477, but there are references to later events that suggest that the author, or someone else, may have updated his chronicle after its completion.

Al-Zarkashī followed an annalistic organization. He included noteworthy events such as the pledge of allegiance to rulers, military campaigns, sudden increases in the price of wheat and barley, and appointment of notable figures to official functions. While he dates a small number of these events incorrectly, he is generally precise—especially when he relies on older texts.

Al-Zarkashī was a Ḥafṣid official who occupied a position as *kātib* at the chancery and also served as a legal functionary (*'adl*).⁴³ His literary talents and broad learning, which he conspicuously displays in both his extant works, gained him some recognition in Tunis. He was present at the formal send-off that courtiers and notables gave the ruler Abū 'Amr Uthmān (r. 1435–88) upon his departure on a campaign.⁴⁴ As a Ḥafṣid official of some importance, he had access to the palace and was part of the learned literary circles in Tunis.

Al-Zarkashī wrote his narrative in a style that reminds one of biographical dictionaries, especially because of its scrupulous citations. Between its frequent reliance on other texts, its synoptic character and annalistic organization, and the inclusion of hundreds of ornate notices about the deaths of notables, the history presents itself as an amalgam with no unified tone or texture. However, and perhaps paradoxically, this makes it a very effective presentation of a Tunis-centric pro-Ḥafṣid perspective, because it juxtaposes apparently reliable biographical information with political arguments presented as matters of fact: “In the year 795, the people of Qafṣa (Gafsa) acted deceitfully so the ruler [Abū al-'Abbās] took his army and besieged [the city]. He cut down many of [the city's] palm and other trees and, after he was tired of the Bedouins, he returned to Tunis.”⁴⁵

The overarching dynastic logic of the text and the author's privileging of information about Tunis are presented as simply expressing givens that everyone knew and accepted: Tunis was the capital of Ifrīqiyā and the Ḥafṣids its legitimate rulers.

In his literary study of the popular panegyric poem, al-Zarkashī more explicitly expresses his attachment to the dynasty and the regional emir.⁴⁶ His analysis of the poem was an opportunity to extol Abū al-'Abbās (r. 1370–94)

and his grandson Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān (r. 1435–88). He also praised the Ḥafṣid rulers who had preceded Abū al-‘Abbās, and found a way to praise Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434) for exhibiting signs of greatness while a young prince.⁴⁷ In the conclusion, al-Zarkashī added a biographical narrative of the Ḥafṣid Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān that combines two well-established formats. He represents the Ḥafṣid ruler as a pious man in a genre, the *manāqib*, generally associated with the Sufis; and using the *sīra*, the tale of his great deeds and accomplishments, he depicts him as a noble warrior.

Al-Zarkashī’s glorification of the Ḥafṣids is not subtle. His literary study, entitled *Attainment of Hopes*, is a celebration of the victory of Emirism, a victory he dated to the advent of Abū al-‘Abbās. This aspect of his work illuminates his treatment of Abū al-‘Abbās and Abū Fāris in his *Chronicle*. It sheds light on his satisfaction with the return of Tunis-based Ḥafṣid peace under Abū al-‘Abbās, even as his chronicle also shows the difficulties the ruler had enforcing it. In fact, those hurdles merely accentuate Abū al-‘Abbās’s heroic feat.⁴⁸

There is no doubt, however, that the author wrote his narrative with the full benefit of hindsight. He used the knowledge of how the political struggles of the past century had been resolved to express the inevitable coming of the regional emirate. Importantly, al-Zarkashī’s Tunis-centric narrative accommodates the aspirations of the Andalusi Ibn Khaldūn and the pride of Ibn Qunfudh in his *Qasanṭīna*. Since the emergence of the regional emirate relied on the support of members of the elite, the integration of their perspectives is not surprising.

But unlike Ibn Khaldūn and Ibn Qunfudh, al-Zarkashī did not belong to a recognized “community” (*jamā‘a*) or the urban notability. His “origins,” or at least how he would have wished to represent them, are unknown to us because he did not elaborate on them.⁴⁹ It is probable that the captive or slave status of his grandfather made it difficult for him to claim honor and pride the way his elite contemporaries did. Descendents of slaves did not form a recognized community even if a number of them came to hold high-level positions in the government. For this social category, personal talent and excellence in a craft were paramount. Someone like al-Zarkashī had a relatively successful, but not outstanding, career thanks to his literary gifts. In a way, he could belong to the community of poets and writers because birth was not a requirement of membership. His personal talent earned him an office at the Ḥafṣid court, and it was natural for him to kiss the hands that fed him.

Nothing in his political perspective deviated from the dominant Emirism of his time.

Ibn al-Shammā‘: The Honor of Bedouin Urbanites

By the fifteenth century, the era of the powerful Almohad sheikhs who inflected Ḥafṣid politics was long gone. But the memory of their former greatness, though it now accommodated Ḥafṣid Emirism, remained. It shaped the writing of the remaining historical narrative written by Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457) in the middle of the fifteenth century.

In his *The Clear Luminous Indications (Adilla) of the Points of Pride of the Ḥafṣid Dawla*, Ibn al-Shammā‘ presented a synoptic narrative that extolled the deeds of the Ḥafṣids.⁵⁰ The stated goal for producing his history was didactic.⁵¹

My purpose and the essence of my intention [in writing this text] is [for it to serve as a] reminder and exhortation. For in mentioning the tales (*akhbār*) of past peoples (*umam*), centuries gone, vanished *duwal* (sing. *dawla*), and earlier kings, there is a warning and “a promise for him who listens and is a witness.”⁵²

The particular lessons Ibn al-Shammā‘ wanted his readers to absorb were those that glorified the Ḥafṣid dynasty. Ibn al-Shammā‘ began his history by delineating the frontiers of the Maghrib and Ifriqiyā, mentioning the “points of pride” (*majākhir*) of each.⁵³ He then introduced the city of Tunis, his hometown and capital of the Ḥafṣids, and established that Ifriqiyā had become Muslim in the seventh century, discussing the companions of the Prophet Muḥammad who first raided Ifriqiyā. He then dedicated an entire section to “the duty to obey the rulers (*wulāt al-amr*) and not to rebel against them” in which he referred to a number of well-known statements attributed to the Prophet (*hadīth*), such as “he who finds something hateful about his emir must be patient.” Bringing the point home, Ibn al-Shammā‘ noted that those who revolted cut themselves off from the community of Muslims.⁵⁴

The chronicle proceeds along according to the succession of rulers of Tunis. Sections are often divided into subsections that thematically organize the information from “accession to the throne” to “death notice.” Noticeably, he does not treat all rulers equally, and information about cities other than Tunis is sparse. Combining accounts of great feats (*sīra*) with more “hagiographic”

(*manāqib*) ones, the *Adilla* does not follow a strict chronological order within those subsections.⁵⁵

The narrative about the Ḥafṣid rulers begins with Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wāḥid (d. 1221) and, unlike other histories, gives a very favorable, full genealogy of the Ḥafṣids, tying them to the second caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 644).⁵⁶ Like the Ḥafṣids, Ibn al-Shammā‘ belonged to the Hintāta, so of course he shared this honor with them. He also shared something that distinguished them from other Almohads: “The Hintāta were among the greatest [of the Maṣmūda], its most numerous and most powerful.”⁵⁷ They were the earlier supporters of the Imām al-Mahdi [Ibn Tūmart], those who prepared for his *dawla* and the *dawla* of the emir ‘Abd al-Mu’min after him.”⁵⁸

Casting the Hintāta as Ur-Almohads positions the Ḥafṣids clearly ahead of the Mu’minids as bearers of the Almohad message. It also emphasizes the author’s close kinship ties to the Ḥafṣids. His father, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad al-Shammā‘, had been a regional Ḥafṣid judge (*qāḍī al-maḥalla*) and delivered the Friday sermon at the Kasbah of Tunis.⁵⁹ When he was younger, Ibn al-Shammā‘ used to accompany him to the court of Abū Fāris.⁶⁰ While it is not fully clear what official positions Ibn al-Shammā‘ actually held, there is no doubt that he was a member of the pro-Ḥafṣid elite.⁶¹ His family exemplified those Almohads who had become part of the urban elite in Tunis. His portrayal of Tunis as the great Ḥafṣid capital of Ifriqiyyā thus combined the Tunis-centric dynasticism dominant at his time with the pride that of the Tunisian elite in their city.

Ibn al-Shammā‘ added two sections at the end of the *Adilla* on the problem of bandits and rebel Bedouins (*muḥāribūn*) that further supported this general orientation. In the first section, Ibn al-Shammā‘ presented a series of legal arguments against bandits, outlaws, and rebels supported by holy writ, prophetic tradition, and jurisprudence. The question of the legal status of the *muḥāribūn* was politically important because it involved the legitimacy of deploying Ḥafṣid armies against them. Ibn al-Shammā‘ called on law-abiding Muslims to fight against them.⁶²

His interest in this issue may have come from his official position as judge of the Ḥafṣid expeditionary force (*maḥalla*).⁶³ It may also have come from the seriousness of the problem (*ḥirāba*) in Ifriqiyyā, since Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān led an annual campaign against them.⁶⁴ Ibn al-Shammā‘ expressed the concerns of the pro-Ḥafṣid urban elite in a way that typically established the legality and expediency of the Ḥafṣid campaigns and undermined the “Bedouins” (*a‘rāb*), who “were Muslim only by name.”⁶⁵ His teacher, the Tunisian judge Ibn ‘Arafa

(d. 1401), had not been as cautious. He had famously declared at least some of them outlaws and non-Muslims, and issued an opinion sanctioning a war effort (*jihād*) against them. This war was to be fought against the Daylam and the Riyāḥ, “the emirs of the Arabs (Bedouins) of the central Maghrib” whose behavior outraged the jurist.

In our Maghrib, there is a group of Arabs who number 10,000 or more between cavalrymen and foot soldiers whose only activity is to raid, rob poor travelers and kill them, and kidnap Muslim women by force. This is the custom among them. The authority of the sultan and his representative (*nā'ib*) can do nothing against them. [Worse,] he gives them gifts, concedes [entire] regions to them that they administer through governors whom they appoint, and where they impose their own taxes. This does not [even] stop them from attacking caravans, robbing, killing, or raping.⁶⁶

Ibn ‘Arafa’s opinion demonstrates that the Ḥafṣid “War on Bedouins,” which raged from the 1370s through the 1390s, left its mark on the writing of history. And even if Ibn al-Shammā‘ was more gentle in his depiction of the legal status of the “Bedouins,” his conclusions were the same, and he duly celebrated the pacification of Ifriqiyā under Abū Fāris and Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān.

At this time, God has spared us their evil, divided and displaced them, and extinguished their rebellion through the presence of our ruler (*mawlā*), the Commander of the Faithful, and his pious intention. He is still supported by God with the glory of victory, the attainment of his goal, the permanence of peace, the achievement of plenty, and the agreeability of luxury.⁶⁷

But these accomplishments did not eliminate the memory of the Bedouin threat: after all, Ibn al-Shammā‘ still considered the matter pertinent enough to include it in his history as late as the mid-fifteenth century. Although the issue allowed him to bolster the deeds of his Ḥafṣid ruler, that was not its only function in his narrative.

Yet like many in Ifriqiyā, Ibn al-Shammā‘ himself claimed descent from a Bedouin group. And, in spite of the achievements of the Ḥafṣids, the Hintāta had become urbanized only recently. Compared to the older Ifriqiyan urbanites and the urban Andalusis, they were new to city life. For Ibn al-Shammā‘,

and those in his position, anti-Bedouin sentiment was a reality they faced because of the centrality of the city in the dominant discourse. Adding a section on the struggle against Bedouin outlaws allowed him to distinguish between good Bedouins and bad Bedouins. And he continued to do so in the final section of his book.

Ibn al-Shammā‘ entitled the last section “The First Appearance (*dukhūl*) of the Bedouins (*a‘rāb*) in Ifrīqiyyā.” Framing the issue in terms of the “origins” of the “Bedouin problem,” he shifted the discussion away from the complexity of circumstances prevailing at the time. His section did not discuss the Ḥafṣids’ “need for Bedouins,” their economic importance, or the series of natural disasters (plagues and droughts) that had befallen them.⁶⁸ He did not discuss the migration of a great many Bedouins to the cities and their settlement there. Although he was not ignorant of all these facts, Ibn al-Shammā‘ chose to focus on the “source of the problem”: the migration of the Banū Hilāl to Ifrīqiyyā in the eleventh century.

He tells the story this way. The Fatimid caliph of Egypt, al-Mustanṣir (r. 1036–94), after his client the governor of Ifrīqiyyā al-Mu‘izz b. Bādis (r. 1016–62) renounced him, encouraged the Banū Hilāl and Banū Sulaym Bedouins to leave Egypt and conquer Ifrīqiyyā. With an army composed of slaves from the Sūdān, al-Mu‘izz tried to defend Ifrīqiyyā, but he ultimately failed.

When al-Mu‘izz was defeated by the Bedouins (‘Arab), the latter spread war throughout Ifrīqiyyā and dominated it entirely. They divided its countryside (*bawādihā*) among their tribes. The city was besieged and could be exited or entered only after payment of a fee.⁶⁹

Ibn al-Shammā‘ was, however, silent on the involvement of the Zanāta who, according to Ibn Khaldūn, defended Ifrīqiyyā against the Banū Hilāl.⁷⁰ Their disappearance from the narrative may have had something to do with the fact that the Ḥafṣids’ rival dynasties, the Marīnids and the ‘Abd al-Wādids, both belonged to the Zanāta, and depicting them as defenders of Ifrīqiyyā would have had political implications that the author did not want to broach. Leaving out the epic fight between the Banū Hilāl and Zanāta, Ibn al-Shammā‘ was able to depict the Bedouins as a problem that plagued Ifrīqiyyā until the Ḥafṣids put an end to it. The Hintāta were thus part of the solution because they freed the cities of Ifrīqiyyā from the state of siege that had prevailed for ages.⁷¹ Ibn al-Shammā‘s retelling of the story of the invasion is

especially interesting because it offers a concrete example of the ways historians inscribed present concerns in retelling the past.

Like the other three Ḥafṣid historians, Ibn al-Shammā‘ made selective use of the chronicles available to him and constructed a view of the past informed by the concerns of his present. Though hardly surprising, this aspect of his historical narrative shows that Emirism was not an amalgam of arbitrary ideas, but rather the product of concrete historical processes that inflected both its form and content.

The Emir and History

In the early years of the fifteenth century, Abū Fāris made the regional emirate a political reality and saw Emirism become the dominant political ideology. These two processes altered the historical perception of contemporaries mostly by setting the powerful emir as the standard against which previous history was measured. Representations of Abū Fāris and his historical standing illustrate the adaptation of historical interpretation to ideological exigencies.

In the fifteenth century, Ḥafṣid intellectuals represented the emir by tapping into three familiar registers. They portrayed him as a great warrior, a man of learning and culture, and a pious man who resembled the Sufis. Ibn al-Shammā‘, for instance, described Abū Fāris as “Courageous, steadfast, and devout. He had believed in the righteous [Sufis] since he was young. He treated the ulama with reverence, verified [facts], was God-fearing, charitable, sagacious, intelligent, eloquent, and loved the good (*khayr*) and its people.”⁷² But the terms of this representation were not abstract. They built on existing discourses, not only on the significance of Sufis and their ideas, but, perhaps paradoxically, on the bravado of Bedouin sheikhs and the courtly elegance and learning of the urban elites.

Ibn Khaldūn is the earliest source for Bedouin poetry in the Maghrib, of which he recorded a number of examples from the fourteenth century. These poems, whose most common themes were honor, individual courage, and love, confirm the existence of a thriving culture with norms, values, and aesthetics distinct from those of the urban elite. According to Ibn Khaldūn, Bedouin sheikhs used them to rally their kin, to argue for a particular course of action, or to insult their foes.⁷³

Even before Abū Fāris, poets had established a tradition of representing Ḥafṣid emirs as great military men, much like the Bedouin heroes who battled

enemies. They emerge as great leaders with legendary prowess. As Ḥāzim al-Andalusī (d. 1285) put it, “[the emir] was a lion and turned other lions into prey.”⁷⁴ The Ḥafṣid Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr (r. 1318–1346) agreed: in one of his boasts, he claimed to be fearless.

Look at us and you will find no fear,
For how could one strike fear in the lion in [his] forest?⁷⁵

As for love of learning, Abū Fāris surrounded himself with the greatest minds. He was a highly educated man, enjoyed the company of other learned men, and participated in their discussions. He was certainly not an illiterate, uncouth general who enjoyed only tales about battles and horses. He engaged in reading and writing books in various disciplines and genres.⁷⁶ Although many of the great poets who depicted him in the image of the classical Arab hero had never seen a battle, he could take pleasure in listening to their crafty metaphors, subtle puns, and other rhetorical ornamentations. He was one of them.

Chroniclers also represented Abū Fāris as a pious Muslim who respected the teachings of the Sufis. Al-Zarkashī mentioned that he built a number of *zawāŷā*.⁷⁷ His humility, charity, and love for the ‘people of good’ conferred upon him a great many of the qualities valued by the Sufis. The battles he fought to repel Christian attacks on coastal areas further anchored his status as a man of God.⁷⁸ So did his tireless war against bandits and rebellious Bedouins.

The authors of Sufi *manāqib* did not necessarily share the sentiment of Ḥafṣid intellectuals about the piety of the emir or his power. They imagined a world in which the power of the Ḥafṣid emir was fundamentally flawed and corrupt. Their heroes had the real power. When they used it to punish an arrogant or unjust emir, all of the latter’s weapons became useless. Through their dreams, visions, and gestures, Sufis overpowered the emir and his soldiers. When they drew on Sufi imagery to describe the emir, Ḥafṣid intellectuals preferred the versions associated with the elite, not the popular ones.⁷⁹

For others, the coming of Abū Fāris evidenced God’s intervention in support of his people. In his collection of legal opinions, the great judge al-Wansharīsī (1430/31–1508) included an unattributed and undated statement about the place that Abū Fāris held in history. While he did not comment on it, al-Wansharīsī thought it to be valuable enough to include it among the thousands of fatwas in his collection. In this piece, Abū Fāris is clearly represented as a providential figure. The text is a testimony to the significance of

Abū Fāris and his larger-than-life status. Written in the coded language characteristic of the literary tastes of the period, it is full of allusions and winks for “those who understand.”

Glorifying Abū Fāris ‘Abd al-‘Azīz the Ḥafṣid King of Ifrīqiyā:

It was said: If you examine the centuries carefully in terms of kings and ulama in each land [you will notice] that the beginnings of centuries are blessed in both because of God’s custom of having each century be ultimately good, with a predominance of the good over evil. We witnessed [an instance of] this at the beginning of the ninth [fifteenth] century, when God bestowed upon the people of Ifrīqiyā the Commander of the Faithful, who relied on God, was invested with the God’s command, and fought in the cause of God, Abū Fāris ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, son of the caliph, the Commander of the Faithful Abū al-‘Abbās son of the Rightly-Guided Ḥafṣid emirs. With him, God eliminated those who deviated and corrupted [His message], both Bedouins and city-dwellers. He combated rebels and opponents, fought against the Unbelievers who landed in al-Mahdiya, and waged a true war against them in the name of God. He ripped all of them apart and banished them to deserted lands, took their possessions, took their children captive, and banished them to the worst areas. He also eliminated a great many illegal taxes, subjugated evil and immoral bandits, and revived the *dawla* of the Almohads and Ḥafṣids after it had almost vanished [because it had been] overcome by opponents. His justice and deeds became renowned all over the world. He was recognized in the land of the two sanctuaries [Mecca and Medina] in the Hijāz region and was mentioned and honored there and included in [people’s] supplications [to God]. From that land, the most noble of noblemen went to visit him in Ifrīqiyā and gave him precious gifts such as the keys to the Ka‘ba, pieces of its cloth cover, and garments from the noble land, and other such objects. God rewarded him for his deeds on behalf of Muslims and Islam, and gave him a long life for their good. God made his long life end after he pronounced the declaration of belief in God’s oneness and the prophecy of Muḥammad, and put him among the Rightly-Guided Imāms. Praise be to God for this blessing from beginning to end. Thanks be to God. End.⁸⁰

More than any emir before him, Abū Fāris embodied the most excellent qualities available to urbanites and Bedouins, ulama and Sufis. He was both a culmination and a synthesis. A new age was born with his reign. In the new age, the centrality of Tunis and Ḥafṣid rule over Ifrīqiyyā became fundamental facts, and the previous century's struggles the faint memory of a difficult birth.

The Evidence of Politics

Crucial as they are to our understanding of political motivations, the four Ḥafṣid chronicles are not our only source of information. The historical record is much richer than that. It includes very useful texts such as the biographical dictionaries written by al-Ghubrīnī and Ibn al-Tawwāḥ, travel accounts (*riḥla*) such as al-Tijānī's, and fatwa collections such as those compiled by al-Burzūlī and al-Wansharīs.⁸¹ In addition to these, one can find information about Ifrīqiyyā and the Ḥafṣids in chronicles written about the 'Abd al-Wādids and Marīnids, and in documentary sources preserved in northern Mediterranean archives.⁸² However, it should be clear that without the four Ḥafṣid chronicles, it would be very difficult to construct a basic political chronology, let alone ascertain complex political processes and their evolution over time. Even as historians have noted the bias of these chronicles in favor of the Ḥafṣid dynasty, they generally agree on their importance.⁸³

The relative usefulness of a particular source depends to a great extent on the questions the historian asks of it. In his important study of Bijāya, Dominique Valérian found al-Zarkashī and Ibn al-Shammā‘ dry and less informative about the “western provinces.” He remarked that Ibn al-Shammā‘’s *Adilla* added nothing new because it was interested mostly in Tunis and its history.⁸⁴ Of course, judgments like these cannot be taken as absolute. They make sense only in the context of the specific agendas that a historian delineates.

Shifting the discussion of the sources from an analysis of the information they contain to the conditions of their production raises a set of questions about the relations between politics and the historical record. It brings into focus the contribution of a rather limited number of individuals to the making of what modern historians consider “the evidence.” Taking full stock of the fact that elite elements were behind the production and preservation of written material is a necessary, if only preliminary, step to understanding the “bias” of the sources.

Historians have sought to ascertain the facts of politics through critical

evaluation of statements available in the historical record. They have acknowledged that politically aware individuals who engaged in politics put those facts there. They have described the constitution of libraries and archives and their importance to the elite. However, they have less frequently pursued the implications of their source criticism beyond challenging the reliability of sources and then using the information they contain in a way that ignores their fragility.⁸⁵ This method, which is tied to positivism and its social scientific avatars, has yielded excellent results when it comes to improving our understanding of important subjects such as Mediterranean trade. While this method may be appropriate for the analysis of documentary sources produced by merchants and those associated with their activities, it is of little help with literary sources, which are more important for understanding dynastic and other sorts of politics.

In this vein, Valérian noted that “the study [of biographical dictionaries] may illuminate intellectual and religious history, and possibly even social and political history, but sheds little light on economic aspects.”⁸⁶ This may indeed be the case. However, underlying this judgment is the view that these “aspects” had objectivity beyond that conferred upon them by modern knowledge. The involvement of the Hafṣid dynasty in institutions of learning, its employment of prominent intellectuals, and its sponsorship of historians, some of whom wrote “the histories [it] desired,” force us to consider the impact of the dynasty on the historical record—and consequently on modern interpretations.⁸⁷ In this case, historians have generally written the history of the Hafṣid dynasty from a Tunis-centered perspective, without accounting for the genesis of that perspective and the political conditions that sustained it. Doing so opens research possibilities for historians who find the separation between the study of the empirical and that of the normative unsatisfactory.

Toward a Conclusion

Historians usually begin their books with a discussion of the sources they plan to use. They describe the kind of information available in each source and discuss how they plan to use it in relation to the arguments they propose to make. This entire book has been a discussion of the sources because its main argument is about the writing of history. Considering the problem that the development of political ideologies posed in the medieval period, it becomes necessary to account for and develop a critique of all available sources

of information—especially when the ruling elite actively manipulated the historical record. Moreover, while Emirism shaped the way contemporaries envisioned and wrote about the fourteenth century, the popularity of Emirist authors such as Ibn Khaldūn among modern historians of the Maghrib points to the impact of this ideology on the interpretation of other periods and locations.

C O N C L U S I O N

Departures

I began this volume by showing that a focus on Bijāya challenges the appearance of Ḥafṣid dynastic continuity and brings attention to relations between the activities of elite groups and political arrangements and ideas. Figuring prominently among these groups were the Almohad sheikhs from whose ranks the Ḥafṣids emerged, elite Andalusis, the elites of cities, and a number of powerful groups in the countryside. While the composition, orientation, and evolution of these groups changed over time, they shaped the transformation of Ḥafṣid rule in Ifrīqiyyā from a regional configuration centered on Tunis to a local one in which a number of independent Ḥafṣid emirates coexisted. After a serious political crisis in the mid-fourteenth century that threatened the very existence of the dynasty, a new political coalition formed around the Ḥafṣids and, within a few decades, brought about a new regional configuration. This victorious politics of regionalization united the elites of the major urban centers in Ifrīqiyyā around the dynasty. Elite authors celebrated the new regional emir Abū Fāris (r. 1394–1434), and described him as the greatest and most powerful ruler Ifrīqiyyā had ever seen.

Modern historians have used the claims made by Ḥafṣid intellectuals about the greatness of the regional emirate to support the view that Ifrīqiyyā was a region. Beginning with an analysis of the evolution of land tenure and agricultural production, this book has argued that the dynasty and its urban supporters controlled or taxed only a portion of the area between Tarāblus and Bijāya—the eastern and western limits of Ifrīqiyyā. Moreover, in the course of the fourteenth century, the urban elite gradually lost its influence over land it had once controlled. For Ifrīqiyyā to be a region, the largely autonomous economic zones that coexisted throughout the period would have to have been brought together by more than the Ḥafṣid fiscal system.

At a time when Mediterranean trade and piracy came to play an increasingly important economic role in Bijāya, nothing in the activities of the merchants there fostered the integration of Ifrīqiyyā. After the 1370s, piracy and the trade in European captives became a major source of profit for Bijāya's powerful, enabling the elite to compensate for the loss of control over the countryside, or to put it differently, for the lack of economic integration in Ifrīqiyyā. The continued existence of a multiplicity of economic arrangements, the fragile integration of some into a city-centered economy, and the complete autonomy of others reveal that there is no empirical basis for thinking of a single, integrated Ifrīqiyan economy.

The multiple references to “the Ḥafṣid kings of Ifrīqiyyā” in the medieval sources may have convinced modern historians that Ifrīqiyyā was a region, even if it did not constitute a political or economic unit. Analyzing the writings of pro-Ḥafṣid intellectuals reveals that they had reason to express their support for the dynasty in those terms. They were city-centric, favored a powerful, effective emir, and subscribed to Emirism, the ideology that became dominant after the victory of the regional emirate, and that supported the control of a single, Tunis-centered emir over a broader region. One of the most salient characteristics of this ideology was the centrality of al-Andalus as a point of reference. Because of the association of elite Andalusis in Ifrīqiyyā with the various Ḥafṣid courts, that elite was influential in the formulation of Emirist ideology and incorporating it into elite culture. As they did so, they drew on elite Andalusi culture, especially the form it had taken in the eleventh century under the Party Kings, when the identity of Arab dynasties was first distinguished from what were called “Berbers.” This made the idea of al-Andalus an instrument of dynastic ideological domination.

Once the regional emirate won, Emirism became dominant, thanks to the patronage and surveillance of intellectuals that the Ḥafṣids had implemented over the previous century. Whether they were judges, litterateurs, or elite Sufis, the Ḥafṣids shaped prominent intellectuals in the cities of Ifrīqiyyā and laid the institutional groundwork for a regionalization of power. The institutional context within which the intellectuals operated illuminates their loyalty to the dynasty. It explains why the four chroniclers whose texts are our main guide to politics in this period, all of them writing in the late fourteenth century and the fifteenth century, agreed in their preference for a strong Ḥafṣid emir. Internalizing the stance of these authors, and seeing it through the prism of modern notions of state and territory, modern historians came to think of Ifrīqiyyā as a region, without feeling the need to explain what its having become one

would really have entailed. Using the notion of region as a heuristic device, this book has analyzed the making of a Mediterranean emirate, a process that illuminates both medieval texts and modern scholarship.

Ibn Khaldūn, the Medieval Maghrib, and the Mediterranean

When Baron William MacGuckin de Slane translated Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-ībar* into the *Histoire des berbères*, he authored a new text, "a colonial text that employed colonialist categories to perceive, to think, and to represent North African history."¹ Published only thirty-some years after the French conquered Algiers, de Slane's Ibn Khaldūn was critical to the justification of colonialism—especially after the large-scale military campaigns of the 1880s. At the time when French social science was emerging, Ibn Khaldūn's ideas about Berbers and Arabs, Bedouins and urbanization, politics and religious propaganda, came to support the emerging discourse about the natives, and to sustain the empirical validation of its myths.²

Specialists in the medieval Maghrib knew Arabic and were thus able to read Ibn Khaldūn's original Arabic text, unlike other Maghrib specialists, who did not always read Arabic. But because these medievalists had such a strong notion of what the text said, they did not pay adequate attention to the differences between the original and the translation. Moreover, they learned to rely on, and refer to, French scholarly translations of a select number of medieval texts, which, unsurprisingly, shared their ideological presuppositions with the new, colonial Ibn Khaldūn. They thus fit medieval texts into a modern framework.

Significantly, as they translated a corpus of medieval texts, colonial translators undermined the historians' ability to develop a sense of the evolution of usage in Arabic, thus supporting preconceptions about homogeneity and lack of change. Even today, historians continue to suffer the consequences of colonial translation when they allow it to collapse the chronological distinctions they seek to elucidate. For example, in his recent study of the Moors in the late antique period, Yves Modéran made use of colonial translations, even as he acknowledged that doing so was anachronistic and ideologically laden.³ As a result, Modéran produced two distinct books: one in which he carefully examined and weighed shifts in Latin and Greek usage, and another in which modern French concepts such as "race" effectively banished chronology and made it unsustainable.⁴ In fact, categories such as Arab, Berber, and Bedouin

evolved with changing circumstances. Since change is a central tenet of historical method, its replacement with a Khaldunian cycle of dynasties, imagined as either Arab or Berber, has allowed for the maintenance of those terms in an antihistorical, highly ideological interpretation of those histories.

The theoretical contribution of *al-Muqaddima* to the development of colonial discourse on the natives and their past was not the only reason Ibn Khaldūn became an important source for medievalists. The *Kitāb al-‘ibar* contains information that is otherwise unavailable. Framing a history of the entire Maghrib in terms of the succession of Arab and Berber dynasties, Ibn Khaldūn's history included references to little-known dynasties and tribes that it classified genealogically. Ibn Khaldūn's theoretical stance on the political importance of religious propaganda, such as that of the Almohads, made him pay special attention to events that illustrated his contention. While specialists of the early medieval period are of course aware of the late date of Ibn Khaldūn's history, they have not paid attention to his context in order to determine his possible presentist biases. Consequently, they have incorporated a late medieval interpretation into their studies of earlier periods and other places.⁵ In some cases, historians have simply incorporated Ibn Khaldūn's framework into their own framing of the medieval period. Jamil Abun-Nasr was clear about the methodological orientation of his *History of the Maghrib*:

[Its] conceptual framework . . . is inspired by Ibn Khaldūn's ideas on the rise and fall of states and the role of religious doctrines as instruments of political cohesion. It assumes the dependence of urbanization on political centralization. It also implies that the only two concepts of political legitimacy the Maghriban society knew before the cultural impact of Europe became important were the tribal and the Islamic. Two further assumptions implied, generally accepted by Islamists, are that Islam is an urban religion and one that encourages political centralization.⁶

For Abun-Nasr, the particular ideological position of Ibn Khaldūn has become a framework around which to organize the medieval history of the Maghrib. Although historians have learned to avoid racial epithets and obviously derogatory statements about the natives, they continue to deploy notions such as state, territory, race, ethnicity, sect, and tribe. They have yet to take full measure of the impact of late medieval ideologies on their understanding

of earlier periods; without doing so, they are condemned to establishing late medieval ideology as history.

How to confront the problem? Historians of the medieval Mediterranean have had to face a difficult choice. On the one hand, they could incorporate a colonial perspective on the Maghrib into their work and run the risk of anachronism and ideology. On the other, they could leave the Maghrib out, and run the risk of narrowness and Euro-centrism. To avoid this predicament, specialists can attempt to conceive of history in a way that disables the possibility of incorporating ideologies into their studies. One way to do this is to take into account the political and ideological contexts that gave rise to the historiographic consensuses—medieval and modern—on which they rely.

More can be said about the impact of colonial translation on the modern understanding of the medieval Maghrib. Its production of a hierarchy between various extant sources based on preconceived, and by now dated, notions of usefulness and importance remains to be fully examined. In a crucial sense, by selecting a small number of medieval texts and making them available to non-medievalists (especially ethnologists), colonial translators produced a new archive through which they mediated learned references about the Maghrib. Within this resonance case of references and self-references, historians have thought only rarely to distinguish between medieval ideologies and modern ones. They have labored gingerly to fit untranslated texts into a prescribed range of interpretations, even when their perspective did not neatly match that of masterpieces such as Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-ībar*. Establishing historical knowledge within terms that bypass colonial translations is not easy, since they pervade the entire scholarly apparatus. Taking this as a challenge is, however, something that historians should welcome: it broadens the scope of the historical enterprise beyond the retrieval of information about a limited period of the past, and instead interrogates the genealogy and transmission of knowledge from the past to the present.

While the issue of translation exemplifies the constellation of questions that face historians, it gains even fuller significance in relation to the development of social scientific disciplines. Notions such as region and state have been part of the commonly used stock that continues to furnish the perspectives of government officials, journalists, school teachers, and, of course, historians. In this book, I have not analyzed the processes through which these concepts came to shape the modern historical imagination. Instead, I explained that the set of ideas that developed in the fourteenth century *lent themselves* to

supporting the particular range of interpretations that have prevailed in the last century or so. Working out the circumstances in which they did so is, however, a task I simply could not undertake here. More modestly, I have offered the analysis and recasting of a medieval ideology and of its adaptation to modern forms of knowing in the hopes that this line of questioning will open up new interpretive possibilities.

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

EI² = *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Ed. Peri J. Bearman, Thierry Bianquis, Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Emeri J. van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Al-Burzulī, *Fatawā* = Abū al-Qāsim al-Burzulī. *Jāmi‘ masā‘il al-abkām limā nazala min al-qadāyā bi al-muftīn wa al-hukkām*. Edited by Muḥammad al-Ḥabīb al-Hila. 7 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2002.

Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar* = ‘Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Khaldūn. *Kitāb al-‘ibar wa-diwan al-mubtada’ wa-al-khabar fi ayyām al-‘arab wa-al-‘ajam wa-al-barbar wa-man ‘āṣarahu min dhawī al-sulṭān al-akbar*. 7 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1956–61.

—, *al-Muqaddima* = *Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn lil al-‘allāma al-mu‘arrikh ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Muḥammad b. Khaldūn*, ed. Ahmad al-Zu‘bī, Beirut: Dār al-Arqam, 2001.

Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā* = Abū al-‘Abbās Ahmad b. Ḥusayn Ibn Qunfudh. *al-Fārisiyā fi mabādi‘ al-dawla al-ḥafṣiyā*. Ed. Muḥammad al-Shādhilī al-Nayfar and Abdel-Magid Turki. Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiya li al-Nashr, 1968.

Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla* = Muḥammad b. Ahmad Ibn al-Shammā‘. *al-Adilla al-bayyina al-nūrāniya fi mafākhir al-dawla al-ḥafṣiyā*. Ed. al-Ṭāhir al-Ma‘mūrī. Tripoli: al-Dār al-‘Arabiya li-al-Kitāb, 1984.

Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah* = Franz Rosenthal, ed. and trans. *Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History*. 3 vols. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Al-Wansharīsī, al-Mi‘yār = Ahmad b. Yahyā al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār al-mu‘rib wa al-jāmi‘ al-mughrīb ‘an fatāwī ‘ulamā‘ ifrīqiya wa al-andalus wa al-maghrib*, ed. Muḥammad Hajjī. 13 vols. (Rabat-Beirut, 1981).

Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh* = Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Zarkashī. *Tārikh al-dawlatayn al-muwahhidiyā wa al-ḥafṣiyā*. Tunis: al-Maktaba al-‘Atīqa, 1966.

This page intentionally left blank

N O T E S

INTRODUCTION: ORIENTATIONS

1. In French colonial discourse, North Africa was also “French North Africa” (Afrique du Nord française), “our French North Africa” (notre Afrique du Nord), and “white Africa” (Afrique blanche). French North Africa did not include Libya, the western part of which (Barqa) was in medieval times considered to be part of the Maghrib.

2. The category “native” (Fr. *indigène, autochtone*) was critical to the functioning of colonial ideology.

3. Robert Brunschwig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides des origines à la fin du XVe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940–47), 2: 158.

4. Scholarship on the colonial period is as vast as it is diverse. My discussion above could not possibly do it justice. My point about the development of a multiplicity of economic zones under colonial rule is only inferred from modern studies and a general familiarity with the texts of that period. See Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France 1871–1919*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1968, repr. 2005); Julia Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)* (Berkeley, 1994); Dale Eickelman, *Knowledge and Power in Morocco: The Education of a Twentieth-Century Notable* (Princeton, 1985); Kamel Kateb, *Européens, “indigènes” et juifs en Algérie (1830–1962)* (Paris, 2001); David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône 1870–1920* (Cambridge, 1990); Daniel Rivet, *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve de la colonisation* (Paris, 2002); Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale 1830–1954* (Paris, 1991).

5. J. B. Rives, “Imperial Cult and Native Tradition in Roman North Africa,” *Classical Journal* 96, 4 (2001): 425–36.

6. The idea of a Roman Maghrib is equally anachronistic and is sometimes found in the work of some of the best historians. See Brent D. Shaw, “Water and Society in the Ancient Maghrib: Technology, Property and Development,” *Antiquités africaines* 20 (1984): 121–73.

7. On this issue, see L. Carl Brown, “Maghrib Historiography: The Unit of Analysis Problem,” in *The Maghrib in Question: Essays in History and Historiography*, ed. Michel Le Gall and Kenneth Perkins (Austin, 1997), 4–16; Abdallah Laroui, *L’histoire du Maghreb: un essai de synthèse* (Paris, 1979).

8. Mohamed Talbi, “Ifrikiya,” *EI²*, 3: 1049.

9. See also Paul-Louis Cambuzat, *L'évolution des cités du Tell en Ifriqiya du VIIe au XIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Algiers, 1986), 1: 167. Cf. Dominique Valérian, *Bougie: Port Maghrébin, 1067–1510* (Rome, 2006), 39–40. The term “medieval” is obviously loaded. As I use, it merely refers to the thousand years between 500 and 1500. It is of no analytical significance in this book.

10. Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Idrīsī, *Nuzhat al-mushtaq fi ikhtirāq al-āfāq*, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1989), 260.

11. Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī, *Masālik al-absār fī mamālik al-amṣār (min al-bāb al-thāmin ilā al-bāb al-thāmin ‘ashar)*, ed. Mustafā Abū Ḥayyān (Casablanca, 1988), 84, 86–87.

12. Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. Aḥmad al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān al-dirāya fīman ‘urifa min al-‘ulamā’ fī al-mī'a al-sābi'a bi-bijāya*, ed. ‘Ādil Nuwayhid (Beirut, 1969), 60. Some compilers, like the famed Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, dealt with the contradictory information available to him by deciding that Bijāya was somewhere between the central Maghrib and Ifrīqiyyā. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu‘jam al-buldān*, 6 vols. ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (Leipzig, 1866–73), 1: 495. See also ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Abī Zar‘, *al-Anis al-mutrib bi-rāwḍ al-qirtās fi tārīkh al-maghrib wa madīnat fās*, ed. al-Hāshimī al-Filālī (Rabat, 1936), 2: 160–61.

13. Valérian, *Bougie*, 40. The extent to which Ifrīqiyyā experienced “real political unity” in the “Hafṣid period” will be discussed at length in Chapter 1.

14. See for example, Hichem Djait, “La wilāya d’Ifriqiyya au IIe/VIII siècle: étude institutionnelle,” *Studia Islamica* 27 (1967): 77–121; 28 (1968): 79–108. Historian Hichem Djait analyzed the beginnings of “Ifrīqiyyā” as an administrative province (*wilāya*).

15. Fredric L. Cheyette, “The Invention of the State,” in *The Walter Prescott Webb Memorial Lectures: Essays on Medieval Civilization*, ed. Bede K. Lackner and Kenneth R. Phillip (Austin, 1978), 143–78.

16. The modern Arabic word for the modern state is also *dawla*. This has led many historians writing in Arabic to simply assume the equivalence between the two. This means that in modern Arabic one can find examples of a personified *dawla* that expresses a will through action.

17. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 577.

18. The title of Ibn al-Shammā’s history is “al-Adilla al-bayyina al-nūrāniya fī mafākhir al-dawla al-hafṣiyā.”

19. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 134.

20. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 188–89.

21. *Arkān* (sing. *rukn*) is more accurately translated as bearing walls or corners. The meaning here is that the architectural feature performs a support function.

22. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 150.

23. “wa rattaba al-dawla atamm tartib.” Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 152.

24. Mohamed Kably, *Société, pouvoir et religion au Maroc à la fin du moyen âge* (Paris, 1986), 93. See Mohamed Hassen, “Les ribāṭ du Sahel d’Ifrīqiyyā: peuplement et évolution du territoire au Moyen Âge,” in *Zones cotières littorales dans le monde méditerranéen au Moyen Âge: défense, peuplement, mise en valeur, Actes du colloque international organisé par l’École*

Française de Rome et la Casa de Velázquez, Rome, 23–26 octobre 1996, ed. Jean-Marie Martin (Rome-Madrid, 2001), 147–62.

25. Valérien, *Bougie*, 103–5. Valérien's most explicit statement of his thesis about the development of territorial notions tied to politics can be found in an earlier article that also argues for the importance of the notion of frontier in this regard. Dominique Valérien, “Frontières et territoire dans le Maghreb de la fin du Moyen Age: les marches occidentales du sultanat hafside,” *Correspondances* 73 (November 2002–February 2003): 3–8. I tend to agree with Valérien's analysis of the situation in Bijāya, but I am not as confident as he is that using examples from the western Maghrib, the central Maghrib, and Ifrīqiyyā demonstrates, rather than simply assumes, a Maghrib-wide transformation.

26. See for example, Shlomo Dov Goitein, “Medieval Tunisia, the Hub of the Mediterranean,” in Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions* (Leiden, 1966), 308–28; Mahfoud Kaddache, *L'Algérie médiévale* (Algiers, 1992); Hedi Slim and Hichem Djait, *Histoire générale de la Tunisie: le moyen âge* (Tunis, 2005). For issues raised by the tripartite division of the Maghrib, see Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay* (Princeton, 1977), 65–70.

27. For example, Robert Brunschwig calls it a period of “Troubles et scissions.” Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 1: 71–143.

28. For a discussion of the state in relation to social theories and historical research, see for example, Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, 1 (1978): 58–89; Rees Davies, “The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 16, 2 (2003): 280–300; Susan Reynolds, “The Historiography of the Medieval State,” in *Companion to Historiography*, ed. Michael Bentley (London, 1997), 117–36.

29. Note that a number of Arabic terms such as *jiha*, *iqlīm*, *nāḥiya*, and *mawāṭin* have all been translated as “region.” See Valérien, *Bougie*, 38–41.

30. For examples of the range of ways scholars have conceived of regions around the Mediterranean, see David Abulafia, *The Two Italies: Economic Relations Between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes* (Cambridge, 1977); Henri Bresc, *Un monde méditerranéen, économie et société en Sicile (1350–1450)*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1986); Olivia Remie Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900–1500* (Cambridge, 1994); Stephan R. Epstein, *An Island for Itself: Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily* (Cambridge, 1992); idem, “Cities, Regions, and the Late Medieval Crisis, Sicily and Tuscany Compared,” *Past and Present* 130 (1991): 3–50; Mohamed Kably, “Identité régionale et conflits politico-culturels: cas du Maroc médiéval,” *Studia Islamica* 58 (1983): 83–107.

31. Jacques Berque, “Qu'est-ce qu'une ‘tribu’ nord-africaine?” in *Éventail de l'histoire vivante, hommage à Lucien Febvre* (Paris, 1953), 1: 261–71.

32. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 196.

33. A full-length study of the activity of these outlaws and bandits (*hirāba*) would greatly improve our understanding of the period.

34. al-Burzulī, *Fatawā*, 4: 519.

35. Like “Bedouin,” the notion of countryside (*bādiya*) tends to lump together a variety of diverse contexts and reflects the perspective of elite urban sources.

36. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 325–27; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 114–17. I refer those who cannot read the Arabic original to Rosenthal’s translation. In spite of his occasional use of problematic notions such as race, Rosenthal is mostly correct and always erudite. When he added words, Rosenthal used parentheses. When I modify his translation, I use brackets.

37. See for example, Chase F. Robinson, *A Medieval Islamic City Reconsidered: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Samarra* (Oxford, 2001).

38. Michael Brett, “The City-State in Medieval Ifriqiya: The Case of Tripoli,” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 34, 137–38 (1986): 69–94.

39. Muḥammad Ḥasan, *al-Madīna wa al-bādiya fī ifriqiya fī al-‘ahd al-hafṣī*, 2 vols. (Tunis, 1999), 1: 497–510.

40. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 683–86.

41. Valérian, *Bougie*, 99. Cf. Mohamed Salah Baizig, *Bijāya fī al-‘ahd al-Hafṣī: dirāsa iqtiṣādiya wa-ijtīmā’iya* (Tunis, 2006), 441–52.

42. I am thankful to Dominique Valérian and Marina Rustow for making me address this important question.

43. Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford, 2000), 9.

44. Édouard Baratier, “Le commerce de Marseille avec l’Afrique du Nord avant 1599,” *Marseille, Revue Municipale* 11 (1951): 31–37; Charles-Emanuel Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane et le Maghreb aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles: de la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l’avènement du sultan mérinide Aboul-Hasan (1313)* (Paris, 1966); Georges Jehel, *L’Italie et le Maghreb au moyen-âge: conflits et échanges du VII^e au XV^e siècle* (Paris, 2001); María Dolores López Pérez, *La corona de Aragón y el Magreb en el siglo XIV (1331–1410)* (Barcelona, 1995). See also David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (Oxford, 1992), 14: “Sicily, North Africa and Egypt were the bread-baskets of the classical world; in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries North Africa had lost many of its wheat-lands to nomadic predators or to erosion, and Tunisia in consequence became Sicily’s best market.”

45. See, for example, Susan E. Alcock, “Alphabet Soup in the Mediterranean Basin: The Emergence of the Mediterranean Serial,” in *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, ed. William V. Harris (Oxford, 2005), 333; Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain*, 139; Horden and Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea*, 362; Maya Shatzmiller, *Labour in the Medieval Islamic Worlds* (Leiden, 1994), 34.

46. See, for example, Mohamed Habib Belkhodja, “L’émigration andalouse vers l’Ifriqiya au 7e–13e s.,” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 69–70 (1970): 129–37; J. Derek Latham, “Towns and Cities of Barbary: The Andalusian Influence,” *Islamic Quarterly* 16 (1973): 189–204; Mohammed Talbi, “al-Hijra al-Andalusiyā ilā ifriqiya ayyām al-hafṣiyyin,” *al-Asāla* 26 (1975): 46–90. Cf. Mohamed Salah Baizig, “L’élite andalouse à Tunis et à Bougie et le pouvoir hafside,” in *Communautés et pouvoirs en Italie et au Maghreb au Moyen Âge et à l’époque moderne, actes du séminaire de Rome, 26–27 octobre 2001*, ed. Annliese Nef and Dominique Valérian (Rome, 2003), 523–42; Dominique Valérian, “Les Andalous à Bougie, XIe–XVe

siècle,” in *Migrations et diasporas méditerranéennes, XIe–XVIIe siècles*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris, 2002), 313–30.

47. J. Derek Latham, “Towards a Study of Andalusian Immigration and Its Place in Tunisian History,” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 5 (1957): 203. Instead of “diaspora,” an ideological term, I prefer to refer to a “migration” in the most neutral sense of the term. In order to insist on the social and political prominence of those Andalusis whose migration to Ifriqiyyā impacted politics, I will describe them as elite Andalusis.

48. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*; Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*; al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*.

49. Ibn Khaldūn joined the court of the last local emir of Bijāya, immediately after these events.

50. See, for example, Fuad Baali, *Society, State, and Urbanism: Ibn Khaldūn’s Sociological Thought* (Binghamton, 1988), 64; Ernest Gellner, “Tribalism and the State in the Middle East,” in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley, 1991), 121; Abdallah Laroui, *Islam et modernité* (Paris, 1987), 97–125; Barbara F. Stowasser, “Religion and Political Development: Some Comparative Ideas on Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli,” CCAS Occasional Papers (Washington, 1983), 20.

51. The scholarship on Ibn Khaldūn is vast. For a sense of the diversity of approaches, see Aziz Azmeh, *Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation* (London, 1982); idem, *Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientalism* (London, 1981); Michael Brett, *Ibn Khaldūn and the Medieval Maghrib* (Aldershot, 1999); Abdesselam Cheddadi, *Ibn Khaldūn: l’homme et le théoricien de la civilisation* (Paris, 2006); idem, *Ibn Khaldūn revisité* (Casablanca, 1999); Abdelmajid Hannoum, “Translation and the Colonial Imaginary: Ibn Khaldūn Orientalist,” *History and Theory* 42, 1 (2003): 61–81; Gabriel Martinez-Gros, *Ibn Khaldūn et les sept vies de l’Islam* (Arles, 2006); Róbert Simon, *Ibn Khaldūn: History as Science and the Patrimonial Empire* (Budapest, 2002); Mohamed Talbi, *Ibn Khadlun et l’histoire* (Tunis, 1973).

52. For a portrayal of Ibn Khaldūn as a precursor of modern thinkers and a secular thinker, see Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldūn’s Philosophy of History* (Chicago, 1971), 6.

53. Maya Shatzmiller, *Historiographie mérinide: Ibn Khaldūn et ses contemporains* (Leiden, 1982).

CHAPTER I. THE POLITICS OF THE EMIRATE

1. Louis IX was at the head of a coalition in which his brother Charles of Anjou played an important role. For Ḥafṣid historians, it is Louis who came to personify the Frankish threat. For a recent study on the role of Charles of Anjou, see Gian Luca Borghese, *Carlo I d’Angiò e il Mediterraneo: politica, diplomazia e commercio internazionale prima dei Vespri* (Rome, 2009). The idea that Charles turned Tunis into a tributary state is difficult to accept because the Ḥafṣids did not pay the “tribute” consistently or over an extended period of time. For more, see Dominique Valérian, *Bougie: Port Maghrébin, 1067–1510* (Rome, 2006), 510.

2. Robert Brunschvig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsidès des origines à la fin du XVe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940–47), 1: 71–143. For examples of the oscillation between Tunis-based rule and independent emirates, see Mohamed Salah Baizig, *Bijāya fi al-‘ahd al-Ḥafṣī: dirāsa iqtisādiya wa-ijtimā‘iya* (Tunis, 2006), 68; Muḥammad al-‘Arūsī al-Maṭwī, *al-Saltana al-Ḥafṣiya, tārikhuha al-siyāsi wa dawruha fi al-maghrib al-islāmī* (Beirut, 1986); Valérian, *Bougie*, 78.
3. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 326; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 114–16.
4. Ḥafṣid historiography will be discussed in depth in Chapter 6.
5. For problems with the idea of an impersonal state, see Patricia Crone, *Medieval Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh, 2005), 3.
6. For examples of Bedouin poetry, see Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 362–71; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 3: 412–39.
7. I describe the tribes that defied dynastic rule as leading “rebellions” against the Ḥafṣids. Unlike dynastic sources, I am neutral as to the moral character of these actions.
8. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 27.
9. I use “Almohad” instead of *Muwahḥidūn* because it is widely used in the scholarship. The correct dynastic term for the Almohads is in fact Mu’mínids since they are the branch of the original followers of Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130) led by ‘Abd al-Mu’mín (r. 1130–63) that established the first dynasty after his death. The Ḥafṣids formed another dynasty that claimed the exact same legitimacy as the Mu’mínids, arguing that their ancestor Abū Ḥafs was as close to Ibn Tūmart as ‘Abd al-Mu’mín. This is to say that the Ḥafṣids are to be considered Almohads but not Mu’mínids, even though I will follow common historiographic practice of using Almohad to mean Mu’mínid. As will be explained, contemporary authors themselves switch back and forth between the two positions, though for reasons of their own.
10. For a good synthesis of the events leading to the end of the Almohads and the debates among specialists, see Maya Shatzmiller, “al-Muwahḥidūn,” *EI²*, 7: 801–7.
11. The Banū Ghāniya were Almoravids who ruled in Majorca and challenged Almohad rule in the central Maghrib. See Alfred Bel, *Les Benou Ghānya: Derniers représentants de l’empire Almoravide et leur lutte contre l’empire Almohade* (Paris, 1903); Gabriel Camps, “Ghāniya, Banū” *EI²*, 2: 1007–8; Jacinto Bosch-Vila, “Mayürka, Majorca, or Mallorca” *EI²*, 6: 926–27. There are enough sources to envisage projects that go beyond these dated and short pieces.
12. The term *mahdī* refers to “The Rightly Guided One,” who was expected to restore true religion and justice, and to rule before the end of the world. See Wilfred Madelung, “al-Mahdī,” *EI²*, 5: 1230–38.
13. See J. F. P. Hopkins, “Ibn Tūmart,” *EI²*, 3: 958–60. On Almohad political and administrative organization, see Hopkins, “The Almohad Hierarchy,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 16 (1954): 93–112; Abdellatif Sabbane, *Le gouvernement et l’administration de la dynastie Almohade (XIIe–XIIIe siècles)* (Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2001).
14. Ḥafṣid historians are especially keen on noting Abū Ḥafṣ’s commitment to the teachings of Ibn Tūmart and his opposition to Almohad policies that went against those

teachings. Later Hafṣid authors try to make him seem more Almohad than the Almohads (Mu'minids). See Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 1: 15.

15. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 58.

16. The Hintātā were from mountainous areas near Marrakech. They were among the early supporters of Ibn Tūmart and became one of the most important components of the coalition supporting Almohad rule. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 562.

17. Any of these events can be used to date the foundation of the Hafṣid dynasty. Historians generally agree that it took place in 1228 or 1229.

18. Michele Amari, *I diplomi arabi del R. archivio fiorentino: testo originale con la traduzione letterale e illustrazioni* (Florence, 1863), 292–94, 472–73; Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 27–28; Louis de Mas-Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des chrétiens avec les arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1866), 31–35, 196–99. According to one of these treaties, his domain extended from Tripoli to Bijāya, suggesting that he claimed the old Ḥammādīd Emirate of Bijāya (1015–1152). Mas-Latrie, *Traité*, 116–18.

19. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 593 et seq.; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 107–16; Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 54–62; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 23–31.

20. The Hafṣids also used Christian mercenary forces. Understandably, chroniclers did not include this fact among their accomplishments. While the military role of these mercenaries was often prominent and has been noted by historians, their contribution to the development of Emirist ideology was mostly indirect. See Carmen Batlle, “Noticias sobre la milicia Cristiana en el Norte de África en la segunda mitad del siglo XIII,” in *Homenaje al profesor Juan Torres Fontes* (Murcia, 1987), 1: 127–37.

21. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 626–27; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 117; Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 58; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 32–33.

22. See Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 1: 62.

23. Christian converts included those who had joined the Hafṣids voluntarily, not just captives.

24. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 135.

25. Brunschwig suggests that the Aragonese reacted to the influence the Genoese and Majorcans had gained in Tunis, and supported Abū Ishāq's party. Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 1: 75–79.

26. It is not clear what the agreement between the Hafṣids and the Banū Muznī entailed in terms of finances. The relations between the two dynasties changed over time. See Michael Brett, “Ibn Khaldūn and the Dynastic Approach to Local History: The Case of Biskra,” *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes*, 12 (1991): 157–80.

27. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 44–45.

28. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 694–95. According to Ibn Khaldūn, these supporters were Abū al-Husayn b. Abī Bakr b. Sayyid al-Nās, Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim b. Idris al-Fazāzī, and Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. Khaldūn, his great-grandfather. Ibn Khaldūn mentioned that “They may have taken turns carrying him on their backs when he was tired.”

29. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 699.
30. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, there were direct economic benefits to being associated with the ruler.
31. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 705, “*li khalā’i jaww al-dawla bi-bijāya min mashy-akhat al-muwahhidin alladhīna yuzāḥimūnahu*.”
32. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 627, “*zāḥamūbum fi marākizihim min al-dawla*.”
33. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 705.
34. The alliance was not formed against the city of Bijāya itself but against those who supported its independence from Tunis. My usage here is in keeping with medieval authors’ description of the Bijāyan elite as Bijāyans (*ahl Bijāya*).
35. In 707/1307–8, Abū al-Baqā’ signed a treaty with the ruler of Tunis Abū ‘Aṣida which stipulated that on the death of one of the two emirs, the survivor would inherit his cousin’s throne. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 733.
36. Ya‘qūb b. Abī Bakr b. Ghāmr al-Sulamī was an Andalusi from Játiva. On his death in 1319, he was replaced by his cousin ‘Alī b. Ghāmr.
37. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 738–41.
38. The ‘Abd al-Wādids made a second attempt to conquer western Ifrīqiyyā. Abū Bakr signed a treaty with Aragon in 1323 and their alliance defeated the Tilimsānis.
39. Ibn al-Qālūn was one of the Kurds that immigrated into Ifrīqiyyā after the fall of Baghdad in 1258; see Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 770.
40. The westerner Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who was in Bijāya in 1325, described the injustices committed by Ibn Sayyid al-Nās as those of the emir of Bijāya. Whether a pointed remark or a slip, the reference shows that the *hājib* was considered to be the real ruler. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa* (Beirut, 1964), 15–16.
41. See Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 274–5; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 17.
42. The identity of the *awghād al-bitāna* is imprecise at best. The phrase probably refers to armed young men in the employ of the court or simply court guards.
43. In addition, Fāriḥ was clearly connected to the Banū Sayyid al-Nās and may have been a client of theirs. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 833. Al-Zarkashī describes him as “his client Fāriḥ al-Mā’lūjī b. Sayyid al-Nās,” which could mean that he was a convert client of the Sayyid al-Nās (if it is read *min ‘ulūjī*). Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 78.
44. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 806–7.
45. Mohamed Kably, *Société, Pouvoir et religion au Maroc à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1986), 128–44. See also Sid Ahmed Bouali, *Les deux grands sièges de Tlemcen* (Algiers, 1984).
46. In the spring of 1346, Abū al-Ḥasan asked to marry a second daughter of the Hafṣid Abū Bakr, after his wife Fātīma died. He married ‘Azzūna and built for her a beautiful palace in Tilimsān. The princess learned of the death of her father on her way to marry Abū al-Ḥasan.
47. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 811.
48. Brunschwig, relying on numismatic evidence, adds that Abū Ḥafṣ took on the caliphal title of al-Nāṣir li-din-Allāh. Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 1: 165.
49. Ibn Khaldūn suggests that Abū al-Ḥasan had been mulling to invade Ifrīqiyyā but waited for the death of Abū Bakr to do so. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 811.

50. Ibn Marzūq (d. 1379), *al-Musnad al-ṣahīḥ al-ḥasan fī ma’āthir wa māḥāsin mawlānā Abī al-Ḥasan*, ed. María-Jesús Viguera (Algiers, 1981), 354.

51. Kably, *Société*, 145–54.

52. It is difficult to characterize the Banū Sayyid al-Nās when their client (*wali*) ruled the city.

53. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 833.

54. Note that in Rosenthal’s translation of the *Muqaddima*, Book 1, Chapter IV, section 21 is skipped. Its title is “*fi wujūd al-‘asabiya fi al-amṣār wa tagħallub ba’duhum ‘alā ba’dq*” (On the existence of group cohesion inside the cities and the domination of some over others). In this section, Ibn Khaldūn refers to the *ghawgħā* taking over without referring to explicitly to Bijāya. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 413–14.

55. The term *ghawgħā* refers to locusts and was used in reference to the lower classes of society—though perhaps only by the elite. The *ghawgħā* are thus different from commoners (*āmma*), which referred to those who did not belong to the dynasty and its court (*khāṣṣa*). The lack of definition and precision found in the sources acknowledged, *ghawgħā* can be translated as “mob.” Mohamed Salah Baizig thought that the *ghawgħā* should belong with the poor sectors of society (*al-fi’at al-faqīra*) whose conditions led them to rebel against the *khāṣṣa*. There is, however, no indication that the members of the *ghawgħā* were very poor or that the living conditions of the poor should lead to rebellion or explain its success. Baizig, *Bijāya*, 445–49.

56. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 846.

57. *du “är*, sing. *dā’ir*: “a man who steals, has sex outside of marriage, and harms people,” Muhammad b. Mukarram Ibn Manzūr, *Lisān al-‘Arab* (Beirut, 1955–56).

58. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 847.

59. Cf. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 105: “tawajjaha al-mawlā Abū Ishaq ilā Bijāya fa-akhadhaha min Banī Marīn” (Abū Ishaq went in direction of Bijaya and took it from the Marīnid).

60. Ibn Khaldūn tells the story as if the main struggle was between Hafṣids. His descriptions always assume the overarching rule of an emir, Hafṣid or not, even when he recognizes it as ineffectual.

61. The title *‘arif* was commonly reserved to the assistants of the representatives of a trade (*amīn*), and came under the control of the judge. In the eyes of someone like Ibn Khaldūn, *‘arif* was a subaltern title.

62. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 854.

63. Yahyā b. Khaldūn wrote a history of the ‘Abd al-Wādids of Tilimsān whom he served. See Yahyā b. Muḥammad Ibn Khaldūn (1332/3–1378/9), *Bughyat al-ruwwād fi dhikra al-mulūk min Banī ‘Abd al-Wād*, ed. Abdelhamid Hadjat (Algiers, 1980).

64. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rihlat Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. Muḥammad b. Tāwīt al-Tanjī and Nūrī al-Jarrāḥ (Beirut, 2003), 142.

65. See al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 102.

66. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 896.

67. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 903.

68. Ibrahim Jedla, “Nouveaux regards sur les rois Hafsides,” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 45,

159–60 (1992): 165. Jedla edited an unknown incomplete chronicle with a partial title written by Ibn al-Shamma‘, author of the *Adilla*. The partial Arabic title of the chronicle is “... fi ‘adad al-salaf min ayyām al-mulūk al-hafsiyīn.”

69. The articulation of these ideas and their impact on the writing of history will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.

CHAPTER 2. TAXATION AND LAND TENURE

1. See Muhammed Ḥasan, *al-Madīna wa al-bādiya fi ifrīqiya fi al-‘ahd al-hafṣī*, 2 vols. (Tunis, 1999), and, for Bijāya, Mohamed Salah Baizig, *Bijāya fi al-‘ahd al-Hafṣī: dirāsa iqtiṣādiya wa-ijtimā‘iya* (Tunis, 2006). The strength of Dominique Valérian’s study on Bijāya resides in his superlative and unequaled utilization of European documentation. Both Ḥasan and Baizig make better use of Arabic legal sources than Valérian, and it would have been interesting to see the latter discuss their work more systematically. Ḥasan’s decision to limit his analysis to eastern Ifrīqiyyā and his focus on socioeconomic, rather than political or ideological, considerations may have been influenced by the availability of sources or his knowledge that Baizig was preparing a study on Bijāya. Both of these factors skewed his study in that it focuses on areas where the influence of Tunis was greatest, even as he showed that that influence was neither constant nor absolute.

2. The importance of judges is particularly relevant to historians for whom legal sources are a major source of information.

3. What I call strategies of resistance and evasion were institutionalized mechanisms recognized by Islamic law.

4. I rely on two collections of legal opinions: al-Burzuli (d. 1438), *Fatāwā* and al-Wansharīsī (1430/31–1508), *al-Mi‘yār*. For a very helpful introduction to al-Wansharīsī’s collection, see Vincent Lagardère, *Histoire et société en occident musulman au moyen âge: analyse du Mi‘yār d’al-Wansharīsī* (Madrid, 1995).

5. Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī (1301–49), *Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār (min al-bāb al-thāmin ilā al-bāb al-thāmin ‘ashar)*, ed. Mustafa Abū Ḥayy Ahmad (Casablanca, 1988), 86. I borrow the notion of green belt (*hizām rīfi*) from Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*.

6. With the coming of Andalusis, Ifrīqiyyā saw the introduction of new plants and techniques that improved productivity. See for example, Ibn al-Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 112–13.

7. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 628–29. See also Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 72–96.

8. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 31.

9. Jacques Berque, “Du nouveau sur les Banū Hilāl,” *Studia Islamica* 36 (1972): 86–109; Claude Cahen, “Quelques mots sur les Hilaliens et le nomadisme,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 11 (1968): 130–34; Hady-Roger Idris, “L’invasion hilaliène et ses conséquences,” *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 11 (1968), 353–69; idem, “De la réalité de la catastrophe hilaliène,” *Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 23 (1968): 390–96; Jean Poncet, “Le mythe de la catastrophe hilaliène,” *Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 5 (1967) 1099–1120; idem, “Encore à propos des hilaliens, la mise au point de R. Idris,” *Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 23 (1968): 660–62. For most

recent summaries and arguments, see Baizig, *Bijāya*, 36–50; Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 27–53; Valérian, *Bougie*, 1–12.

10. For relatively recent studies of Almohad rule, see Atallah Dhina, *Les états de l'occident musulman aux XIIIe, XIVe, et XVe, institutions gouvernementales et administratives* (Algiers, 1984); Halima Ferhat, *Le Maghreb aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles: les siècles de la foi* (Rabat, 1994); Muhammad ‘Abd Allāh ‘Inān, *Asr al-murābiṭin wa al-muwahhidin fi al-Maghrib wa al-Andalus* (Cairo, 1964); Roger Le Tourneau, *The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (Princeton, 1982); Abdellatif Sabbane, *Le gouvernement et l'administration de la dynastie Almohade (XIIe–XIIIe siècles)* (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2001).

11. In the seventh century, the legal status of land, and therefore the tax rate imposed on it, was based on how it came under Muslim rule—by treaty (*ṣulḥan*) or by force (*‘anwatan*). Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 304–7, 312–19. The extent to which Almohad discourse on religious difference served to support this unusual taxation regime is a question that requires further examination.

12. Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī (d. ca. 1332), *Nihāyat al-arab fi funūn al-adab*, ed. Husayn Naṣṣār (Cairo, 1983), 24: 312; Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1233), *al-Kāmil fi al-tārīkh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, 14 vols. (Leiden, 1851–76), 10: 242. See also Ḥasan b. ‘Alī Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (fl. 13th century), *Nazm al-jumān li tartib mā salafa min akhbār al-zamān* (Beirut, 1990).

13. The Almohads replaced the Almoravids as rulers of Marrakech and articulated much of their early policies in relation to theirs. For a study of economic activity in the Maghrib in the twelfth century, see ‘Iz al-Dīn ‘Umar Mūsā, *al-Nashāt al-iqtisādī fi al-maghrib al-islāmī khilāl al-qarn al-sādīs al-hijrī* (Beirut, 2003). Because its frame of reference is the entire Maghrib, including al-Andalus, this study tends to underestimate variation within the Maghrib. However, its interest in economic policy makes it a very useful source on the difference between the Almoravids and the Almohads.

14. The demarcation between *makhzin* land controlled by the dynasty on behalf of the “Muslim community” and the land of individual Almohad caliphs is not always clear. With the Ḥafṣids, the difference became clearer. See Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 308.

15. Ibn Abī Zar‘ (d. 1340 or 1341), *al-Anis al-mutrib bi-rawḍ al-qirtās fi tārīkh al-maghrib wa madinat fās*, ed. al-Hāshimī al-Filālī, 2 vols. (Rabat, 1936), 2: 161.

16. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 29, 36, 153. The position of *ṣāḥib al-ashghāl* continued under the Ḥafṣids.

17. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 29, 37, 41, 60, 147.

18. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 308.

19. Al-Burzuli, *Fatāwā*, 3: 32, 28.

20. For the legal definition of *mawāt*, see Muḥammad ibn Qāsim al-Raṣṣā‘, *Sharḥ budūd Ibn ‘Arafa, al-mawsūm, al-bidāya al-kāfiya al-shāfiya li-bayān haqā’iq al-imām ibn ‘Arafa al-wāfiya*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and al-Tāhir Ma’mūrī, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1993), 2: 535–57.

21. Although it literally means the tenth, the *ushr* was a variable tax that depended on the type of irrigation and product. See Tsugitaka Sato, “‘Ushr,” *EI²*, 10: 917–19.

22. Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, *Nazm al-jumān*, 193. The Ḥafṣid judge Ibn ‘Arafa (d. 1401) defined the *maks* (pl. *mukūs*) as a form of usurpation (*ghaṣb*) and abuse of power (*zulm*). See al-

Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 2: 492–93. The *maks* enables one to have monopoly over the trade of a particular commodity. See also Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, 1: 972; Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 1: 387.

23. The Catalan pirates that raided the region also collected such a fee. See Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 538; Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 51, 78; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 136, 144; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 18, 47, 107; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 2: 214–48. Muslims paid a similar fee in Majorca known as the *dret de estada dels sarrays franchs*. See David Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge, 1994), 61.

24. Expressing the memory of the dissatisfaction of the urban elite with the reinstatement of these taxes by the Ḥafṣids, even pro-Ḥafṣid chroniclers noted that the usurper's action “pleased the inhabitants of Tunis.” Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 79; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 144; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 47.

25. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 539.

26. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 9: 73. Al-Raṣṣā‘ discussed Ibn ‘Arafa's definition of *iqtā‘* as “the act of giving a piece of land as *milk* by the ruler” (*tamlīk al-imām juz'an min al-ard*). Al-Raṣṣā‘, *Sharḥ hudūd Ibn ‘Arafa*, 2: 537–38. This sentiment was echoed by Ibn ‘Arafa's prominent student al-Burzulī (d. 1438), who thought that such lands were not the private property of anyone in particular and that the legal ruler (*imām*) could only specify the identity of those who can exploit them. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 29.

27. ‘Abd al-Wāhid al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib fi talkhīs akhbār al-maghrib wa al-andalus*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Azab (Cairo, 1994), 312–13.

28. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 9: 73.

29. Ibn Khaldūn's great-grandfather was the beneficiary of such a grant from the Ḥafṣid Abū Zakariyā Yāḥyā (r. 1229–1249). Ibn Khaldūn, *Rihlat Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. Muḥammad b. Tāwīt al-Tanjī and Nūrī al-Jarrāḥ (Beirut, 2003), 58. See also al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib*, 207; al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 95. See also Mūsā, *al-Nashāt al-iqtisādī*, 141–48, and Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 321.

30. Al-Burzulī (d. 1438) and judges of his stature benefited from such grants. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 309.

31. Ḥasan estimates that some of these *hanāshīr* reached “thousands of hectares” in size. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 331.

32. The Almohads and the Ḥafṣids were not the only ones to settle military men near Bijāya. According to al-Marīnī (fl. early 16th century), bands of ‘Abd al-Wādids and Banū Tūjin had settled in the valleys of Bijāya after the campaign of the ‘Abd al-Wādīd Abū Ḥammū (r. 1308–18). Al-Marīnī, *‘Unwān al-akhbār fī mā marra ‘ala Bijāya*, trans. Laurent-Charles Féraud as “Conquête de Bougie par les espagnols,” *Revue Africaine* 12 (1868): 337.

33. Al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 95. See also Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 315.

34. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 376. See also Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 319–33.

35. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 5: 116–18.

36. There were two main waves of Ghuzz migration into the Maghrib, the first in the 1170s–1180s and the second in the 1260s. See Al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib*, 235–39; also Mohamed Azzaoui, *Rasā'il muwabbidiya, majmū'a jadida* (Casablanca, 1995), 151.

37. Al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib*, 289–90, 322, 340. Like most things Almohad, the

distribution of these grants followed a very hierarchical scheme: “great sheikhs” (*ashyākh kibār*) received 240 hectares while “little sheikhs” (*ashyākh sīghār*) only 120 hectares. Al-‘Umari, *Masālik*, 95.

38. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 139; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 43.

39. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 696–97.

40. The Ḥafṣids could not even collect taxes on these lands. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6:73–74, 6: 759–61; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 127; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 1: 377.

41. For a discussion of various tribes and their relations to the Ḥafṣids, see Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 98–148; Valérian, *Bougie*, 141–73.

42. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 6: 153–56. This assessment is confirmed by Abū al-Qāsim al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1440) and al-Burzulī (d. 1438). See also al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 2: 435–36.

43. See for example, Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 69–79.

44. David S. Powers, “Maliki Family Endowment: Legal Norms and Social Practices,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, 3 (1993): 379–406; idem, “A Court Case from Fourteenth Century North Africa,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 110, 2 (1990): 229–54; Alejandro García Sanjuán, *Till God Inherits the Earth: Islamic Pious Endowments in al-Andalus (9–15th Centuries)* (Leiden, 2007); Maya Shatzmiller, “Islamic Institutions and Property Rights: The Case of the ‘Public Good’ Waqf,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44, 1 (2001): 44–74. See also Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 355–82.

45. Mūsā notes that the Almoravids and Almohads were not interested in establishing pious endowments. Mūsā, *al-Nashāt al-iqtīādī*, 154. This does not mean that pious endowments established by individuals not belonging to the dynasty were inconsequential.

46. The *taḥbīs* (the establishing of an endowment) is only valid if ownership is proven on the day of the act (*lā yuqdā bi al-ḥabs illā ba’d thubūt milk al-muḥabbis lammā ḥabbasa yawma al-taḥbīs*). Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 7: 452. See also al-Raṣṣā‘, *Sharḥ ḥudūd Ibn ‘Arafa*, 2: 539–48.

47. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 320. Mūsā suggests that the Almohads counted the funds associated with the *aḥbās* among those of the treasury (*makhzin*). Mūsā, *al-Nashāt al-iqtīādī*, 156. While this generalization is based on only two cases from the western regions, and is thus tentative, it is consonant with the aggressiveness of the Almohads in these matters.

48. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 7: 119.

49. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 7: 248–57. See David S. Powers’s intelligent and instructive discussion of the issue of preferential treatment of a descendant over others (*tawlij*). David S. Powers, *Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300–1500* (Cambridge, 2002), 206–28; idem, “The Art of the Legal Opinion: Al-Wansharīsī on *Tawlij*,” in *Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas*, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David Powers (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 98–115.

50. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 403; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 284.

51. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 401.

52. In a specific case, a number of individuals took turf from an endowed cemetery, plausibly for a construction project. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 385.

53. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 403; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 284.

54. Endowments did not always generate rents from land or urban real estate. Often-times, they received part of the product of land in kind or a set portion of the sale of the product, thus not a set and invariable amount or rate.

55. “‘uyinat al-ujra ‘alā shay’in ma’lūm.” Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 433.

56. Some of these outlaws are described as *khawārij* who kidnapped Muslims and sold them to Europeans (Rūm). See Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh al-Tijānī (d. 1301/2), *Rīħlat al-Tijānī* (Tunis, 1981), 119.

57. See Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 368–71; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 7: 100, 123, 186, 211, 217, 221, 298, 302, 387, 456, 480.

58. On exactions committed by rulers, see al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 46–50.

59. The Ḥafṣids used pious endowments to fund institutions of learning and employ prominent intellectuals. This aspect is discussed in Chapter 5. Almohad rulers also used these endowments to support their activities in Ifriqiyā. See Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, *Nażm al-jumān*, 176–77; al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu‘jib*, 231.

60. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 7: 175.

61. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 1:20 and 118a, cited in Brunschwig 2:180; and Hasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 336. The term qarya refers to a variety of settlements from small villages to small towns.

62. See Mūsā, *al-Nashāt al-iqtisādī*, 186.

63. Later in the book, I sometimes call those who controlled lands as *iqtā‘āt* or pious endowments, without technically owning them, landlords or landowners. The reason is that they formed the “non-laboring” party in the agricultural contracts under study. Since the lands they controlled were not always their private property, they were landowners de facto, not de jure.

64. For examples, see al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 403–28; al-Marrākushī, *Wathāiq al-murābiṭin wa al-muwahhidin*, (Cairo, 1997), 533–74; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 5: 36–37, 60–62, 7: 120, 8: 142–43, 145–46, 156, 158–59, 161 (2), 164–45, 211–13.

65. “*al-muzāra‘a sharikatun fi al-harbi*.” Al-Raşṣā‘, *Sharḥ*, 2: 513. See also M. J. L. Young, “Muzāra‘a,” *EI*², 7: 822–83.

66. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 403–28; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 3: 411, 8: 142–43, 154, 161, 169, 175–76, 176, 183, 193, 287.

67. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 403–28; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 1: 365, 8: 144–45, 145–46, 149, 149–50, 150–51, 154 (3), 156, 160 (2), 164, 233–24.

68. Hasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 415, 420–33. See Jacques Berque, *Les Nawāzil el-mouzāra‘a du Mi‘yār al-Wazzānī* (Rabat, 1940); idem, “En lisant les Nawāzil Mazouna,” *Studia Islamica* 32 (1970): 31–39; Houari Touati, “En relisant les “Nawāzil” Mazouna: marabouts et chorfa au Maghreb central au XVe siècle,” *Studia Islamica* 69 (1989): 75–94.

69. Jurist Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 1348) referred to “our custom” (*‘urfuna*), according to which the *khammās* was considered merely a laborer. However, it is difficult to say for sure whether the custom in question pertained to all Ifriqiyyā or the region around Tunis only, or was a generalization meant to downplay differences between jurists. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 8: 152–53.

70. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 427; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 8: 137, 144–45.

71. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 8: 149–50.
72. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 407–8.
73. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 403–28; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 8: 150–54.
74. Importantly, *mughārasa* contracts were not allowed for pious endowments (*la yajūz i'tā' al-ard al-muhabba mughārasatan*). See al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 399, 427.
75. Eds., “*Mughārasa*,” *EP*², 7: 346; al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 371–402; al-Marrākushī, *Wathā'iq*, 575–81; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 8: 171–78, 9: 624.
76. The same general economic trends affected *musāqāt* contracts. M.J.L. Young, “*Musāqāt*,” *EP*², 7: 658; al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 371–88; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 177–81; Hasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 418–19.
77. Al-Marrākushī, *Wathā'iq*, 494–95, 503–4.
78. Commercial activity will be discussed in the following chapter.
79. Al-Marrākushī, *Wathā'iq*, 479–87.
80. Although sources often refer to the main shepherd, one may assume that shepherds who took on sizable herds enlisted the labor of others, possibly among their kin.
81. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, 7: 231–33, 303–36.
82. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 330–31, 9: 49–50. The recognition of the legal status of *al-ard al-qānūniya* (lands in which customary or tribal law reigned) demonstrates the existence of a multiplicity of legal regimes.
83. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 71, recounted that Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām al-Hawwārī was appointed judge based on his knowledge of customary practices.
84. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 1: 436.
85. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, 7: 897.
86. Nelly S. Amri, *al-Walāya wa al-mujtama': musāhama fi al-tārikh al-dinī wa al-ijtima'i li ifriqiyyā fi al-'abd al-hafṣī* (Tunis, 2001), 103–19, 123–65; Atallah Dhina, *Les états de l'occident musulman aux XIIIe, XIVe et XVe, institutions gouvernementales et administratives* (Algiers, 1984), 303–6; Hasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 735–45; Mohamed Hassen, “Les ribāṭ du Sahel d'Ifriqiyyā: peuplement et évolution du territoire au Moyen Âge,” in *Zones côtières littorales dans le monde méditerranéen au Moyen Âge: défense, peuplement, mise en valeur*, Actes du colloque international organisé par l'École Française de Rome et la Casa de Velázquez, Rome, 23–26 octobre 1996, ed. Jean-Marie Martin (Rome, 2001), 147–62.
87. Ibn Khaldūn is expressing an important part of his vision and argument for “de-urbanization” and thus of relative decline in civilization (*'umrān*).
88. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 232–33. His opinion depended on the beneficiary and the state of the endowment.
89. Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad b. Aḥmad al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān al-dirāya fiman 'urifa min al-'ulamā' fi al-mi'a al-sābi'a bi-bijāya*, ed. Ādil Nuwayhid (Beirut 1969), 193.
90. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 213.
91. The term *ribāṭ al-jihād* confers a holy veneer of respectability on what was a fortress. Ibn al-Hājj al-Nūmāyī, *Fayd al-'ubāb wa ifādat qidāḥ al-ādāb fi al-ḥaraka al-sa'idā ilā qasantīna wa al-zāb*, ed. Mohamed Benchekroun (Beirut, 1990), 267.
92. Hasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 740. Epidemics are attested in the region prior to the Black Death and after it. For example, a “sickness” befell Tunis in 656/1258 from which the Sultan

al-Mustanṣir (d. 1277) suffered. Historians attributed the disease to the dark humor produced by the Mongol sack of Baghdad. See Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 121.

93. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 741. The *fugara'* also served as agricultural workers around the *zawāyā*.

94. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 8: 237.

95. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 6: 67.

96. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 236–37.

97. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 177–81.

98. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 5: 88 (emphasis mine).

CHAPTER 3. BETWEEN LAND AND SEA

1. Ibn Ḥawqal, *Configuration de la terre (Kitāb sūrat al-arḍ)*, ed. J. H. Kramers and G. Wiet (Paris, 1964), 72.

2. Dominique Valérian describes an “animation” of Bijāya from the mid-tenth to the eleventh century and links it to contacts with Andalusi ports and the foundation of the Ḥammādīd capital. Dominique Valérian, *Bougie: Port Maghrébin, 1067–1510* (Rome, 2006), 42–43.

3. Abū ‘Abayd al-Bakrī, *Kitāb al-masālik wa al-mamālik*, ed. Adrien van Leeuwen and André Ferré (Tunis, 1992), 757. Al-Bakrī completed his book in 1068, and did not mention the “foundation,” or inauguration, of the city by the Ḥammādīd ruler al-Nāṣir b. ‘Alannās (r. 1062–1088/89), that took place in 1067/68.

4. Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Idrīsī, *Nuzhat al-mushtaq fī ikhtirāq al-āfāq*, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1989), 1: 260. Valérian, *Bougie*, 39.

5. Mohamed Salah Baizig, *Bijāya fī al-‘ahd al-Ḥafṣi: dirāsa iqtiṣādiya wa-ijtīmā‘iya* (Tunis, 2006), 104–19; idem, “Muḥāwala li-taqdir ‘ādad sukkān Bijāya fī al-‘ahd al-ḥafṣi,” *Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies* 9–10 (1994): 73–82; Robert Brunschwig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les ḥafṣides des origines à la fin du XVe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940–47), 1: 383–84.

6. The Almohads saw merchants and artisans as beneficial to the economy (*ṣunnā‘ wa ahl al-sūq wa man yuntafa‘u bihi*). Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī (d. ca. 1332), *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, ed. Husayn Nassar (Cairo, 1983), 24: 298.

7. See Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1304), *‘Unwān al-dirāya fīman ‘urifa min al-‘ulamā‘ fī al-‘mi‘a al-sābi‘a bi-bijāya*, ed. ‘Adil Nuwayhid (Beirut, 1969), 45–46; al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 15.

8. See Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 51.

9. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 57. Other historians praised Ḥafṣid rulers for abolishing these very taxes. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 116–17.

10. ‘Izz al-Dīn ‘Umar Mūsā, *al-Nashāt al-iqtiṣādī fī al-maghrib al-islāmī khilāl al-qarn al-sādis al-hijrī* (Beirut, 2003), 294–95; Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 511–13.

11. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwa*, 3: 148–52.

12. Abū al-Faḍl Abū al-Qāsim b. ‘Isā Ibn Nājī al-Tanūkhī, *Ma‘ālim al-īmān fī ma‘rifat*

ahl al-qayrawān, 4 vols. (Tunis, 1968–), 4: 138, 151, 184, 186, 210, 228. See also Brunschvig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 150, 202.

13. Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān al-dirāya fiman ‘urifa min al-‘ulamā’ fi al-mi‘a al-sābi‘a bi-bijāya*, ed. Ḥāfiẓ Nuwayhid (Beirut, 1969), 195–96.

14. For a discussion of the Ḥafṣids' aggressive courting of jurists, see Chapter 5.

15. Al-Idrīsī, *Nuzhat al-mušriq*, 1: 262–63. A longer description of Bijāya in this period is to be found in the twelfth-century anonymous work entitled *Kitāb al-istibṣār fi ‘ajā‘ib al-amṣār*, ed. Sa‘d Zaghlūl (Alexandria, 1958), 128–31. See also Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-‘Abdarī (fl. 1290), *al-Rihla al-maghribīya* (Rabat, 1968), 26–27, 31, 34.

16. Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī (1301–49), *Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār (min al-bāb al-thāmin ilā al-bāb al-thāmin ‘ashar)*, ed. Mustafā Abū Ḏayf Aḥmad (Casablanca, 1988), 86.

17. The anonymous author of the *kitāb al-istibṣār* noted that Bijāya had two shipyards (*wa laḥā dārān li-śinā‘at al-marākib*), 130. During the second Marīnid takeover in 1352, Ibn al-Hājj recounted that the Marīnid ruler entered the *rābaṭ* of Bijāya where was located the *dār al-śinā‘a* (shipyard, singular). Ibn al-Hājj al-Numayrī (b. 1312 or 1313), *Fayd al-‘ubab wa ifādat qidāḥ al-ādāb fi al-ḥaraka al-sa‘īda ilā qasanṭīna wa al-zāb*, ed. Mohamed Benchekroun (Beirut, 1990), 95. See also Baizig, *Bijāya*, 138.

18. The reference to a Genoese *funduq* in Bijāya in 1200 is the earliest for the city. Valérian, *Bougie*, 275.

19. For a study of this institution, see Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World* (Cambridge, 2003). For examples, see David Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge, 1994); Michel Balard, *La Méditerranée médiévale: espaces, itinéraires, comptoirs* (Paris, 2006); Charles-Emanuel Dufourcq, “Les consulats catalans de Tunis et de Bougie au temps de Jacques le Conquérant,” *Annuario de Estudios Medievales* 3 (1966): 469–79; Roger Letourneau, “Funduk,” *EI²*, 3: 945; Dominique Valérian, “Le foundouk, instrument du contrôle sultanien sur les marchands étrangers dans les ports musulmans (XIe–XVe siècles)?” in *La mobilité des personnes en Méditerranée de l'antiquité à l'époque moderne*, ed. Claudia Moatti (Rome, 2004), 677–98.

20. See Baizig, *Bijāya*, 234–49; Constable, *Housing*, 132, 135, 139, 192–93; Valérian, *Bougie*, 274–303.

21. Typically, treaties allowed European merchants to travel freely within the kingdom.

22. Literally, *sūq al-ṣawwāfiṇ* means “market of the wool-sellers.” Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 175; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 9: 72–73. Not all markets had names like “market of x-commodity.” For instance, outside the walls of Bijāya, there was a neighborhood where butchers slaughtered animals and where captives were sold (*ḥawmat al-madhbah*). Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 45. Bijāya was not a major market for West African slaves. See Baizig, *Bijāya*, 200–203; Valérian, *Bougie*, 412–13.

23. Louis de Mas-Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1866), 98–99; Francesco Balducci Pegolotti (fourteenth century), *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 206, 294, 295. See also Henri Amouric, “Les

importations de céramiques dites de Bejaia (Bougie) en Provence et Ligurie (XIIIe–XVIe siècles): le témoignage énigmatique des textes,” *A Cerâmica medieval no Mediterrâneo ocidental, Lisboa, 16–22 novembro 1987* (Mértola, 1991), 333–37; Georges Marçais, *Les poteries et faïences de Bougie (collection Debruge): contribution à l'étude de la céramique musulmane* (Constantine, 1916).

24. Lawrin Armstrong, Ivana Elbl, and Martin Elbl, eds., *Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: Essays in Honour of John H. A. Munro* (Leiden, 2007); Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000–1700* (New York, 1976); Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese (958–1528)* (1996; Chapel Hill, 2000); Robert S. Lopez, *The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971).

25. Valérian, *Bougie*, 385.

26. Valérian, *Bougie*, 379.

27. Al-Qul (Collo) was the privileged Mediterranean port for the inland city of Qasanṭīna.

28. John E. Dotson, trans., *Merchant Culture in Fourteenth-Century Venice: The Zibaldone da Canal* (New York, 1994), 91. The point here is not that tribute and tax are the same, just that the Ḥafṣids collected. According to the *Zibaldone*, Qasanṭīna was the third largest market in Ifrīqiyyā. Jijel (Jijel), situated less than forty miles east of Bijāya, stands out as not having been “tax-farmed” and as a source for wool, fleeces, hides, and wax. Dotson, *Merchant Culture*, 92. See also Michele Amari, *I diplomi arabi del R. archivio fiorentino: testo originale con la traduzione letterale e illustrazioni* (Florence, 1863), 17–22; and Mas-Latrie, *Traité*, 28–30.

29. Carmen Batlle i Gallart, “Uns mercaders de Barcelona al nord d’Africa a mitjan segle XIII,” *Acta historica et archaeologica mediaevalia* 10 (1989); Dominique Cardon, *La draperie au Moyen Âge: essor d’une grande industrie européenne* (Paris, 1998); Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 591–93; Hilmar C. Krueger, “The Wares of Exchange in the Genoese-African Traffic of the Twelfth Century,” *Speculum* 12, 1 (1937): 57–71; Dominique Valérian, “Les archives de Marseille, source de l’histoire du Maghreb médiéval: le cas du port de Bougie (XIIIe–XVe siècles),” *Annales du Midi* 113, 233 (2001): 5–26; idem, *Bougie*, 332–47.

30. See Charles-Emanuel Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane et le Maghreb aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles: de la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l’avènement du sultan mérinide Aboul-Hasan (1313)* (Paris, 1966), 594.

31. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 116–17. The importance of the wool trade can be inferred from the size of the cattle, clothes, and soap markets. See also Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 455.

32. Robert Delort, *Le commerce des fourrures en Occident à la fin du Moyen Âge (vers 1300-vers 1450)*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1978), 1: 22, 88, 224.

33. In the spring of 1181, the Pisans sent a letter to the Almohad Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf (r. 1163–84) complaining about difficulties they were having trading leather in Bijāya. Bijāya’s customs officers had prevented them from exporting without leaving a security deposit worth 500 dinars—an amount that suggests that the values involved were significant. See Amari, *Diplomi*, 10–13 (Arabic), 270 (Latin); Mas-Latrie, *Traité*, 27.

34. Mas-Latrie, *Traité*, 98–99. “Du royaume de Bougie vient peleterie de aingniax,

cuirs, sire et alun de plume.” Wool is conspicuously absent from this list due to the existence of alternative sources of wool in Flanders.

35. Delort, *Commerce*, 169, 243. See also Olivia Remie Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900–1500* (Cambridge, 1994), 198–99, 219; Valérian, *Bougie*, 395–97.

36. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 194.

37. Louis Blancard, *Documents inédits sur le commerce de Marseille au Moyen Âge*, 2 vols. (Marseille, 1884–85), 202.

38. Valérian, *Bougie*, 397.

39. Rawhide that was not sold as such was sometimes sheared for the wool. Jurists, such as al-Burzulī, faced the possibility of the pollution of the wool by the dead body (*mayta*) and urged that the wool be washed. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 248.

40. On the relocation of leather-related activities far from residential areas, see al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 8: 412, 446.

41. See al-‘Uqbānī al-Tilimsānī, *Tuhfat al-nāzir wa ghunyat al-dhākir fi hifz al-sa‘ā’ir wa taghyīr al-manākir*, ed. Ali Chenouf, *Bulletin d’Études Orientales* 19 (1965–66): 274.

42. Dotson, *Merchant Culture*, 93.

43. See Dotson, *Merchant Culture*, 194.

44. Nicola Nicolini, *Codice Diplomatico sui rapporti Veneto-napoletani durante il regno di Carlo I d’Angiò* (Rome, 1965), #153 (7/24/1276), #160 (4/12/1276). Valérian added up the amounts and converted *salme* into hectoliters. Valérian, *Bougie*, 359. Note the difference between Valérian and Henri Bresc on the size of a *salma* of wheat from Sicily. Henri Bresc, *Un monde méditerranéen; économie, et société en sicile, 1300–1450* (Rome, 1986), 55.

45. Scholars have pointed out that Tunis was a privileged market for Sicilian wheat. Bresc, *Un Monde*, 536; David Abulafia, “A Tyrrhenian Triangle: Tuscany, Sicily, Tunis, 1276–1300,” *Studi di storia economica Toscana nel Medioevo e nel Rinascimento in memoria di Federigo Melis* (Pisa, 1987), 53–75; idem, “Sul commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo medioevo,” *La Società mediterranea all’epoca del Vespro*, 4 vols. (Palermo, 1983), 2: 5–22.

46. The association with these *hanāshir* with the ruling family and prominent members of the elite is discussed in the previous chapter.

47. Collections of legal opinions cite many examples of such partnerships. These examples do not allow us to know how prevalent a particular type of contract was, or the evolution of contracts over time. See al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 288–307.

48. Often, one partner entrusted the other with a sum of money and gave him or her the authority to acquire goods for the partnership when he deemed doing so profitable. This delegation of authority (*tafiwīd*) was very popular and allowed smaller merchants greater flexibility. Abraham L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton, 1970), 144.

49. See Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 527–28; Abraham L. Udovitch, “*Kinād*,” *EP*, 5: 129–30; idem, “At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium,” *Speculum* 37 (1962): 198–207. See also al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 3: 440–66; al-Marrākushī, *Wathā’iq*, 600–607.

50. Dominique Valérian, “Ifriqiyān Muslim Merchants in the Mediterranean at the End of the Middle Ages,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 14, 2 (1999): 47–66.

51. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 315; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 94.
52. Merchants engaged in a number of such practices. On *musāwama*, *muzāyada*, *istirsāl*, *muzābana*, and *muwāzana*, see Udovitch, *Partnership*.
53. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 519.
54. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 314–16; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 93–96.
55. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 281–83; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 93–96.
56. Andalusi immigrants brought with them a savoir-faire that allowed them to intensify cultivation, though mostly nearer urban centers. Al-Maqqarī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad (d. 1631 or 1632), *Nafḥ al-ṭib min ghuṣn al-Andalus al-raqīb wa dhikr wazīrihā Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb* (Beirut, 1986), 4: 148–49. See also Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 290.
57. The significance of the gradual and much slower changes to land tenure becomes clear in relation to ongoing political struggles.
58. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 314–15; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 93.
59. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 404; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 285.
60. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 7: 897.
61. As was seen, before the 1370s a few emirs succeeded in forcing the reunification of Ifrīqiyyā but could not maintain that configuration.
62. To fund a military force capable of maintaining them in power and pay for the loyalty of supporters and allies, Ḥafṣid emirs needed to accumulate wealth at a greater rate than their opponents did.
63. I use “pirate” in a generic sense that includes both privateers and corsairs. The commonly used Arabic term is *ghāzī al-baḥr* or more generically *ghāzī*. Semantically, it is associated with the discourse on the early Islamic conquests and the frontier battles in al-Andalus. It has a different set of implications from the Latin and Romance terms for pirate. For the difference between pirate and corsair, see Henri Bresc, “Course et piraterie en Sicile (1250–1450),” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 10 (1980): 751–57; Michel Mollat, “De la piraterie sauvage à la course réglementée, XII–XIVe siècle,” *Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome* 87 (Rome, 1975); idem, “Essai d’orientantion pour l’étude de la guerre de course et la piraterie (XIIIè–XVè s.),” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 10 (1980): 743–49. See also Irène Mélikoff, “Ghāzī,” *EP*, 2: 1043–44.
64. “Christians qui apud vos captivi tenebantur,” Mas-Latrie, *Traités*, 8.
65. *Chronica Monasterii Casinensis*, ed. Hartmut Hoffmann, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores* 34 (Hanover, 1980), 516.
66. Al-Ghubrīnī, ‘*Unwān*, 45 (italics mine). On the importance of Mediterranean islands in piracy, see Henri Bresc, “Îles et tissu ‘connectif’ de la Méditerranée médiévale,” *Médiévaux* 47 (2004): 123–38.
67. Al-Ghubrīnī, ‘*Unwān*, 45–46. Al-Ghubrīnī recounted these events to explain the reasons behind some of the poetry written by ‘Umāra.
68. Valérian, *Bougie*, 423.
69. Mas-Latrie, *Traités*, 46, §§29, 30.
70. Mas-Latrie, *Traités*, 44, §3.
71. Valérian, *Bougie*, 424.
72. Abū Bakr ruled Bijāya from 1312 to 1318. In 1318, he became ruler of both Tunis and

Bijāya. He died in 1346. James II of Aragon (1267–1327) was King of Aragon and Valencia, Sicily (1285–96), Sardinia and Corsica (1297–1327), and Count of Barcelona (1291–1327). See Maximiliano Alarcón y Santón and Ramón García de Linares, *Los documentos árabes diplomáticos del Archivo de la corona de Aragón* (Madrid, 1940), 288. In this particular letter, Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr refers to Bijāya as his capital (*hadra*), a term contemporary authors tended to use for Tunis, the capital of Ifriqiyā.

73. Ángeles Masiá de Ros, *La corona de Aragón y los estados del norte de África* (Barcelona, 1951), 419. The distinctions made in the European and Arabic sources describe a differentiation between various types of un-freedoms.

74. Masiá de Ros, *La corona*, 420–25.

75. Sancho also disbursed some of his own money to free captives from Bijāya, and lent money to family members seeking to ransom their kin from there. Valérian, *Bougie*, 424–25.

76. Alarcón y Santón, *Documentos*, 49. “Decís que Ibn al-Ŷundī ha apresado de unos individuos de vuestro país y los ha vendido en Bujía. Pero este sujeto no es de nuestra tierra ni a estado nunca al servicio de al-Andalus.”

77. Dominique Valérian sees a growing trend that begins in the 1370s, continues through the 1380s and 1390s, peaks in the 1400s, and then wanes after the 1430s. Valérian, *Bougie*, 431. See also Charles Verlinden, “Aspects quantitatifs de l’esclavage méditerranéen au bas Moyen Âge,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 10 (1980): 759–90.

78. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 903. See also María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Documenti catalani sulla spedizione franco-genovese in Berberia (1390),” *Miscellanea di Studi Storici* 1 (1969): 211–61.

79. Ibn Khaldūn was not trying to indicate an exact date but rather explain the ebbs and flows of domination over the Mediterranean.

80. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 896. The historian Ibn Qunfudh describes him as leader of its navy (*qā’idān fi bābrihā*). Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 168.

81. María Dolores López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb en el siglo XIV (1331–1410)* (Barcelona, 1995), 728–89.

82. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 903.

83. James Brodman, *Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain: The Order of Merced on the Christian-Islamic Frontier* (Philadelphia, 1986), 112. Reference to the great number of captives may have been a way to encourage donations. The thirty-eight ransomed captives cost 3,840 gold *duplæ*. Brodman, *Ransoming Captives*, 114. See also Giulio Cipollone, ed., *La liberazione dei ‘captivi’ tra cristianità e islam. Oltre la crociata e il ţihād: tolleranza e servizio umanitario* (Vatican, 2000); Francisco Vidal Castro, “Poder religioso y cautivos creyentes en la Edad Media: la experiencia islámica,” in Isidro Hernández Delgado, ed., *Fe, cautiverio y liberación: actas del I Congreso Trinitario (Granada, octubre 1995)* (Cordoba, 1996).

84. Historians have sought to evaluate the impact of piracy by analyzing its impact on commercial activity in the Mediterranean. Baizig, *Bijāya*, 302; Valérian, *Bougie*, 495. For the activities of European pirates and their capture of Bijāyan and Bijāyan property, see Andrés Díaz Borrás, *Los orígenes de la piratería islámica en Valencia: la ofensiva musulmana trecentista y la reacción cristiana* (Barcelona, 1993); Andrés Díaz Borrás and Rafael Cariñena

Balaguer, “Corsaris valencians i esclaus barbarescs a les darreries del segle XIV: una subhasta d'esclaus a València el 1385,” *Estudis Castellonencs*, 2 (1984–85): 441–56. I am indebted to Debra Blumenthal for these references.

CHAPTER 4. THE AGE OF THE EMIR

1. For a fuller discussion, see Chapter 1.
2. The term “elite” is politically indefinite. As I use it, it refers to the groups from which there issued those who participated in bringing about or supporting the rule of a Ḥafṣid emir.
3. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the leaders of the *ghawḡā'* were not necessarily autonomous or able to completely bypass elite politics (as their eventual defeat shows). However, from a political standpoint, their takeover was significant.
4. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 595; Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 58; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 109; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 27.
5. Instead of Emirism, I could have called the ideology Sultanism after the title (*sultān*) borne by many Ḥafṣids. Calling the ideology Emirism follows the choice made by Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā to think of himself as emir. For the evolution of the title emir, see ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Duri, “Amīr,” *EI*², 1: 438.
6. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 113. “fa-li'an ṭawā badr al-imāratī maghribun, falaqad jalā shams al-khilāfati maṭla'u.”
7. Ismā‘il b. Yūsuf b. al-Āḥmar al-Naṣrī (d. 1404 or 1405), *A'lām al-maghrib wa al-Andalus, wa huwa kitāb nathir al-jumān fi shi'r man naẓamānī wa iyyāhu al-zamān*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍwān Dāya (Beirut, 1976), 98–102; Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī (1301–49), *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār (min al-bāb al-thāmin ilā al-bāb al-thāmin 'ashar)*, ed. Mustafā Abū Ḏayf Alḥmad (Casablanca, 1988), 91–92.
8. This type of statement implies that the Ḥafṣid emir recognized the existence of other forms of *mulk* in Ifrīqiyyā.
9. Ibn al-Āḥmar, *Nathir al-jumān*, 103–5.
10. “wa kulluhum wulliya illa Abū Bakr.” Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 114. See also Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 61.
11. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 777–78. “kāna al-sha'nu fi mahriha wa zafāfiha wa mashāhidī a'rāsiha wa walā'ihiha wa jihāzīha kulluhu min al-mafākhīr li-al-dawlatayn.” According to Ibn Khaldūn, Fāṭima was “the sister of the Ḥafṣid emir Abū Zakariyā.” Honorific attributes for women of the Ḥafṣid dynasty emphasized their religiosity, purity, and nobility. They included terms such as *al-hurra*, *al-sāliha*, *al-tāhira*, *al-zakiya*, *al-muqaddasa*, *al-mukarrama*, and *al-afīfa*. See Muḥammad Ḥasan, *al-Madina wa-al-bādiya fī ifrīqiyyā fī al-'abd al-ḥafṣī*, 2 vols. (Tunis, 1999), 1: 151; idem, “Nouvelles branches dans l'arbre généalogique des Ḥafṣides,” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 121–22 (1982): 95–134.
12. For example “wa tafarragha bi ḥawli Allāh al-'amru ilayhi.” Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 189.
13. References to the courage and astuteness of emirs abound. Abū Fāris was naturally

among those mentioned. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 57, 76, 81–82, 88, 109, 113. For defeated emirs, see Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 191; Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 84, 93.

14. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 262; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 472.

15. See, for instance, Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 634; al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 10: 10; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 37–39.

16. *Mawlā* is customarily translated as “lord.” Patricia Crone, “Mawlā,” *EI²*, 6: 874. The term “possessor” (*sāhib*) occurs often in the four historical chronicles considered here. Though not a title per se, it describes the effective ruler of a city.

17. For a reference to the protected Kasbah and its mosque, see Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān al-dirāya fitman ‘urifa min al-‘ulamā’ fi al-mi‘a al-sabi‘a bi-bijāya*, ed. ‘Ādil Nuwayhid (Beirut 1969), 282. “wa wulliya al-khiṭāba bi-jāmi‘ al-qasaba al-mahrūsa min bijāya.” See also Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 7: 603, 604; al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 86.

18. Al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 88.

19. In a 1264 treaty with the Ḥafṣids, the Pisans demanded access to the emir once a month. Louis de Mas-Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l’Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1866), 46.

20. “lā yadkhulu al-qasaba rākiban.” Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 57.

21. The Kasbah of Bijāya was most probably built in the early years of Almohad rule. Robert Brunschwig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Ḥafsides des origines à la fin du XVe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940–47), 1: 380.

22. Henri Basset, Henri Terrasse, *Sanctuaires et forteresses Almohades* (Paris, 1932); Patrice Cressier, “Les portes monumentales urbaines almohades: symboles et fonctions,” in *Los Almohades: Problemas y perspectivas*, ed. Patrice Cressier, Maribel Fierro, and Luis Molina, 2 vols. (Madrid, 2005), 1: 149–87; Gaston Deverdun, “Kaṣaba,” *EI²*, 4: 713–14.

23. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 274–75; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 16–17.

24. Ibn Khaldūn experienced this firsthand when he served as *ḥājib* in Bijāya. Ibn Khaldūn, *Riḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. Muḥammad b. Tāwīt al-Tanjī and Nūrī al-Jarrāḥ (Beirut, 2003), 141. “The meaning of the *ḥijāba* in our countries of the Maghrib is the control of the government (*istiqlāl bi-al-dawla*) and the mediation between the ruler (*sultān*) and the high-ranking officials at his court (*ahl dawlatihī*). No one shares these privileges with the *ḥājib*.”

25. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 302–3; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 69–73.

26. Al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 86–90.

27. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 167.

28. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 168. “Rakaba wa ikhtaraqa al-aswāq wa kashafa ‘an wa-jih wa kāna qalīl al-zuhūr.”

29. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 314–16; Rosenthal, 2: 93–96.

30. The claim I make here is not that Ibn Khaldūn invented these ideas but that political and socioeconomic conditions validated them. Emirism was a novel rearticulation of ideas and definitely not the result of spontaneous generation.

31. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 275; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 17.

32. Al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 86.

33. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 57–58; Valérian, *Bougie*, 35–62. Valérian translates *mawāṭin* as *territoire*.

34. Al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 84–85.

35. Abū al-Ḥasan granted them the cities in *iqtā‘* and they were to live on the proceeds of taxation. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 7: 692; Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 171.

36. Most of the governors of Bijāya were members of the Ḥafṣid dynasty. They were Ḥafṣid emirs who could, theoretically, accede to the throne in Tunis. When the *wālī* of Bijāya was not a Ḥafṣid emir, he was a prominent Almohad sheikh (1262–79), Andalusi (1319–20), or a member of a powerful allied Bedouin group (1309–12).

37. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 414; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 303.

38. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 413; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 302.

39. Ibn Khaldūn does not argue that people living in smaller urban centers are dirty. However, his choice of this particular example cannot be ignored.

40. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 410; Rosenthal, 2: 297.

41. Typically, the latter involved famous ulama and institutions of learning. See, for example, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-‘Abdarī, *Riḥlat al-‘Abdarī*, *al-musammāt al-Riḥla al-maghribiyya*, ed. Muḥammad al-Fāsi. (Rabat, 1968), 25–26; Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Riḥlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa* (Beirut, 1964), 17–18; al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 84–87.

42. Abū Zakariyā Yahyā claimed independence from Tunis and ruled over both Bijāya and Qasanīna.

43. The *‘udūl* (sing. *‘adl*) served under the judge and were legal witnesses.

44. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 148–49.

45. This was not the case in Bijāya, where Almohads had little presence in the fourteenth century. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 705.

46. Mohamed Salah Baizig, *Bijāya fī al-‘ahd al-Ḥafṣī: dirāsa iqtiṣādiya wa-ijtimā‘iya* (Tunis, 2006), 369–75; idem, “L’élite andalouse à Tunis et à Bougie et le pouvoir hafside,” in *Communautés et pouvoirs en Italie et au Maghreb au Moyen Âge et à l’époque moderne, actes du séminaire de Rome*, 26–27 octobre 2001, ed. Annliese Nef and Dominique Valérian (Rome, 2003), 523–42; Dominique Valérian, “Les Andalous à Bougie, XIe–XVe siècle,” in *Migrations et diasporas méditerranéennes, XIe–XVIe siècles*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris, 2002), 313–30.

47. In the twelfth century, many Andalusis settled in the Maghrib after being chased from their homes. See Baizig, *Bijāya*, 359–69.

48. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 287.

49. Like the modern term “community,” the term “*jamā‘a*” tends to posit the existence and significance of a social group on the basis of some “common” characteristic.

50. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 625, 654, 677, 705, 711, 724, 742, 787, 805.

51. See for example, Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 61.

52. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 705.

53. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 625, 677.

54. Information about migration from al-Andalus into the Ifriqiyan countryside is basically nonexistent for the thirteenth century, although nothing suggests it did not take place. The documentation is a great deal better for later centuries.

55. J. Derek Latham, “Towards a Study of Andalusi Immigration and Its Place in Tunisian History,” *Cabiers de Tunisie* 5 (1957): 203–52.

56. Al-Andalus was one of the places where people were known (*nasab*) by the cities of their residence. See Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 159; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 266–67.

57. See ‘Abd al-Rahmān Muḥammad Ḥusayn, *Rithā’ al-mudun wa al-mamālik al-zāila fi al-shi’r al-‘arabi ḥattā suqūt gharnāṭa* (Cairo, 1983); Alexander E. Elinson. *Looking Back at al-Andalus: The Poetics of Loss and Nostalgia in Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Literature* (Leiden, 2009); ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Zayyāt, *Rithā’ al-mudun fi al-shi’r al-andalusī* (Benghazi, 1990).

58. ‘Ali b. Abī Naṣr had through a short chain of impeccable sources “heard from” one of the foremost Muslim traditionists, Muḥammad b. Ismā‘il al-Bukhārī (d. 870). The latter is an important compiler of genuine *hadīth* whose collection *al-Sahīh* became an authoritative source. He is said to have selected the less than 3,000 reliable statements out of the 300,000 he had first gathered.

59. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 140.

60. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 694–95.

61. In his autobiography, Ibn Khaldūn explained how elite Andalusis like the Banū Sayyid al-Nās were unhappy about the influence of Andalusis like al-Fāzāzī, who had been subordinate to them in Seville. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, 59–60.

62. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 274; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 16.

63. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 278; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 24. Al-Andalus becomes Spain in Rosenthal’s translation.

64. This is not to say that the descendants of the Almohad sheikhs were Bedouin or tribal in an objective sense but rather in relation to Andalusi ways of encoding and decoding political discourse. I am thankful to Dominique Valérian who made me realize the need for this clarification.

65. A great number of Ḥafṣid officials held offices in al-Andalus or studied there when young. See Dominique Urvoy, “La structuration du monde des ulémas à Bougie au VIIe/XIIIe siècle,” *Studia Islamica* 43 (1976): 87–107.

66. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 326–327; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 116. Formal similarities between the Maghrib and the Mashriq require closer scholarly scrutiny than I am able to give them here.

67. “Party Kings” (Ar. *mulūk al-tawā’if*, Sp. *Reyes de taifas*) refers to the thirty-nine rulers divided up the former Umayyad kingdom in the eleventh century. See Afif Ben Abdessellem, *La vie littéraire dans l’Espagne musulmane sous les mulūk al-tawā’if. Ve/XIe siècle* (Damascus, 2001); Sa’d Ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Bishrī, *al-Hayāt al-‘ilmīya fi ‘aṣr mulūk al-tawā’if fi al-andalus*, 422–488/1030–1095 (Riyad, 1993); Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of Al-Andalus* (New York, 1996); Mahmoud Makki, “The Political History of al-Andalus, 92/711–897/1492),” in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. Salma K. al-Jayyusi (Leiden, 1992), 3–87; María Jesús Viguera, *De las taifas al reino de Granada, siglos XI–XV* (Madrid, 1995); David Wasserstein, *The Rise and Fall of the Party-Kings: Politics and Society in Islamic Spain 1002–1086* (Princeton, 1985). For the period before the taifas, see

Gabriel Martinez-Gros, *L'idéologie omeyyade: la construction de la légitimité du califat de Cordoue (Xe-XIe siècles)* (Madrid, 1992), and Janina Safran, *The Second Umayyad Caliphate: The Articulation of Caliphal Legitimacy in al-Andalus* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).

68. These are regnal names often taken by caliphs.

69. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 186, 261; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 316, 1: 470.

70. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 601–4; Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 59; al-Zarkashi, *Tārīkh*, 27.

71. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 406; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 290. In this passage, Ibn Khaldūn used the term *ḥadāra* to refer to “sedentary culture,” and “urban culture,” or “civilization.” The point about the “cultural” contribution of Andalusis is repeated. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 205; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 351.

72. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 393; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 266.

73. See Ahmed Abdesselam, *Ibn Khaldūn et ses lecteurs* (Paris, 1983); Abdesselam Ched-dadi, *Ibn Khaldūn: l'homme et le théoricien de la civilisation* (Paris, 2006), 169–80.

74. See Saad Ghrab, “Réflexions à propos de la querelle Ibn ‘Arafa (716/1316–803/1401), Ibn Haldoun (732/1332–808/1406),” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 35, 139–40 (1987), 49–70.

75. The term *‘asabiya* is also translated as group solidarity, fanatical solidarity, group instinct, *Gemeingefühl*, corporate will of a group, intention to organize, party spirit, and socio-agnatic solidarity. Catalogued and critiqued in Aziz Azmeh, *Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship* (London, 1981), 170.

76. Ibn Khaldūn dedicated and offered the *Muqaddima* to the Ḥafṣid Abū al-‘Abbās (r. 1370–94). While in Egypt, he rededicated it to the Mamlūk ruler al-Zāhir Barqūq (r. 1384–86) and then to the Marīnid ruler Abū Fāris al-Mustanṣir (r. 1366–72). Although the latter was dead at the time, Ibn Khaldūn was hedging his bets, perhaps believing that the Marīnids would be the most powerful dynasty in the Maghrib. As it happens, in the last years of his life, Ibn Khaldūn may have heard that the Ḥafṣids proved to be the stronger dynasty.

77. The Mu’minids were those supporters of ‘Abd al-Mu’min who founded the first “Almohad” dynasty after the death of Ibn Tūmart. The Ḥafṣids were also Almohads but did not belong to the Mu’minid house.

78. The Ḥafṣids also made no claims on the western Maghrib where the Marīnid Bedouins took over from the Almohads in a way that conformed to the Khaldunian model.

79. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ībar*, 6: 578.

80. Favoring the rule of a powerful dynast, Ibn Khaldūn believed that the ruler “must exercise political leadership and get people to submit to him to the degree he desires and be satisfied that *he alone* has all the glory and they have none” (emphasis mine). Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 269; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 3.

81. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 200; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 342–43.

82. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 200; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 342.

83. Noticeably, Ibn Khaldūn did not build his interpretative scheme around the “tribe” (*qabilah*). For instance, it is conceivable to logically preserve his framework by reconstructing it in terms of going from a decadent, cowardly, effeminate urban civilization to

an honorable, courageous, and manly tribe and then back to the state of decay. The *dawla* cycle could easily be replaced by a *qabila* cycle. The difference is, of course, the values imbedded in his city-centric understanding of civilization in terms of greater division of labor, specialization, and luxury consumption.

84. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 414; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 303–4.

85. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 414; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 304. For the Banū Makkī of Qābis (Gabès), see Ibrahim Jedla, “Banū Makki wa al-ḥafṣiyūn: min al-taḥāluf ilā al-ṣirā‘ 624/1227–796/1394,” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 34, 162–63 (1986): 29–41. “Shadow” is a common term describing relations of patronage and influence.

86. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 405; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 287. See also Al-‘Umarī, *Masālik*, 87.

87. In keeping with his dynasticism, Ibn Khaldūn held that “Civilization [*ḥadāra*] in cities comes from dynasties.” Consequently, “civilization” was an eminently political notion. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 404; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 286.

88. Naturally, the frontier was not between Islam and Christianity but between specific and changing polities.

89. Cf. Valérian, *Bougie*, 56–57.

90. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 152.

91. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 577.

92. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 27.

93. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 61.

94. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 31.

95. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 91; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 130.

96. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 755.

97. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 84–85.

CHAPTER 5. LEARNING AND THE EMIRATE

1. Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad al-Ghubrīnī, ‘*Unwān al-dirāya fiman ‘urifa min al-‘ulamā’ fi al-mi‘a al-sābi‘a bi-bijāya*, ed. ‘Adil Nuwayhid (Beirut, 1969), 107–8. The concept of ‘*amal* (works) was fundamental in the thinking of Ibn Tūmart. See ‘Abd al-Majid al-Najjār, *al-Mahdi Ibn Tūmart: hayātuhu wa ḥāfiẓuhu wa thawratuhu al-fikriya wa al-ijtīmā‘iya wa atharuhu bi al-maghrib* (Beirut, 1983), 264; Saad Ghrab, *Ibn ‘Arafa et le Mālikisme en Ifriqiyyā au VIIIe–XIVe siècles* (Tunis, 1992), 199–202; Dominique Urvoy, “La pensée d’Ibn Tūmart,” *Bulletin d’Études Orientales* 27 (1974): 19–44.

2. The scholarship on the ulama is as vast as it is varied. For a broad survey, see Claude Gilliot, Richard C. Repp, Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, M. Barry Hooker, Chang-Kuan Lin, and John O. Hunwick, “Ulamā,” *EJ*, 10: 801–10. See also Jonathan P. Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo* (Princeton, 1992); Jacques Berque, *Ulémas fondateurs insurgés du Maghreb* (Paris, 1982); Richard W. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972); Maribel Fierro, “Los Banū ‘Āṣim al-Thaqafī, antepasados de Ibn al-Zubayr,” *Al-Qantara: Revista de estudios árabes*, 7 (1986): 53–84; Manuela Marin, “Una familia de

ulemas cordobeses: los Banū Abī ‘Īsā,” *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes*, 6 (1985): 291–320; Franz Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam* (Leiden, 1970); Dominique Urvoy, *Le monde des ulémas andalous du Ve/XIe au VIIe/XIIIe siècle* (Geneva, 1978); idem, “La structuration du monde des ulemas à Bougie au VIIe/XIIIe siècle,” *Studia Islamica* 43 (1976): 87–107.

3. Nelly S. Amri, *al-Walāya wa al-mujtama‘: musāhama fi al-tārīkh al-dīnī wa al-ijtimā‘i li-ifrīqiyyā fi al-‘abd al-hafṣī* (Tunis, 2001), 433. The status of Sufis in this regard was a serious question for contemporaries, who discussed the matter in terms of the difference between *‘ilm* and *ma‘rifa*. See ‘Abd al-Wāhid Muhammad Ibn al-Tawwāḥ, *Sabk al-maqāl li-fakk al-‘iqāl, tarājim wa a‘lām min al-qarnayn al-sābi‘ wa al-thāmin al-hijriyyayn*, ed. Muhammad M. Jabrān (Beirut, 1995), 46–51. Brunschvig put “la religion” and “la production intellectuelle et artistique” in different chapters. Robert Brunschvig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Ḥafṣides des origines à la fin du XV^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940–47), 2: 352–416.

4. Amri’s study is an exploration of charismatic leadership. It is based on extensive archival research and organizes the material into very helpful categories. Amri’s sensitivity to narrative conventions in Ifrīqiyyā and her cautious approach make her work a very useful introduction to this subject. For the purposes of this study, her sociological methodology is more useful than that of intellectual historians. However, one must be aware that her typologies do not always take into account change over time.

5. The French term *encadrement* implies both supervision and framing. I use it to describe the involvement of the Ḥafṣids in supporting institutional arrangements that gave them influence over intellectuals.

6. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 184; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 313.

7. See, for example, Halima Ferhat, *Le Maghreb aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles: les siècles de la foi* (Casablanca, 1993); Saad Ghrab, *Ibn ‘Arafa et le mālikisme en Ifrīqiyyā au VIII^e/XIV^e siècles* (Tunis, 1992–96).

8. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 615; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 3: 302. Though Ibn Khaldūn focuses on Tunis, there is no indication that Bijāya or other cities in Ifrīqiyyā were different in this regard.

9. Some of these teachers, such as Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām (1246–1300), had been, were then, or would become, judges. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 221.

10. For example, Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd-Allāh b. Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām gave private lessons in *fiqh*. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 221. Girls from prominent families also studied at home. See al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 47–48.

11. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 317–19.

12. Al-Ghubrīnī refers to “teaching” and “place of teaching” in reference to these mosques. Consequently, while there is no textual proof of it, there is no reason for us to doubt that teaching also took place at the *Masjid al-Murjānī*, *Masjid al-Naṭṭā‘īn*, *Masjid al-Imām al-Mahdī*, or the *Masjid Abū Zakariyā al-Zawāwī*. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 27, 51, 149, 150, 174.

13. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 261.

14. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 63–65, 82, 229, 260, 291–94, 316; Ibn al-Tawwāḥ, *Sabk al-*

maqāl, 196–202. See also Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 470; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 428–29.

15. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 79.

16. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 119.

17. Muḥammad Ḥasan, *al-Madīna wa al-bādiya fī ifrīqiya fī al-'ahd al-hafṣī*, 2 vols. (Tunis, 1999), 2: 707–9; Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 280–91.

18. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 7–8, 262–63.

19. Al-Wansharīsī cites the case of local merchants renting rooms in the *madrasa* to store merchandise and use the space to rest. It is plausible that the merchants in question were former students or had some other connection to the school. In any case, the legal opinion was for an immediate eviction and retroactive imposition of rent. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 7–8, 262–63.

20. Georges Vajda, "Idjāza," *EI²*, 3: 1020–21. For a critical introduction to education, see *Law and Education in Medieval Islam: Studies in Memory of Professor George Makdisi*, ed. Joseph E. Lowry, Devin J. Stewart, and Shawkat M. Toorawa (Cambridge, 2004).

21. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 316. In addition to formal institutions of learning, there were gathering places of a more informal nature. A shop in the marketplace where Bijāyan intellectuals met regularly was known as the *Madinat al-'ilm* (the city of science). Al-Ghubrīnī's description of the place as a *majlis* suggests a public meeting place outside the royal court, private homes, and mosques.

22. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 190. Al-Ghubrīnī uses the expression *wulliya al-madāris*, suggesting a political appointment.

23. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 342.

24. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 342.

25. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 342.

26. See, for instance, Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 226, 227–28.

27. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 7–8. The exclusion of followers of a certain brand of Sufism from the possibility of finding employment in the administration will be discussed below.

28. See, for example, Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 216–17; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 374–77.

29. Al-Wansharīsī defined a city as a place that had a *madrasa*. See Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 707. I was not able to find that reference.

30. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 456.

31. Ibn 'Arafa's successor, al-Burzulī (d. 1438), noted that by the early fifteenth century, it was difficult to identify the sources of revenue for many pious endowments in Ifrīqiyyā. Warfare, famines, population movements, and the absence of heirs made this a common problem. See Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 716.

32. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 335.

33. See Abdelaziz Daoulatli, *Tunis sous les Hafsidès* (Tunis, 1976), 162–71; al-Ṭāhir al-Mā'mūrī, *Jāmi' al-Zaytūna wa madāris al-'ilm fī al-'ahd al-hafṣī wa al-turkī* (Tunis, 1980); Aḥmad al-Ṭawilī, *Marākiz al-thaqāfa wa al-ta'līm bi-madinat tunis fī al-'ahd al-hafṣī* (Tunis, 2000).

34. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 618; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 3: 307.
35. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, eds., *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination* (Berkeley, 1990); Salah M'ghirbi, *Les voyageurs de l'Occident musulman du XIIe au XIVe siècles* (Tunis, 1996); Houari Touati, *Islam et voyage au Moyen Âge: histoire et anthropologie d'une pratique lettrée* (Paris, 2000).
36. Other than Andalusis, Ifriqiyan scholars who gained prominence tended to have traveled to the Mashriq, or studied with someone who did.
37. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 178, 180, 183.
38. These elites had been part of the Hammādīd order (1015–1152).
39. See Jean-Pierre van Staëvel, “Almohades et Mālikites de Tunis. Réflexions sur les relations entre élites civiles et gouvernants dans l’Ifriqiya des VIe/XIIe–XIIIe/XIVe siècles,” in *Los almohades: problemas y perspectivas*, vol. 2, ed. Patrice Cressier, Maribel Fierro, and Luis Molina (Madrid, 2005), 937–73.
40. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 55. Muftis were pious learned men who issued legal opinions. See more below.
41. The fact the Banū Ghāniyya remained a political force in the region may have given further leverage to Mālikī jurists.
42. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 210–11.
43. Bijāya’s elite were part of the Almohad order but retained their ability to challenge Almohad sheikhs politically.
44. Roger Le Tourneau, “Sur la disparition de la doctrine Almohade,” *Studia Islamica*, 32 (1970): 193–201; Abdellatif Sabbane, *Le gouvernement et l’administration de la dynastie Almohade (XIIe–XIIIe siècles)* (Paris, 2001), 318–46.
45. The Almohads appointed military judges (*qāḍī al-maḥalla*) who followed the armies in campaigns and settled disputes. The position also existed in al-Andalus prior to the Almohads and may have been tied to frontier activities. See al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 9: 57.
46. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 430; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 335. Officials such as court advisors were very well compensated. Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh al-Qal'i (d. 1281) received 1,000 dinars a year working at the court before he went on to teaching and became a Sufi. He taught at the “Circle of Judges” at the Great Mosque (*majlis al-quḍāt*). Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 65.
47. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 429–30; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 2: 334–35.
48. When Abū 'Abd Allāh b. Shu'ayb (fl. 13th century) was governor (*wālī*), he refused to enforce the collection of *mukūs*, declaring “there is no *maks* in the *shari'a*.” Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 191.
49. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 245.
50. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 8: 226.
51. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 97.
52. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 63–64, 111–13, 221, 341–44.
53. He was also the son of a judge. Many of these judges were sons of judges, which supports Sabbane's characterization of Almohad judgships as hereditary.
54. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 120.

55. See Maribel Fierro, “The qādī as Ruler,” in *Saber religioso y poder político en el Islam: actas del simposio internacional, Granada, 15–18 octubre 1991* (Madrid, 1994), 71–116.

56. Hasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 714–52.

57. Brunschvig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 298.

58. “La population autochtone, plus attachée à la religion qu’aux emplois profanes, se laissaient gouverner par des gens de souche marocaine ou espagnole [i.e. the Ḥafṣids], satisfaite si l’on recrutait dans son sein la plupart et les plus élevés des fonctionnaires religieux.” Brunschvig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 118. I find no need to suppose that the Ifriqiyans were intrinsically more attached to religious employment or that they “allowed themselves” to be governed by Moroccans [sic] or Spaniards [sic].

59. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh*, 104.

60. The “judge of marriages” (*qādī al-anķiḥa*) was a very high post. It often led to the higher judgeship. Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46) asked both Abū ‘Alī b. Qaddāḥ (Superior Judge) and Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Salām (Marriage Judge) their opinion on an important matter involving the commerce in kidnapped Muslims. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mīyār*, 2: 435.

61. This official adjudicated conflicts among Almohads, but with time, and the disappearance of the Almohads as a meaningful group, the position lost much of its political importance.

62. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 320.

63. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mīyār*, 5: 97, 6: 182, 9: 49–50.

64. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 719.

65. See Cristina Segura Graño, “Los repartimientos medievales andaluces: Estadio de la cuestión,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 12 (1982): 625–39; Mohamed Talbi, “al-Hijra al-andalusīya ilā Ifriqiyā ayyām al-ḥafṣiyīn,” *al-Āṣāla* 26 (1975): 46–90. See also Mikel de Epalza and Ramón Petit, eds., *Recueil d’études sur les moriscos andalous en Tunisie* (Madrid, 1973).

66. See Saad Ghrab, *Ibn ‘Arafa et le mālikisme en Ifriqiyā au VIIIe/XIVe siècles* (Tunis, 1992–96); Louis Pouzet, “Ibn Khaldoun et les ‘ulamā’ d’après son *Kitāb at-Ta’rif*: de la théorie à la réalité,” in *Saber religioso y poder político*, 213–30; and idem, “Maghrébins à Damas au VII/XIIIe siècle,” *Bulletin des Études Orientales* 28 (1975): 167–99.

67. Egyptian judges wrote to complain about Ifriqiyan forgers (*man ẓahara ‘alayhi al-ḍarb ‘alā al-khuṭūṭ*) and were told that they had nothing to fear from them, because Mamlūk documents were written in markedly different script and style. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mīyār*, 2: 414. Ibn ‘Arafa (d. 1404) reports this practice without specifying a time frame. See also Saad Ghrab, “Réflexions à propos de la querelle Ibn ‘Arafa (716/1316–803/1401), Ibn Haldoun (732/1332–808/1406),” *Cabiers de Tunisie* 35, 139–40 (1987): 49–70.

68. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 605; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 3: 290.

69. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 270. “wa kānā qasduhu, wa Allāh a’lam, an yanfarida binaw‘ yashtahiru bibi dūna ghayrihi min al-nās.” Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 190–92.

70. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 252–53, 254.

71. The Andalusis used Andalusi notaries who prepared form contracts, bills of sale, and marriage licenses in their own format. This guaranteed the employment of some of

the immigrants and was one of the mechanisms that made “Andalusis” an objective social category.

72. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 8: 445.

73. The connection between judges and official “trust” can also be seen in relation to their role as ambassadors. Ibn al-Tawwāḥ, *Sabk al-maqāl*, 197–98.

74. “The *fatwā* is an opinion on a point of law, the term ‘law’ applying, in Islam, to all civil or religious matters.” Emile Tyan, “Fatwā,” *EI²*, 2: 866.

75. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 265.

76. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 254.

77. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 245, 250.

78. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 262. The mufti Abū Sulaymān al-Wajhānī (fl. 13th century), “made his living from land he owned in his country (*balad*).”

79. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 250.

80. See, for example, al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 263–64, 307–8, 320, 341.

81. Al-Ghubrīnī, *'Unwān*, 245–46. The grand judge of Tunis Abū al-Qāsim al-Ghubrīnī (d. 1440) was the grandson of Abū al-'Abbās al-Ghubrīnī, the grand judge of Bijāya and author of the *'Unwān*.

82. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, 7: 898.

83. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 618–19; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 3: 308–10.

84. Abū Bakr b. 'Alī al-Sinhājī al-Baydhāq (d. after 1164), *Akhbār al-mahdi Ibn Tūmart wa bidāyat dawlat al-muwāḥhidin* (Rabat, 1971); Ḥasan b. 'Alī Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (fl. 13th century), *Nazm al-junān li tartib mā salafa min akhbār al-zamān* (Beirut, 1990). See also J. F. P. Hopkins, “Ibn Tūmart,” *EI²*, 3: 958.

85. Sufi ideas and practices have generated a great deal of scholarly interest. For the Maghrib, see for example, Nelly Amri, “La gloire des saints: temps du repentir, temps de l’espérance au Maghreb ‘médiéval’ d’après une source hagiographique du VIIIe/XIVe siècle,” *Studia Islamica* 93 (2002): 133–47; idem, *al-Walāya wa al-mujtama': musāhama fi al-tārikh al-dīni wa al-ijtimā'i li ifriqiyā fi al-'ahd al-hafṣi* (Tunis, 2001); idem, “Écriture hagiographique et modèles de sainteté dans l’Ifriqiya ḥafṣide (VIIe–IXe/XIVe–XVe siècle) d’après trois recueils de manāqib,” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 49 (1998): 11–31; Michael Brett, “Islam in the Maghreb: The Evolution of the Zawiya (pt. 2),” *Maghreb Review* 2: 4 (1977): 14–18; Vincent Cornell, “Mystical Doctrine and Political Action in Moroccan Sufism: The Role of the Exemplar in the Ṭarīqa al-Jāzuliyya,” *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes*, 13 (1992): 205–36; Halima Ferhat, *Le Soufisme et les Zaouyas au Maghreb: Mérite individuel et patrimoine sacré* (Rabat, 2003); Mercedes García-Arenal, “La práctica del precepto de al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahy 'an al-munkar en la hagiografía magrebí,” *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes*, 13:1 (1992): 143–65; Mohamed A. M. Mackeen, “The Early History of Sufism in the Maghrib Prior to Al-Shadhilī (d. 656/1256),” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 91 (1971): 398–408; Francisco Rodríguez Mañas, “Hombres santos y recaudadores de impuestos en el occidente musulmán,” *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes*, 12: 2 (1991): 471–96; Houari Touati, *Entre Dieu et les hommes. Lettrés, saints et sorciers au Maghreb (17e siècle)* (Paris, 1994); idem, “En relisant les “Nawāzil” Mazouna: marabouts et chorfa au Maghreb central au XVe siècle,” *Studia Islamica* 69 (1989): 75–94. See also

Jean-Claude Schmitt, “La fabrique des saints,” *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 39 (1984): 286–300.

86. See Halima Ferhat, *Le Maghreb aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles: les siècles de la foi* (Casablanca, 1993); Maya Shatzmiller, “Al-Muwahhidūn,” *EI²*, 7: 801.

87. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 742.

88. *Karāma* is the favor God gives his friends (known as *awliyā'*, sing. *walī*) by which they become capable of marvels. The term is distinguished from *mu'jiza* (miracle), which is bestowed on prophets. The difference between the two resides in the procedure by which prophecy is determined and the personal favor given to the *walī* (commonly translated as saint). See Louis Gardet, “Karāma,” *EI²*, 4: 639–41.

89. Al-Burzuli, *Fatāwā*, 6: 402–26.

90. Al-Burzūlī refers to many ulama, some of whom were his own teachers, who tolerated such behaviors before the imposition of the regional emirate. See, for example, al-Burzūlī, *Fatāwā*, 6: 426.

91. Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 748. A student who brandished a book saying, “This is a section of the Qur’ān (*juz*) or an even more truthful text,” explicitly equating the sacred text to a Sufi text, was decapitated after Tunisian jurists decreed that he deserved death. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 2: 364.

92. See Vincent Cornell, *The Way of Abu Madyan: Doctrinal and Poetic Works of Abu Madyan Shū‘ayb ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Ansari (ca. 500/1115–16–594/1198)* (Cambridge, 1996); Elmer Douglas, ed., *The Mystical Teachings of al-Shadhili: A Translation from the Arabic of Ibn al-Sabbagh's Durrat al-asrār wa tuhfat al-abrār* (Albany, 1993). See also Imed Melliti, “La baraka: construction ordinaire et construction savante. Réflexions autour d’un travail de recherche,” *IBLA: Revue de l’Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes* 194 (2004): 149–68.

93. According to Brunschwig, “Son grand mérite, sa grande réussite, c'est d'avoir réalisé, d'une manière accessible à ses auditeurs, l'heureuse synthèse des influences diverses qu'il avait subies. Avec lui, le šūfisme modéré, qu'un Ghazali avait déjà intégré dans l'orthodoxie musulmane, cent ans plus tôt, à l'usage principalement d'une élite privilégiée, s'adapte en outre à la mentalité du croyant nord-africain, homme du peuple ou lettré. Le caractère moyen de ce mysticisme, à mi-chemin entre la froide dévotion et une exaltation excessive, entre la piété ignare et une dialectique desséchante, l'avait vite rendu séduisant. D'où son succès rapide, et comme sans effort.” Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 319.

94. See Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 328; Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 2: 741–45.

95. Urvoj, “Structuration,” 92–93.

96. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 391–94. In spite, or perhaps because, of the extraordinary character of *karāmat*, al-Ghubrīnī examined a great number of documents, treaties, and copies of books and tried to keep his accounts close to a notion of “truth” that resembles our conception of “reliability.” “*wa sami'tu mimman wathiqtu bi-hadīthihī*” (I heard from a trusted source) comes naturally to him. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 307. He also sought some documents in the *mawdī* (storage place or archive) of Bijāya. His approach combines belief in the *karāmat* and a judge’s reliance on established fact. Legal facts are averred on the basis of reports of trusted witnesses. See Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 206.

97. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 127–32.

98. During the Marinid takeover in 1352, the Sultan Abū ‘Inān visited al-Zawāwī’s tomb and prayed there. This act is seen as purely political-ideological, tied to the Marinid propaganda that tried to reunite the region. Ibn al-Hājj al-Numayrī, *Fayd al-‘Ubāb wa ifādat qidāh al-ādāb fī al-ḥaraka al-sa‘īda ilā qasantīna wa al-zāb*, ed. Mohamed Benchekroun (Beirut, 1990), 96. After the death of these two supermen, Muhammad b. Abī al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāsī (13th century) gave their ideas new life and made them common currency among the Bijāyans.

99. Al-Burzulī noted that the fame of the *‘ulamā’ al-zāhir* died with them, whereas that of the *sulāḥa* who preferred the *bātin* grew after their death. Al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 6: 403.

100. Abū Madyan is considered to be the “patron saint” of both Tilimsān where he died and Bijāya where he lived and taught. However, the process of “sanctification” is not yet fully understood.

101. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 60, 99.

102. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 100.

103. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 107, 265.

104. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 620–23.

105. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 227–28, 262.

106. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 190–92.

107. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 152.

108. Amri, *al-Walāya*, 279.

109. The famous traveler Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 1377) mentioned a Ḥafṣid embassy to the ruler of Tilimsān led by a judge and a Sufi sheikh. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa* (Beirut, 1964), 15.

110. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Miyyār*, 11: 34. The term *bid’ā* refers to a belief or practice which finds no precedent in the time of the Prophet. Though the term has a strong negative connotation (and legal repercussions), with the passing of time a distinction was made between good innovations and bad ones. For instance, Sufis who invited men and women to their gatherings violated the norms supported by judges. Finding a “legal” reason to validate their practices, some argued that “the good outweighed the wrong” and ignored their detractors. See Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Raṣṣā‘ (d. 1488 or 1489), *Fihrist al-Raṣṣā‘* (Tunis, 1967), 195–96.

111. Al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān*, 107–8. For legal opinions against these Sufis, see al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 6: 403–28.

112. Maghribis were not the only ones seeking followers in the countryside. The Andalusī al-Qashtalī crisscrossed the region near Bijāya without much success. See Aḥmad al-Qashtalī, *Tuhfat al-Mughtarib bi-bilād al-maghrib fī karāmat al-shaykh abi marwān*, ed. Fernando de la Granja (Madrid, 1974), 130.

113. See Francisco Rodríguez Mañas, “Supplanting the Ruler: The Levying of Taxes by Sufi Zāwiyas in the Maghrib,” *Islamic Quarterly* 40, 3 (1996): 188–99.

114. Subordinate to the ruling elite, the wealthy merchants, and the landed urban notables, were a great many groups. They included the poorer merchants, craftsmen, servants, and slaves in the cities and sharecroppers, farmhands, and shepherds in the country. The routinization of power around the *zāwiya* gave those who owned and controlled the land

and cattle a determining say in the articulation of Sufi ideas in the countryside. The *zāwiya* became an institution that supported the reproduction of their influence over others.

115. It is critical to repeat that by themselves the ideas of these Sufis were not a political threat.

116. Clearly, when they took over Bijāya, the *ghawghā'* were not subordinate to the urban elite. Their political defeat made them subordinate.

117. Brunschvig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 286–351. The idea of “Mālikī orthodoxy” is broadly accepted and appears often in contrast to “Sufism.” See for example, Michael Brett, *Ibn Khaldun and the Medieval Maghrib* (Aldershot, 1998), 32; Ross E. Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the Fourteenth Century* (Berkeley, 2005), 279; Jonathan Katz, *Dreams, Sufism, and Sainthood: The Visionary Career of Muhammad al-Zawāwī* (Leiden, 1996), 15; David S. Powers, *Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300–1500* (Cambridge, 2002), 16.

118. Hasan, *al-Madina*, 2: 743–44.

119. For the persecution of Ibaqites, see al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi'yār*, 7: 362–33.

120. Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī (d. 1349), *Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār* (8–14) (Casablanca, 1988), 86.

121. Urvoy, “Structuration,” 98.

122. Amri, *al-Walāya*, 391–429.

CHAPTER 6. EMIRISM AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY

1. See al-Zarkashī, *Bulūgh al-amānī fi sharḥ qaṣīdat al-damāmīnī*, ed. Ahmād al-Ṭawīlī (Tunis, 2003), 210.

2. Of course, there were competing factions within the Ḥafṣid dynasty, and elite intellectuals were often actively involved in them. Consequently, the *encadrement* referred to here was dynamic and must therefore be related back to actual politics. My generalization pertains more specifically to the period in which the historical chronicles were composed.

3. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 197.

4. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ibar*, 6: 589; al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 18.

5. This did not preclude subordinate groups from developing alternative narratives about the past.

6. The ruler had been a student of his, probably back when he was an Almohad official in al-Andalus. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 119. See also Ahmād al-Ṭawīlī, *al-Hayāt al-adabiya bi-tūnis fi al-‘abd al-hafṣī*, 2 vols. (Kairouan, 1996), 2: 70–71.

7. ‘Alī b. Sa‘īd, *al-Mughrib fi hulā al-maghrib*, ed. Shawqī Dayf, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1964), 2: 73.

8. Famously, Ibn Sa‘īd’s involvement in court politics led to his removal from office after enemies convinced the ruler that he was guilty of embezzlement. The poems he composed to regain al-Mustanṣir’s trust are literary masterpieces. Ultimately, Ibn Sa‘īd was able to regain favor with the Ḥafṣid court.

9. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 124. See also al-Ṭawīlī, *al-Hayāt*, 1: 98–101.

10. The elimination of Ibn al-Abbār points to the primarily political role many Andalusi intellectuals played in Ifrīqiyā in the thirteenth century.
11. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 124.
12. See Chapter 4. For an exhaustive and systematic recent study of his life and work, see Abdesselam Cheddadi, *Ibn Khaldūn: l'homme et le théoricien de la civilisation* (Paris, 2006).
13. Ibn Khaldūn used the notion of *tabaqā* to mark a succession of dynasties. The idea can be found in earlier works. See for instance, Abū al-Qāsim Ṣā‘id al-Andalusī (1029–70), *Tabaqāt al-umam*, ed. Ḥusain Mu’nis (Cairo, 1998).
14. For the importance of al-Andalus as a center of production of Berber genealogies, see Maya Shatzmiller, “Le Mythe d’origine Berbère: Aspects historiographiques et sociaux,” *Revue de l’Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 35 (1983): 145–56.
15. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 35; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 3; Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. Muḥammad b. Tāwīt al-Ṭanjī and Nūrī al-Jarrāḥ (Beirut, 2003), 49–61.
16. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, 50.
17. This was not the case in the Arabian Peninsula, for example, where the fact of “not being Berber” was irrelevant to being Arab.
18. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, 51.
19. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, 53.
20. See, for example, Emilio García Gómez, *Andalucía contra Berbería* (Barcelona, 1976).
21. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, 56.
22. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, 56–57.
23. Ibn Khaldūn, *Rīḥlat Ibn Khaldūn*, 58.
24. Scholars have used Ibn Qunfudh’s closeness to his mother’s family to explain his interest in Sufis. Their reasoning on the matter is very sensible. The point was articulated most cogently by Turki and al-Nayfar, who discussed Ibn Qunfudh’s “two families.” Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 40–52. This particular *zāwiya* was politically important, and Ḥafṣid emirs treated its sheikhs with great deference. Ibn Qunfudh, *Uns al-Faqīr wa ‘izz al-haqīr*, ed. Muḥammad al-Fāsī and Adolphe Faure (Rabat, 1965), 41, 45.
25. For a discussion of his various works, see Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 65–84.
26. In addition to his *Fārisiya*, Ibn Qunfudh authored a book of biographies of the students of the twelfth-century Sufi Abū Madyan Shū‘ayb al-Andalusī (1126–97). Ibn Qunfudh, *Uns al-Faqīr*. He also wrote a famous and extremely useful book dating the deaths of famous ulama. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Wafāyāt*, ed. ‘Ādil Nuwayhiq (Beirut, 1971). His biography of the Prophet Muhammad has also been published. Ibn Qunfudh, *Wasīlat al-islām bi al-nabī* (Beirut, 1984).
27. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 99. Ibn Qunfudh reminds the reader that “Abū Fāris and three of his immediate ancestors were born in Qasanṭīna and the city has, because of that, honor unavailable to other cities.” Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiya*, 193.
28. Robert Brunschwig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafṣides des origines à la fin du XVe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940–47), 2: 394.

29. This book could have used the autonomy of Qasanṭīna to historicize the centrality of Tunis. The city was an important economic, political, and cultural center. It deserves more scholarly attention than it has received so far.

30. See for example, Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 157. (*akbārānī man ra'āh*)

31. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 148–49. See discussion in Chapter 4.

32. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 197.

33. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 196.

34. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 197; emphasis mine.

35. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 145.

36. In fact, he used the occasion to buttress the standing of his city, stating that the emir “preferred the people of Qasanṭīna above all.” Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 148.

37. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 194.

38. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 193.

39. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 196.

40. Al-Zarkashī's major work is his chronicle, *Tārikh al-dawlatayn al-muwahhidiyā wa al-hafṣiyā*. See Brunschvig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 395–96; al-Tawīlī, *al-Hayāt*, 1: 278–79; al-Zarkashī, *Bulūgh al-amānī*, 19–23.

41. The poem was written by the Alexandrian al-Damāmīnī (d. ca. 1422). He was an Egyptian scholar and merchant who was eager to migrate to Tunis, perhaps to escape creditors. Al-Zarkashī refers to a longer study of the same poem, but it is no longer extant. The abridged study has been recently edited and published. Al-Zarkashī, *Bulūgh al-amānī*.

42. Muḥammad al-Mas'ūd was heir to the throne but died before his father. Al-Zarkashī was attached to him.

43. Al-Zarkashī, *Bulūgh al-amānī*, 20–21.

44. Al-Zarkashī, *Bulūgh al-amānī*, 210–11.

45. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 114.

46. Interestingly, the Tunisian judge Ibn 'Arafa (d. 1401) brought the poem with him from the east when he returned from pilgrimage.

47. Al-Zarkashī, *Bulūgh al-amānī*, 92–95.

48. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 106–14.

49. Al-Zarkashī stands out for mentioning the mothers of the Ḥafṣid rulers. Since many were slave girls, one may speculate that he was saying something about his own status.

50. The full title of *al-Adilla* by Ibn al-Shammā' is *al-Adilla al-bayyina al-nūrāniya fī mafākhir al-dawla al-hafṣiya*.

51. A didactic purpose was common in Arabic historiography. See Tarif Khalidi, *Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period* (Cambridge, 1994); Chase F. Robinson, *Islamic Historiography* (Cambridge, 2003); Franz Rosenthal, *A History of Muslim Historiography* (Leiden, 1952).

52. Ibn al-Shammā', *al-Adilla*, 28. The latter part is from the Qur'ān, 50:37.

53. *Mafākhir* was, by the fifteenth century, a well-established literary genre.

54. Ibn al-Shammā', *al-Adilla*, 45.

55. The *manāqib* genre tends to transpose “events” into an atemporal realm.

56. This genealogy is not found in other histories.
57. For the relation between number and power, see Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 192–93; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 1: 327–30.
58. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 48–49.
59. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 128.
60. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 114. He mentions that his father washed the dead body of the heir to the throne. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 119.
61. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 18–19.
62. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 133–35.
63. His father had held this position, which was by then hereditary.
64. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 132–33.
65. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 135. Ibn al-Shammā‘ asks for God’s retribution against the one responsible for “their coming to Ifriqiyyā.”
66. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 6: 153.
67. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 138.
68. See Muḥammad Ḥasan, *al-Madīna wa-al-bādiya fi ifriqiyya fi-al-‘abd al-hafṣī*, 2 vols. (Tunis, 1999), 2: 638–59. For the involvement of these Bedouins in the leather trade with cities, see al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 5: 122, 217, 219. See also al-Burzulī, *Fatāwā*, 1: 568; 3: 249; 5: 131.
69. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 138.
70. Cf. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 27–48.
71. “‘alā marr al-zamān wa al-duhūr.” Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 138. Ibn Khaldūn famously described the Banū Hilāl as “swarms of locusts that destroy anything they came in contact with.” Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, 6: 31.
72. Ibn al-Shammā‘, *al-Adilla*, 113.
73. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 662–691; Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*, 3: 412–40.
74. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 130. The lion imagery was widely used by courtiers and Hafṣid emirs alike. See, for example, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ al-ṭib min ḡhusn al-andalus al-raqīb wa dhakr waziraha Ibn al-Khaṭīb*, 8 vols. (Beirut, 1968), 2: 322–23; Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh al-Tijānī, *Riḥlat al-Tijānī* (Tunis, 1981), 198–203.
75. Ibn Fadl Allāh al-‘Umari, *Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār* (*min al-bāb al-thāmin ilā al-bāb al-thāmin ‘ashar*), ed. Mustafa Abū Ḏayf Ahmad (Casablanca, 1988), 91.
76. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 121.
77. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 116.
78. Al-Zarkashī, *Tārikh*, 126.
79. Nelly S. Amri, *al-Walāya wa al-mujtama‘: musāhaba fi al-tārikh al-dīnī wa al-ijtīmā‘i li ifriqiyyā fi al-‘abd al-hafṣī* (Tunis, 2001), 263–96.
80. Al-Wansharīsī, *al-Mi‘yār*, 10: 10.
81. Abū al-Qāsim al-Burzulī, *Jāmi‘ masā‘il al-ahkām limā nazala min al-qadāyā bi al-muftīn wa al-ḥukkām*, ed. Muḥammad al-Ḥabib al-Hila, 7 vols. (Beirut, 2002); Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī, *‘Unwān al-dirāya fīman ‘urifa min al-‘ulamā‘ fi al-mi‘a al-sābi‘a bi-bijāya*, ed. ‘Ādil Nuwayhid (Beirut, 1969); ‘Abd al-Wāhiḍ Muḥammad b. al-Ṭawwāḥ, *Sabk al-maqāl li-fakk al-‘iqāl, tarājim wa a’lām min al-qarnayn al-sābi‘ wa al-thāmin al-hijriyyayn*, ed. Muḥammad M. Jabrān (Beirut, 1995); al-Tijānī, *Riḥlat al-Tijānī*.

82. See, for example, Louis Blancard, *Documents inédits sur le commerce de Marseille au Moyen Âge*, 2 vols. (Marseille, 1884–85); Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abd Allāh Ibn al-Hājj al-Numayrī, *Fayḍ al-‘Ubāb wa ifṣādat qidāḥ al-ādāb fī al-ḥaraka al-sa‘ida ilā qasāntīna wa al-zāb*, ed. Mohamed Benchekroun (Beirut, 1990); Yahyā b. Muḥammad Ibn Khaldūn (1332/33–1378/79), *Bughyat al-ruwād fi dhikra al-mulūk min Bani ‘Abd al-Wād*, ed. Abdelhamid Hadjat (Algiers, 1980); Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Marzūq, *al-Musnad al-ṣaḥīḥ al-hasān fī ma‘āthir wa maḥāsin mawlānā Abī al-Ḥasan*, ed. María-Jesús Viguera (Algiers, 1981); Louis de Mas-Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l’Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1866).

83. See Mohamed Salah Baizig, *Bijāya fī al-‘ahd al-Hafṣī: dirāsa iqtisādiya wa-ijsimā‘iya* (Tunis, 2006), 14–16; Brunschwig, *La Berbérie*, 2: 384–98; Ḥasan, *al-Madīna*, 1: 17–18; Dominique Valérian, *Bougie: Port Maghrébin, 1067–1510* (Rome, 2006), 15–17.

84. Valérian, *Bougie*, 17.

85. The strength of Dominique Valérian’s study resides in his consistent reminder of this fragility of the sources. Although it may seem hesitant or cautious, his approach is commendable.

86. Valérian, *Bougie*, 18.

87. Ibn Qunfudh, *al-Fārisiyā*, 124.

CONCLUSION: DEPARTURES

1. Abdelmajid Hannoum, “Translation and the Colonial Imaginary: Ibn Khaldūn Orientalist,” *History and Theory* 42, 1 (2003): 81; William MacGuckin de Slane, *Histoire des berbères*, 4 vols. (Algiers, 1852–56). See also Abdesselam Cheddadi, *Ibn Khaldūn revisité* (Casablanca, 1999).

2. Ibn Khaldūn’s statements on Bedouins were mobilized to support the myth of Arab Bedouinization and desertification of a land that had been the granary of Rome. See Diana K. Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa* (Athens, 2007).

3. Yves Modéran, *Les maures et l’Afrique romaine (IVe–VIIe siècle)* (Rome, 2003), 11. In fact, Modéran utilized a great many artifacts of colonial translation.

4. For recent examples of the utilization of colonial Ibn Khaldūn to generate the Berber “race,” see Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers* (Oxford, 1996), 124; Maya Shatzmiller, *The Berbers and the Islamic State: The Marinid Experience in Pre-Protectorate Morocco* (Princeton, 2000), 11, 32, 36. Those who read Ibn Khaldūn through Franz Rosenthal’s English translation of *al-Muqaddima* will also encounter the modern concept of race. Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*.

5. See for example, Michael Brett, *The Rise of the Fatimids: The World of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the Tenth Century CE* (Leiden, 2001), 54, 255, 261.

6. Jamil Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1975), 12.

This page intentionally left blank

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

- Al-‘Abdarī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Riḥlat al-‘Abdarī, al-musammāt al-Riḥla al-maghribiya*. Ed. Muḥammad al-Fāṣī. Rabat: Jāmi‘at Muḥammad al-Khāmis, 1968.
- Abdesselam, Ahmed. *Ibn Khaldūn et ses lecteurs*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983.
- Abrams, Philip. “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State.” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, 1 (1978): 58–89.
- Abulafia, David. *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- . *Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- . “Sul commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo medioevo.” In *La Società mediterranea all’epoca del Vespro: XI Congresso della Corona d’Aragona, Palermo-Trapani-Erice, 25–30 aprile 1982*. Palermo: Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti, 1983. 5–22.
- . “A Tyrrhenian Triangle: Tuscany, Sicily, Tunis, 1276–1300.” In *Studi di storia economica Toscana nel Medioevo e nel Rinascimento in memoria di Federigo Melis*. Pisa: Pacini, 1987. 53–75.
- Abu-Lughod, Janet L. “The Islamic City: Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, 2 (1987): 155–76.
- Abun-Nasr, Jamil. *A History of the Maghrib*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1971), 1975.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Les Algériens musulmans et la France 1871–1919*. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, repr. 2005.
- Alarcón y Santón, Maximiliano, and Ramón García de Linares. *Los documentos árabes diplomáticos del Archivo de la corona de Aragón*. Madrid: E. Maestre, 1940.
- Alcock, Susan E. “Alphabet Soup in the Mediterranean Basin: The Emergence of the Mediterranean Serial.” In *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, ed. William V. Harris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 314–36.
- Amari, Michele. *I diplomi arabi del R. archivio fiorentino: testo originale con la traduzione letterale e illustrazioni*. Florence: Le Monnier, 1863.
- Amouric, Henri. “Les importations de céramiques dites de Bejaia (Bougie) en Provence et Ligurie (XIIIe–XVIe siècles): le témoignage énigmatique des textes.” In *La Cerámica medieval no Mediterráneo occidental, Lisboa, 16–22 novembro 1987*. Mértola: Campo Arqueológico de Mértola, 1991. 333–37.

- Amri, Nelly S. "Écriture hagiographique et modèles de sainteté dans l'Ifriqiya Ḥafṣide (VIIIe–IXe/XIVe–XVe siècle) d'après trois recueils de manāqib." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 49 (1998): 11–31.
- . "La gloire des saints: temps du repentir, temps de l'espérance au Maghreb 'médiéval' d'après une source hagiographique du VIIIe/XIVe siècle." *Studia Islamica* 93 (2002): 133–47.
- . *al-Walāya wa al-mujtama': musāḥama fī al-tārīkh al-dīnī wa al-ijtīmā'i li-ifrīqiyā fī al-'ahd al-ḥafṣī*. Tunis: Kulliyat al-Ādāb bi-Mannūba, 2001.
- Armstrong, Lawrin, Ivana Elbl, and Martin Elbl, eds. *Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: Essays in Honour of John H. A. Munro*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Azmeh, Aziz. *Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation*. London: Cass, 1982.
- . *Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship*. London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1981.
- Attaoui, Mohamed. *Rasā'il muwaḥḥidiya, majmū'a jadīda*. Kenitra: Kulliyat al-Ādāb wa-al-'Ulūm al-Insāniya, 1995.
- Baali, Fuad. *Society, State, and Urbanism: Ibn Khaldūn's Sociological Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988.
- Baizing, Mohamed Salah. *Bijāya fī al-'ahd al-Ḥafṣī: dirāsa iqtiṣādiya wa-ijtīmā'iya*. Tunis: Kulliyat al-'Ulūm al-Insāniya wa-al-ijtīmā'iya bi-Tūnis, 2006.
- . "L'élite andalouse à Tunis et à Bougie et le pouvoir hafside." In *Communautés et pouvoirs en Italie et au Maghreb au Moyen Âge et à l'époque moderne, actes du séminaire de Rome, 26–27 octobre 2001*, ed. Annliese Nef and Dominique Valérian. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2003.
- . "Muḥāwala li-taqdir 'adad sukkān Bijāya fī al-'ahd al-ḥafṣī." *Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies* 9–10 (1994): 73–82.
- Al-Bakrī, Abū 'Abayd. *Kitāb al-masālik wa al-mamālik*. Ed. Adrien van Leeuwen and André Ferré. Tunis: al-Mu'assasa al-Waṭaniya li-al-Tarjama wa-al-Taḥqīq wa-al-Dirāsāt, 1992.
- Balard, Michel. *La Méditerranée médiévale: espaces, itinéraires, comptoirs*. Paris: Picard, 2006.
- Baratier, Édouard. "Le commerce de Marseille avec l'Afrique du Nord avant 1599." *Marseille, Revue Municipale* 11 (1951) : 31–37.
- Basset, Henri and Henri Terrasse. *Sanctuaires et forteresses Almohades*. Paris: Larose, 1932.
- Batlle i Gallart, Carmen. "Noticias sobre la milicia Cristiana en el Norte de África en la segunda mitad del siglo XIII." In *Homenaje al profesor Juan Torres Fontes*. Vol. 1. Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1987. 127–37.
- . "Uns mercaders de Barcelona al nord d'Africa a mitjan segle XIII." *Acta historica et archaeologica mediaevalia* 10 (1989): 145–57.
- Al-Baydhaq, Abū Bakr b. 'Ali al-Šinhājī. *Akhbār al-mahdi Ibn Tūmart wa bidāyat dawlat al-muwaḥḥidin*. Rabat: Dār al-Manṣūr li al-Ṭibā'a wa-al-Wirāqa, 1971.
- Bel, Alfred. *Les Benou Ghānya: derniers représentants de l'empire Almoravide et leur lutte contre l'empire Almohade*. Paris: E. Leroux, 1903.
- Belkhodja, Khaled, Hichem Djait, Ammar Mahjoubi, and Hédi Slim. *Histoire générale de la Tunisie: le moyen âge*. Tunis: Sud, 2005.

- Belkhodja, Mohamed Habib. "L'émigration andalouse vers l'Ifrikiya au 7e-13e s." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 69–70 (1970): 129–37.
- Ben Abdesselem, Afif. *La vie littéraire dans l'Espagne musulmane sous les mulūk al-ṭawā'iṭ: Ve XIe siècle*. Damascus: Institut Français d'Études de Damas, 2001.
- Berkey, Jonathan P. *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Berque, Jacques. "Du nouveau sur les Banū Hilāl." *Studia Islamica* 36 (1972): 86–109.
- _____. "En lisant les Nawāzil Mazouna." *Studia Islamica* 32 (1970): 31–39.
- _____. *Les Nawāzil el-mouzāra'a du Mi'yār al-Wazzānī*. Rabat: Editions Felix Moncho, 1940.
- _____. "Qu'est-ce qu'une 'tribu' nord-africaine?" In *Éventail de l'histoire vivante, hommage à Lucien Febvre*. Vol. 1, 261–71. Paris: Armand Colin, 1953.
- _____. *Ulémas fondateurs insurgés du Maghreb*. Paris: Sindbad, 1982.
- Al-Bishrī, Sa'd Ibn 'Abd Allāh. *al-Ḥayāt al-'ilmīya fi 'aṣr mulūk al-ṭawā'iṭ fi al-andalus*, 422–488/1030–1095. Riyad: Markaz al-malik fayṣal li-al-buhūth wa-al-dirāsāt al-islāmiya, 1993.
- Blancard, Louis. *Documents inédits sur le commerce de Marseille au Moyen Âge*. 2 vols. Marseille: Barlatier-Feissat, 1884–85.
- Borghese, Gian Luca. *Carlo I d'Angiò e il Mediterraneo: politica, diplomazia e commercio internazionale prima dei Vespri*. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2009.
- Borrás, Andrés Díaz. *Los orígenes de la piratería islámica en Valencia: la ofensiva musulmana trecentista y la reacción Cristiana*. Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Institución Milá y Fontanals, 1993.
- Borrás, Andrés Díaz and Rafael Cariñena Balaguer. "Corsaris valencians i esclaus barbarescs a les darreries del segle XIV: una subhasta d'esclaus a València el 1385." *Estudis Castellonencs* 2 (1984–85): 441–56.
- Bosch-Vila, Jacinto. "Mayūrqa, Majorca, or Mallorca." *EJ*².
- Bouali, Sid Ahmed. *Les deux grands sièges de Tlemcen*. Algiers: Enterprise Nationale du Livre, 1984.
- Bresc, Henri. "Course et piraterie en Sicile (1250–1450)." *Anuario de estudios medievales* 10 (1980) : 751–65.
- _____. *Un monde méditerranéen: économie et société en sicile, 1300–1450*. Rome: École Française de Rome, 1986.
- Brett, Michael. "The City-State in Medieval Ifriqiya: The Case of Tripoli." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 34/137–38 (1986): 69–94.
- _____. "Ibn Khaldūn and the Dynastic Approach to Local History: The Case of Biskra." *Al-Qantara: Revista de estudios árabes* 12 (1991): 157–80.
- _____. *Ibn Khaldūn and the Medieval Maghrib*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999.
- _____. "Islam in the Maghreb: The Evolution of the Zawiya (Pt.2)." *Maghreb Review* 2, 4 (1977): 14–18.
- _____. *The Rise of the Fatimids: The World of the Mediterranean & the Middle East in the Tenth Century CE*. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
- Brett, Michael and Elizabeth Fentress. *The Berbers*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

- Brodman, James. *Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain: The Order of Merced on the Christian-Islamic Frontier*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986.
- Brown, Leon Carl. "Maghrib Historiography: The Unit of Analysis Problem." In *The Maghrib in Question: Essays in History and Historiography*, ed. Michel Le Gall and Kenneth Perkins. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997. 4–16.
- Brunschwig, Robert. *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafside des origines à la fin du XVe siècle*. 2 vols. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1940–47.
- Bulliet, Richard W. *The Patricians of Nishapur*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Al-Burzulī, Abū al-Qāsim. *Jāmī‘ masā‘il al-ahkām limā nazala min al-qadāyā bi al-muftīn wa al-hukkām*. Ed. Muḥammad al-Ḥabīb al-Hila. 7 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al- Islāmī, 2002.
- Cahen, Claude. "Quelques mots sur les Hilaliens et le nomadisme." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 11 (1968): 130–34.
- Cambuzat, Paul-Louis. *L'évolution des cités du Tell en Ifriqiya du VIIe au XIe siècle*. 2 vols. Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1986.
- Camps, Gabriel. "Ghāniya, Banū." *EI²*.
- Cardon, Dominique. *La draperie au Moyen Âge: essor d'une grande industrie européenne*. Paris: CNRS, 1999.
- Castro, Francisco Vidal. "Poder religioso y cautivos creyentes en la Edad Media: la experiencia islámica." In *Fe, cautiverio y liberación: actas del I Congreso Trinitario (Granada, octubre 1995)*, ed. Isidro Hernández Delgado. Córdoba: Córdoba Secretariado Trinitario, 1996.
- Cheddadi, Abdesselam. *Ibn Khaldūn: l'homme et le théoricien de la civilisation*. Paris: Galimard, 2006.
- _____. *Ibn Khaldūn revisité*. Casablanca: Toubkal, 1999.
- Cheyette, Fredric L. "The Invention of the State." In *The Walter Prescott Webb Memorial Lectures: Essays on Medieval Civilization*, ed. Bede K. Lackner and Kenneth R. Phillip. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978. 143–78.
- Chronica Monasterii Casinensis*. Ed. Hartmut Hoffman. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1980.
- Cipolla, Carlo M. *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000–1700*. New York: Norton, 1976.
- Cipollone, Giulio, ed. *La liberazione dei "cattivi" tra cristianità e islam: oltre la crociata e il ġīhād: tolleranza e servizio umanitario*. Vatican: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, 2000.
- Clancy-Smith, Julia. *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
- Constable, Olivia Remie. *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- _____. *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900–1500*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Cornell, Vincent. "Mystical Doctrine and Political Action in Moroccan Sufism: The Role of the Exemplar in the Ṭarīqa al-Jazuliyya." *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes* 13 (1992): 205–36.

- . *The Way of Abu Madyan: Doctrinal and Poetic Works of Abu Madyan Shu'ayb ibn al-Husayn al-Ansari (ca. 509/1115–16–594/1198)*. Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1996.
- Cressier, Patrice. "Les portes monumentales urbaines almohades: symboles et fonctions." In *Los Almohades: problemas y perspectivas*, ed. Patrice Cressier, Maribel Fierro, and Luis Molina. 2 vols. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005.
- Crone, Patricia. *Medieval Islamic Political Thought*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.
- Daoulatli, Abdelaziz. *Tunis sous les Hafsidès*. Tunis: Institut National d'Archéologie et d'Art, 1976.
- Davies, Rees. "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?" *Journal of Historical Sociology* 16 (2003): 280–300.
- Davis, Diana K. *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007.
- Delort, Robert. *Le commerce des fourrures en Occident à la fin du Moyen Âge: (vers 1300-vers 1450)*. 2 vols. Rome: École Française de Rome, 1978.
- Deverdun, Gaston. "Kaşaba." *EI²*.
- Dhina, Atallah. *Les états de l'occident musulman aux XIII^e, XIV^e et XV^e siècles: institutions gouvernementales et administratives*. Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1984.
- Djaït, Hichem. *Histoire générale de la Tunisie: le moyen âge*. Tunis: Sud, 2005.
- . "La wilâya d'Ifriqiya au IIe/VIII siècle: étude institutionnelle." *Studia Islamica* 27 (1967): 77–121; 28 (1968): 79–108.
- Dotson, John E. *Merchant Culture in Fourteenth Century Venice: The Zibaldone da Canal*. Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1994.
- Douglas, Elmer H. *The Mystical Teachings of al-Shadhili: A Translation from the Arabic of Ibn al-Sabbagh's Durrat al-asrār wa tuhfat al-abrār*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.
- Dufourcq, Charles-Emanuel. *L'Espagne catalane et le Maghreb aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles: de la bataille de las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l'avènement du sultan mérinide Aboul-Hasan (1313)*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.
- . "Les consulats catalans de Tunis et de Bougie au temps de Jacques le Conquérant." *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 3 (1966): 469–79.
- Dunn, Ross E. *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the Fourteenth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- Duri, 'Abd al-'Azîz, "Amîr." *EI²*.
- Eickelman, Dale. *Knowledge and Power in Morocco: The Education of a Twentieth-Century Notable*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- . "Is There an Islamic City?" The Making of a Quarter in a Moroccan Town." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5 (1974): 274–94.
- Eickelman, Dale and James Piscatori, eds. *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Elinson, Alexander E. *Looking Back at al-Andalus: The Poetics of Loss and Nostalgia in Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Literature*. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

- Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Ed. Peri J. Bearman, Thierry Bianquis, Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Emeri J. van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
- Epstein, Steven A. *Genoa and the Genoese (958–1528)*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- Ferhat, Halima. *Le Soufisme et les Zaouyas au Maghreb: mérite individuel et patrimoine sacré*. Casablanca: Éditions Toubkal, 2003.
- . *Le Maghreb aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles: les siècles de la foi*. Casablanca: Wallada, 1993.
- Ferrer i Mallol, Maria Teresa. “Documenti catalani sulla spedizione franco-genovese in Berberia (1390).” *Miscellanea di Studi Storici* 1 (1969): 211–61.
- Fierro, Maribel. “Los Banū ‘Āsim al-Thaqafī, antepasados de Ibn al-Zubayr.” *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes* 7 (1986): 53–84.
- . “The Qādī as Ruler.” In *Saber religioso y poder político en el Islam: actas del simposio internacional (Granada, 15–18 octubre 1991)*. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, 1994. 71–116.
- García-Arenal, Mercedes. “La práctica del precepto de *al-amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar* en la hagiografía magrebí.” *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes* 13, 1 (1992): 143–65.
- García-Sanjuán, Alejandro. *Till God Inherits the Earth: Islamic Pious Endowments in al-Andalus (9th–15th Centuries)*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Gardet, Louis. “Kārāma.” *EP²*.
- Gellner, Ernest. “Tribalism and the State in the Middle East.” In *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 109–26.
- Ghrab, Saad. *Ibn ‘Arafa et le mālikisme en Ifrīqiyā au VIIIe/XIVe siècles*. Tunis: Université de Tunis, Faculté des Lettres de la Manouba, 1992–96.
- . “Réflexions à propos de la querelle Ibn ‘Arafa (716/1316–803/1401), Ibn Hal-doun (732/1332–808/1406).” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 35, 139–40 (1987): 49–70.
- Al-Ghubrīnī, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. Aḥmad. *‘Unwān al-dirāya fitman ‘urifa min al-‘ulamā’ fi al-mi’ā al-sābi‘a bi-bijāya*. Ed. Ḵālid Nuwayhid. Beirut: Lajnat al-Ta‘rīf wa-al-Tarjama wa-al-Nashr, 1969.
- Goitein, Shlomo D. *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*. Vol. 4. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- . “Medieval Tunisia, the Hub of the Mediterranean.” In S. D. Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*. Leiden: Brill, 1966. 308–28.
- Gómez, Emilio García. *Andalucía contra Berbería*. Barcelona: Departamento de Lengua y Literatura Árabes, 1976.
- Al-Ḥamawī, Yāqūt. *Jacut’s geographisches Wörterbuch aus den Handschriften zu Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, London und Oxford (Mu‘jam al-buldān)*. Ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld. 6 vols. Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1866–73.
- Hannoum, Abdelmajid. “Translation and the Colonial Imaginary: Ibn Khaldūn Orientalist.” *History and Theory* 42 (2003): 61–81.

- Hasan, Muhammad. *al-Madīna wa-al-bādiya fī ifrīqiya fī-al-‘ahd al-ḥafṣī*. 2 vols. Tunis: Manshūrāt kulliyat al-‘ulūm al-insāniyya wa al-ijtimā‘iyya bi-tunis, 1999.
- Hassen, Mohamed. “Les Ribāt d’Ifriqiyā: peuplement et évolution du territoire au moyen âge.” In *Zones côtières littorales dans le monde méditerranéen au Moyen Âge: défense, peuplement, mise en valeur, Actes du colloque international organisé par l’École Française de Rome et la Casa de Velázquez, Rome, 23–26 octobre 1996*, ed. Jean-Marie Martin. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2001. 147–62.
- Hitti, Philip K. *Capital Cities of Arab Islam*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973.
- Hopkins, J. F. P. “The Almohad Hierarchy.” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 16 (1954): 93–112.
- _____. “Ibn Tūmart.” *EI²*.
- Horden, Peregrine and Nicholas Purcell. *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
- Hourani, Albert H. and Samuel M. Stern, eds. *The Islamic City: A Colloquium*. Oxford: Cassirer, 1970.
- Husayn, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahmān. *Rithā’ al-mudun wa-al-mamālik ak-zā’ila fī al-shi‘r al-‘Arabi hattā suqūt Gharnāṭa*. Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Jabalāwī, 1983.
- Ibn Abī Zar‘, ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh. *al-Anīs al-muṭrib bi-rāwḍ al-qirtās fī tārikh al-maghrib wa madīnat fās*. Ed. al-Hāshimī al-Filālī. 2 vols. Rabat: al-Maṭba‘a al-Waṭaniya, 1936.
- Ibn al-Āḥmar, Ismā‘il b. Yūsuf al-Naṣrī. *A’lām al-maghrib wa al-Andalus, wa huwa kitāb nathir al-jumān fī shi‘r man naẓamani wa iyyāhū al-zamān*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍwān Dāyā. Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1976.
- Ibn al-Athīr. *al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh*. Ed. C. J. Tornberg. 14 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1851–76.
- Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. *Riblat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1964.
- Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā. *Masālik al-absār fī mamālik al-amṣār (min al-bāb al-thāmin ilā al-bāb al-thāmin ‘ashar)*. Ed. Mustafā Abū Ḏayf Aḥmad. Casablanca: Tawzī‘ Sūsbrīs, 1988.
- Ibn al-Ḥājjī, Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Numayrī. *Fayḍ al-‘ubāb wa ifādat qidāḥ al-ādāb fī al-ḥaraka al-sa‘īda ilā qasantina wa al-zāb*. Ed. Mohamed Benchekroun. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990.
- Ibn Hawqal, Abū al-Qāsim Muḥammad. *Configuration de la terre (Kitāb sūrat al-ard)*. Ed. J. H. Kramers and G. Wiet. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1964.
- Ibn Khaldūn, ‘Abd al-Rahmān. *Kitāb al-‘ibar wa-diwan al-mubtada’ wa-al-khabar fī ayyām al-‘arab wa-al-‘ajam wa-al-barbar wa-man ‘āṣarabum min dhawī al-sulṭān al-akbar*. 7 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1956–61.
- _____. *Riblat Ibn Khaldūn*. Ed. Muhammed b. Tāwīt al-Tanjī. Beirut: al-Mu’assasa al-‘Arabiyya li-al-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 2003.
- Ibn Khaldūn, Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad. *Bughyat al-ruwwād fī dhikra al-mulūk min Banī ‘Abd al-Wād*. Ed. Abdelhamid Hadjat. Algiers: al-Maktaba al-Waṭaniya, 1980.
- Ibn Marzūq, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. *al-Musnad al-ṣahīḥ al-ḥasan fī ma’āthir wa mahāsin mawlānā Abī al-Ḥasan*, ed. María-Jesús Viguera. Algiers: al-Sharika al-Waṭaniya li-al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1981.

- Ibn Manzūr, Muḥammad b. Mukarram. *Lisān al-‘Arab*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–56.
- Ibn Nājī, Abū al-Faḍl Abū al-Qāsim al-Tanūkhī. *Ma‘ālim al-imān fī ma‘rifat abl al-qayrawān*. 4 vols. Ed. Ibrāhīm Shabbūh, Muḥammad al-Aḥmadī Abū al-Nūr, Muḥammad Mādūr, Maḥmūd al-Majdūb, and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Majdūb. Tunis: al-Maktaba al-‘Atīqa, 1968–93.
- Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Ḥasan b. ‘Alī. *Naqṣ al-jumān li-tartīb mā salafa min akhbār al-zamān*. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990.
- Ibn Qunfudh, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn. *al-Fārisiyā fī mabādi‘ al-dawla al-hafsiya*. Ed. Muḥammad al-Shādhilī al-Nayfar and ‘Abd al-Majid al-Turkī. Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūniyya li-al-Nashr, 1968.
- _____. *Uns al-Faqīr wa ‘izz al-haqīr*. Ed. Muḥammad al-Fāsī and Adolphe Faure. Rabat: al-Markaz al-‘Āmi‘ī li-al-Baḥth al-‘Ilmī, 1965.
- _____. *al-Wafāyāt*. Ed. Ādil Nuwayhiḍ. Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriya, 1971.
- _____. *Wasīlat al-islām bi al-nabī*. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1984.
- _____. Ibn Sa‘īd, ‘Alī b. Mūsā. *al-Mughrib fī hulā al-maghrib*. Ed. Shawqī Dayf. 2 vols. Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘arif, 1964.
- Ibn al-Shammā‘, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. *al-Adilla al-bayyina al-nūrāniya fī mafākhir al-dawla al-hafsiya*. Ed. al-Ṭāhir al-Mā‘mūrī. Tripoli: al-Dār al-‘Arabiyya li-al-Kitāb, 1984.
- Ibn al-Ṭawwāḥ, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. Muḥammad. *Sabk al-maqāl li-fakk al-‘iqāl, tarājim wa a’lām min al-qarnayn al-sabi‘ wa al-thāmin al-hijriyyayn*. Ed. Muḥammad M. Jabrān. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1995.
- Idris, Hady-Roger. “De la réalité de la catastrophe hilaliène.” *Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 23 (1968): 390–96.
- _____. “L’invasion hilaliène et ses conséquences.” *Cahiers de civilisation medieval* 11 (1968): 353–69.
- Al-Idrīsī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad. *Nuzhat al-muṣṭaq fī ikhtirāq al-āṣāq*. 2 vols. Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1989.
- ‘Inān, Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh. *Asr al-murābiṭin wa al-muwāḥhidin fī al-Maghrib wa al-Andalus*. Cairo: Lajnat al-Ta’lif, 1964.
- Jedla, Ibrahim. “Banū Makkī wa al-hafsiyūn: min al-tahāluf ilā al-ṣirā‘ 624/1227–796/1394.” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 34, 162–63 (1986): 29–41.
- _____. “Nouveaux regards sur les rois Hafsidès.” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 45 (1992): 123–68.
- Jehel, Georges. *L’Italie et le Maghreb au moyen-âge: conflits et échanges du VIIe au XVe siècle*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001.
- Julien, Charles-André. *Histoire de l’Afrique du Nord, Tunisie—Algérie—Maroc de la conquête Arabe à 1830*. 2 vols. Paris: Payot, 1966.
- Kably, Mohamed. *Société, pouvoir et religion au Maroc à la fin du Moyen Age*. Paris: Maison-neuve et Larose, 1986.
- Kaddache, Mahfoud. *L’Algérie médiévale*. Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1992.
- Kateb, Kamel. *Européens, « Indigènes » et Juifs en Algérie (1830–1962)*. Paris: Institut national d’études démographiques, 2001.
- Katz, Jonathan. *Dreams, Sufism, and Sainthood: The Visionary Career of Muhammad al-Zawāwi*. Leiden: Brill, 1996.

- Kennedy, Hugh. *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of Al-Andalus*. New York: Longman, 1996.
- Khalidi, Tarif. *Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Kitāb al-istibṣār fī ‘ajā’ib al-amṣār*. Ed. Sa‘d Zaghlūl. Alexandria: Jāmi‘at al-Iskandariya, 1958.
- Krueger, Hilmar C. “The Wares of Exchange in the Genoese-African Traffic of the Twelfth Century.” *Speculum* 12, 1 (1937): 57–71.
- Lagardère, Vincent. *Histoire et société en occident musulman au moyen âge: analyse du Mi‘yār d’al-Wansharisi*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1995.
- Lapidus, Ira. “The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15 (1973): 21–50.
- Laroui, Abdallah. *L’histoire du Maghreb: un essai de synthèse*. Paris: Maspero, 1976.
- . *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- . *Islam et modernité*. Paris: La Découverte, 1987.
- Latham, J. Derek. “Towards a Study of Andalusian Immigration and Its Place in Tunisian History.” *Cahiers de Tunisie* 5 (1957): 203–52.
- . “Towns and Cities of Barbary: The Andalusian Influence.” *Islamic Quarterly* 16 (1973): 189–204.
- Le Tourneau, Roger. *The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth centuries*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, (1969) 1982.
- . “Funduk.” *EI²*.
- . “Sur la disparition de la doctrine Almohade.” *Studia Islamica* 32 (1970): 193–201.
- . Lopez, Robert S. *The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- López Pérez, María Dolores. *La corona de Aragón y el Magreb en el siglo XIV (1331–1410)*. Barcelona: Institución Milá y Fontanals, 1995.
- Lowry, Joseph E., Devin J. Stewart, and Shawkat M. Toorawa, eds. *Law and Education in Medieval Islam: Studies in Memory of Professor George Makdisi*. Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2004.
- Mac Guckin de Slane, William. *Histoire des Berbères*. 4 vols. Algiers: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1852–1856.
- Mackeen, Mohamed A. M. “The Early History of Sufism in the Maghrib prior to Al-Shadhili (D. 656/1256).” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 91 (1971): 398–408.
- Mahdi, Muhsin. *Ibn Khaldūn’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophical Foundation of the Science of Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Makki, Mahmoud. “The Political History of al-Andalus, 92/711–897/1492.” In *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed., Salma K. al-Jayyusi. Leiden, Brill, 1992. 3–87.
- Al-Ma‘mūrī, al-Ṭāhir. *Jāmi‘ al-Zaytūna wa madāris al-‘ilm fi al-‘ahd al-hafṣī wa al-turkī*. Tunis: al-Dār al-‘Arabiyya li-al-Kitāb, 1980.
- Al-Maqqarī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad. *Nafḥ al-ṭib min ḡuṣn al-Andalus al-raqṭib wa dhikr wazīrīhā Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb*. Ed. Iḥsān ‘Abbās. 8 vols. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1968.

- Marçais, Georges. *Les poteries et faïences de Bougie (collection Debruge): contribution à l'étude de la céramique musulmane*. Constantine: D. Braham, 1916.
- Marin, Manuela. "Una familia de ulemas cordobeses: los Banū Abī 'Isā." *Al-Qantara: Revista de estudios árabes* 6 (1985): 291–320.
- Al-Marīnī, Abū 'Alī Ibrāhīm. *'Unwān al-akhbār fī mā marra 'ala Bijāya*. Trans. Laurent-Charles Féraud as "Conquête de Bougie par les Espagnols d'après un manuscript arabe." *Revue Africaine* 12 (1868): 245–56, 337–49.
- 'Abd al-Wāhid al-Marrākushī. *Wathā'iq al-murābiṭin wa al-muwaḥḥidin*. Cairo: Maktabat al-thaqāfa al-diniya, 1997.
- . *al-Mu'jib fi talkhīs akhbār al-maghrib wa al-andalus*. Ed. Muḥammad 'Azab. Cairo: Dār al-farḥānī li-al-nashr wa al-tawzī', 1994.
- Martinez-Gros, Gabriel. *Ibn Khaldūn et les sept vies de l'Islam*. Arles: Sindbad, 2006.
- . *L'idéologie omeyyade: la construction de la légitimité du califat de Cordoue (Xe–XIe siècles)*. Madrid: Casa Velázquez, 1992.
- Masiá de Ros, Ángeles. *La corona de Aragón y los estados del norte de África*. Barcelona: Instituto Español de Estudios Mediterráneos, 1951.
- Mas-Latrie, Louis de. *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Âge*. Paris: Plon, 1866.
- Al-Matwī, Muḥammad al-'Arūsī (Métoui, Mohamed Laroussi). *al-Salṭana al-Hafṣiyā, tārikhuha al-siyāsī wa dawruha fī al-maghrib al-islāmī*. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1986.
- Mélikoff, Irène. "Għażi." *EI²*.
- Melliti, Imed. "La baraka: construction ordinaire et construction savante. Réflexions autour d'un travail de recherché." *IBLA: Revue de l'Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes* 194 (2004): 149–68.
- M'ghirbi, Salah. *Les voyageurs de l'Occident musulman du XIIe au XIVe siècles*. Tunis: Université des lettres, des Arts et des Sciences Humaines, Tunis I, 1996.
- Mikel de Epalza and Ramón Petit, eds. *Recueil d'études sur les moriscos andalous en Tunisie*. Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura, 1973.
- Modéran, Yves. *Les Maures et l'Afrique romaine (IVe–VIIe siècle)*. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2003.
- Mollat, Michel. "De la piraterie sauvage à la course réglementée, XII–XIVe siècle." *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome*. Rome: École Française de Rome, 1975.
- . "Essai d'orientantion pour l'étude de la guerre de course et la piraterie (XIIIe–XVe s.)." *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 10 (1980): 743–49.
- Mūsā, 'Iz al-Dīn 'Umar. *al-Nashāt al-iqtisādī fī al-maghrib al-islāmī khilāl al-qarn al-sādis al-hijrī*. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2003.
- Nicolini, Nicola. *Codice Diplomatico sui rapporti Veneto-napoletani durante il regno di Carlo I d'Angiò*. Rome: Sede dell'Istituto, 1965.
- Al-Nuwayrī, Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*. Ed. Ḥusayn Naṣṣār. Vol. 24. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriya, 1983.

- Pegolotti, Francesco Balducci. *La pratica della mercatura*. Ed. Allan Evans. Cambridge Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1936.
- Poncet, Jean. "Encore à propos des Hilaliens: la mise au point de R. Idris." *Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 23 (1968): 660–62.
- . "Le mythe de la catastrophe hilaliène." *Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 5 (1967): 1099–1120.
- Pouzet, Louis. "Ibn Khaldoun et les 'ulamā' d'après son *Kitāb at-Ta'rif*: de la théorie à la réalité." In *Saber religioso y poder político en el Islam: actas del simposio internacional (Granada, 15–18 octubre 1991)*. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, 1994. 213–30.
- . "Maghrébins à Damas au VII/XIIIe siècle." *Bulletin des Études Orientales* 28 (1975): 167–99.
- Powers, David S. "The Art of the Legal Opinion: Al-Wansharīsī on *Tawlīj*." In *Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas*, ed. Muhammad Khaldi Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David Powers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. 98–115.
- . "A Court Case from Fourteenth Century North Africa." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 110, 2 (1990): 229–54.
- . *Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300–1500*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- . "Maliki Family Endowment: Legal Norms and Social Practices." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, 3 (1993): 379–406.
- Prochaska, David. *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône 1870–1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Al-Qashtālī, Aḥmad. *Tuhfat al-Mughṭarib bi-bilād al-maghrib fī karāmāt al-shaykh abī marwān (f. 13th C.)*. Ed. Fernando de la Granja. Madrid: al-Ma'had al-Miṣrī li al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiya, 1974.
- Al-Raṣṣā', Muḥammad ibn Qāsim. *Sharḥ ḥudūd Ibn 'Ārafa al-mawsūm al-hidāya al-kāfiya al-shāfiya li-bayān haqā'iq al-imām ibn 'Ārafa al-wāfiya*. Ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Ajfān and al-Tāhir Ma'mūrī. 2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993.
- Reynolds, Susan. "The Historiography of the Medieval State." In *Companion to Historiography*, ed. Michael Bentley. London: Routledge, 1997. 117–36.
- Rives, J. B. "Imperial Cult and Native Tradition in Roman North Africa." *Classical Journal* 96, 4 (2001): 425–36.
- Rivet, Daniel. *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve de la colonisation*. Paris: Hachette, 2002.
- Robinson, Chase F. *Islamic Historiography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- . *A Medieval Islamic City Reconsidered: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Samarra*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Rodríguez Mañas, Francisco. "Hombres santos y recaudadores de impuestos en el occidente musulmán." *Al-Qanṭara: Revista de estudios árabes* 12, 2 (1991): 471–96.
- . "Supplanting the ruler: The Levying of Taxes by Sufi Zawiya-s in the Maghrib." *Islamic Quarterly* 40, 3 (1996): 188–99.
- Rosenthal, Franz. *A History of Muslim Historiography*. Leiden: Brill, 1952.

- . *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*. Leiden: Brill, 1970.
- Sabbane, Abdellatif. *Le gouvernement et l'administration de la dynastie Almohade (XIIe–XIIIe siècles)*. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Septentrion, 2001.
- Safran, Janina. *The Second Umayyad Caliphate: The Articulation of Caliphal Legitimacy in al-Andalus*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Sato, Tsugitaka. “‘Ushr.’ *EI*².
- Schmitt, Jean-Claude. “La fabrique des saints.” *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 39 (1984): 286–300.
- Segura Graño, Cristina. “Los repartimientos medievales andaluces: estadio de la cuestión.” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 12 (1982): 625–39.
- Shatzmiller, Maya. *The Berbers and the Islamic State: The Marinid Experience in Pre-Protectorate Morocco*. Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener, 2000.
- . *Historiographie mérinide: Ibn Khaldūn et ses contemporains*. Leiden: Brill, 1982.
- . “Islamic Institutions and Property Rights: The Case of the ‘Public Good’ Waqf.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44, 1 (2001): 44–74.
- . *Labour in the Medieval Islamic Worlds*. Leiden: Brill, 1994.
- . “al-Muwahhidūn.” *EI*².
- Shaw, Brent D. “Water and Society in the Ancient Maghrib: Technology, Property and Development.” *Antiquités africaines* 20 (1984): 121–73.
- Simon, Róbert. *Ibn Khaldūn: History as Science and the Patrimonial Empire*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2002.
- Stora, Benjamin. *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale 1830–1954*. Paris: La Découverte, 1991.
- Stowasser, Barbara F. *Religion and Political Development: Some Comparative Ideas on Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli*. Occasional Papers. Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1983.
- Talbi, Mohamed. “al-Hijra al-andalusiya ilā Ifriqiyā ayyām al-ḥafṣiyyīn.” *al-Asāla* 26 (1975): 46–90.
- . *Ibn Khaldun et l'histoire*. Tunis: Maison Tunisienne de l'Édition, 1973.
- . “Ifrikiya.” *EI*².
- Al-Tawīlī, Aḥmad. *al-Ḥayāt al-adabiya bi-tūnis fi al-‘abd al-hafṣī*. 2 vols. Kairouan: Manshūrāt Kulliyat al-Ādāb wa-al-‘Ulūm al-Insāniya, 1996.
- . *Marākiz al-thaqāfa wa al-ta‘lim bi-madinat tunis fi al-‘abd al-hafṣī*. Tunis: [n.p.], 2000.
- Al-Tijānī, Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh. *Rihlat al-Tijānī*. Tunis: al-Dār al-‘Arabīya lil-Kitāb, 1981.
- Touati, Houari. “En relisant les ‘Nawāzil’ Mazouna: marabouts et chorfa au Maghreb central au XVe siècle.” *Studia Islamica* 69 (1989): 75–94.
- . *Entre Dieu et les hommes: lettrés, saints et sorciers au Maghreb (17e siècle)*. Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1994.
- . *Islam et voyage au Moyen Âge: histoire et anthropologie d'une pratique lettrée*. Paris: Seuil, 2000.

- Al-‘Uqbānī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Tilimsānī. *Tuhfat al-nāzir wa ghunyat al-dhākir fi ḥifẓ al-sa’ādīr wa taghyīr al-manākir*. Ed. Ali Chenoufi. *Bulletin d’Études Orientales* 19 (1965–66).
- Udovitch, Abraham L. “At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium.” *Speculum* 37 (1962): 198–207.
- _____. “*Kirād*.” *EI²*.
- _____. *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Urvoy, Dominique. *Le monde des ulémas andalous du VIe/XIe au VIIe/XIIIe siècle: étude sociologique*. Geneva: Droz, 1978.
- _____. “La structuration du monde des ulemas à Bougie au VIIe/XIIIe siècle.” *Studia Islamica* 43 (1976): 87–107.
- Valérian, Dominique. “Les Andalous à Bougie, XIe–XVe siècle.” In *Migrations et diasporas méditerranéennes, XIe–XVIe siècles*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002. 313–30.
- _____. “Les archives de Marseille, source de l’histoire du Maghreb médiéval: le cas du port de Bougie (XIIIe–XVe siècles).” *Annales du Midi* 113, 233 (2001): 5–26.
- _____. *Bougie: Port Maghrébin, 1067–1510*. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2006.
- _____. “Le foundouk, instrument du contrôle sultanien sur les marchands étrangers dans les ports musulmans (XIe–XVe siècles)?” In *La mobilité des personnes en Méditerranée de l’antiquité à l’époque moderne*, ed. Claudia Moatti. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2004.
- _____. “Frontières et territoire dans le Maghreb de la fin du Moyen Âge: les marches occidentales du sultanat hafside.” *Correspondances* 73 (Novembre 2002–Février 2003): 3–8.
- van Staëvel, Jean-Pierre. “Almohades et Mālikites de Tunis. reflexions sur les relations entre élites civiles et gouvernants dans l’Ifriqiya des VIe/XIIe–XIIIe/XIVe siècles.” In *Los Almohades: Problemas y perspectivas*, ed. Patrice Cressier, Maribel Fierro, and Luis Molina. 2 vols. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005. 2: 937–73.
- Verlinden, Charles. “Aspects quantitatifs de l’esclavage méditerranéen au bas Moyen Âge.” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 10 (1980): 759–90.
- Viguera, María Jesús. *De las taifas al reino de Granada, siglos XI–XV*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995.
- Al-Wansharīsī, Aḥmad b. Yahyā. *al-Mī'yār al-mū'rib wa al-jāmi' al-mughrīb 'an fatāwi 'ulamā' ifrīqiya wa al-andalus wa al-maghrib*. Ed. Muḥammad Ḥajjī. 13 vols. Rabat–Beirut: Dār al-Maghrib al-Islāmī, 1981.
- Wasserstein, David. *The Rise and Fall of the Party-Kings: Politics and Society in Islamic Spain 1002–1086*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Young, M. J. L. “Musālķāt.” *EI²*.
- _____. “Muzāra'a.” *EI²*.
- Al-Zarkashī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm. *Bulūgh al-amānī fī sharḥ qaṣīdat al-damāmīnī*. Ed. Aḥmad al-Ṭawīlī. Tunis: al-Maṭba'a al-Rasmiya li-al-Jumhūriya al-Tūnisīya, 2003.

- . *Tārīkh al-dawlatayn al-muwahhidiyā wa al-hafsiyā*. Tunis: al-Maktaba al-‘Atīqa, 1966.
- Al-Zayyāt. ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad. *Rithā’ al-mudun fī al-shī‘r al-andalusī*. Benghazi: Jāmi‘at Qāriyūnis, 1990.

I N D E X

- 'Abd Allāh al-'Ādil (Almohad), 31
'Abd Allāh Ismā'īl b. Faraj. *See* Ibn Faraj
'Abd al-Mu'min (Almohad), 30, 31, 33, 59, 60,
 61, 116, 117, 164, 186n9
'Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Khaldūn. *See* Ibn
 Khaldūn
'Abd al-Wādids, 8, 38, 40, 42–44, 46, 52, 101,
 140, 153, 166, 170, 192n32
'Abd al-Wāhid b. Abī Ḥafṣ 'Umar al-Hintātī,
 29–31, 150, 164
Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad II, 25, 46, 50, 51, 52,
 92, 98, 100, 103–4, 124, 160–62, 169,
 206n76
Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad b. Ḥasan b. Qunfudh.
 See Ibn Qunfudh
Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad al-Shammā', 164
Abū al-'Abbās al-Ghubrīnī, 5, 42, 72, 90,
 108–11, 123, 125, 128, 130, 132, 136, 138, 139,
 141–44, 146, 170
Abū 'Abd Allāh b. Nakhlī. *See* Ibn Nakhlī
Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b.
 Ya'qūb (Almohad). *See* al-Nāṣir
Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad (emir of Bijāya),
 45, 47–52, 92
Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b.
 Lu'lū' al-Zarkashī. *See* al-Zarkashī
Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Mustanṣir. *See*
 al-Mustanṣir
Abū 'Amr 'Uthmān, 52, 53, 120, 160, 162,
 164, 165
Abū Bakr b. Ḥasan b. Khaldūn, 38, 40
Abū al-Baqā' Khālid (b. Abū Zakariyā Ya'hyā
 b. Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm) (emir of Bijāya),
 42, 43
Abū Fāris, 38, 39
Abū Fāris 'Abd al-'Azīz, 10, 20, 25, 26, 52–54,
 82, 98, 101, 106–7, 109, 120–22, 124–25,
 132, 137, 145, 147, 149, 157–60, 162, 164–65,
 167–70, 173
Abū Fāris al-Muṣṭanṣir (Marīnid), 206n76
Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar I, 7, 35, 38, 39, 40, 64, 100,
 III, 143, 150
Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar II, 45, 46
Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar b. Ya'hyā al-Hintātī, 7, 30,
 32, 33, 117
Abū al-Ḥasan (Marīnid), 46, 47, 105
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhili. *See* al-Shādhili
Abū Ḥimāra, 35
Abū Ibrāhīm Aḥmad (Aghlabid), 102
Abū 'Inān, 46–49, 214n98
Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm I, 26, 31, 34, 38, 39, 40,
 64, 100, 113
Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm II, 49, 50, 52
Abū Madyān Shu'ayb al-Andalusī, 141–42
Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Wāhid
 b. Abī Ḥafṣ, 31
Abū al-Qāsim al-Ghubrīnī, 109, 137, 158
Abū al-'Ulā al-Mā'mūn (Almohad), 31
Abū Ya'hyā Abū Bakr II (emir of Bijāya then
 Tunis), 42, 43, 91, 100, 103–4, 131, 168
Abū Ya'hyā Zakariyā (b.) al-Lihyānī. *See*
 al-Lihyānī
Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf b. Muḥammad (Almohad),
 31
Abū Yūsuf al-Manjallātī, 142
Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb al-Manṣūr (Almohad), 142
Abū Zakariyā Ya'hyā I, 25, 31–34, 37, 53, 78,
 99, 100, 109, 112, 114, 129, 143, 146, 150–51,
 155
Abū Zakariyā Ya'hyā (II) al-Wāthiq, 37, 38, 39,
 100, 143
Abū Zakariyā Ya'hyā b. Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm
 (emir of Bijāya), 26, 37–43, 45, 90, 107–8,
 113, 123, 128, 159
Abū Zayd 'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Abd al-Wāhid, 7
 'ādāt. *See* customary practices
Africa, 2, 18
ahl al-filāḥa, 71

- ahl al-ma'rifa*, 71
 Alexandria, 88
 Algeria, 2, 8
 'Ali b. Sa'id, 151
 'Ali b. Salih, 49, 50
 Almohads, 17, 20, 26, 28–34, 36, 37, 46,
 55–57, 59, 61–65, 67, 69, 72–74, 77, 90,
 97, 99, 101–2, 115–17, 119–20, 129, 133–34,
 140–42, 150, 152–53, 155, 160–61, 164, 169,
 176, 186n9; under Hafṣids, 25, 28, 31–41,
 45–47, 49, 53, 60, 63, 64, 77, 97, 109,
 112–13, 122, 133, 136, 139, 143, 156, 163–64,
 173
 Almoravids, 60, 72, 73, 101, 116, 140, 153, 155
 'amāla, 63, 105
 amīn, 78
 'āmma, II, 13, 14, 34, 50, 103, 189n55
 Al-Andalus, 4, 16–19, 28, 30, 32–35, 56, 61, 91,
 109, 110, 112–15, 127, 132, 134, 140, 151–57,
 174
 Andalusis, in Ifriqiyā, 17, 18, 20, 21, 28, 34,
 36–38, 40–42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 53, 61, 63,
 86–88, 97, 107–16, 119, 121–22, 127–28,
 136–39, 146, 151–56, 159, 162, 165, 173, 174;
 militia, 28, 37, 41
 Arabs, 64, 65, 117, 120, 153, 154–56, 165–66,
 168, 174–76
 Aragon, 17, 33, 37, 46, 84, 90, 91, 119
 arḍ al-qānūn, 56, 57, 137
awqāf and *ākbās*. See pious endowments

 Al-Bakrī, 76
 Banū al-'Azafī, 155
 Banū Ghāniya, 29, 60, 62, 77, 90
 Banū Ghubrīn, 40, 108, 132
 Banū Hilāl, 59, 76, 166
 Banū Khaldūn, 61, III, 154–56
 Banū Muznī, 38
 Banū Riyāḥī, 31, 64, 65, 165
 Banū Sayyid al-Nās, 43, 46, 48, 61, 155
 Banū Sulaym, 76, 166
 Al-Bayāsī, 151
 Bedouins: as concept, 9, 10, 14, 27, 175,
 184n35; politics of, 25, 28, 29, 31, 34–37,
 39–44, 47, 50, 52–56, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 71,
 72, 87, 89, 97, 106, 120–21, 159, 161; livelihood of,
 38, 47, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62–64,
 71, 73; representations of, 67, 72, 73, 108,
 112–13, 115–20, 122, 145, 153, 155–56, 163–70,
 205n64
 Berbers, 84, 89, 153–56, 160, 174–76
 Biskra, 6, 8, 29, 35, 38, 118
 Būna (Annaba), 6, 29, 31, 43, 52, 63, 71, 76,
 79, 84, 88, 106, 120, 140, 155
 Al-Burzulī, 63, 69, 70, 83, 137, 141, 170
 captives, 34, 89–93, 155, 162, 169, 174
 Catalans, 44, 80
 Christian militia, 37, 38
 Cordoba, 16, 17, 83
 Corsica, 201n72
 customary practices (*a'rāf*, *'adāt*), 71, 137,
 194n69, 195n83. See also *ard al-qānūn*

 Dabbāb, 31, 35, 38, 39
 dār al-thiqā, 139
 Dawāwida, 31, 33–35, 47, 49, 64
 dawla, 6–14, 49, III, 116–19, 135, 152–53, 155,
 157, 159–60, 163–64, 169
 Daylam, 65, 165
diyāt, 60, 63. See also *hanāshīr*

 Egypt, 2, 59, 86, 117, 138, 166

 Fās (Fez), 6, 16, 52, 157, 222
 Fernando III (León and Castile), 155
 Florence, 81
 France, 2
fundūq, 80, 82

 Genoa, 16, 80, 81, 83, 84
ghauḡha', 26, 48, 49–52, 98, 124, 145
 Al-Ghazālī, 140–41
ghuzāt al-bahr. See pirates
 Al-Ghuzz, 64
 Granada, 16, 34, 37, 44, 50, 88, 91, 137
 Gregory VII (pope), 89

habs. See pious endowments
hājib, 37, 38, 41–45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 102–4,
 107, 110–11, 128, 136
 Ḥammādids, 5, 60, 76, 77, 79, 89, 153
hanāshīr (large estates), 63, 85, 87
 Hintāta, 32, 47, 153, 164–66

 Ibn al-Abbār, 114, 151–52
 Ibn Abī 'Umāra, 39, 40, 50, 62, 159
 Ibn al-Aḥmar. See Muhammad b. Yūsuf
 Ibn 'Arafa, 14, 61–63, 65, 69, 74, 129–31, 164,
 165
 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, 80, 204n41
 Ibn Burṭūla, 128

- Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī, 5, 79
 Ibn Faraj (Naṣrid), 91
 Ibn Ghāmr, 42, 43, 44
 Ibn al-Habbabar, 37, 38
 Ibn Ḥawqal, 76
 Ibn Ḥayyān al-Qurṭubī, 154
 Ibn Ḥazm, 154
 Ibn al-Jundi, 91
 Ibn Khaldūn (*Abd al-Rahmān*), 7, 11, 14, 15,
 18–21, 25, 41, 43–46, 48–52, 59, 64, 66, 72,
 86–89, 92, 101–6, 109–13, 115–21, 125–28,
 132, 134–35, 138–40, 149–57, 159, 161–62,
 166–67, 172, 175–78
 Ibn Nakhil, 150, 161
 Ibn Qunfudh, 7, 18, 37, 64, 100, 103, 107–8,
 149, 156–62, 179
 Ibn Rushd, 140
 Ibn Sa‘id. *See* ‘Ali b. Sa‘id
 Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, 41, 43, 44, 87, 110, 128
 Ibn al-Shammā‘, 18, 27, 32, 52, 78, 119, 120,
 163–67, 170
 Ibn Tafrakīn, 40, 46, 47, 49
 Ibn al-Tawwāḥ, 125, 170
 Ibn Tufayl, 140
 Ibn Tūmart, 30, 33, 116–17, 140, 161, 164
 Al-Idrīsī, 5, 76, 79, 80
iqtā‘. *See* land grants
- Jáen, 110
 James I (Aragon), 33, 34, 90
 James II (Aragon), 91
 Al-Jarīd, 6, 38
 Játiva, 17, 73, 109, 110, 128
 Al-Jazā‘ir, 6, 35, 108
- kāffā*. *See* ‘āmma
karāmāt, 141–42
kātib, 150–52, 161
khammās and *khimāsa*, 69, 70, 194n69
kharāj, 59
kuttāb, 127, 136
 Ku‘üb, 33, 35, 39, 40
- Lamtūna (Almoravids), 101
 land grants (*iqtā‘at*), 56, 57, 60, 62–65, 69, 73,
 74, 105–6, 155
 leather, 70, 71, 81, 83–85
 Al-Lihyānī, 120
 Louis IX, 25, 28, 35, 36, 137, 142
 Lucca, 81
 Al-Lu’lu’a palace, 73
- Machiavelli, 19
madrasa, 128, 129, 130–31, 145
maghārim, 61, 64, 89
 Maghrib, 1–9, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 28, 29, 31–33,
 36–39, 46, 52, 56, 62, 63, 65, 68, 72, 79, 81,
 84, 101, 105, 113, 115–16, 126, 128, 132, 134,
 140–41, 152–57, 163, 165, 167, 172, 175–78;
 central, 5, 6, 8, 29, 31, 47, 65, 68, 76, 77,
 165; western Maghrib, 6, 8, 28, 33, 36, 38,
 39, 47–49, 63, 81, 84, 85, 97, 99, 120, 127,
 132, 140, 144, 157
mahalla, 61, 72, 89, 137, 164
 Al-Mahdiya, 4, 6, 8, 29, 51, 72, 92, 169
 Majorca, 16, 29, 33, 77, 83, 91, 92
 Mālikī law, 14, 56, 70, 126, 133–34, 140, 145
 Mamlūks, 5, 79, 117, 206n76
 Al-Māmūn (Almohad), 32, 134
manaqib (hagiographies), 147, 151, 162, 164,
 168
 Marīnids, 8, 19, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 89, 101,
 105, 140, 153, 166, 170
 Marmājanna, 39, 40
 Marrakech (Marrākush), 8, 28–30, 32, 33, 36,
 60, 77, 116–17, 140
 Marseille, 16, 80, 83
 Al-Mashaddāfi, 128
 Mashriq, 64, 132–33, 139, 155
 Maṣmūda, 153, 164
mawāt, 61, 63, 105
 Al-Māzārī, 74
 Mediterranean, 1, II, 15–18, 20, 28, 35, 58,
 62, 70, 71, 76, 77, 79–86, 89, 93, 108, 155,
 170–71, 174–75, 177
 merchants and commerce, 13, 37, 41–42, 55,
 63, 65, 70, 71, 76–88, 89, 90, 103–4, 139,
 171, 174
milk (private property), 58, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66,
 69, 70, 192n26, 193n46
 Mirdās, 33, 35, 71
 Monte Cassino, 90
 Morocco, 2, 8
 mountains, 10, 54, 58, 89, 106, 120, 159, 160
mughārasa, 70
 Muḥammad V (Naṣrid), 50
 Muḥammad b. Khaldūn, 38
 Muḥammad b. Yūsuf (Ibn al-Āḥmar)
 (Naṣrid), 34
muhtasib, 78
 Al-Mu‘izz b. Bādis (Zīrid), 166
mukūs, 61, 210n48
mulük al-ṭawā’if, 113, 154, 155, 174

- Mu'minids. *See* Almohads
muqāraḍa, 86
 Murcia, 17, 37, 109–10
mustaghriqūn al-dhimma (outlaws), 67, 137, 164–66
 Al-Mustanṣir, 7, 25, 34–38, 40, 41, 53, 90, 99, 100, 101, 109, 112, 128, 136, 143, 146, 151–52
 Al-Mustanṣir (Almohad), 31
 Al-Mustanṣir (Fāṭimid), 59, 166
muzāra'a, 69
- Naḍrūma (Nedroma), 47, 105
 Al-Ñaṣir (Almohad), 29, 30, 31, 134
 Al-Ñaṣir b. 'Alannās (Hammādīd), 89
 nomads, 9, 10, 58, 70, 89, 150
 North Africa, 1, 2, 3, 8, 16, 175, 181n1. *See also* Maghrib
- Party Kings. *See* *mulūk al-tawā'if*
 pious endowments (*abbās, awqāf*), 61, 65–69, 72–74, 130–31
 pirates, 51, 52, 75, 89, 90–93, 119
 Pisa, 16, 80, 83, 90, 91
- Qābis (Gabès), 39, 118
 Qafṣa (Gafsa), 118, 158, 161
 Qal'at Bāni Ḥammād, 6, 76, 108
 Qasānṭīna (Constantine), 6, 8, 11, 25, 26, 33, 35, 38, 42–44, 47, 48, 50, 52, 59, 63, 71, 79, 82, 84, 105–9, 113, 142, 156–59, 162
 Al-Qayrāwān (Kairouan), 4, 29, 39, 60, 69, 76, 106, 143
 Al-Qul (Collo), 6, 198n27
- racial ideology, 2, 18, 175, 176, 184n36
ribāt, 71, 72, 73, 74
 Roger II of Sicily, 79, 90
- Sabta (Ceuta), 6, 8, 16, 155
 Sadwikish, 35, 49, 71, 124
 Safāqis (Sfax), 8, 39
 Sahara, 1, 35, 38, 58
sāhib al-ashghāl, 60, 77, 111
 Sancho of Majorca, 91
 Şanhāja, 42, 43, 48, 153
 Sardinia, 84, 90
 Seville, 17, 31, 109–11, 127, 154–55
- Al-Shādhili, 141–42
 Sicily, 79, 84, 90
 Spain, 18
 Sufis, 72, 73, 123, 125–26, 130, 140–48, 151, 157, 162, 167, 168, 170, 174
sūq (market), 78, 80, 82
- Tabassa (Tebessa), 6, 29, 30
taksīr (land survey), 60
 Tanja (Tangier), 6
 Tarāblus (Tripoli), 11, 25, 47, 86, 106, 120, 173
 Tilimsān (Tlemcen), 6, 16, 33, 37, 38, 40–44, 46–48, 52, 157
 Tunisia, 2, 8
 Tūzar (Tozeur), 100, 118, 158
- ulama, 14–15, 63, 73, III, 123–26, 133, 135, 137, 140–42, 144, 167–70
umm al-khulafā', 155
'urf. *See* customary practices
'ushr (tithe), 56, 61
 'Uthmān. *See* Abū 'Amr 'Uthmān
- Valencia, 16, 17, 34, 128
 Venice, 81, 84
- Al-Wād al-Kabīr, 79, 102, 105
 Al-Wansharīsī, 141, 168, 170
 Al-Wāthiq. *See* Abū Zakariyā Yahyā (II)
 al-Wāthiq
 wheat, 58, 70, 84, 85, 161
 wool, 70, 71, 78, 80–83, 85, 87
 Wujda (Oujda), 47, 105
- Yaghmurāsan b. Zayyān ('Abd al-Wādīd), 38
 Yahyā b. Ghāniya, 29, 30, 31, 33
 Yahyā b. Maymūn, 48, 49
 Yūsuf b. Tashfīn (Almoravid), 155
- Al-Zāb, 6, 33, 35, 38, 118
zāhir, 63, 64
 Al-Ζāhir Barqūq (Mamlūk), 206n76
 Zanāta, 31, 101, 117, 153–54, 166
 Al-Zarkashī, 18, 64, 82, 120, 160–62, 168, 170
zāwiya, 71, 73, 74, 141–44, 146, 148, 157, 159
 Zīrids, 60, 76, 77, 153